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ABSTRACT 
 
This is a C ase Study of Somalian refugees living in Stockholm, Sweden. The study is 
based on interviews conducted with twenty-eight Somalis, ten Swedish officials and a 
focus group interview involving eight other Somalis. The thesis examines respondents’ 
views about their experiences and perceptions relating to the ‘integration’ of Somalis into 
Swedish society. The study explores how Somali refugees in Sweden orientate themselves 
to the prevailing Swedish system of integration. It also aims to identify some of the key 
factors that impinge upon their (Somalis) socioeconomic and cultural integration into 
Swedish society. The study reveals that there are a n umber of ‘integrative dilemmas’ 
confronting Somali refugees in Sweden. These include widespread unemployment; 
‘unsuitable’ education; residential segregation; and, institutional discrimination – notably, 
in the labour market and housing sectors. The study links the inability of Somalis to ‘settle 
in’ within Swedish society to their ‘divergence’ from the prevailing ‘norms’, particularly in 
relation to ‘culture’ and ‘religion’. These ‘differences’ reflect the intensity that Somalis 
attach to family bonds, patriarchal gender role/patterns and their adherence to Islam (the 
religion most Somalis adhere to). Although there have been a number of investigations 
concerning immigrant integration in Sweden, this is one of the few detailed in-depth 
qualitative studies on Somali refugees in Sweden. This research concludes with a number 
of recommendations and suggestions which may assist with the smooth transition of 
Somalis refugees into Swedish society.    
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 CHAPTER ONE 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This is a qualitative research that deals with the integration of adult Somali refugees (aged 18-
55) in the Metropolitan region of Stockholm in Sweden. Integration here denotes the process 
of interaction between Somali refugees and ‘native’ Sweden (to be referred herein as 
‘mainstream Swedish society’). It is about the ‘qualitative’ ‘participation’ of the former in the 
socio-economic and political spheres of societal life in Sweden (see Diaz, 1993:7).    
 
This research is based on interviews conducted with twenty-eight Somalis (consisting of 
nineteen men and nine-women), ten Swedish officials (seven at local municipal level and three 
at national level) and a focus group interview involving eight Somalis (whom the researcher 
believed were knowledgeable about the current situation of Somalis in Sweden). The research 
engages with and draws from the respondents’ accounts about their experiences, perceptions, 
understandings, interpretations, and meanings regarding the integration of Somalis in Sweden. 
It relies partly on the trajectories of individual Somali research respondents. Most of these 
respondents have spent more than a decade and half in Sweden, at the time the interviews 
were conducted. Nonetheless, this research is not autobiographical – and will not present those 
trajectories on an individual-by-individual case. Rather it uses the personal information 
solicited from the respondents to gauge the current situation of Somalis and the challenges 
they face in their adoptive country, Sweden. 
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1.1 The Purpose of the Research  
 
The overall purpose of this research is to explore how Somali refugees in Sweden orientate 
themselves to the prevailing Swedish system of integration, and to find out those factors that 
impinge upon their (Somalis) integration into mainstream Swedish society.  
 
1.2 The Research Questions 
 
The thesis’ main research question and two sub-questions flow directly from the stated aim of 
this research. The main research question is: How do Somali refugees in Sweden orientate 
themselves to the prevailing Swedish system of integration? The sub-questions are: (a) what 
factors impinge upon the integration of Somalis in Sweden? And, (b) how do cultural factors 
intrinsic to Somalis in Sweden inhibit their integration into mainstream Swedish Society? The 
answers to these questions are summarized in the Conclusion Chapter of this research. 
 
1.3 Raising the Issues 
 
There are about 30000 (unofficial estimates) Somalis in Sweden. The official estimate puts 
them at just over 25000 in 2009 (SCB, 2009). In terms of demographics, Somalis are regarded 
as ‘a young group’ in Sweden, where ‘54 % are under 30 years of age, only 19 % are over 40 
years, and, only 0.1% are older than 65 ( Wallin & Ahlström, 2010:358). The geographical 
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distribution of Somalis across the country is hugely uneven. However, the majority of Somalis 
in Sweden live in the three metropolitan regions of Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö (Wallin, 
2009:18). In Stockholm the majority of Somalis live in City’s northern suburbs of Rinkeby 
and Tensta (see Appendix 2). 
 
The majority of Somalis came to Sweden from the early 1990s onwards as refugees. The main 
trigger for their exodus was the civil war in Somalia which broke out in the late 1980s. The 
civil war led to the overthrow of the late Siad Barre’s regime in January 1991, and, 
subsequently to the collapse of central government in Somalia. Other reasons that led to 
Somalis to immigrate into Sweden include family reunion, the prospects of finding work and 
better education, and, pressures from peers and family.  
 
Arguably, the easiest part for Somalis has been the migration into Sweden – a country which 
until recently had a more or less open borders for those seeking refuge from persecution and 
socioeconomic hardships worldwide. The harder part for Somalis, however, has been their 
integration into a society that was, in many respect, very different from theirs, ethnically, 
socially, economically, politically, culturally and ‘religiously’ (taking ‘Swedish secularism’ as 
a form of ‘religion’). It is this variance from the prevailing socio-economic and cultural 
standards of ‘native’ Swedes (i.e., the majority group) that presents the main ‘integrative 
dilemmas’ relating to the integration of Somalis, and to which a great deal of focus in this 
research is based upon. This research has identified five main ‘integrative’ dilemmas relating 
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to the integration of Somali integration in the following spheres. They include: (1) 
employment (labour market) and education, (2) housing, (3) institutional forms of 
discrimination, (4) culture and religion, and, (5) gender patterns and roles.   
 
As noted above, Somalis in Sweden are socially, economically and culturally excluded from 
mainstream society. First, they suffer from widespread long-term unemployment. Indeed, the 
performance of Somalis in the Swedish labour market has characteristically been low. Studies 
in 1999 and 2003 have shown that only approximately 23-27 % of Somalis were engaged in 
some form of economic activity, e.g., education, training programmes, employment, etc, in 
Sweden (Invandrarverket, 1999; Carlson, 2006). The situation may have slightly improved in 
recent years. Nonetheless, for many Somalis unemployment has become somewhat quasi-
permanent and a vicious circle from which they find it difficult to break. In Swedish official 
and media circles, ‘mass unemployment’ is often evoked when referring to the lack of labour 
market integration among Somalis. In education, which is inextricably linked to the labour 
market, the performance of Somalis has equally been uninspiring. Many Somalis are ‘poorly’ 
or ‘unsuitably’ educated and lack appropriate skills to improve their position in the Swedish 
labour market.   
 
Secondly, Somalis predominantly live in segregated urban suburbs. In Stockholm, the majority 
of Somalis live in Tensta and Rinkeby – two segregated suburbs – where immigrants 
constitute 90% and 86% of the inhabitants respectively (USK, 2008; USKa, 2008). Living in 
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these areas entails a number of challenges, notably, the lack of connectivity with the host 
population, unemployment, poor services in comparison to other suburbs, high staff turnover 
in vital service areas (e.g., education, health, social services, etc); as well as, perceived high 
crime rates. Other problems include relative poverty and overcrowding.     
 
Thirdly, Somalis suffer from institutional forms of discrimination in society (cf. 
Invandrarverket, 1999). This occurs in many spheres. Nonetheless, the focus on institutional 
discrimination in this research is limited to that which is embedded in the Swedish labour 
market and housing. In this research, institutional discrimination in the labour market was 
most pertinent in the recruitment processes of employing organisations. This was identified as 
a major concern for Somalis since gaining a foothold in the labour market was a main target 
for many Somalis, given their unemployment. It was at this ‘entry point’ where ‘gatekeepers’ 
(recruiters) were perceived, by a n umber of respondents, to be most effective in their 
discrimination against Somalis. In housing, Somalis (like other immigrant applicants) also felt 
they were bypassed on the waiting-list/queue-system in favour of ‘native’ applicants, by 
housing agents. The ‘steering’ of immigrants into immigrant dominated suburbs and away 
from the less segregated suburbs of Stockholm was one of the striking examples of how 
institutional discrimination in housing often afflicted Somalis.   
 
Fourthly, the inability of Somalis to integrate into mainstream Swedish society is mainly 
linked to their ‘divergence’ from the prevailing cultural standards in Sweden. ‘Excessive’ 
6 
 
divergence in culture and ‘religion’ (taking Swedish secularism’ as a form of ‘religion’) 
between Somalis and ‘native’ Swedes is bound to create frictions that adversely impacts on the 
integration of the former with the latter. When it c omes to culture, the main difference 
revolves round the intensity Somalis and ‘native’ Swedes attach to family bonds. The role 
‘native’ Swedes attach to the ‘family’ is less intense in comparison with Somalis; hence, the 
family is less ‘constraining’ among Swedes. Somalis, on the other hand, are very loyal to their 
clan families, making the goals of the groups a priority over individual goals.  
 
Moreover, Somalis subscribed to Islam, a r eligion that is seen as a ‘threat’ to Swedish 
secularism (which is fiercely secular). Indeed, Islam is a major source of contention that has 
great implications for the integration of Somalis and Sweden. In particular, the lack of 
demarcation between Somali cultural practices (equated to state) and Islam (religion) on one 
hand, and the apparent relative deep degree of religiosity among Somalis in the backdrop of a 
highly secular Swedish environment, on the other, were endorsed as problematic by t he 
overwhelming majority of respondents in this research.  
 
Furthermore, another ‘dilemma’ that confronts Somalis in Sweden is how to align their 
‘divergent’ patriarchal gender patterns to prevailing socio-cultural standards and norms in 
Sweden. This occurs in a country and society that is regarded as one of the least gendered 
societies in the world; where the participation of women in economic activities (employment, 
education, etc) is rated as among the highest in the world; and, where socialisation processes 
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in the family and educational institutions (from pre-schooling onwards) are geared towards the 
eradication of patriarchy in society. 
 
1.4 The Outline of this Research 
 
The thesis consists of ten chapters. Chapter One provided the introduction and highlighted the 
aims of the research, the research questions and raised the main ‘integrative dilemmas’ 
confronting Somalis in Sweden. Chapter Two introduces and expounds on t he term 
integration. Integration is looked at both as a concept and a mode of integration (i.e., 
assimilation and multiculturalism). Assimilation and multiculturalism, as modes of integration, 
form the theoretical basis for explaining and predicting the integration of minorities (or 
immigrants) into society. The assimilationist approach stipulates that, for minorities to 
‘integrate’, they have to adopt the host culture. The multiculturalist approach holds that people 
can and should integrate by participating in all spheres of societal life (e.g., social, economic, 
political, including culture), without necessarily abandoning their original culture, in favour of 
the host community’s. The chapter concludes by explaining the rationale for choosing these 
two ‘theoretical model’ in this research.  
 
Chapter Three maps Swedish immigration and integration policies. It deals with immigration 
from a historical perspective: ‘from emigration to immigration’; and ‘from immigration to 
integration’. The chapter shows how these two policies evolved over time. It reveals that both 
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were incremental and subject to revisions, alternating in the case of immigration, from free 
migration to tightening controls. With regard to integration, the policy evolved from being a 
vague, generous and ambitious policy at first but successively transformed to become a more 
reality-based policy. These alterations were often influenced by t he prevailing economic 
situation and political atmosphere in the country. Moreover, the chapter outlines the objectives 
of Swedish integration policy and the programmes adopted in Sweden to operationalise the 
stated goals of this policy. The chapter concludes by highlighting some of the recent changes 
occurring both to immigration and integration policies in Sweden.  
 
Chapter Four provides the methodological framework of the research. It is divided into two 
sections. The first section deals with the procedures followed in conducting the research. It 
focuses on the choice of qualitative research methodology, methods, sampling strategy and the 
data collection processes involved, including the issue of access. The impact of the 
researcher’s identity/biography on the research (reflexivity) is also reflected upon. The second 
section deals with the steps taken to analyse the research, i.e., transcription, familiarisation and 
coding of the research data. It also stipulates the analytic approach employed (thematic 
analysis), and the rationale for its choice in this research.    
 
Chapter Five deals with the importance of employment (labour market participation) and 
education in the integration process of Somalis. It describes how ‘unemployment’ rather than 
‘employment’ dominates the discourse and reality relating to Somali refugees in Sweden. It 
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highlights ‘unsuitable education’ and the ‘perceived’ prevalence of ‘illiteracy’ among Somalis 
in Sweden. The chapter also illuminates the ‘emergent’ perception of how Somalis are said to 
have failed to ‘make greater use’ of the educational opportunities available to them in Sweden.     
 
Chapter Six gives an outline of the housing situation of Somalis in Stockholm, which is 
primarily a pattern of residential segregation from mainstream society. The chapter begins 
with a brief definition of housing/residential segregation, followed by a brief discussion on the 
dimensions and types of residential segregation. The bulk of this chapter discusses the causes, 
maintenance and perpetuation of residential segregation between Somalis and ‘native’ 
Swedes, viz.: ‘personal preference’ (of wanting to live in close proximity with one another), 
‘socio-economic’ factors (e.g., unemployment, low education, low income, etc), and 
‘unintended’ consequences from policy changes.   
 
Chapter Seven highlights institutional forms of discrimination in Swedish labour market and 
housing. Within the context of Swedish labour market relation, institutionalised forms of 
discrimination occur in workplaces. However, it is the kind of discrimination embedded in the 
employment screening procedures of employing organisations in Sweden that presents the 
greatest challenge to Somalis, and hence, it’s pre-eminence in this chapter. With respect to 
housing, the chapter underscores the role of housing corporations and agents as ‘gatekeepers’ 
when allocating accommodation to immigrants/refugees like Somalis.  
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Chapter Eight deals with cultural and ‘religions’ differences between Somalis and ‘native’ 
Swedes. With regard to culture, the main ‘differences’ between the two stem largely from the 
intensity individuals attach to the role of the ‘family’. With respect to religion, the chapter 
focuses on the tensions between Islam (a religion Somalis subscribe to) and Swedish 
secularism, particularly as pertains to the public domain. Islam is perceived as a ‘threat’ to the 
Swedish way of life, hence, a major source of contention which in turn has enormous 
implication for the integration of Somalis in Sweden.   
 
Chapter Nine identifies ‘differences’ in gender relations patterns between Somali and ‘native’ 
Swedes. Gender equality dominates gender patterns among Swedes, whilst patriarchy defines 
spousal relationships among Somalis. Patriarchy amounts to an ‘excessive’ deviation from the 
normative gender relation standards in Sweden, not least because Sweden is one of the least 
gendered societies in the world – hence, the consternation with patriarchy in society. The 
chapter also reveals evidence that suggests Somalis in Sweden are beginning to ‘renegotiate’ 
the patriarchy inherent in their culture. This renegotiation is made possible due to the 
influences from a proactive social welfare system (that promotes gender equality through its 
diverse policy initiatives) and a society (i.e., Swedish) with different normative practices, 
expectations and attitudes with regard to gender issues.    
 
Chapter Ten brings together the main themes raised in this research. The themes outlined in 
this chapter are discussed under various sub-titles organised around specific research 
questions. The chapter also provides a number of policy recommendations relating to 
11 
 
immigrant integration, and in particular, as they pertain to Somalis immigrants in Sweden. A 
brief account of how this research has contributed to existing knowledge and suggestions 
about ways forward with regard to future research is also discussed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
2 THE ‘CONCEPT’ AND ‘MODELS’, OF INTEGRATION 
 
This chapter explores the concept and models of integration. The chapter attempts to answer 
the following questions. What is integration? And, how does integration through assimilation 
differ from integration through multiculturalism? It b egins by de fining the concept of 
integration, by acknowledging its contested nature. It then moves on to discuss its types, as 
well as its applicability in the Swedish context.  
 
The models of integration explored are assimilation and multiculturalism. These models form 
the theoretical basis for explaining and predicting the integration of immigrants (or minorities) 
in society. The assimilationist approach stipulates that, for immigrants/minorities to 
‘integrate’, they have to adopt the host society’s culture. The Multiculturalist approach, on the 
other hand, holds that people can integrate by participating in all spheres of societal life (e.g., 
social, economic, political, including culture), without the need to abandon their original 
culture, in favour of the host community’s culture.  
 
Nonetheless, the analysis of this research has found that whilst these two options (integration 
through assimilation or through multiculturalism) might be the path chosen for many 
immigrants (present or subsequent generations) to integrate into society, there is the possibility 
for a third ‘option’, i.e., that of ‘rejecting’ both. That means some individuals or groups may 
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opt consciously not to integrate into mainstream society at all (either through assimilation or 
multiculturalism). When it c omes to Somalis in Sweden, this latter ‘option’ applies to the 
‘resisters’, – a group that stands in stark contrast to the ‘pragmatists’ who seem to integrate in 
accordance with the goals of Swedish multiculturalim. This will be discussed more detailed in 
Chapter Ten.    
 
2.1 What is Integration? 
 
The literal definition of integration – which is often in line with the assimilationist approach – 
views integration as “‘ a process of making the ‘whole’, but also one that has an ‘added’ 
connotation in which the ‘whole’ is formed ‘from constituent parts’” (Van Kooten, 1959:2). In 
this context the ‘whole’ would stand for the wider Swedish society (also referred to herein as 
‘native’ Swedes) whilst the ‘constitute parts’ stands for minorities (e.g., Somalis).  
 
Contemporary definitions of integration (in line with the multiculturalist approach) view 
integration as a process of interaction between the migrant and host population. As the 
European Council on R efugees and Exiles (ECRE, 2005:14) comprehensively puts it, 
integration is a ‘ process of change’ which is ‘dynamic’, ‘two-way’, ‘long term’ and ‘multi-
dimensional’. Integration is ‘two-way’ in the sense that ‘it places demand’ on both immigrants 
and the host society; and ‘long term’, because it is a process that starts when the immigrant 
first ‘arrives’ into the country, and, continues even after the immigrant has ‘become an active 
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member of society from a legal, socioeconomic and cultural perspective’ (ECRE, 2005:14). 
Integration is ‘multi-dimensional’ because ‘it relates both to the conditions for and actual 
participation in all aspects’ of societal life’ be it ‘cultural’, ‘socio-economic’, ‘political’, etc 
(ECRE, 2005:14). It a lso relates to the immigrant’s ‘own perceptions’ regarding his his/her 
membership and acceptance by the society (ECRC, 2005:14). 
 
2.1.1 Integration: An Elusive Concept 
 
Integration is not as straightforward concept since people often interpret it differently 
(Lemaitre, 2007:10). The reason is because integration often covers a very wide area, ranging 
from assimilation to multiculturalism (c.f. Vermeulen and Penninx, 2000:3). Assimilation 
denotes the adoption of the majority’s culture by minorities. Multiculturalism allows 
minorities to maintain their original cultures. Indeed, whilst some people view integration as a 
process of assimilation, others view it a s neither multiculturalistic nor assimilationist, but 
‘something in between’ (Vermeulen and Penninx, 2000:3). 
  
Van Kooten (1959:45), for example, places integration somewhere in-between ‘isolation’ and 
‘assimilation’, although in ‘reality’, he says, it is much closer to the latter than the former (see 
Figure 2.1). Lemaitre (2007), on the other hand, uses a ‘spectrum’ (see Figure 2.2) to clarify 
his version of integration. Lemaitre (2007:10) notes, ‘at one end of the spectrum is the notion 
of an economic/social convergence between the immigrant and native population’ with 
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regards to employment, income, education, housing, political participation, etc., and, ‘at the 
other end is the much broader notion of integration as assimilation’, which implies conforming 
to the host country’s cultural standards, ‘values’ and ‘beliefs’.    
 
The elusiveness of integration is further compounded by the fact that its ‘abstract’ meaning 
(e.g., tolerance to other cultures, etc) often conceals a ‘subtext’ that ‘remains intolerant to 
cultural specificities deemed outside the mainstream’ (Li, 2003:3). To Li (2003:7), this subtext 
points to the vitality of ‘shared values’ and ‘compliance’ to host society’s ‘standard of life’ as 
being ‘essential to successful integration’ (cf. Lemaitre, 2007:10). Indeed, according to Li 
(2003:12), ‘official discourse constructs a language of integration’ that ‘pays nominal service 
to diversity and multiculturalism’, nonetheless, it a lso ‘warns against the peril of excessive 
diversity’ from the host society. 
 
Figure 2.1: Integration as ‘in-between’ ‘Isolation’ and ‘Assimilation’ 
 
 
Source: Adopted from Van Kooten’s descriptions (1959: 45-54). 
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Figure 2.2: A Spectrum to Illustrate what Integration Entails 
 
 
 
Source: Adopted from Lemaitre’s description (2007:10). 
 
It is no c oincidence, therefore, that many academic and policy discourses point to the 
elusiveness of the term integration. Indeed, to many writers the term integration embodies 
confusion (Gordon, 1964), incoherence (Ager and Strang, 2008), wideness, ambiguity and 
imprecision (Grillo, 1998), ‘treacherousness’ (Banton, 2001:151-2), and ‘looseness’ (Jenkins 
(1967:267, as cited in Grillo, 1998:177). This is summed up in Ager and Strang (2008:166), 
who argue that this ‘widely differing literature’ of the term integration, and its usage, is a 
‘threat’ to the ‘development’ of both ‘coherent policy’ and ‘productive public debate’, on the 
subject’. Table 2.1 illuminates some of the concerns which are associated with integration (its 
elusiveness, lack of straightforwardness, etc). 
 
 
 
 
 
Socio-economic  
convergence  
Cultural 
Convergence 
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Table 2.1 Selected Quotes to Highlight the Elusiveness of the term Integration 
 
Source: Developed as part of this study. Courtesy: To the various authors quoted. 
 
Author Concern on Elusiveness of the Term, Integration  
Gordon (1964:84) Integration is frequently embedded in a gilded form of rhetoric 
that is not calculated to facilitate clarity or precise analytical 
distinctions. In some cases one must even make one’s own guess 
as to whether the discussant is talking about “ideal goal” or 
historical process which has already occurred, or both. 
Grillo (1998: 176-7) Through much of the argument run terms such as ‘assimilation’, 
‘integration’, ‘multiculturalism’, ‘pluralism’, and ‘separation’. 
All are ambiguous, and sometimes used interchangeably: 
‘integration’ for ‘assimilation’, ‘multiculturalism’ or ‘pluralism’ 
for ‘integration’, ‘separatism’ for ‘pluralism’: the discourse is not 
noted for its precision. 
Banton (2001:151-2) It is a treacherous concept, resting on a mathematical metaphor, 
which assumes that the social processes of group interaction can 
be likened to the mathematical processes of making up a whole 
number, into which the fractions are being combined. A person 
can be well integrated into a local group without being so well 
integrated into a n ational society because local groups are 
sometimes in conflict with national societies. Until there are 
satisfactory ways of measuring the degrees to which members of 
ethnic majorities are integrated into their national societies it will 
not be possible to measure the integration of members of ethnic 
minorities. 
Jenkins (1967: 267, as 
cited in Grillo, 
1998:177) 
Integration is perhaps a rather loose word. I do not  regard it as 
meaning the loss, by immigrants of their own national 
characteristics and culture. I do not think we need in this country 
a ‘melting pot’, which will turn everybody out a common mould, 
as one of a ser ies of carbon copies of someone’s misplaced 
vision of the stereotyped Englishman … I define integration, 
therefore, not as a f lattering process of assimilation but as equal 
opportunity, coupled with cultural diversity, in an atmosphere of 
mutual tolerance. 
Ager and Strang 
(2008:166) 
Both coherent policy development and productive public debates 
are threatened because the concept of integration is used with 
widely differing narrative. 
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2.1.2 The Swedish Context 
 
In the Swedish context, integration is a ‘notion’ that ‘replaced assimilation’ in the mid 1970s, 
and ‘indicates’ a ‘ greater degree of tolerance and respect for other cultures in society’ 
(Vermeulen and Penninx, 2000:2; Li, 2003). Integration, which occurs within Swedish 
‘multicultural project’, not only allows ethnic minorities to ‘maintain’ their cultural practices 
and religious beliefs, but it also strongly encourages them to engage fully in the socio-
economical and political spheres of the society (cf. Diaz, 1993:1; Grillo, 1998:178; Cashmore, 
1994:148 cited in Vermeulen and Penninx, 2000:3). Nonetheless, there is a caveat. The 
freedom to maintain cultural and religious uniqueness does not envisage a situation where 
ethnic minorities insulate themselves from the wider Swedish society. On the contrary, ethnic 
minorities are expected to ‘pledge’ their loyalty (though not explicitly stated) to their new 
society; and, to share basic values with all citizens in the country (cf. Li, 2003; Van Kooten, 
1959).  
 
In Sweden, the term integration is multifaceted. Integration is a key ‘policy objective’ in the 
areas of refugee, immigration, resettlement, and community cohesion (cf. Ager and Strang, 
2008; Ager et al., 2004; Li, 2003). It is a strategy adopted by governments to facilitate the 
smooth transition of newcomers. It is a ‘desirable outcome’ by which newcomers become part 
of the mainstream society (Li, 2003:3). It is also seen as a measure by which one can ‘gauge’ 
the ‘success and failures’ of that ‘outcome’, as well the ‘efficacy’ of a country’s immigration 
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and integration policies (Li, 2003:3; see Ager et al., 2004; Phillimore and Goodson, 2008; 
Muttarak, 2004; see Bauböck, 1994:5). 
 
2.1.3 Types of Integration  
 
Integration is multidimensional: it is psychological, legal and political, socio-economical and 
cultural. Once an individual (or a group) attains all these levels of integration, it is  arguable 
then to talk of that individual (or group) as having successfully integrated into society. We 
examine each of these levels or types of integration sequentially.  
 
2.1.3.1 Psychological Integration 
 
‘Acceptance’ by the host community and the ‘willingness’ of the newcomer to become 
incorporated into the host community (Weimer, 1996:48); and, the feeling of security and 
stability on the part of the newcomers in the new environment (see Ager and Strang, 2008), all 
go a long way in helping individuals become integrated psychologically into mainstream 
society. The acceptance accorded to immigrants by the host society relates often to whether 
they are viewed as ‘ temporary residents’ or as p ermanent settlers (Weimer, 1996:49). The 
willingness of the newcomer to become part of society has psychological dividends in the 
sense that the newcomers becomes motivated to learn the host society’s language, make 
friends with members of the host society and identify with his/her adoptive country. As 
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Weimer (1996:49) sums up, integration is not likely, if the immigrant is viewed as a 
‘temporary resident’, and or, if the migrant is not willing ‘to accept membership, both in the 
legal sense and by adopting a new identity’. Thus the attitudes of migrants towards the host 
community and vice versa are important factors that facilitate the ‘psychological’ integration 
of immigrants into mainstream society.   
 
Psychological integration is often affected by the intentions of the newcomers in relation to 
whether or not they wish to settle in the country permanently, or return to their countries of 
origin; or whether they are temporary sojourners who want to relocate to a third country. 
Again, as Weimer (1996:49) points out, integration into mainstream society is problematic if 
people wish to be in a country temporarily since they would have no need ‘to go through the 
process of redefining their identity’, which is seen as central to immigrant incorporation.  
 
I argue psychological integration is both an initial step, as well, as a concurring one (in 
relation to other types of integrations) as individuals endeavour to incorporate themselves into 
mainstream society. 
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2.1.3.2 Legal and Political Integration 
 
For a society to take the first step to facilitate integration, it has to put in place policies that 
give immigrants and their children the same legal status as that of the native population 
(Weiner, 1996). One such first step might be to grant ‘resident’ newcomers permanent 
residency status (Bauböck, 1994: Engbersen, 2003). The second step could involve granting 
citizenship rights to immigrants and their children (Ager & Strang, 2008; Weimer, 1996). 
Citizenship is a contract between the individual and the state. It is defined as a ‘legal category 
that introduces a set of rights and obligations between the individual and the state’ (Vah & 
Lusic-Hacin, 2008:10). The ‘obligations’ are somewhat straightforward and are often evoked 
to mean, ‘the duty’ to pay taxes, ‘completing compulsory education’, ‘obeying the law of the 
land’, and so on (Bloemraad, et al., 2008:154).  
 
Citizenship ensures that all citizens, irrespective of gender, ethnicity, cultural or religious 
affiliation, gain access t o such basic rights as social welfare including health, employment, 
housing and education (Strang & Ager, 2010). It contributes to their ‘inclusion’ and 
‘participation’ in societal affairs (Strang & Ager, 2010:592; see Bauböck, 1994; Engbersen, 
2003). As Ager and Strang (2008:166) argue, the granting of ‘citizenship rights’ is the 
foundation for integrating immigrants.  
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There are two main dimensions of citizenship. The first, as alluded to, involves the granting of 
legal status and rights to those of the native population (Weimer, 1996; Bloemraad, et al., 
2008:154; Strang & Ager, 2010). Nonetheless, the mere fact of obtaining citizenship (legal 
and political integration) does not ensure that an individual or a group is fully integrated. 
However, it does provide the individual (or the group) a sense of stability and security 
necessary for other types of integration, namely, socio-economic- and cultural integration to 
occur. As Bauböck (1994:29) confirms, access t o citizenship rights is ‘a necessary 
precondition’ for any form of stable integration in a democratic society. 
 
The second factor, which is more crucial, is the dimension that associates citizenship with 
‘belongingness’ (Bloemraad, et al., 2008:154). This entails a deeper meaning of citizenship 
which calls to mind such notions as shared values, identity and nationhood (see Strang & 
Ager, 2010). This phase carries with it a strong feeling of emotional attachment of being part 
of that society (Bloemraad, et al., 2008:154). McPherson (2010:546) equates ‘belongingness’ 
to the acquisition of the distinctive national and cultural identity of the host society by 
newcomers. This includes shared identify, values and a sense of nationhood – i.e., a “sense of 
‘place’ and ‘home’” (Castle, et al., 2002:413). ‘Belongingness’ results in a ‘deeper 
commitment’ by the individual to his society/community , and, vice versa. The individual feels 
there is a mutual acceptance and acts accordingly.  As Strang & Ager (2010:594) point out, ‘to 
belong to a nation’ shapes one’s understanding of his/her ‘own integration’. Acceptance or a 
higher degree of ‘wantedness’ makes individuals want to continue their association in a given 
society (Strang & Ager, 2010:594). 
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2.1.3.3 Socio-economic Integration 
 
Ager and Strang (2008:169) identified employment, housing and education (to which they 
called ‘makers and means’ of integration) as important areas in which immigrants have to 
perform favourably for them to integrate successfully into mainstream society. Ager et al., 
(2004) argued that for immigrants to become integrated, they need to achieve ‘outcomes’ 
within employment, housing and education that are, or equivalent to those, achieved by 
members of the host community. This resonates with Bauböck (1994:40) who provides a 
further breakdown of employment, housing and education as important indicators of 
immigrants’ social-economic (structural) integration in society. To Bauböck (1994:40), 
employment encompasses such measures as participation (‘employment’) rates in the labour 
market, the ‘proportion of skilled labour’, ‘percentage’ of minority in ‘self-employment and 
professions’; housing is dealt with in relation to ‘the concentration and segregation of groups 
across urban districts’, the ‘quality of housing’, ‘percentage of house ownership’, etc; whilst, 
education, refers to the ‘distribution over type of schools’, ‘participation in preschool’ 
education, ‘educational performance’, ‘adult education skills’, enrolment in colleges and 
universities, etc.  
 
Indeed, socio-economic integration ‘determines the position of immigrant groups’ in social 
and economic life of the receiving country (Bauböck, 1994:38; Keefe and Padilla, 1987:18; 
Engbersen, 2003:61). According to Bauböck (1994:38), ‘social position’ in society is 
hierarchal. The higher a group occupies in that hierarchy, ‘the higher its level of structural 
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integration’. Groups represented in the top strata of a hierarchy have a higher share of national 
‘income’, ‘professional prestige’, ‘education’, high status ‘residential areas’, etc (Bauböck, 
(1994:38). The group that performs poorly in these aforementioned indicators would find itself 
in the bottom strata or stratum of that hierarchal arrangement. Many of its members would 
likely be unemployed or likely to underperform educationally attainments, become spatially 
segregated, and endure prejudice and discrimination.  
 
2.1.3.4 Cultural Integration 
 
Cultural integration is often equated with assimilation (Bauböck; 1994:41) and refers to the 
adoption by a minority of the host or majority’s culture (Van Kooten, 1959; Gordan, 1964; 
Bauböck, 1994). It entails the acquisition by immigrants of the majority society’s language, 
social rituals, memories, sentiments and attitudes (see Gordon, 1964). Cultural integration 
leads to the disappearance of cultural differences between immigrants and the majority 
members. It is also at this stage where structural barriers such as discrimination are said to 
disappear (Gordon, 1964). Cultural integration occurs normally after several generations, with 
many writers putting it at or after the third generation (see Van Kooten, 1959).  
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2.2 Towards Theoretical Models   
 
This section explores the models of integration, i.e., assimilation and multiculturalism. The 
assimilationist approach stipulates that, for minorities to ‘integrate’, they have to adopt the 
host’s culture. The Multiculturalist approach, on the other hand, holds that people can 
integrate by participating in all spheres of societal life (e.g., social, economic, political, 
including culture), without the need to abandon their original culture, in favour of the host 
community. These theoretical models can also be used to predict how subsequent immigrant 
generations are likely to integrate into society. After all, integration is intergenerational, hence, 
the need to look beyond first generation immigrants in Sweden. 
 
These models are deployed in this research for a n umber of reasons. First they provide the 
theoretical basis for explaining and predicting the integration of minorities (or immigrants) in 
society. Second, they provide the ‘theoretical language’ or ‘concepts’ needed to explain the 
integration – the phenomenon under investigation (cf. Blaikie, 2000). Third, they have a 
relationship with the overall topic under investigation (i.e., ‘integration’). 
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2.2.1 The Assimilationist Approach 
 
This sub-section leans heavily on the work of Milton Gordon (1964) on assimilation. Gordon’s 
work on assimilation still stands as a classical text to which many writers and researchers on 
immigration refer. As Alba & Nee (2003:23) affirm, ‘Gordon’s singular contribution was to 
set down a sy nthesis that elaborated a multidimensional concept of assimilation’. Muttarak 
(2004) also holds that ‘Gordon’s (1964) sub-processes of assimilation’, continue to act as 
benchmarks when investigating the degree to which ethnic minorities assimilate into the host 
society (see below).  
 
Assimilation is both a process and a policy strategy. As a process, assimilation occurs when 
two groups, often minority and majority groups, belonging to ‘different racial and cultural 
backgrounds’ come into ‘continuous first-hand contact with one another’ – with subsequent 
‘changes’ occurring in the original ‘cultural patterns’ and ‘behaviour’ of the former group (see 
Redfield, et. al, 1936 (as cited in Gordon, 1964:62; Alba & Nee, 2003:38).  I t refers to the 
‘adoption’ by the minority of the host or majority’s culture or the ‘process’ leading to this 
adoption (see Park & Burgess, 1921:735; and, Rose, 1956:557-8, as cited in Gordon, 1964:62-
66). It entails a ‘process of interpenetration, whereby, minorities acquire’ not only the 
‘language and social rituals of the native community’, but also the ‘memories, sentiments, and 
attitudes of native persons’ (Park & B urgess (1921:735, as cited in Gordon, 1964:62). 
Assimilation is gradual but when it occurs, it results in the ‘disappearance’ of cultural 
differences between groups (Alba & Nee, 2003:19; Gordon, 1964). The point at which 
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divergent ethnic groups ‘converge’ is often the ‘end point’, the point at which assimilation is 
achieved (Gordon, 1964). Once assimilation occurs, it becomes ‘irreversible’ (Jiménez, 
2010:10; Gordon, 1964; see Alba & Nee, 2003:65). 
 
Assimilation is also a policy approach pursued by some governments in order to ‘incorporate’ 
their minorities into society. Here assimilation is viewed as a trajectory on which minority 
groups are expected to move, and where convergence and cultural alignment with the host 
community is encouraged. Governments pursuing this strategy accord the host culture an 
‘exclusive’ position’ in society. The host culture becomes the ‘master cultural mould’ that 
provides not only the reference point for immigrants and their children to emulate but also the 
opportunity with which they ‘can measure their relative degree of adjustment’ to the 
prevailing norms and values of the dominant group in society (Gordon, 1964:72).    
 
2.2.1.1 The Sub-processes of Assimilation  
  
Assimilation is not only gradual but also ‘incremental’ and ‘cumulative’ (Alba & N ee, 
2003:38). It is often a matter of degree since no two persons, or groups may assimilate exactly 
in the same way. Gordon’s (1964) synthesis of assimilation accounts for the above by arguing 
that assimilation occurs in stages. According to Gordon (1964), each stage or sub-process 
takes place in varying degrees – the culmination of which is the disappearance of differences 
between ethnic minority or group(s) and the host community concerned. Gordon’s (1964) sub-
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processes of assimilation involved cultural, structural, marital, identificational, attitude 
receptional, behaviour receptional, and civic assimilation. Nonetheless, although Gordon 
wanted us to believe that assimilation occurred in stages or in sequential manner, the reality is 
that these sub-processes are often interwoven and inseparable and must thus be comprehended 
of as being only ideal-types. 
 
Cultural assimilation (or acculturation) is a so cial process that leads groups, with different 
cultures, achieve a common culture. Acculturation encompasses not only such items of culture 
as dress, cutlery, language, food, sports, arts, etc – which were relatively easy to appreciate 
and acquire – but also those less tangible items such as values, memories, sentiments, ideas 
and attitudes (Gordon, 1964). Cultural assimilation is ‘concerned’ with the total ‘adoption by 
minorities of the prevailing value orientation’ of the host society (Weller, 1974).   
 
Structural Assimilation is defined as the ‘social, economic, and political integration’ of an 
ethnic minority group into mainstream society (Keefe and Padilla, 1987:19). To Weller 
(1974:523), structural assimilation is realised when minorities achieve demographic and 
socioeconomic traits that are equivalent to those of the natives. Structural assimilation is often 
seen as both a precursor to, and, a consequence of cultural assimilation.   
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Marital assimilation is a process of ‘fusion’ of minorities ‘interbreeding’ and ‘intermarrying’ 
with members of the host society (Park & Burgess (1921:737, as cited in Gordon, 1964:63-4). 
Intermarriage is an important indicator of the degree of assimilation because it denotes the 
extent to which, (a) a minority group member is able to ‘mingle with the host society’s 
marriage market; (b) interaction across group boundaries exists; and (b) intimate link between 
social groups become binding (Muttarak, 2004:1). It is imperative, however, to note that 
ethnic minority groups have different patterns of intermarital relationship with the host 
community, since their experiences differ (see Muttarak, 2004).  
 
Marital assimilation is often a consequence of structural assimilation since the latter facilitates 
the entrance of minority groups into ‘the social cliques, clubs, and institutions of the host 
society at the primary group level’ (Gordon, 1964:80). Marital assimilation inevitably leads to 
a substantial amount of intermarriage between the two groups (Gordon, 1964; Bernard, 1980; 
Bigelow, 1980).  
 
Next in line, is identificational assimilation. Identificational assimilation occurs when a 
minority group loses its ethnic identity by identifying and becoming part of the wider host and 
core society (Gordon, 1964). Identificational assimilation in turn leads to attitudinal 
receptional assimilation and behavioural receptional assimilation (Gordon, 1964). Simply 
put, it is when a minority internalises the attitudes and behaviours of the core society, and 
aligns its attitudes and behaviour to the prevailing norms and values in the wider society, that 
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the host society is likely to respond favourably and accept that group as one of its own. It is 
further argued that whilst attitudinal receptional assimilation heralds the absence of prejudice 
in society, behavioural receptional assimilation leads to the absence of discrimination in 
society. Groups assimilating at this level thus face no pr ejudices and discrimination. As 
Gordon (1964) puts it, the descendants of the original minority group become 
indistinguishable from the host or core group. Hence, prejudices and discrimination cease to 
be a problem in society. Gordon (1964:62) states: 
Assimilation has not taken place, it is asserted, 
until the immigrant is able to function in the host 
community without encountering prejudiced 
attitudes or discriminatory behaviour.  
 
Civic assimilation takes place when assimilation has become complete ‘in all intrinsic as well 
as extrinsic cultural traits’ (Gordon, 1964:80; see Parekh, 2006:200). Intrinsic cultural traits’ 
include a group’s religious beliefs and practices – its ethical values, folk recreational values, 
literature, historical language, a sen se of common past, etc’ – and constitutes the vital 
ingredients of the group’s cultural heritage, and which are derived from that heritage (Gordon, 
1964:78-9; see Parekh, 2006). Extrinsic cultural traits encompass such aspects as the dress 
sense, patterns of emotional expression, as well as a group’s adjustment to its local 
environment, including the present one (Gordon, 1964:78-9; see Parekh, 2006). Also included 
in extrinsic cultural traits are class experiences and values since these are – in a real sense - 
external to the core of the group’s cultural heritage (see Gordon, 1964:78-9; see Parekh, 
2006). Indeed, when civic assimilation is achieved, ‘no value conflict on civic issues’ is likely 
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to arise between ‘the now dispersed descendants’ of the ethnic minority and members of the 
core society’ (Gordon, 1964:80). 
 
2.2.2 The Multiculturalist Approach  
 
The multiculturalist approach is proactive in that it attempts to create the conditions for 
achieving a ‘multiculturally constituted society’ (Parekh, 2006). Policies are adopted to 
incorporate minorities as equal members in society; improve their socioeconomic and political 
positions in society (Rydgren, 2004, Vertovec, 1998); and, to counter structural factors, e.g., 
discrimination, in society (see, Rydgren, 2004; Parekh, 2006; Vertovec, 1998).  
 
Multiculturalism is also about the politics of recognition. It i s adopted to accommodate the 
cultural and religious needs of minorities, with an aim to facilitate the ‘inclusion’ and 
‘adjustment’ of minorities in society (Modood, 2007:19; see Parekh, 2006, Barry, 2001, 
Kymlicka, 1998; Vertovec, 1998). It entails moving away from one cultural standard (as 
hitherto was the case) to an understanding and celebration of diversity (i.e., of ethnic groups, 
ideas and values) in society. It means allowing minorities to retain their cultures whilst at the 
same time exploring ways to accomplish a common culture based on commonalities.  
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Multiculturalism allows people to separate their relationships depending on w hether these 
relationships occur in public or private spheres (Rex, 1986, 1991; Vertovec, 1998). Public 
sphere involves shared laws, free enterprise, equal access to state institutions and provisions, 
etc. This is the kind of relationship that is bound to occur when people of different ethnicity 
meet at state or local institutions, colleges, in work places, etc. The private sphere, on the other 
hand, is left as a matter for, and between, individual citizens. Religion is, for example, a matter 
relegated to the private domain.  
 
Nonetheless, there are other writers like Parekh (2006:220) who argue that, cultures constantly 
encounter one another, both formally and informally (cf. public and private spheres above) in 
multicultural societies. Accordingly, in order to facilitate the emergence of a multiculturally 
constituted culture, both private and public realms need to encourage intercultural interaction 
(Parekh, 2006:222). To Parekh (2006:222), these two realms are inseparable since they 
‘deeply influence each other’.   
 
Two types of minorities are distinguished in the discourse of multiculturalism, viz.: ‘national 
minorities’ and ‘ethnic minorities’ (Kymlicka, 1995:10-11). National minorities are often 
‘self-autonomous’, ‘territorially concentrated’ and have ‘historically’ been ‘part’ of the wider 
society. Normally, they wish to ‘maintain themselves as distinct societies’ alongside the 
majority culture, and ‘demand’ various forms of ‘autonomy or self-government’ to ensure 
their ‘survival as distinct societies’ (Kymlicka, 1995:11). Examples of these societies include 
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the Sami of Sweden. Ethnic minorities, on the other hand, are a product of migration. They 
want to integrate into the larger society, become ‘accepted as full members’ of society – and 
do not wish to be ‘separate or distinct’, from the majority society (Kymlicka, 1995:11). In this 
research, we will limit our discussions to ethnic minorities since our target group, Somalis, fall 
under this category.   
 
2.2.2.1 Separate and Competing Domains 
 
Multiculturalism encompasses various competing domains.  Accordingly, to get a grip on this 
all important and encompassing concept, it is imperative to examine the issues that take centre 
stage in the discourse (of multiculturalism). The discourse on multiculturalism often dwells on 
the following: Multiculturalism as (a) a broad political ideology, (b) a set of policy initiative 
(aimed at enhancing the smooth transition and incorporation of minorities into the host 
society), and, (c) a strategy to restructure institutions, with the intent to create a 
‘multiculturally constituted society’ (see Parekh, 2006: Kymlicka, 1998; Vertovec, 1998).  
  
2.2.2.1.1 A broad Political Ideology 
 
Multiculturalism is an ideology that recognises diversity. It takes into consideration 
differences in attitudes, values, behaviours, languages and cultural identity (Ryder, et al., 
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2000:05; Kymlicka, 1995:14). It is an ideology that accepts, recognises and promotes such 
cultural and ethnic pluralism as a long-term feature of society.   
 
Multiculturalism emerged in the mid 1970s onwards as an  antithesis to the assimilationist 
approach to immigrant integration (Vertovec, 1998; Van Oudenhaven, et al., 2006). It was 
necessitated by the new realities that rendered assimilation both as untenable and 
undemocratic, given the increasing ethnic diverse in society, thanks to immigration. In 
particular, it was the ‘patronising imposition on minority people’ who wish to ‘maintain their 
cultural and ethnic integrity’ that was untenable and undemocratic (Alba & Nee, 2003:1). 
Above all, multiculturalism was in tune with the needs of postmodern society – a society that 
was increasingly characterised not only by diverse cultures, ideas and values but also one that 
was constantly and rapidly transforming, and where old certainties, e.g., familiar customs and 
traditions of doing things and conceiving the world no longer applied (see Giddens, 2001).  
 
Indeed, multiculturalism is recognised as a struggle or social movement which is located 
within a postmodernist paradigm (Vertovec, 1998; Giddens, 2001). It amounts to the 
‘deconstruction’ of the ‘old’ way of thinking, and ‘reconstruction’ of a ‘new’ one (Uris 
(1993:95, as cited in Watson 1995:61). Like postmodernism, it stands for a ‘new moral or 
truth relativism’ (Modood, 2007:7; Peréz-Torres, 1993:161), and recognise that society is 
highly pluralistic. Both postmodernism and multiculturalism argue that society can no longer 
be geared towards the maintenance and reproduction of a ‘homogeneous population’. It argues 
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for a more ‘participatory’ heterogeneous society where diversity of cultures, greater degree of 
equality and justice for all citizens irrespective of creed, religion, ethnicity or culture not only 
co-exist but are celebrated (Young, 1990:16-17, Giddens, 2001:674; Modood, 2007:7).   
  
Moreover, like postmodernism, multiculturalism rejects ‘grand’ or ‘metanarratives’ – i.e., ‘a 
system of thought that attempts to understand the social world within a single, all-
encompassing critique’ (Fritzpatrick, 2008; see Giddens, 2001:674, 293, 696); acknowledges 
the existence of a multiplicity of ‘ideas and values’ in society (Giddens, 2001:267; 696; Peréz-
Torres, 1993:161; see Vertovec, 1998; Watson, 1995); and, endorses the view that there is no 
one truth or single way of knowing. It acknowledges that people and societies ‘interact in a 
complex and non-lineal way’ not least because of their different ‘historical and cultural 
specificities’ (Lather (1991:21, as cited in Watson, 1995:61). 
 
In this paradigm, assimilation is seen to represent the old way of thinking, knowing, of 
comprehending truth, realities, etc. Assimilation represents only one truth, one way of 
knowing, one culture, one narrative and one ‘single set of rules that applies to all citizens’ – 
rules that were geared towards the ‘control and dominance’ of minorities in society (Barry, 
2001:300). In essence there was ‘certainty and predictability’ about assimilation (cf. Watson, 
1995; Giddens, 2001). In multiculturalism, by contrast, ‘everything’ is constantly in the ‘flux, 
transforming and doing so rapidly’ – it is an era that is characterised by ‘new risks and 
uncertainties’, one that stands in stark contrast to the ‘old familiar world’ which was ‘always 
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geared’ towards familiar ‘customs’, ‘traditions’, ‘established way of doing things’ and 
comprehending the world, among others (Giddens, 2001:680). Multiculturalism thus entails 
the deconstruction and negation of hitherto held conventions about ethnic minority cultures, 
and the way different cultures had to relate to one another (as minority and majority 
communities).  
 
2.2.2.1.2 Multiculturalism as a Set of Policies 
 
In part, multicultural policies were adopted as a response to obvious problems in society vis-à-
vis ethnic minorities in society. These included the difficulties of adapting, discrimination and 
other negative attitudes towards minorities, unequal power relationships between minorities 
and the majority group, and, the negative impact of immigration, especially, on areas where 
there were sizeable ethnic minority groups, e.g., in larger metropolitan areas, among others 
(Churchill, 1987; see Andersen & Solid, 2003). For the most part though, multiculturalism is 
about adopting a set of policies that are aimed at improving, and advancing, the 
socioeconomic and political positions (i.e., integration) of minorities in society (Rydgren, 
2004, Vertovec, 1998). These policies are also in part directed towards accommodating the 
cultural needs of minorities (Barry, 2001, Parekh, 2006, Kymlicka, 1998).  
 
Multicultural policy objectives relating to immigrant integration often concur with the 
objectives of the country’s integration policy (see Chapter Three). These include the 
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introduction of measures that facilitate the smooth transition and incorporation of minorities 
into society. In the case of Sweden, they include ‘introduction programmes’; labour market 
initiatives; anti-discrimination legislation to combat discrimination; and development 
initiatives in metropolitan areas to combat residential segregation (see Chapter Three). They 
also include policies that promote and achieve virtues such as social justice, equality, social 
cohesion, harmony, etc, in society.   
 
In particular, multicultural policies emphasise extending equal opportunities and rights to all 
citizens. According to Parekh (2006:211), equal opportunities enable ‘all citizens to acquire 
the capabilities and skills needed to function’, as well as, ‘to pursue self-chosen goals equally 
and effectively’. It is also anticipated that, through equal opportunity measures, minorities 
would ‘overcome’ some of the ‘disadvantages’ that are ‘derived from cultural differences’ 
with the host society (Parekh, 2006:211).  
 
Another emphasis of multiculturalism has been how to counter structural factors that may 
inhibit the advancement of minorities, e.g., discrimination, disadvantage and exclusion (see 
Vertovec, 1998; Rydgren, 2004; Parekh, 2006). As Modood (2007:19) confirms, 
multiculturalism aims to ‘eliminate visible instances’ of ‘negative stereotyping’ and 
‘discriminatory-type actions’ that hinder the inclusion and adjustment of minorities in society 
(see Churchill, 1987, Rydgren, 2004).   
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2.2.2.1.3 Institutional Restructuring 
 
A great deal of multicultural policies aims at restructuring institutions (Parekh, 2006; 
Kymlicka, 1998; Vertovec, 1998). Institutional restructuring is necessitated by the need to (a) 
adopt to the diversity (of groups, ideas, values, etc) in society (Kymlicka, 1998:44), and, (b) 
achieve a ‘multiculturally constituted society’ (see Parekh, 2006). According to Vertovec 
(2010:84), there are a number of institutional ‘options’ that are often undertaken in order to 
operationalise multiculturalism. These include, ‘the establishment of bodies, committees, or 
councils that local and state institutions can readily consult on i ssues that relate to ethnic 
minorities’; the ‘creation of ethnic minority organisations that run programmes that are 
publicly funded’; the ‘provision of public funds for interpreting facilities’, and, the ‘training of 
core public sector workers e.g., social workers, health-care practitioner, teachers, police, etc – 
to gain understanding about the values and practices of ethnic minorities (Vertovec (2010:84; 
Vertovec, 1998; see Vollmer, 2004; Vollmer, 2005; Geddes, 2003; Lemaitre, 2007:15; 
Andersen & Solid, 2003). 
 
Some key institutions are targeted for restructuring in order to achieve a multiculturally 
constituted society. Education stands out as most pertinent example where restructuring of 
institutions has been most effective. The reasons why ‘multicultural education’ is emphasised 
in multicultural societies are numerous. The broader aims include, helping citizens 
communicate in order to overcome cultural and language barriers. It also includes, overcoming 
injustices against ‘historically marginalised and excluded groups’, e.g., minorities, and other 
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excluded groups such as women, the disabled and gays, among others (Banks & Banks, 
2010:1). More specifically, though, multicultural education aims to empower ethnic minority 
children in order to increase their ‘self-esteem’; create the ‘basis for social understanding in 
the classroom; and, to ‘mould’ children into becoming multicultural citizens as they grow up 
(Parekh, 2006); counter prevailing educational culture and beliefs that may hinder pupils from 
reaching their potentials (see Banks & Banks, 2010:1); provide ethnic minority children with a 
compatible environment, particularly, in their ‘initial transition’ into a new schooling situation 
(Churchill, 1987); make changes to the curricula so as t o eliminate stereotypes of different 
ethnic groups (Churchill, 1987); encourage educators to ‘use examples and content from a 
variety of cultures’ to counter ‘cultural assumptions, perspectives, biases in many disciplines’ 
that  ‘ influence the ways in which knowledge is constructed’ (Banks and Banks, 2010:23); 
increase the awareness of educational staff about minority cultures; and, where possible to 
provide staff that have the same cultural background as ethnic minority children (Churchill, 
1987; Banks & Banks, 2010).  
 
Other measures introduced to promote multicultural education include home language 
instruction in schools – which is a common practice in Swedish schooling system. Another 
common measure is the dissemination of culturally-relevant information about ethnic 
communities in the country. The latter is aimed at ‘developing a knowledge base on persons 
belonging to minorities’; eliminate misinformation; and to create a positive attitude towards 
cultural differences (Churchill, 1987:66).   
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2.3 The Rationale for Choosing these Models 
 
As noted previously, the rational for choosing assimilationist and multiculturalist models as 
the theoretical basis for this research are many. Firstly, these models had a relationship with 
the overall topic under investigation (i.e., ‘integration’). They had a direct bearing on t he 
research questions of this research. Second, these theoretical models provided the ‘theoretical 
language’ or ‘concepts’ needed to explain the phenomenon under investigation (cf. Blaikie, 
2000). 
  
These models evoked many questions that were theoretically laden. Examples of these 
questions included, whether or not Somalis wanted to be integrated or assimilated; the extent 
to which Somalis were willing (or were expected) to retain their original culture; the way in 
which Somalis orientated themselves to the prevailing Swedish system of integration; the 
extent to which cultural factors intrinsic to Somali culture inhibited their successful integration 
into society; their receptiveness to policy initiatives intended to enhance their integration into 
society; whether they were suspicious of these policies, and so on and so forth.  
 
As alluded to, these theoretical models were specifically chosen because they provided the 
‘theoretical language’ (or ‘concepts’) needed to explain the phenomenon under investigation, 
i.e., the integration of Somalis in Sweden (cf. Blaikie, 2000:26).  They provided ‘the 
vocabulary and meaning’ for contexts’ and brought forth ‘multiple definitions and disputes’ 
41 
 
with regard to the phenomenon under investigation (cf. Blaikie, 2000:162). For example, the 
concepts employed in this research relating to the phenomenon under investigation, i.e., 
integration, encompassed ‘assimilation’, ‘pluralism’, ‘interaction’, ‘integration’, ‘fitting-into’, 
‘incorporation’, ‘diversity’, ‘social cohesion’, ‘separation’, ‘resistance’, etc. These concepts 
are indeed peculiar to the theoretical models chosen for this research. 
  
2.4 Conclusion  
 
This chapter attempted to provide a conceptual understanding of ‘integration’. It started by 
looking at existing definitions and types of integration in literature, acknowledging the 
elusiveness of the term. This chapter also highlighted the ‘theoretical models’ of immigrant 
integration, viz.: ‘assimilation’ and ‘multiculturalism’. Each model ‘interpreted ‘reality’ (i.e., 
explained ‘what integration was’ and ‘how best immigrants were to integrate’), though in 
‘distinct ways’ (cf. Möller et al., 2003:2). Assimilation entails a p rocess that leads to the 
adoption of the majority’s culture by minorities. It aims for the elimination of differences in 
cultures since it regards ‘cultural and ethnic diversity’ as ‘threat’ to the social, economic and 
political order of society (cf. Banting and Kymlicka, 2006:1). Assimilation takes time and is 
gradual. It occurs not in a linear manner but in stages. It involved cultural, socioeconomic, 
marital, identificational and civic assimilation. Once assimilation occurred though, it was 
irreversible. Multiculturalism, on the other hand, involves a process that allows minorities to 
retain their original culture whilst at the same time encouraging them to participate in the 
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socioeconomic and political spheres of society. It encouraged and celebrates differences in 
cultures, ideas and values.  
 
Both assimilation and multiculturalism were multidimensional. They represented dialectically 
opposed ideological stances. Both represented processes of change and both were policy 
measures, either actively (e.g., multiculturalism) or tacitly (e.g., assimilation) pursued by 
states (e.g., in Europe) in one form or another. Both embodied policy objectives and measures; 
all aim at achieving the integration of minorities into mainstream society.   
 
Although many people often relegate assimilation to the relics of history, it is  very much 
present and alive (see Alba & Nee, 2003). It remains the preferred option for a large section of 
the populous as the ‘best’ way of integrating minorities into society. The upsurge of support 
for rightwing parties who are opposed to immigration in many parts of Europe and more 
recently in Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, the UK, etc, does lend credence to the 
assertion that assimilation remains a ser ious alternative to immigrant integration even in 
contemporary times. 
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CHAPTER THREE   
3 THE POLITICS OF IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION IN SWEDEN 
 
This chapter sets out to map Swedish immigration and integration policies. Immigration policy 
is concerned with ‘regulating the flows’ of immigration and ‘control of aliens’ whilst 
integration policy is concerned with making the ‘transition’ of newcomers to settle in the 
country permanently as smooth as possible (Hammar, 1985:7; Dahlström, 2007:320). The first 
section of this chapter (on immigration) provides a prelude to the latter Section (on 
integration). The reason why such a disposition is adopted is because the two, immigration and 
integration, are inexorably linked and cannot, therefore, be treated in isolation.   
 
3.1 Immigration: A Historical Perspective 
 
Sweden was predominantly a land of emigration in the Nineteenth and early Twentieth 
Centuries (Wadensjö, 2009). Swedes emigrated primarily to the North America (USA and 
Canada) but also to Australia, Argentina, Germany, Denmark and Norway (Andersson & 
Solid, 2003; Lithman, 1987; Lemaitre, 2007, Wadensjö, 2009). There were a number of 
factors that triggered Swedish emigration, particularly, during the Nineteenth Century. The 
most commonly cited included ‘poverty’, ‘population increase’, ‘falling mortality rates’, ‘low 
agricultural wages’, ‘poor arable land’, ‘archaic agrarian system’, ‘a succession of poor 
harvests’ and ‘high unemployment’, among others (Karlström, 1980:7-9; Wadensjö, 2009:2).  
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Despite the dominance of emigration, immigration into Sweden was occurring concurrently 
(as shown in Figure 3.1). Nonetheless, it was not until 1930 that immigration into Sweden 
finally ‘surpassed’ emigration (Lundh & Ohlsson, 1994:11). The reasons were twofold. First, 
the US government imposed restriction on immigration in the 1920s, as its economy 
deteriorated in the wake of the Great Depression which meant fewer were able to emigrate 
from Sweden (Wadensjö, 2009; Lundh & Ohlsson, 1994; Runblom, 1994). Second, many 
Swedish-American returned to Sweden, during the same period, thereby, contributing to an 
increase in immigration into Sweden (Lundh & Ohlsson, 1994).  
 
After WWII, Sweden became a more permanent ‘net-receiver’ of international migrants 
(Lundh & Ohlsson, 1994:11; Runblom, 1994:627; see Andersson & Solid, 2003). Widgren 
(1980, as cited in Andersson & Solid, 2003:67) cites three main reasons why Sweden finally 
became a ‘land of immigrants’. Firstly, Sweden stayed neutral in WWII, hence, was under 
‘moral obligation’ to welcome refugees fleeing war and persecution. Secondly, Swedish birth 
rates in the 1930s were alarmingly low. Thirdly, Swedish women became increasingly drawn 
into the labour market in the 1940s onwards. Fourthly, post-war unemployment had decreased 
to about 2% as the demand for Swedish goods (particularly from Europe whose infrastructure 
lay in ruins due to the WWII) increased rapidly. 
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Figure 3.1: Immigration and Emigration 1851-2009. 
 
 
 Key:  
           Immigration (Invandrare)  
 
                      Emigration (utvandrare) 
Source: SCB (2009): (http://www.scb.se/Pages/TableAndChart_231104.aspx), Date accessed 
12/04/10. 
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3.2 Swedish Immigration Policy 
 
Swedish immigration policy has changed direction a number of times since the Nineteenth 
Century (Lithman, 1987; Lundh & Ohlsson, 1994; Runblom, 1994; Geddes, 2003; Andersson 
& Solid, 2003; Wadensjö, 2009). Prior to 1917, Swedish immigration policy was very liberal 
in nature. All people of ‘European origins’ could, for example, enter Sweden without the need 
for passports or visas (Lundh & Ohlsson, 1994:11; see Runblom, 1994:627). Nonetheless, 
Swedish immigration policy was still ‘closed’ to people deemed unwelcome such as Gypsies 
whose presence in Sweden were highly resented by t he majority population (Arnsberg, 
1998:170).  
 
The inter-war years (1917-1945) saw a decline in migration to Sweden following the adoption 
of a more restrictive immigration policy (Wadensjö, 2009:3). Passport, visas, residence and 
work permits requirement were re-instated. Work permits could now be issued depending on 
how the labour market performed. Foreigner nationals had to secure employment and approval 
from their respective national trade union(s) before they could travel to Sweden.  T hese 
restrictions resulted in part from an intensive lobby from Swedish trade unions who were 
concerned about the prospect of employers exploiting cheap foreign labour (Lundh & 
Ohlsson, 1994). It should be noted that the interwar period was characterised by a protracted 
industrial conflicts between organised capital and organised labour. Compromise between 
these two parties did not occur until the Saltsjöbadet Agreement was signed in 1938 (Baldwin, 
1990; Lewin, 1994; Torbjörn 2004).  
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The adoption of the restrictive immigration policy was also attributed to the prevalence of 
nationalistic tendencies in Sweden society, especially, in the 1920s and 1930 (Hammar 
(1999:179, cited in Geddes, 2003:120). The Aliens’ Act of 1927 was, for example, explicit in 
imposing restrictions on immigration on racial grounds. The Act stipulated, among others, that 
the ‘Nordic race’ was supreme, unique and god-given, and advocated for the preservation of 
‘Nordicness’ against potential (racial and ethnic) impurities (Lundh & Ohlsson, 1994:12). One 
group that bore the brunt of this legislation were the Jews – whose immigration into Sweden 
had dwindled to a mere trickle by 1938. The restriction on Jews was lifted when Germany 
invaded Denmark and Norway in 1940 (Lundh & Ohlsson, 1994:12).  
 
Another evidence of racially driven legislation occurred when earlier in 1921, t he Swedish 
Parliament (Risksdag) established the Swedish Institute of Racial Hygiene. This infamous 
institute was to oversee a racial indoctrination programme that led to the sterilisation of more 
than 60000, persons (including physically and mentally disabled persons) who were deemed 
as unsuitable parents in Sweden (see Geddes, 2003:120). The practice of sterilisation 
continued as late as the 1970s in Sweden (Amstrong, 1997; Lennerhed, 1997; Geddes, 2003). 
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3.2.1 Immigration Policy 1945-1973 
 
Sweden re-introduced a liberal immigration policy after WWII. Work permits for Nordic 
citizens were abolished in 1943. Immigration rules for other non-Nordic Europeans were also 
relaxed. Indeed, through this relaxation, European nationals were able to enter Sweden as 
tourists, apply for jobs and subsequently settle in the country. Moreover, rules for family 
reunification were also liberalised.  
 
However, by the 1940s, it became apparent to Swedish policy makers that the nation could not 
rely on (a) Nordic labour migration alone, and, (b) the informal manner in which individual 
labourers from European countries entered the country to work (Lundh & Ohlsson, 1994; 
Wadensjö, 2009). Accordingly, policy makers began to explore the possibility of importing 
labour en masse albeit in an orderly version (Torbjörn, 2006). 
 
Consequently, the Swedish Government created a labour market commission in 1947 t o 
recruit workers in Europe (Torbjörn, 2004:5). The commission began recruiting workers in 
Italy and Hungary in 1947, and in 1948, i n Austria, Belgium, Hungary, Italy and West 
Germany (Andersson & Solid, 2003:65-102). In the 1950s, Swedish companies were able to 
directly recruit own labour through this collective transfer system, on condition that they 
consulted the trade unions and national labour market boards of respective countries. Sweden 
also reached Agreements with Yugoslavia and Turkey in 1966 a nd 1967 r espectively 
(Torbjörn, 2004:5).  
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Besides, the Aliens' Act of 1954 us hered a renewed era of generous immigration policy in 
Sweden (Lundh & Ohlsson, 1994; Wadensjö, 2009). This legislation was an amendment to 
existing immigration laws and was intended to enable foreigners, especially European 
workers, to visit Sweden and take up employment (Lundh & Ohlsson, 1994; Torbjörn, 2006).  
As a sign of generosity, foreigners were not deported without their consent. Dubbed the 
'tourist immigration policy’, the generous immigration policy of the day was also in tune with 
the ‘general optimism’ in Sweden in the 1950s and 1960s, as a result of economic and 
industrial growth (Lundh & Ohlsson, 1994:60). Figure 3.2 summarises the institutional labour 
market arrangements between 1945 and 1972.  
 
Figure 3.2: State or Market: Institutional Arrangements during the Labour Market 
Period 
 
 
1945           State             1955  Market                1968       State                1972                            
 
 
 
State      Market 
-Regulation via the AMS*                   -Tourist visa (3 months) enabled job seeking on the spot                    
-Collective recruitment                                                                                                                           
-Work permit in home country                                                                                                        
*Swedish Labour Market Board 
Source: Adopted from Torbjörn (2006:190) 
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Nonetheless, when the numbers of immigrants increased in Sweden in the mid 1960s, 
immigration became a p olitical issue. There was also a simultaneous political discourse 
advocated for a more regulated labour migration policy, as well as, the need for assimilating 
immigrants than was hitherto the case. This discourse was driven by many important societal 
actors, including Swedish political parties, trades union and the media.  
 
The debate led to some concrete outcomes (see Andersson & Solid, 2003; Lithman, 1987). 
With regard to demands for a more regulated immigration, restrictions were imposed on non-
Nordic immigrants in 1967. Non-Nordic workers were required to obtain work permits, secure 
jobs and accommodation before entering Sweden (Andersson & Solid, 2003; Lundh & Olsson, 
1994). In relation to the need for assimilation (then the model of integration), measures that 
facilitated the ‘integration’ of immigrants were adopted. For example, the government decided 
to subsidise organisations that provided Swedish language courses for immigrants by 1965 
(Lithman, 1987). From 1966 onwards municipally-run immigrant bureau(s) began to provide 
free information services to immigrants. In 1969, the Swedish Migration Board (SIV) was set 
up to cater for many immigration and immigrant related issues (Lithman, 1987; Andersson & 
Solid, 2003; Wadensjö, 2009). SIV was among other things charged with the task of receiving 
and settling immigrants in Sweden.  
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3.2.2 Decline in Labour migration  
 
By the mid 1970s, labour migration into Sweden declined sharply. This was precipitated by a 
slump in the Swedish economy (with a decline in GNP, manufacturing and industrial 
production); rising unemployment; the global oil crisis in 1973; and, a strong opposition from 
Swedish trade unions towards migration (Ålund & Schierup, 1991:22; see Lundh & Olsson, 
1994; Runblom, 1994).  Indeed, the prevailing assumption from mid 1970s onwards was that 
labour migration was no longer an option in Sweden and that internal labour (both foreign and 
indigenous), could now cater for those needs generated by the labour market (Nelhans, 1973; 
Alund & Schierup, 1991). Nonetheless, as labour migration dwindled, another form of 
immigration, notably, refugee and family reunification was becoming commonplace from 
early 1970 onwards in Sweden (Wadensjö, 2009; Westin, 2006; Andersson & Solid, 2003; 
Ginsburg, 2001; Ålund and Schierup, 1991; Lundh & Olsson, 1994).   
  
3.2.3 Refugee Migration Increases 
 
Sweden has provided refuge to people fleeing religious and political persecution for centuries. 
But, it was not until the early Twentieth Century that the numbers of people entering Sweden 
became significant. The first major arrivals of refugees into Sweden occurred, between 1917 
and 1918, f rom Russia and Finland (Andersson & Solid, 2003). The 1930s saw refugees 
coming mainly from the Baltic region (Westin, 2006). 
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During WWII, Sweden adopted a more restrictive Refugee policy. For example, asylum was 
not granted to people fleeing racial persecution like the Jews from Germany, Austria and 
Eastern Europe (Lundh & Olsson, 1994). The underlying reason for denying asylum to Jews 
was mainly due to ‘anti-Semitism’ and other ‘discriminatory’ practices linked to the ‘racial 
ideology prevalent in Sweden at that time’ (Westin, 2006:3). However, after WWII, Sweden 
adopted a more generous refugee policy. Many Jews were now able to settle in Sweden under 
the so-called ‘Bernadotte action’ (Lundh & Olsson, 1994:26-27; Andersson & Solid, 2003:65). 
‘Bernadotte action’ aimed to rescue as many people as possible from the Nazi concentration 
camps in Germany and Nazi-occupied countries.  
 
In 1956 a nd 1968, r efugees were also received from Hungary and Czechoslovakia, 
respectively, as a consequence of the invasion by t he Soviet in these countries (Lundh & 
Olsson, 1994). The 1970s saw refugees coming from Latin America (Argentina, Chile, Peru 
and Uruguay), Asia (Syria, Turkey) and Eastern Europe (Poland). In the 1980s refugees came 
from Africa (Eritrea, Ethiopia and Kenya), the Middle East and Persian Gulf (Iran, Iraq, 
Lebanon, and Syria), Latin America (El Salvador and Peru) and Eastern Europe. In Early 
1990s, Sweden became home to a relatively very large influx of refugees from the Former 
Yugoslavia (Ginsburg, 2001:211). Sweden also accepted a considerable number of refugees 
from Iraq and Somalia in the 1990s onwards.  Refugees from Somali continue to arrive into 
Sweden at the present time. 
 
 
53 
 
3.3 Integration Policy in Sweden 
 
This section looks at Swedish Integration Policy over time. Like many countries in Western 
Europe, immigrant integration is a key policy area in Sweden. The imperativeness of 
integration policy is underscored by Banton (2001:151) who argues that, no c ountry can 
contemplate to relegate its immigrant integration policy into some sort of secondary policy 
without dire consequences. Banton (2001:151) goes on to say, ‘any failure on the part of states 
to integrate its immigrants will prove costly, economically and socially’. Sweden has, on i ts 
part, invested enormous resources in terms of finance and work force over the years to realise 
an operational immigrant integration policy, which despite the challenges it faces, nonetheless, 
can be seen as vital for incorporating its newcomers into mainstream society. 
  
Chronologically, integration policy proper began in 1966 when ‘a task force was established to 
deal with information to immigrants’ (Lithman, 1987:18). In 1968, a Parliamentary 
Commission on immigration was appointed ‘to examine the position of immigrants’ (Lithman, 
1987:18). The recommendation of this Commission eventually bore fruit. Evidently, there was 
a shift towards some kind of accommodation to meet the cultural needs of immigrants 
(Hammar, 1999:172, cited in Geddes, 2003:120). Moreover, language training for adult 
immigrants and home language instruction (hemspåkundervisning) for immigrant children at 
public schools were provided free of charge; local immigrant councils (invandrarbyråer) were 
created; interpretive services for immigrants were granted; and, permanent status to foreign 
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workers were granted to ‘ensure their welfare state integration’ (Geddes, 2003:120; Lithman, 
1987:18).  
 
In 1974, a nother Parliamentary Commission on i mmigration was set up to map out a more 
‘accommodative multicultural policy’ for Sweden (Geddes, 2003:120). In 1975, following the 
commission’s recommendations, Sweden officially proclaimed itself a multicultural society. 
Three overarching policy principles were to steer the nation towards this declared direction (of 
multiculturalism), namely, equality, freedom of choice and partnership (Lundh & Olsson, 
1991; Ålund & Schierup, 1994; Lithman, 1987; Jederlund & Kayfetz, 1999; Geddes, 2003: 
Muus, 2003; Soininen, 1999; Westin, 2006).  
 
Equality meant immigrants were to expect the ‘same opportunity, rights and obligation’ and 
‘comparable’ living conditions with those of native Swedes (Soininen, 1999:685). It a lso 
meant immigrants were to be accorded equal opportunities in employment, housing, social 
care and education – i.e., as enjoyed by the rest of the populous (Soininen, 1999:688; Westin, 
2006:7). Freedom of choice was intended mainly for the ‘private’ domain whereby ethnic 
minorities were ‘at liberty to choose whether to adopt Swedish cultural identity or retain their 
original identity’ (Westin, 2006:7). Partnership connoted co-operation and solidarity between 
Swedes and immigrants (Westin, 2006:7). Immigrant groups and the Swedish-born population 
were to work together to resolve issues of common interest (Jederlund & Kayfetz, 1999:1). 
Partnership was to ‘take place on equal terms’ and in the ‘spirit of shared purpose’ (Lithman, 
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1987:20). Through partnership, society was to actively combat the barriers of integration, 
mainly, xenophobia and ethnic discrimination; and, together immigrants and Swedes were to 
‘promote harmonious ethnic relations’ (Lithman, 1987:20). Partnership also entailed that 
immigrants were ‘granted voting rights in local elections’ (Westin, 2006:7). 
 
According to Lithman (1987:19), the expressed aims of these goals were to: (a) give 
immigrants ‘equal rights and opportunities’ as the rest of the populous; (b) ‘respect the identity 
and integrity’ of immigrants as individuals; and (c) accord immigrants the ‘opportunities to 
develop their cultural heritage’. However, as a caveat, these stated goals were to be mediated 
within existing framework of Swedish ‘fundamental principles’ with regards to ‘human 
coexistence’, ‘reciprocal tolerance, solidarity and cooperation between people’ (Lithman, 
1987:19). It was explicitly emphasised, for example, that ‘Swedish values’ such as ‘individual 
rights’ and ‘equality between sexes’ were ‘non-negotiable’ (Lithman, 1987:20). Nonetheless, 
allowance was given, ‘where practical’, to ‘negotiate matters’ that may arise as a result of 
‘cultural conflicts’ (Lithman, 1987:20)    
 
3.3.1 Swedish Integration Policy (1975-1997) 
 
In many ways, 1975 represent a turning point in Sweden’s history of immigration. ‘Ideas of 
Swedish multiculturalism’ were put into effect from 1975 onwards; immigrants were accorded 
‘full welfare state membership’, and ‘same legal privileges’ as Swedish citizens; and, ‘faith’ 
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was placed ‘in the ability of welfare state institutions to level out inequalities’ (Geddes, 
2003:121). According to Geddes (2003:120-121), these measures were ‘remarkably inclusive 
in comparison to other European nations, many of whom were still struggling about what to do 
with their ‘guest workers’.   
 
To Ålund & Schierup (1991:3), Swedish Integration Policy (1975-97) represented a form of 
planned and systematic diversity – what they called ‘prescribed multiculturalism’. Ålund & 
Schierup (1991:3) buttressed their assertion by the following: First, all actors, e.g., the State 
and its institutions, political parties, trade unions and the national association of local 
municipal administrations (Kommunförbundet) were ‘compelled’ to ‘embrace’ 
multiculturalism (see Dahlström, 2007:320). Secondly, ‘state-sponsored research commissions 
formulated policies to combat racism, discrimination, ethnic conflict and the development of a 
segregated society’. Thirdly, the Swedish public were readied to ‘accept’ the officially 
proclaimed ‘egalitarian’ multicultural ideology of ‘equality’, ’freedom of choice’ and 
’partnership’. Fourthly, the state provided resources to immigrant organisations and other 
NGOs that work with immigrants.  
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3.3.2 The Need for a New Integration Policy 
 
Whilst multiculturalism was supposedly the approach to integrate immigrants in Sweden, it 
soon became apparent the policy had begun to flounder. Indeed, by mid the 1980s, there was a 
growing uneasiness relating to immigration. The ever-increasing number of refugees from 
diverse backgrounds coming into the country did not bode well with some quarters in the 
population. Refugee camps were becoming overcrowded as the waiting time for processing 
asylum applications grew lengthier – a clear indication that there was a problem in regulating 
immigration in Sweden. The media and political discourse about immigration was intense. 
Municipalities were also becoming reluctant to accept more refugees.  
 
The integration policy Sweden adopted from 1975 onwards was not, after all, as socially and 
economically inclusive of immigrants as ear lier anticipated. As Ålund & schierup (1991:37) 
confirmed, there was an increasing ‘disjuncture’ between the proclaimed intentions 
(declarations) and the actual development in Sweden. The authors also pointed to the 
following contradictions: ‘equality’ versus discrimination and a hierarchic ethnic division of 
labour; ‘freedom of choice’ versus exclusiveness and segregation; and, ‘partnership’ versus 
bureaucratic and techno-scientific monitoring (Ålund & schierup, 1991:37). Indeed, marketed 
once as a ‘resource’, immigration was now becoming a social and an economic liability (see 
Ålund & Schierup, 1991). 
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By the early 1990s, the mood towards immigration and immigrants had changed drastically 
(Andersson & Solid, 2003; Ålund & Schierup, 1991; Geddes, 2003). Mass migration from the 
Former Yugoslavia and from Third World countries had almost sprawled out of control. At the 
same time, the nation’s economy had ‘steeped’ into a ‘ deep recession’ (Eliason & Storrie, 
2006:833). For example, between 1990 a nd 1993, GDP in Sweden had declined by 6% ; 
unemployed quadrupled to 12-13% and social expenditure was curtailed (Eliason & Storrie, 
2006:833; see Kersbergen, 2000:21-2, cited in Cochrane, et al., 2001:4; Ginsberg, 2001:205). 
There was also a s imultaneous ‘drift towards’ decentralisation and privatisation – i.e., to a 
more neo-liberal policy approach (Kersbergen (2000:21-2, cited in Cochrane, et al., 2001:4). 
In the year 1994, t he central government budget deficit exceeded 15% of GDP (see 
Hauptmeier, et al., 2006:20). As a r esult, the position of immigrants in the labour market 
deteriorated; and residential segregation, especially, in the major metropolitan regions became 
commonplace. Moreover, overtly open right wing tendencies were creeping into the Swedish 
political landscape with populist parties like Nydemokratiet  (the New Democratic Party) 
scooping a significant electoral gain during the 1991 p arliamentary election. All these 
occurrences were particularly painful to Sweden, a nation that so rightfully gloats about its 
‘cradle-to-grave’ and egalitarian type of welfare state.  
 
As it turned out, the overarching principles of ‘equality’, ’freedom of choice’ and 
’partnership’ were over-ambitious and had to be modified accordingly, since ‘discrepancies’ 
emerged between the official proclamation of Swedish multiculturalism and reality on the 
ground (Dahlström, 2007:319).  
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3.3.2.1 The 1984 Parliamentary Report 
 
Acknowledging that the ‘approach’ to immigrant integration (of ‘equality’, ‘freedom of 
choice’ and ‘partnership’) in Sweden ‘was too broad’, the 1984 Parliamentary Report made a 
number of recommendations (Geddes, 2003:121). According to Geddes (2003:121), a ‘link 
between future migrations into Sweden’ and the ‘country’s ability to integrate’ them 
successfully into society was to be made. Second, there was need to distinguish between 
‘national minorities’ (e.g., Sami, Tornedal Finns, Swedish Finns, Roma and Jews who have 
lived in Sweden for centuries) and ‘immigrants and refugees’ (who have arrived or continue to 
arrive in Sweden much later) – recommending that national minorities be accorded a different 
status than those enjoyed by i mmigrants and refugees. Third was the need to accord ethnic 
minorities language and cultural protection on condition they respected ‘basic core Swedish 
values’ (Geddes, 2003:121).   
 
3.3.3 Swedish Integration Policy (1997-2007) 
 
The Swedish Parliament (Riksdagen) decided on a new integration policy in 1997. The 
Government Bill (no. 1997/98:16) entitled ‘Sweden, the future and diversity – from 
immigration to integration’ was the basis for this parliamentary decision 
(www.sweden.gov.se). The new policy now emphasised individual rights, responsibilities, 
empowerment, participation and the ability for individuals to become self-sufficient and self-
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support, although it still took into account ethnic and cultural diversity of society as before 
(Gustafson, 2002:468: see Geddes, 2003). 
 
According to the Swedish Government website (www.sweden.gov.se), the aims of this 
Swedish integration policy were as follows: Firstly, ‘extend equal rights, responsibilities and 
opportunities to all regardless of ethnic, cultural, religious or gender background’. Secondly, 
‘create a community based on diversity (ethnic, cultural and religious diversity), i.e., a society 
characterised by m utual respect and tolerance in which everyone can take an active and 
responsible part, irrespective of background’. Thirdly, ‘encourage individuals to support 
themselves, in order to become full members of society’. Fourthly, ‘create the favourable 
structural conditions under which self-sufficiency/supporting strategy could be possible’. 
Fifthly, ‘safeguard fundamental democratic values, (e.g., freedom of choice, association, 
worship, speech, etc), in society’. Lastly, ‘prevent and combat discrimination, xenophobia and 
racism in society’.   
 
3.3.3.1 Policy Programmes 
 
In order to facilitate the integration of immigrants, the Government adopted a number of 
policy measures. A Government Report entitled, Integration Policy for the 21st Century 
(2001/02:129), spells out these measures. They include the following: the establishment of the 
Swedish Integration board in 1998 – which was to be responsible for the coordination of 
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Swedish integration policy; the enactment of a stricter anti-discrimination law to counter 
discrimination in society; development initiatives in the metropolitan areas – to counter the 
negative trend of segregation; an ‘introduction programme’ for new arrivals; putting 
immigrants’ skills and qualifications to use in the labour market; and, concentration of efforts 
for gender equality (Vollmer, 2004; Vollmer, 2005).  
 
Accordingly, this sub-section examines the following measures in more detail: (a) the 
introduction programme; (b) labour market initiatives; (c) the efforts to counter ethnic 
discrimination; and, (d) development initiatives in the metropolitan areas. The role of the now 
defunct Swedish Integration Office (SIO) in the integration processes of newcomers will also 
be discussed briefly (see below). 
 
3.3.3.1.1 The Introduction Programme 
 
The Government provides funding to facilitate the smooth introduction and transition of 
newcomers and their families into society. This Programme is commonly known as the 
Introduction Programme.  Through the programme, newcomers obtain ‘introduction into life 
in Sweden’, Swedish language instruction (SFI), housing and vocational upgrading or training 
where necessary (Lemaitre, 2007:16). Also included are the living expenses of newcomers and 
their families, day-care costs and other related expenses on children.  
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Until recently, the municipalities were responsible for the practical ‘administration, 
provisions, and coordination’ of introduction programmes (Lemaitre, 2007:15; see Andersen 
& Solid, 2003). The administration of the programme has since been transferred to the 
Swedish Employment Board (AMS). Nonetheless, municipalities still have a decisive 
collaborative role to play in how the programmes are run. Introduction Programmes apply 
between two to three years from the time a newcomer is placed in a municipality. 
 
At the initial introductory phase, the authorities (previously the municipal refugee reception 
organisation, now the Employment Board) ‘carry out the preliminary assessment to determine’ 
how best or quick to introduce the new comer into the labour market (Lemaitre, 2007:15; see 
Andersen & Solid, 2003). It is routinely followed by an action plan in which the newcomer 
agrees to undertake the responsibility to comply with the aims and activities of the 
introduction programme (see Andersen & Solid, 2003). 
 
3.3.3.1.2 Labour Market Initiatives  
 
Labour market participation is undoubtedly fundamental to immigrant integration. The 
Swedish Government has accordingly invested enormous efforts and resources towards 
achieving this stated goal. The task of assisting immigrants to improve their labour market 
positions falls to the Swedish National Employment Board (AMS). Although AMS is a 
national body that serves all citizens irrespective of employment status and ethnic or national 
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background, it does, however, recognizes the vulnerability of immigrants, hence, the need for 
extra focus and resources towards improving the labour market situations of immigrants 
(Lemaitre, 2007; Vollmer, 2004; Vollmer, 2005; Andersen & Solid, 2003). For immigrants, 
labour market initiatives from AMS may either concur with, or introduced as a follow-up to, 
their introduction programme (see above).  
 
Indeed, the Swedish Employment Board (AMS) has many special measures that benefit 
unemployed immigrants. They include intensive Swedish language courses, vocational 
training, training for employment and work experience at a workplace, among others. To 
stimulate recruitment of workers, AMS also extends incentives to employers (e.g., subsidizing 
employer payroll taxes and insurance contributions) to recruit workers. AMS also encourages 
entrepreneurship and self-employment to improve the chances of immigrants in the labour 
market. To that effect, AMS assists with start-up grants to increase the chances of new 
immigrant becoming self-employed and to ultimately succeed as en trepreneurs in their own 
right. 
 
The overall goals of AMS is set under Sweden’s Annual Action Plans, whose objectives 
include to improve or achieve employability, productivity, and quality of the workforce; 
combat unemployment and inactivity; promoting adaptability and mobility in the labour 
market; promote development of human capital and lifelong learning (see Vollmer, 2005). 
Implicitly, the Annual Action Plan aims to achieve inclusion and social cohesion in society.  
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3.3.3.1.3 Efforts to Combat Discrimination in Society 
 
Swedish anti-discrimination law aims to combat discrimination and promote equal rights and 
opportunity regardless of ethnicity, religious, gender, sexual orientation, age, etc (SFS, 
2008:567). The law identifies and prohibits several types of discrimination viz.: ‘direct’ (or 
intentional), ‘indirect’ (or unintentional), ‘harassments that violate one’s dignity’ and ‘the 
instruction to discriminate another person’ (SFS, 2008:567). In particular, it cautions against 
discrimination in public sphere, e.g., education, employment, labour market situations 
(including the right to participate and benefit from trade unions), social services, health and 
medical care practice, transport services and housing, among others (SFS, 1999:130; SFS, 
2003:307; SFS, 2008:567).  
 
In addition, to combat ethnic discrimination, promote equal rights and opportunities, as well 
as, help implement the law against ethnic discrimination, the Swedish government established 
an ombudsman against ethnic discrimination (DO) in 1986. F rom January 2009, DO was 
merged with four other ombudsmen which together now operate under one government 
agency which works against discrimination and for equal rights and opportunities. The other 
ombudsmen include Equal Opportunities Ombudsman (JämO) which is in charge of sex 
discrimination; Disability Ombusman (HO), in charge of discrimination associated with 
disabilities; and, The Ombudsman against Discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation 
(HomO), which oversees the laws on di scrimination based on s exual orientation were 
followed.  
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The DO advises the government on matters pertaining to ethnic discrimination. It is also 
charged with the task of registering complaints of ethnic discrimination in society, and 
intervenes where necessary by appealing against cases that involving ethnic discrimination 
(www.do.se). The DO specifically aims at combating discrimination in workplaces. In 
particular, it identifies and recommends changes to unfavourable working conditions. It also 
highlights partiality inherent, particularly, in recruitment processes of employing organisations 
in Sweden. More commonly, the DO files lawsuits through employment tribunals on behalf of 
victims and their trade unions. Indeed, employers may be sued for perpetrating discrimination 
or for having failed to investigate and or take appropriate measures against discrimination and 
other forms of harassment suffered by w orkers from ethnic minority groups. Importantly, 
according to Swedish anti-discrimination law, the burden of proof lies more with employers 
than victims of discrimination, i.e., the employers have to ‘demonstrate’ that the employee has 
not been discriminated against (Ginsburg, 2001:212).  
 
Besides monitoring the activities of employers, the DO also gives recommendations on 
diversity plans at work places. It also works with schools, trade unions, employer associations, 
etc, with the intention to encourage them to make special provisions for food, uniforms, 
holidays, etc, in order to accommodate the religious and cultural needs of workers.  
Furthermore, DO organises training seminars and training sessions to public officials, and 
provides information in the form of leaflets, brochures, handbooks, etc, in order to promote 
understanding and cohesion in Swedish society.   
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3.3.3.1.4 Development initiatives in the metropolitan areas 
 
Here the objectives of two government policies (integration and urban/metropolitan policies) 
seem to merge. One of the goals of Sweden’s urban/metropolitan objective is ‘to combat 
social, ethnic and discriminating segregation in the metropolitan regions, and to work for 
equal and comparable living conditions for people living in the cities’ 
(www.storstad.gov.se/english). To redress inequalities (e.g., reverse segregation) in 
cities/country, the Government believes that the following long-term goals are of particular 
importance: Employment rates in socially deprived housing areas should be raised for people 
living in those areas; benefit dependency should be reduced considerably; the proficiency in 
Swedish language for both children and adults should be enhanced; all children and adults 
should be given the opportunity to attain secondary education; all city neighbourhoods should 
be experienced as attractive and safe by the people who live there (i.e., should provide sound 
and healthy living environments); public health should be improved, both as measured in 
terms of health statistics and subjective assessments; and, finally, democratic participation 
should increase in the disadvantaged neighbourhoods (www.storstad.gov.se/english). All these 
goals aim to address structural patterns of inequality, exclusion, marginalisation and 
deprivation, and by implication, ‘residential integration’ in society (see Bauböck, 1994:37). 
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3.3.3.1.5 The Swedish Integration Office (Integrationsverket) 
 
The Swedish Government created the Swedish Integration Office (SIO) in 1998. During its 
existence (1998-2007), the SIO was the main actor in enhancing immigrant integration policy 
and measures (i.e., policy programmes). Its tasks included the following: ‘to coordinate the 
integration of immigrants’; ‘ensure newcomers received support for their integration into 
society’; ‘create the necessary structural conditions for integration’; ‘mobilize all actors to 
effect change and contribute to diversity in society’; ‘provide funds to NGOs and immigrant 
organisations engaged in activities that promoted immigrant integration’; ‘prevent and 
counteract racism, xenophobia and discrimination’; ‘follow and evaluate development with 
respect to the ethnic and cultural diversity in society’; as well as, serve as ‘both an influential 
and knowledge-based public authority’ (‘Swedish Integration Policy’, Integrationsverket, 
2006). 
 
3.3.4 Recent Changes to Swedish Immigration and Integration Policies 
 
3.3.4.1 Recent Changes in Immigrations Policy  
 
Mass migration into Sweden in the 1990s, particularly, from the Former Yugoslavia, had a 
profound impact on t he Swedish system, including, the welfare state, refugee reception 
apparatus, immigrant integration, etc. ‘High unemployment’ and ‘higher social-welfare 
dependence levels’ among immigrants were other issues that come under intense scrutiny 
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which ‘needed attention’ (Westin, 2006:8).  
 
As a consequence, changes to Swedish immigration occurred in 1997 with the adoption of a 
new law, the New Alien’s Act (1997). In a way this law reaffirmed the 1951 G eneva 
Convention giving more emphasis in protecting people ‘in need of protection’, hence, doing 
away with the more relaxed interpretations that accepted ‘war deserters’ and ‘de facto 
refugees’ (i.e., people claiming asylum on political and religious grounds because they faced 
persecution from states or majority population in the countries they fled from (Lundh & 
Olsson, 1994:82). According to this Law (The Alien Act, 1997), ‘people in need of protection’ 
encompassed (a) individuals who risked persecution such as execution, long-term 
incarceration, torture and other forms of inhumane treatments because of their political- and 
religious convictions, among others; (b) people who fled wars (between nations or internal 
civil wars); and, (c) people with well founded fear of persecution for reasons of their gender or 
sexual orientation. 
     
The introduction of the new law meant an emphasis on t emporary permits as opposed to 
permanent residence permits. Sweden would grant asylum to persons fleeing conflicts and 
other forms of harassments but mainly on temporary basis (often on one or two-year basis). 
The hope was that asylum-seekers would return to their countries of origin once the political 
situations of those countries have improved.   
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Another fundamental change to Swedish immigration policy occurred when Sweden joined 
the European Union (EU) in 1995. As signatory to the EU, Sweden lifted restrictions on 
labour movement within the EU, accordingly. Sweden also harmonised its immigration policy 
with other EU member countries which entailed the ‘tightening of controls and management 
efforts at EU’s external borders’ (Van Houtum & Pijpers, 2007:291).  
 
One of those tightening controls of EU external borders came with the adoption of the 1997 
Dublin Convention. The Convention established a ‘system’ that placed ‘responsibility’ on the 
State where the asylum seeker first claimed asylum. The Convention also created a centralised 
database of asylum-seekers’ fingerprints. The objectives of this Convention was two-fold: 
One, it made it difficult for asylum-seekers to claim asylum in other EU countries other than 
the countries they first lodged their asylum applications; and, second, it made it possible for 
countries to share the burdens of refugee migration, so that no one single is ‘burdened’ with 
disproportionate numbers of asylum-seekers (Hurwitz, 1999:646). Nonetheless, as Table 3.0 
and Table 3.1 show, the inflow of immigration from non-EU countries into Sweden has 
continued, despite all attempts to tighten immigration controls from outside EU.  
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Table 3.1 Immigration: Commonest Source of Immigration in 2009 
Citizenship  Women Men   Total 
    
Sweden* 8 795 9 722   18 517 
    
Iraq 4 834 3 705   8 539 
    
Somalia 3 579 3 323   6 902 
    
Poland 2 404 2 763   5 167 
    
Denmark 1 545 2 216   3 761 
China 1 611 1 487   3 098 
    
Thailand 2 381 613   2 994 
    
Germany 1 396 1 377   2 773 
    
Iran 1 249 1 167   2 416 
Finland 1 271 1 127   2 398 
*Swedish Returnees  
Source: SCB (2009). 
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Table 3.2 Somali Immigration to Sweden in Recent Years  
Year                   2006 2007 2008 2009 
No. of Somalis 2974 3781 4064 6902 
 
Source: SCB (2009). 
 
3.3.4.2 Recent Changes in Integration Policy  
 
The Social Democratic Party (SDP) ruled Sweden for the most part of the last century. It was 
‘the dominant force behind social reforms’ in Sweden – shaping both the country and its 
renowned welfare state model (Esping-Andersen, 2006:168; Page, 2008:80-81). However, 
following the general election of autumn 2006 (and most recently, 2010), the SDP was 
defeated and power has passed to a r ight-centre coalition government. This has led to an 
ideological shift in Sweden. Many of the policies and programmes initiated under the reign of 
the SDP, including those of immigrant integration, have come under intense scrutiny. As a 
consequence, some policies and or programme were amended whilst others were abandoned 
altogether.  
 
The Swedish Integration Office (SIO), viewed by m any as the flagship of the Social 
Democratic Party (SDP), was dismantled by the Coalition in June 2007. Nonetheless, many of 
its specific tasks still remained, although they were transferred or incorporated into the work 
of other organisations. For example, the task of allocating funds to ethnic minority groups 
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were taken over by t he Swedish Board for Youth Affairs (Ungdomsstyrelsen); its statistical 
and research functions were taken over by the Swedish Statistics (SCB) and the Multicultural 
Centre (Mångkulturellt Centrum) in Stockholm. The function to manage refugee reception was 
handed to the Migration Office (Migrationsverket). Another new shift was that Swedish 
Employment Service (AMS) took over the responsibilities for coordinating introduction 
activities from municipalities.   
 
The overall work of integration came under a new ministry created called the Ministry of 
Integration and Gender Equality. The Ministry has retained most of the policy in relation to 
integration intact. As before, the overall goal of Swedish integration policy reaffirmed its 
assurance of ensuring equal rights, obligations and opportunities for all, irrespective of their 
ethnic and cultural background. The government (through the new Ministry) still provides 
compensation to municipalities for refugee reception; continues with the introduction 
programme for newly arrived immigrants in society; and, provides funding for urban 
development initiatives in deprived areas. Increasing awareness for democracy and gender 
equality was also retained. However, what was introduced as new was a clause that relates to 
civic orientation which is aimed at communicating and transmitting the importance of 
Swedish ‘values of democracy and equality’ (http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/2188/a/19443, 
Date accessed 24/05/10).  
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3.3.4.3 Emphasis on Labour Market Integration  
 
The one major departure point with the past, however, was the emphasis by the Coalition 
Government on a ctivation and labour market integration of newcomers. The Swedish 
Employment Board (AMS), rather than municipalities, is now responsible for coordinating 
introduction activities, e.g., Swedish instruction courses for immigrants (SFI) as well as t he 
Introduction Programme. Finding work for newcomers has, indeed, become a priority under 
the new Introduction Programme. Newcomers now have, for example, their own official 
mentors under the auspices of AMS to help and assist them with finding work. The drawing 
up of individual introduction plans, as well as, matching new arrivals’ skills with a suitable 
municipality where the new arrival may find jobs weighs as one of the considerations in 
assisting new arrivals, among others. 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
The chapter has dealt with immigration and integration policies from historical and 
chronological perspectives. Immigration into Sweden was categorised into two broad types, 
labour migration and refugee migration. Labour migration was the predominant type of 
immigration in Sweden between 1945 and mid 1970s. From the mid 1970s onwards, however, 
refugee migration and family reunification became the more common form of immigration 
into Sweden. 
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The chapter also showed how both immigration and integration policies were evolutionary and 
cumulative in nature, although they were subject to numerous revisions over the years 
(Dahlström, 2007). Swedish immigration policy has, for example, alternated between free 
immigration and restrictive policies over the years. Nonetheless, despite those periodic 
restrictions, Sweden immigration policy has largely remained very liberal in comparison to 
many European countries (see Geddes, 2003). The Chapter further highlights how, Swedish 
immigration policy has now become more or less harmonised with other EU countries. This 
followed Sweden’s entry into the EU in 1995.  
 
With respect to Swedish integration policy, some policies were modified and others were 
dropped all together, over the years, depending on the prevailing circumstances in the country. 
One example related to pre-1997 integration policy adopted in 1975 which was found 
divorced from reality because of its ‘over- ambitiousness’ (see above). By contrast, the current 
integration policy emphasises individual rights and responsibilities whilst accommodating the 
rights of groups in society. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY   
 
This chapter provides the methodological framework of the research. The chapter is divided 
into two main sections. The first section encapsulates the procedures followed in conducting 
the research. It focuses on the research methodology, methods, sampling strategy and the data 
collection processes involved. The second section deals with the steps taken to analyse the 
research data, as well as, the analytic approach employed (i.e., thematic analysis).  
 
The procedures taken in conducting the research and its subsequent analysis would be 
discussed in the sequence in which they appear. Nonetheless, it was not lost to this research 
that total or rigid adherence to a sequence in social research was, without doubt, a futile 
exercise. The main reason being that what we as social scientists often deal with are human 
being, their issues, and concomitant complexities. Consequently, many of the steps involved 
occurred concurrently and not separately (e.g., data collection and analysis). They were also 
mutually interconnected and not sequential. Take for example, the choice of methodology and 
methods – where the former had a direct bearing on the latter and vice versa. In other words, 
one can hardly treat methodology in isolation of methods, sampling strategy, etc, hence, their 
interconnectedness.   
 
 
76 
 
The process of carrying this research constituted practical steps that were to be realised. It 
started with a pilot study involving three Somalis from Sweden in Birmingham, UK. The sole 
intent of this pilot was not so much about focusing on the subject matter as such, but rather as 
a way to ‘perfect the tool’ of research. Thanks to this tiny pilot, the researcher was able to 
make final amendments to the initial order and sequence of questions in the first interview 
schedule/guide, employed to interview individual Somalis respondents in Stockholm.  
 
Data collection itself proceeded in three stages. The first stage involved interviews with 
individual Somali research respondents. There were twenty-eight persons involved in this first 
stage. They comprised of nineteen men and nine-women. Sampling here was arrived through 
snowballing. Snowballing meant the researcher had no fixed venue. This was because, where 
and who to interview were partly contingent upon recommendations from persons already 
interviewed. The second stage involved interviews with ten Swedish officials who 
corroborated, and acted as a counterweight to the accounts given by individual Somali 
respondents. The third and concluding phase entailed a focus group interview involving eight 
Somalis considered as knowledgeable about the current situation of Somalis in Sweden. 
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4.1 Qualitative Research Methodology 
 
This research is qualitative in nature. Qualitative research methodology is appropriate in 
studying people and their social world (see Bryman, 2001; Grix, 2004; Morgan & Smircich, 
1980). It enables researchers to delve into people’s social and cultural life, as well as, focus on 
the ‘details of human life’ (Payne & Payne, 2004:176). Through qualitative methods, social 
scientists are thus able to acquire a ‘deeper’ understanding of social phenomena than would be 
the case had they relied purely on quantitative research (Silverman, 2000:8). 
 
Qualitative methodology and method(s) were deemed appropriate for this research for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, the research entailed studying sensitive topics (e.g., personal 
issues) and a socially excluded minority groups (whose access is not always easy). Hence the 
choice of interviewing (including focus group interviewing) as the preferred method for 
gathering the information the research sought (see ‘Methods’ below). Secondly, given the size 
of the sample (which was small), a ‘well-grounded, rich descriptions, and explanations’ of the 
topic of inquiry (i.e., the integration of Somalis in Sweden) could only be possible if 
qualitative research methods were deployed (cf. Miles & Huberman, 1994:1; see Arber, 2001). 
Thirdly, qualitative methods was considered appropriate for this research since they were 
better predisposed in helping the researcher ‘preserve the chronological’ flow of events, 
activities, actions, etc, that a p rocess such as integration of immigrants entails (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994:11). The reasons are explored in more details, below.   
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4.1.1 Studying sensitive topics and minorities 
 
Qualitative methods are the most appropriate strategy for studying sensitive topics and 
minorities. This research was dealing with a sensitive topic and a minority group. As the 
collected data was to demonstrate, they contained many private or sensitive personal issues 
emerged – issues respondents were willing to share with the researcher only after the latter 
gained their trust. These involved, for example, people’s personal and emotional feelings, 
beliefs, inner-thoughts, behaviour, their sense of self, etc. 
 
The topic of Somali integration itself entailed personal and painful journeys for the individual 
Somali interviewees concerned. Discernible were disappointments; a clear struggle of up-and-
downs with many bracing themselves against prejudices and discrimination on an almost daily 
basis; an environment that was not always socially and culturally empathetic to them, etc. 
‘Hopelessness’ also characterise the reality of many Somalis in Sweden since many are 
unemployed (see Carlsson & Rooth, 2006). It was easy in such circumstances for people to 
turn inwards and become suspicious to ‘outsiders’. It is the contention of this researcher, 
therefore, that researchers using quantitative techniques would find access to groups like 
Somalis ‘problematic’, than those qualitative techniques. 
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4.1.2 The Choice of Samples 
 
The appropriateness of qualitative research also came to bear when it came to decisions on 
sampling and sampling type this research had to adopt. Ultimately, it was the size of sample – 
which was small – that was decisive, hence, the decision to opt for a non-probability 
purposeful sampling as opposed to a probability sampling (where individuals in the population 
have equal chance of being selected). Indeed, because this research was dealing with a 
minority community (Somalis in Sweden), the researcher was conscious of the fact that there 
were ‘no adequate lists to use as sampling frames’ that are always ‘readily available’ when 
dealing with them (see Arber, 2001:58-82). Moreover, as a minority group, Somali in Sweden 
may feel vulnerable and excluded from mainstream society. Because of this vulnerability and 
exclusion, Somalis were likely to become suspicious of researchers – i.e., as people who wield 
power directly or indirectly over others. Again this underscored the appropriateness of 
qualitative research methodology as a means to ‘enter’ the social world and or ‘realities’ of 
minority groups like Somalis. This research presupposes this ‘entering of social world or 
reality’ would not, therefore, have been forthcoming had this research used anything other 
than qualitative methodology. Procedures such as su rveys were thus considered technical, 
impersonal, and anonymous – and unlikely to tap into the richness and in-depth 
understandably associated with qualitative research. Thanks to the use of qualitative methods, 
this research was able to employ procedures or techniques Somalis as a minority group were at 
ease with.  
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4.1.3 Preserving the chronological flow of events 
 
As Miles & Huberman (1994:11) confirm, qualitative methodology ‘preserves the 
chronological flow of events’ where researchers ‘can see precisely which event leads to which 
consequences’, and hence, ‘derive fruitful explanations’ for their research. In reference to this 
research, one was able to observe some chronological flow of events as pertains to Somali 
refugees in Sweden. This research saw how that chronology began with the appearance of 
Somalis into the Swedish scene in the early 1990s and how their introduction and subsequent 
attempts to ‘incorporate’ them into Swedish society was literally sequential, at least on t he 
surface. For many Somalis in Sweden, the norm was to start life in a refugee reception centre 
or a camp, as conventionally referred to. The next stage came when they were granted work 
and residence permits (PUT) and subsequently moved to the communes or municipalities that 
‘accepted’ them. This was the stage where ‘real’ life in Sweden begun for Somalis.  
 
Through this flow of chronology, this research was able to observe how many Somalis had to 
start their ‘lives in Sweden’ literally from scratch. What was also observable from the 
accounts of Somalis were their expectations, progress (for some) and the fall-out (for others) 
as they proceeded in their integration process. Indeed, as a matter of official procedure, 
Somalis, like other newcomers into Sweden, were expected (which many did) to invest 
considerably, in terms of time and efforts, in attaining an ‘acceptable’ level of proficiency in 
the Swedish language from the outset. These individuals would then proceed to educate or ‘re-
educate’ themselves depending, among other factors, on t heir previous educational 
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backgrounds and motivations. Having attained some form of education, Somalis were then 
able to avail themselves of labour market opportunities. 
 
4.2 The Research Process 
 
This sub-section will run us through the following: a brief account of the pilot study the 
researcher undertook prior to venturing into the field; sampling and the sampling strategy 
adopted in this research and the data collection process (including the main methods of 
investigation i.e., interviewing and focus group interviewing) used in this research.  
 
4.2.1 The Pilot Study 
 
A pilot study is more or less ‘an abbreviated version of the research project’ (Dane, 1990:42). 
It prepares the research to try out in advance some of the ‘procedures’ or techniques to ‘use in 
the subsequent full-scale project’ (Dane, 1990:42). It helps, among others, to identify eventual 
flaws that may exist in the measuring instruments (Kidder & Judd, 1986). It was that element 
of ‘practice’ as well as the ‘identification’ of ‘eventual flaws’ in the initial interview schedule 
of this research, prior to its subsequent employment that led this researcher to undertake a pilot 
study.   
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This research piloted its study on three Somalis in Birmingham, UK. Two of these Somalis, a 
man (aged 43) and a woman (aged 30) had relocated to Birmingham from Sweden, while the 
other, a man (aged 25) was on a visit from Sweden. None of these were related to one another. 
Nonetheless, all these three Somalis had similar experiences to those whom the researcher had 
wanted to study in Sweden.  
 
The rationale for the pilot study arose out of the uncertainties that lingered about the initial 
interview schedule that was constructed. They included, above all, ‘how’ the questions were 
framed and their sequence. There were also doubts that surrounded how potential participants 
would respond to the questions. Were the questions in the interview schedule appropriate? 
Would they yield enough answers (data) for subsequent analysis? These uncertainties led the 
researcher to pilot the research before embarking on the data collection process proper.    
  
Having decided upon t he pilot, the next step was to gain access to potential respondents. 
Although only a few pilot respondents were sought, this was not as straightforward as initially 
anticipated. Indeed, it only materialised after making numerous visits to areas where a number 
of Somalis lived in the City of Birmingham. Moreover, one had to rely on t he 
recommendations of people who knew people who could be living in Birmingham but have 
since relocated from Sweden. In the end, a meeting with one pilot respondent led to the other, 
and so on – similar to the snowball sampling the research had to rely on, albeit on a miniature 
scale (see below on ‘snowballing’).  
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As alluded to previously, the aim of the pilot was to test how effective the constructed 
interview schedule would work in the ‘real world’, i.e., in the field. The research was, thus, 
less keen on identifying potential issue or themes – that could emerge (and indeed, they did) – 
from the pilot and incorporate them to the main body of the research. The pilot, as it were, was 
only limited to the testing of procedures.   
 
Accordingly, this research used the pilot only as means to perfect its ‘measuring instruments’, 
i.e., the interview schedule (and subsequent interview guides and Aide memoires) employed in 
the first data set (i.e., interviews involving individual Somali research respondents). It also 
provided this researcher with hints about what to expect and how to use these with potential 
research respondents.  
 
Overall, the pilot study, despite its tiny size, was instrumental in helping the researcher adjust 
the initial set of topical questions/interview schedule and in changing the initial order and 
sequence of those questions. Moreover, certain ambiguities in the wording of the questions 
(especially where such wordings or questions were perceived or construed to mean something 
else than they were originally intended for) were eliminated. It is noteworthy that due to time 
and financial constraint, more potential respondents could not be involved in the pilot study.   
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4.2.2 Sampling and Sampling Strategy  
   
One important research strategy was to select a s ample from the population (i.e., Somali 
immigrants in Sweden) that could provide the maximum theoretical understanding for the 
topic of inquiry (i.e., the integration of Somalis in Sweden). Sampling was important since it 
encompassed the questions of access and selection of research participants. Thus, the two 
important questions in relation to sampling in this research were: How did the research got its 
access to the population it sought to study? In what ways did the research select its sample 
from the overall ‘target’ population? 
 
As one would appreciate, ‘sampling frames’ (i.e., list of members of the population under 
investigation) are usually not readily obtainable in minority groups (see Arber, 2001:60). In 
the same vein, obtaining a sample representative of the population of this research’s focus was 
virtually impossible – leading the researcher to adopt a sampling type that was purposive (non-
probability) as opposed to probability based.  
 
To distinguish between purposive (non-probability) and probability sampling we turn to Arber 
(2001). According to Arber (2001:61), ‘probability sampling is where every individual 
element in the population is chosen at random and has a known, non-zero chance of selection’. 
In this sampling type, the ‘selection process is predetermined’, and ‘once the units have been 
selected the goal is to collect data from them’ (Arber, 2001:61). On the other hand, in purpose 
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sampling (also called non-probability sampling), ‘the chance of selection for each element in a 
population is unknown and for some elements is zero’ (Arber, 2001:61). 
 
4.2.2.1 Choosing Snowball Sampling 
 
In the end, this research settled for a sampling technique called snowball.  Bryman (2001:508) 
defines snowball sampling as ‘a non-probability sample’ in which the researcher makes ‘initial 
contact with a small group of people who are relevant to the research topic and then uses these 
to establish contacts with others’. This resonates with Burgess (1984:55) who argues, 
snowballing involves ‘using a small group of informants who are asked to put the researcher 
in touch with their friends who are subsequently interviewed, then asking them about their 
friend and interviewing them until a chain of informants has been selected’. Lincoln & Guba 
(1985), provide a similar definition. They state, ‘in this form of sampling one identifies, in 
whatever way one can, a few members of the phenomenal group one wishes to study’(Lincoln 
& Guba, 1985:233). These members are used to identify others, who in turn identify others’ 
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985:233).   
 
Snowballing is said to continue until the researcher reaches the point where the selection of 
new individuals or material adds no more substantive contribution to the sample at hand. As 
Lincoln & Guba (1985:233) confirm, ‘unless the group is very large one soon comes to a point 
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at which efforts to net additional members cannot be justified in terms of the additional outlay 
of energy and resources; this point may be thought of as a point of redundancy’.   
 
In this research, ‘snowballing’ was chosen because it was viewed as t he most appropriate 
method of obtaining samples from Somalis who were ‘numerically a small group’ (cf. Arber, 
2001:63). Also, in agreement with Arber (2001:63), snowballing was chosen because it was 
‘the main feasible method of finding a sample’ where the potential subjects of research were 
likely to be ‘sceptical of the intentions of the researcher’ – as attested in this research (see 
‘Reflexivity’ relating to the ‘encounter with Somali respondents’, below).   
 
4.2.2.2 Applying the Snowball Technique 
 
This researcher’s snowballing technique did commence with a few Somalis acquaintances that 
the researcher requested to volunteer for interviews. This research also relied on personal 
recommendations from friends and their acquaintances. When somebody was identified, the 
researcher got in touch with him or her to arrange for an interview. Once interviewed, the 
interviewee would be asked if s/he knew anyone (a friend or a relative) who would volunteer 
for a similar interview. The same questions were used each time and the approach proceeded 
in subsequent interviews until this research got an adequate number of interviewees (Arber, 
2001; Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Burgess, 1984).  
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It is important to note, however, that the snowballing technique has some limitations that were 
deliberately set, in order to achieve maximum variability among the people studied and the 
data this research sought to collect. To attain maximum variability, this snowball sample had 
to reflect as far as p ossible the entire Somali population in Stockholm in terms of such 
variables as age, sex, education, work, number of years in Sweden, etc. Indeed, snowballing 
continued until the research was certain that it had enough data to cover certain cohorts in the 
population and then move on to other type of people in the quest of attaining maximum 
variation in data. Maximum variability should not, however, be confused with 
representativeness. Being qualitative research, and given the choice and size of sampling, this 
research was not representative in a quantitative sense.      
 
Nonetheless, the quest for maximum variability in the sample was not without glitches. One 
particular problem encountered related to the gaining access to [potential] female respondents. 
Indeed, it became apparent, for example, that attaining the same proportions or numbers of 
female and male respondents became difficult. The main reason for this difficulty relates to 
cultural sensibilities when it c ame to Somali women, to which the researcher was aware. 
Accordingly, the researcher was obliged to negotiate access in a way that was ‘acceptable’ to 
the values of (‘majority of’) Somalis when access to Somali women was sought. The reason 
why only nine out of the twenty-eight Somali research respondents were women was, for 
example, precisely because of the cultural restrictions ‘placed’ on male researchers (as this 
researcher was). 
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4.3 The Data Collection Process 
 
The data collection phase of this research proceeded in three stages. The first stage involved 
individual interviews conducted with twenty-eight Somalis (consisted of nineteen men and 
nine-women). Here the study targeted people aged between 18 and 55. The second stage in 
data collection involved interviewing ten Swedish officials, seven at local (commune) level 
and three at national level. The third and last stage involved a focus group interview conducted 
with eight Somalis, whom the researcher believed were knowledgeable about the current 
situation of Somalis in Sweden.  
 
4.3.1 Methods   
 
Interviewing was the main method for gathering data in this research. There were two types of 
interviews employed. The first was semi-structured interviews (with Somali research 
respondents), and the second, structured interviews (with Swedish officials). These various 
sources of interviewing methods were highly complementary to one another in elucidating the 
accounts about the experiences and perception of Somalis, and experiences and perceptions of 
others (e.g., Swedish officials) about Somalis (and their integration) in Sweden. Separately 
deployed was a focus group interview (with eight Somalis) that played an important 
supplementary role in the data collection process (see below). 
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4.3.1.1 Data Collection: First Stage 
  
This research gathered interviews from twenty-eight Somalis, nineteen of whom were men 
and nine were women. On the average, interviews with individual Somali research participants 
lasted between 60 to 90 minutes, with the exception of two, that each took two hours. This 
research wanted these interviews to be perceived as a ‘conversation with purpose’, which 
meant engaging individual Somali research participants in ‘dialogue-like conversations’ rather 
than interviews per se (Burgess, 1984:102).  
 
Before an interview began, the ‘potential’ interviewee would be asked if s/he still wished to 
participate – even with the full knowledge that the person was part of a sa mple that was 
arrived at through snowballing, and with the assurances from his/her friend(s) to whom 
interviewees sometimes had more confidence and respect, than they would presumably for the 
researcher. Having solicited an agreement and committed participants to sign a consent form 
(see Appendix 3), the researcher explained (to respondents) the aims of the interview and the 
overall purpose of conducting the research. The researcher then spelt out the intentions about 
tape-recording the interviews and discussed that with the respondents (for ‘ethical 
considerations’, see Appendix 4).  
 
Next in line was to give a short explanation of the ‘agenda’ of topics (or Aide Mémoire) that 
had to be covered with the interviewee. There was no requirement on the part of the 
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interviewer and the interviewed to cover all topics. Nonetheless, the researcher tried to 
‘squeeze in’ as many as topics and questions that were possible depending on how much time 
was left for that particular interview session.   
 
The Aide Mémoire was a shortened version of the initial interview schedule. It contained a set 
of themes and topics that were used to form questions in the course of conversation. This gave 
the respondents the opportunity to develop their answers outside a structured format. Thus, 
informants had a relatively high degree of involvement and spontaneity in constructing their 
social world together with the researcher. Nonetheless, the researcher had to intervene from 
time to time when an informant veered away from the topics under discussion. After all, the 
interview was a ‘conversation with purpose’! 
 
The decision to opt for Aide Mémoire rather than an interview schedule was borne out of the 
experience gained from the small pilot study interviews as well as the first initial sets of 
interviews conducted in the field. The reasons were twofold. First, the interview schedule 
contained too much detail. Trying to cover as many topics as possible within the allotted time 
limit (around one hour or an hour and half), proved futile as a result. Second, the interview 
schedule had the potential effect of putting more ‘structure’ into the interviews which meant 
there was less room for spontaneity and in-depth account of issues to be discussed (cf. 
Burgess, 1984:102). For more about the Aide Mémoire of this research (see Appendix 5). 
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4.3.1.2 Data Collection: Second Stage 
 
Interviews conducted with the ten Swedish officials constituted the second stage of the data 
collection process of this research. The rationale was to use the data collected from officials to 
supplement, complement and corroborate the data collected from Somali informants. 
Moreover, it was felt perception and experience of these officials would be invaluable in that 
they could provide a counter-weight to the views expressed by Somali research respondents.  
 
Initially, the plan was to identify and select officials from various departments/actors charged 
(directly or indirectly) with the facilitation of immigrant integration in Sweden. However, as it 
turned out, many officials (five out of ten) came from the same borough in Stockholm, 
namely, Rinkeby (see Appendix 2, for map). For whatever shortcomings, such a concentration 
on one area may have entailed, Rinkeby had some uncontested advantages. First, it is in 
Rinkeby where a relatively sizeable population of Somali in Stockholm lives. It is, therefore, 
in Rinkeby where most experience and knowledge about Somalis would be available. 
Secondly, it was in Rinkeby where access to the officials was most forthcoming in comparison 
to other local administrations in Stockholm, in part thanks to the researcher’s own previous 
knowledge about Rinkeby and his contacts there. Access to the officials was originally sought, 
informally, through the researcher’s own ‘contacts’ (e.g., through former work colleagues), 
and, formally, through correspondence, telephone and e-mail.  
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4.3.1.2.1 Access to Officials   
  
The researcher contacted a sectional head in Rinkeby Social District (Rinkeby SDF) through 
e-mail and informed her (the manager) of the intentions of carrying out research involving 
Somali refugees in the Stockholm metropolitan region. In the pursuits of doing so, the 
researcher told this manager he needed to talk to some officials in order to solicit their 
perspectives on the integration of Somalis in Sweden. After more additional correspondences, 
the Sectional Head was able to inform the researcher that four persons in her organisation 
volunteered for the impending interviews. She also provided the researcher with the names 
and contacts of these officials. The officials were subsequently contacted and they gave their 
consent to be interviewed. The researcher subsequently travelled to Stockholm to conduct 
interviews with the four Rinkeby officials as an initial step.  
 
Whilst in Rinkeby, the researcher was informed of another official who was willingly to 
volunteer for an interview. She too was interviewed. That brought the total number of 
‘official’ interviewees to five. The next move was to gain access to other officials from other 
districts. That meant contacting other acquaintances. Consequently, two acquaintances, one in 
Skärholmen, the other in Märsta were interviewed (see Appendix 6 and Appendix 7, for maps, 
respectively). Through another acquaintance, the researcher was also able to get in touch, and, 
subsequently interview two officials from the Migration Office in Solna (see Appendix 8, for 
maps). It is  worth noting that the two officials from the Migration Office had previously 
worked in Rinkeby, and hence, had an experience of directly working with Somali clients. 
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Most challenging, however, was access to officials from the Swedish Integration Office (SIO). 
Many of the requests for an interview made to SIO remained unanswered. It took almost a 
year before access to interview an official from the Integration Office was gained. SIO was 
located in Norrköping, about 135 KM west of Stockholm (see Appendix 9 for the Map of 
Sweden). For more on Swedish ‘official’ respondents, see Appendix 10. 
 
In all the cases, the researcher asked officials to check with their line managers if it was 
acceptable for them to volunteer for the interviews. All reassured the researcher that they did 
precisely that and had no problems in meeting to talk to him (the researcher). The researcher 
was also able to take great consolation in the relatively vast autonomy accorded to Swedish 
officials in not only structuring their work, but also the relative independence of their line 
managers in contrast to their counterparts in many parts of the world.  
 
There were a number of possible reasons why Swedish officials enjoy relative autonomy from 
their ‘managers’. One observation resulted from the fact that authority and decision making 
within the public sector hierarchies and bureaucracies tend to be more ‘horizontal’ than 
‘vertical’. Second, decentralisation in Sweden seems more pervasive since every commune 
tends to govern itself independently of the central government. Third, the relative influence of 
labour unions and labour laws in Sweden guarantee expanded rights for Swedish workers than 
their counterparts in many part of the world. Fourth and more importantly, Swedish welfare 
state interventions aim to erode visible class differences in comparison to many other 
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countries may have contributed to a tradition of ‘equality’ and shared responsibilities among 
all cadres in Swedish workplaces.     
 
4.3.1.2.2 Structured Interviews with Officials          
 
The interviews with Swedish officials were structured. The use of a structured interview 
format here ensued from the intention to use the accounts solicited from individual Somali 
participants as the basis for discussions with Swedish officials. Accordingly, from the outset, 
the researcher would let officials know that what they were about to talk about was based on 
accounts gathered from individual Somali participants interviewed in Stockholm. For the 
purpose of clarity, the researcher went through a list of points with these officials before the 
interview commenced.  
 
Among others, officials were notified that many questions/statements in the areas (themes) to 
be covered were based on the subjective interpretation of the Somali participants interviewed; 
many of the accounts to be explored bordered on ‘gross generalisation’; many questions were 
in the form of a statements in which the officials would be require to comment (if they may); 
many of the questions could simply be answered by ‘no’ and ‘yes’, but the researcher would 
require them to elaborate (it was hoped more information would be forthcoming through 
probing and prompting); and, some questions could be outside the official’s specific area of 
duty or responsibility in which case the official would not be obliged to answer or respond 
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(although s/he were free to offer a view where possible). Finally, the researcher was insistent 
that he was no expert, and that it would be ‘they’ together – the researcher and the official – 
who would attempt to construct what could be regarded as the ‘accurate’ situation/reality of 
Somalis in Stockholm/Sweden. 
 
4.3.1.3 Data Collection: Third Stage 
 
The last and final stage of data collection entailed the use of a focus group interview. The 
focus group involved eight male participants whom the researcher believed were 
knowledgeable about the current situation of Somalis in Sweden. This assessment was based 
on four grounds. First, all these participants spent a considerable amount of time in Sweden 
and were ‘fairly’ integrated into Swedish society. Second most of these participants had direct 
dealings with Swedish authorities (some of whom were public servants). Third, most of the 
participants were engaged in some form of advocacy (often at individual levels, but also at 
group levels, i.e., as members of Somali ethnic organisations) in advancing the integration of 
Somalis in Sweden. Fourth, all the participants had a good reputation or standing in the Somali 
community at Stockholm. Before we dwell further, let us define the term focus group.  
 
A focus group (also referred to as focus group interview) is a ‘particular type of interview’ – a 
group interview – on a sp ecific topic; hence, where the ‘focus’ comes from (Robson, 
2002:284). Two ‘core’ elements usually associated with focus groups are: (a) ‘a moderator 
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who sets the stage with prepared questions or an interview guide’; and, (b) ‘the goal of 
eliciting participants’ feelings, attitudes and perceptions about a selected topic’ (Vaughn et al., 
(1996 as cited in Puchta & Potter, 2004:6). Simply put, a focus group meeting is a discussion 
in which a small group of people under the guidance of a facilitator or moderator talk about a 
topic selected for investigation (Howard et al., (1989 as cited in Fallon, 2002).  
 
To Morgan (1997:20, as cited in Puchta & Potter, 2004:74), the essence of a focus group is the 
‘bringing together of attitudes, opinions, and experiences of members’. In so doing researchers 
have three objectives in mind: (a) to find out what respondents think about an issue, (b) how 
they think the issue, and, (c) why they think the way they do about the issue.  
 
4.3.1.3.1 Original aim changes midway into research 
 
As noted previously, although the focus group interview was not the main primary source of 
evidence in this research, it nonetheless played an important supplementary role. Originally, 
this research intended to use the focus group members as a sort of panel that could arbitrate 
between individual Somali interviewees and Swedish official. This was because the research 
envisaged a situation where the two groups would perceive many issues regarding the topic of 
inquiry (the integration of Somalis in Sweden) in different ways. This did not occur in 
practice. This research did not find most officials ‘confrontational’ or dismissive in any 
significant way – though, admittedly, there were a minority of officials with differing 
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discourses. In most cases the two data sets – accrued from individual Somali participants and 
Swedish officials respectively, – mostly confirmed and or reinforced each other. What does 
this tells us, then? It tells us that social phenomenon or reality is not linear but more complex – 
certainly, contrary to what this research hitherto envisaged. 
  
Thanks to the flexibility often associated with qualitative research, the researcher had no 
difficulty in figuring out how to re-orientate the focus group interview. The research had 
already committed itself to use focus group interview as part of his data collection methods 
and to drop it at such an advanced stage was deemed unwise.  Ultimately, the focus group 
interview was used as a way to amplify and understand areas in the preceding data sets that 
may have seemed obscure and diffuse (cf. Evason & Whittington (1997 as cited in Robson, 
2002:287). Example of these areas included ‘policy’ (e.g., in the case of ‘multiculturalism’ 
and ‘integration’ which were interpreted differently) and certain ‘cultural and religious’ issues 
(that sounded controversial and needed highlighting). To a lesser extent, the focus group 
interview was used to shed light into some (few) areas where the research believed individual 
Somali interviewees and Swedish officials seemed to disagree.  
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4.4 Reflexivity  
 
This Sub-section deals with many ‘methodological issues’ and other ‘unanticipated’ dilemmas 
that surfaced during my encounters with the research respondents (cf. Thapar-Björkert, 
1999:57). In particular, it deals with the impact my background/biography may have had on 
the research process and data collection. Above all, it highlights the opportunities and 
obstacles my identity/status as a researcher may have presented when interacting with 
different respondents (i.e., from both the Swedish and Somali communities) and vice versa. 
 
I would argue that I was in a unique position to do this research since I could be viewed as an 
‘insider’ and an ‘outsider’ by both the Somali respondents and the Swedish officials. To 
Somalis I was often seen as an  ‘insider’ doing research on his own community. However, I 
was also treated with some suspicion (‘outsider’) by s ome members of this community 
because of my wish to interview Somali women respondents, where my identity/status as a 
[Somali] male researcher may have impacted on this research.     
 
To Swedish officials I was an ‘insider’, in the sense that I was a ‘ former colleague’, having 
worked as a social worker in Stockholm before I embarked on my PhD studies in the UK.  I 
was also seen as an  ‘outsider’ who was ‘othered’ by other factors (e.g., unequal power 
relationships, belonging to an ethnic minority group, etc).  
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4.4.1 My ‘Insider’ Status   
 
I was, in general, first and foremost, an ‘insider’ when it came to my encounters with Somali 
research respondents. The reason was because I shared common language, ethnic, cultural and 
religious background. Secondly, and most importantly, I shared more or less the same ‘lived’ 
experience of the majority of the Somalis respondents I interviewed, in that I too was an 
immigrant (and a ‘former refugee’) who underwent the same integration process as they did. I 
also related to the stories they told about their own integration processes with regard to work, 
education, discrimination and ‘culturally-related’ ‘divergence’ with the host society. 
 
Indeed, like most Somalis I started my life in Sweden as a r efugee. I spent some time on a 
refugee reception centre whilst I waited for a decision from the Migration Board on my 
asylum application. When I was finally granted a resident permit, I had to move to a commune 
where I was able to receive my ‘introduction’ into society with regards to Swedish language 
courses, education and accommodation.  
 
For me, as was for many of Somali respondents, the process of integration was fraught with 
many difficulties. To begin with, I missed a great deal of the ‘things’ I took for granted before 
arriving in Sweden. I missed the familiarity and the secure environment among family, 
friends, culture, etc., and was cast into a new environment with other sets of 
requirements/demands. I had to learn a new language and culture. Soon I was to discover that 
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the education and work experience I accrued outside Sweden was not easily transferable to 
meet the requirements of the new environment. Like many Somalis, I had to endure a long 
spell of unemployment period. I also encountered a fare share of negative experiences such as 
prejudices and discrimination in Swedish society. These varied, from prejudiced comments to 
the ‘denial’ to jobs that I was qualified to do by recruiters.    
 
The ‘milestone’ in my own integration process occurred when I supplement my previous 
education (accrued abroad) in order to bring it in line with Swedish equivalent. This in turn 
enabled me to secure my first job (in Sweden) as a social worker in Stockholm. In the next 
couple of years I continued to work as a so cial worker in a number of social districts. I also 
managed to acquire a p ostgraduate degree in social work which enabled me to deepen my 
understanding of social work theory and practice in Sweden. 
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4.4.2 The Encounter with Somali Respondents  
  
As I alluded to, my ‘insider’ status/identity as a Somali researcher may have had an impact on 
this research in a number of ways. Firstly, I observed that there was a ‘sense of enthusiasm’ 
among some Somali respondents in the way they responded and related to me and my 
research. Secondly, I detected a certain amount of ‘suspicion’ among some respondents that 
might not have occurred if the researcher had been of non-Somali extraction.  As a 
consequence,  I had to discover that research was more about ‘negotiation’ – a negotiation 
which enabled me to navigate through the potential hitches that could either draw me too close 
to my respondents (because of their enthusiastic response) or away (because of hostilities and 
suspicion towards me and my research). In addition, thanks to my ‘insider’ status, I was able 
to make use of influential ‘gatekeepers’ – i.e. those ‘pivotal persons’ within the Somali 
community who were willing to offer help when I m et hurdles in obtaining data. Again as 
alluded to earlier, the ‘insider’ status was not ‘fixed’ or ‘static’ (Thapar-Björkert, 1999:65; see 
Hayden, 2009). I discovered this with my relationship with Somali women respondents where 
I encountered certain problems, e.g., the problem of limited access and constraints imposed as 
a result of cultural and religious ‘demands’.  
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4.4.2.1 A Sense of Enthusiasm 
 
My background (as Somali) meant some respondents received me and my research not only 
cordially but also with some sense of enthusiasm. This was noted both at the stage when 
‘access’ to respondents was sought and at the ‘interviews’. One example of this ‘sense of 
enthusiasm’ was the significant number of Somalis who contacted me because they were very 
keen to be ‘interviewed’. These Somalis had heard about impending or ongoing interviews 
from their friends or relatives. They would call (often through their friends) and say they had 
‘something’ to ‘share’ with me. Nonetheless, whilst a few were included through my 
‘snowball’ sample, it was not possible to accommodate everyone who wanted to participate. 
Indeed, I often struggled to get the ‘right’ people in terms of age, sex, etc., in my quest to 
achieve maximum ‘variability.  Accordingly, I had to declining to interview those who did not 
fit into the precise categories of people wanted for interviews.   
 
This ‘enthusiasm’ also generated a high expectation about this research, especially, amongst 
the ‘less well educated’ interviewees. Some of these interviewees wanted me to take onboard 
certain ‘concerns’ and discuss these with respective authorities. These interviewees could only 
be reassured that the research would come up with some recommendations. Nonetheless, I 
made it clear this research (and I) had no influence whatsoever on officials or policy makers.   
Moreover, because I was regarded as an ‘insider’ (‘as one of us’), some respondents were able 
to confide in me about sensitive issues from time to time in the course of the interviews. 
Indeed, I had to strike a balance, knowing when and where to stop whilst being courteous. 
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This was necessary given the time constraints involved. After all, the goal of this research was 
to make the interviews ‘a conversation with purpose’ (see Burgess, 1984).   
 
4.4.2.2 Suspicion 
 
My encounter with Somalis aroused not only a ‘sense of enthusiasm’, but also generated a 
certain amount of ‘suspicion’ towards me and my research among some respondents. Many of 
these ‘suspicions’ revolved around my ‘intentions’ and the fact that some people were 
reluctant to share what they considered to be ‘private’. Others were defensive at the beginning 
of the interviews but ‘opened up’ as the interviews progressed.  More personal forms of 
‘suspicion’ were also encountered.  One incident was particularly noteworthy.  It involved a 
female respondent who invited me to her family apartment, to conduct an interview. I was 
accompanied by an acquaintance who initially helped arrange the interview. After initial 
greetings that included the husband of the ‘would-be’ respondent, I was ushered into the 
kitchen, to conduct the interview. The respondent’s husband (who was briefed in advance 
about the interview) took a seat next to his wife (the respondent). Realising that the man 
intended to stay put, I had to intervene. This man was informed that the intention was to 
interview his wife alone as she had consented through my acquaintance, previously. Although 
the man agreed to leave so that his wife could be interviewed alone, one could still sense a 
great deal of suspicion and uneasiness on his part towards me as a male researcher.  
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4.4.2.3 Research as being about Negotiation  
 
Thanks to my ‘insider’ role among Somalis, I was in a good position to reassure potential 
respondents about my intentions as a researcher.  My ‘insider’ status helped me to ‘read’ the 
mood of the individual, regarding potential hesitation, hostility or friendliness towards me and 
my research.  This ‘ability’ was useful both when acquaintances introduced me to persons who 
could volunteer for an interview and also in the course of interviews themselves. On one hand 
there were those you would associate such traits as perplexity, suspicion, fear, pensiveness, 
reluctance, etc  On the other hand, there were those who showed expressions that were the 
opposite (they were jovial and friendly – i.e., showed a sense of enthusiasm). All these 
psychological traits or expressions were ‘readable’ on the faces of people. Thus, I knew when 
to press for an interview or to ‘lie low’ or simply withdraw altogether. 
 
4.4.2.4 The Role of ‘Pivotal Gatekeepers’ 
 
Thanks to my role as an ‘insider’, I was able to identify ‘pivotal gatekeepers’, people who held 
important leverage in the Somalian community in Stockholm and who could offer a ‘helping 
hand’ when I needed. These persons were particularly pivotal while sampling was in progress. 
For example, when a potential informant was not forthcoming for one reason or another, I 
would ask these individuals – the ‘pivotal gatekeepers’ – to find out what was happening, not 
least because they were often acquainted with my potential interviewees. With the help of 
these ‘pivotal gatekeepers’ one was able to interview many of those who were reluctant to be 
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interviewed at first. They were also decisive in helping identify the focus group interviewees 
since they knew those persons who were knowledgeable about Somalis in Sweden (see 
above). 
  
4.4.2.5 The ‘Insider’ Status was not Static 
 
As observed, I was an ‘insider’ when it came to Somalis in general, by vi rtue of being a 
Somali. Nonetheless, this ‘insider’ status/identity was more complex than I had originally 
anticipated. As I found out, it was more than simple commonalities with respondents, e.g., 
sharing the same ethnicity, nationality, culture or religion. Indeed, one could argue that my 
‘insider’ status with Somalis may have been limited mainly to Somali male respondents since I 
share more commonality with them than I did with Somali female respondents. This was 
clearly demonstrated by the differing ways in which I was able to negotiate access with 
Somali males vis-à-vis Somali female research respondents.  
 
Two reasons may have made me an ‘outsider’ when it came to my encounters with Somali 
women respondents. First, their ‘lived experience’ was fundamentally different from mine as a 
Somali male. They were culturally and religiously restricted in their interaction with men. 
They also suffered a ‘double jeopardy’ being subjected to disadvantages within their own 
community and the host society – where they encountered ‘oppression’, discrimination, 
economic disadvantages, and were looked down upon by l ow virtue of their low status and 
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limited educational status (see Corra & Kimuna, 2009:1032; Kats, 1982:661). In that sense it 
could be argued that only a Somali woman could truly understand the full emotional 
complexities of living as woman among Somalis, and in Sweden. It could also be argued that 
as a Somali man I was not in a position to ‘identify with’ Somali women and vice versa, and 
hence, the difficulties in earning their trust.  Indeed, I had to work much harder (in the process 
of the interviews) in order to earn the trust and confidence of Somali female respondents. 
Moreover, access to Somali female respondents had to be negotiated in a w ay that was 
compatible with prevailing Somalian cultural and religious practices. 
 
As it has turned out, all but two women were interviewed in their homes or premises of their 
own choice – a friend’s or a relative’s home (and often in the residence of other women). 
Naturally, I was culturally sensitive when it came to interviewing Somali women. 
Understandably, most Somali women interviewees objected to the idea of being interviewed in 
a restaurant. Presumably, many of these Somali women were ‘uncomfortable’ to be ‘seen’ 
together with other men, especially ‘strangers’ (such as r esearchers) in public places. Many 
women may also have shied away from situations where other customers could overhear their 
conversations (i.e., interviews). The seemingly lack of confidence may partly be explained by 
the social control mechanisms inherent in Somali culture pertaining to gender relations (see 
Chapter Nine). All in all, I was obliged to negotiate access in a way that was ‘acceptable’ to 
the values of the ‘majority of’ Somalis when I sought access to interview Somali women.  
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Another issue of cultural sensitivity pertaining to Somali women was obvious with regard to 
their objections to tape-recording. Many Somali women (six out of nine) refused their 
interviews to be tape-recorded. Understandably, they would not let a stranger (a researcher) 
store these conversations. A one-time encounter was not enough to accord a stranger that 
privilege, presumably. There could also be cultural reasons, such the fear of disclosure and the 
repercussions that could entail, and hence their refusal to have their interviews tape-recorded. 
 
4.4.3 The Encounter with Swedish Officials  
 
The majority of officials I interviewed were social workers to whom I was both the ‘insider’ 
and the ‘outsider’ who came to undertake research. I was an ‘insider’ since as a ‘former’ social 
worker I was regarded and ‘treated’ as a colleague. I also had a special affinity to social work 
and social workers since I identified myself professionally with these officials and the 
profession (social work). Moreover, working as a social worker in Stockholm meant I (like 
these officials) dealt with the salient issue of immigrant integration on a daily basis. 
Immigrants are adversely affected by unemployment, inadequate Swedish language skills, 
living off social assistance and resultant stigmatization. This understanding gave me an ‘edge’ 
since I had ‘inside’ knowledge about their work, both with immigrants (as they constitute a 
distinctively disadvantaged group) and with other client groups in Sweden.  
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Nonetheless, in dealing with Swedish officials, there was no way in which my ‘otherness’ did 
not intrude (see Thapar-Björkert, 1999:57; Hayden, 2009:81). Indeed, I had to recognize and 
reflect upon the many differences that ‘othered’ me from the Swedish officials whom I 
interviewed. First, there existed an unequal power relationship between me and these officials. 
I belonged to a minority group (that was in many ways excluded) from the mainstream 
Swedish society, whilst Swedish officials belonged to the majority host society. Second, 
Swedish officials were associated and ‘represented’ a p owerful [welfare] system that often 
affected the lives of many refugees/immigrants and their integration process in Sweden (to 
which I was part). In many ways, this was a structure that enabled or erected barriers against 
those afflicted (refugees/immigrants). In other words, these officials had roles and relative 
status, prestige and power that often placed them in a ‘higher hierarchal position’ over 
members of ethnic minorities – to which I belonged (see Thapar-Björkert, 1999:62; Collins, 
1998).  
 
Third, there were obvious racial, ethnic, social, economic, cultural, religious and social class 
differences with Swedish officials. In all, my perceived place in the [Swedish] social structure, 
i.e., as a member of ethnic minority interlocking with ‘powerful’ respondents from the native 
majority group) meant that I may have been denied the ability to speak from a ‘position of 
dominance’ – as researchers ‘usually’ do over their research subjects (see Rosaldo (1989:168-
9, as cited in Hayden, 2009:83). These ‘differences’ may have thus impacted upon my 
‘positionality’ (identity/status) since their ‘position’ placed them in a superior position in the 
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hierarchy which I had to attempt to ‘overcome’.  (see Hayden, 2009:81; Thapar-Björkert, 
1999:62). 
 
4.4.3.1  Interacting with Swedish Officials: An Observation  
 
In spite of my awareness of the unequal power relationship, I s till tried to cultivate a 
relationship that was equal in status with the Swedish officials. And, for most part, this was 
achieved.  My feeling was that power was more or less laterally/horizontally ‘shared’ with the 
majority of these (Swedish) officials; and, ‘everyone’ seemed to engage with one another 
without ‘regarding’ the other as ‘inferior’ or ‘superior’ in any way. I also felt confident in my 
position/role (e.g., as a  researcher/colleague) – which was characteristically collegial, yet 
focused and business-like when dealing with these officials. It was a relationship in which I 
felt I w as receiving confirmation as a ‘serious’ investigator. This is reinforced by t he 
following sentiment from one of the officials:   
We do not  meet people like you. The people we 
meet are those who have problems with integrating 
themselves in society. 
 
Notwithstanding, this research can reveal important observations on the part of Swedish 
officials, i.e., a series of ‘unconscious’ behaviours that were conveyed to me in the course of 
data collection. These included the way the officials ‘carried themselves’, their body language, 
the confidence they exuded and their level of control in the interview situation. One example 
was the discretion by an official to discontinue an interview due to more ‘important pressing 
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matters’ related to his/her work. All these indicated to me that these officials wielded certain 
‘power’ that was ‘visible’, which was absent when I conducted interviews with Somali 
respondents. The way these officials had undertaken certain practical steps prior to the 
interviews also meant that they had, from the outset, certain ‘control’ in the way the interviews 
were to be conducted. They (officials), for example, determined the venue/‘environment’ 
where the interviews took place. The meeting usually took place in the official’s office or 
workplace. There was also aura of ‘we’re in control here’ in that it was I who was welcomed 
and subsequently ushered into their offices. The seating plan was normally predetermined by 
the official. 
 
Moreover, the venue as well as the interaction seemed all too formal and predictable. There 
was an aspect of ‘formality’ in the atmosphere. This can be compared with Somali 
respondents who were met at different places, where the meeting points were often dictated by 
other sets of circumstances, such as, the suitability of the venue, the convenience to the 
interviewee, or whether or not interviews were to take place in their homes or elsewhere.  
 
4.4.3.2 Other Questions 
 
In reflecting on my encounter with Swedish officials, a number of other important questions 
came to the fore. For example, did I know relatively more about Somalis and some of the 
issues/topics I raised with the officials because I was a Somali and had the ‘lived experience’ 
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of Somalis in Sweden? Could some of the data I collected from the Swedish officials simply 
turn out to be ‘official accounts’ of events that lacked both ‘personal reflections’ and 
spontaneity? Could some of the ‘negative’ sentiments about Somalis (and Muslims) in 
particular and immigrants I o btained from a minority of officials border on xe nophobia or 
Islamophobia?   
 
4.4.3.2.1  Knowing relatively more 
 
There were instances where I felt I had more knowledge about certain areas but where I, 
nonetheless, listened to what an official had to say on t hat topic or topics. This was 
particularly the case when officials deliberated on issues that related to Somalian cultural and 
[Islamic] religious beliefs/practices. The question worth posing here is, whether what they said 
about particular issues – issues that I felt I was more knowledgeable than my respondents – 
really mattered? This kind of ethical dilemma resonates with Boudieu’s (1977) first order 
‘objectification’ in which the ‘interviewer claims to know more about the interviewee’ when 
the latter expresses his/her sentiment (see Collins, 2009:3.7). 
 
4.4.3.2.2 Official version 
 
I was sometimes left with a feeling that some Swedish officials gave what could be referred to 
as ‘official account’ when they responded to certain issues. This dilemma is reinforced by 
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Bourdieu (1977:37, as cited in Collins, 1998:1.4) who claims officials are ‘likely to provide 
the interviewer with the “official account”, i.e., ‘what ought to happen rather than what 
actually does happen’. In some sense these officials may have censored themselves since they 
were after all bounded by the work they did which often expects them to work according to 
established procedures and observe non-discriminatory approaches when at work.  One reason 
which made me believe that there was limited  spontaneity in their responses was the way in 
which these officials often pondered and even paused (as if lost in thought) before they 
provided answers to the question(s) I posed. It was as though, they did not want to say 
something ‘out of the ordinary’.  
  
Why did these officials hesitate before answering questions rather than responding more 
spontaneously? A number of questions come to mind. Might these officials have given 
consideration to my personal feelings, as well as to my ethnic and religious sensibilities? 
Could they have given prior thought to the possibility that if they said something that might 
discomfort me, I would probably feel ‘hurt’? Could they have thought that they would come 
across as ‘intolerant’ if they pursued a harsher judgment about Somalis or other groups in 
similar position in Sweden? In so doing, could they have suppressed some of their inner 
feelings that could otherwise have been important to the outcome of this research? 
 
Another issue that comes into mind was the difficulties these officials found themselves when 
discussing emotive subjects such the integration of refugees like Somalis in Sweden. Sitting in 
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a public office and expressing negative ideas about Swedish integration and multicultural 
policy would perhaps be inappropriate for many. The question then is: could these officials 
have said different things in another context, for example in their private conversations with 
their friends and families? 
 
4.4.3.2.3 The Dilemma of not responding to ‘negative’ views 
 
Last but not least, there were instances where I felt that some of the sentiments expressed by 
certain officials could be interpreted as xenophobic or Islamophobic in nature. Nonetheless, it 
was a conscious ‘ploy’ and a ‘strategic’ stance on my part not to show disapproval of 
respondents’ views or express sentiments that contradicted their accounts whilst interviewing 
them (see Bourdieu, 1977: 3-9). Indeed, I may have felt uncomfortable with what a respondent 
might have said, but for the sake of continued engagement with an interviewee, I had to adopt 
a neutral stance as a way to pursue my goals of attaining the data I sought. The reasons were 
simple. What were expressed were personal views. My role as a r esearcher was after all to 
solicit information and different perspectives (to which negative sentiments were part). 
Undoubtedly, had I challenged the views these officials expressed (negatively) on certain 
topics (for example, Somalian culture and religious practices/Islam) these officials might have 
taken a defensive posturing, and hence, undermined my strategy of remaining neutral as a 
researcher.   
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Nevertheless, by not challenging some of views that may have been xenophobic or 
Islamophobic in nature, it could be said that I was giving the impression that I was ‘agreeing’ 
with what some officials were saying. The question that came to mind was, was it appropriate 
or inappropriate not to challenge some of those sentiments that I felt uncomfortable with at 
the time?  This is analogous to the war reporter who, when faced with reporting a famine or 
genocide is faced with the ethical dilemma of continuing to film or offering assistance.  My 
decision was not to challenge prejudicial views at the time in accordance with ‘good’ research 
practice not least because it could have disrupted or extended the interview.  T hese issues 
have, however, been addressed in my writing up of the research.      
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4.5 Analysing the Research Data   
 
This section describes thematic analysis –, the analytic method employed–, and the steps taken 
in analysing the research data. Thematic analysis is defined as a method for ‘identifying’, 
‘analysing’ and ‘reporting patterns (themes)’ within data (Braun & Clarke, 2006:79). It 
involves ‘searching across a d ata set’ for recurrent ‘themes’ and ‘repeated patterns of 
meaning’ as well as ‘issues of potential interest to the research’ in the transcribed data, with 
the ultimate aim of ‘reporting the content and meaning of patterns (themes) in the data’ (Braun 
& Clarke, 2006:86; see Boyatzis, 1998). 
 
4.5.1 The Process of Analysis  
 
To reiterate, the qualitative data derived from this research came from a number of sources. 
The first of these sources were individual interviews with members of the Somali community. 
These individuals numbered twenty-eight and comprised of nineteen men and nine women. 
With the exception of seven persons (six women and one man), all the interviews were tape-
recorded. All the non-recorded interviews were handwritten. The second source of data came 
from interviews with ten Swedish officials (seven from local municipal levels and three from 
the national level). All ten official interviews were tape-recorded. The final source came from 
a focus group interview involving eight Somali men whom the researcher believed were 
knowledgeable about the situation of Somalis in Sweden. This session was also tape-recorded. 
In order to ‘draw valid meaning’ from the data, it had to be analysed (see Miles & Huberman, 
116 
 
1994:1). Analysis for most part entailed achieving ‘coherence’ and ‘structure’ in the data, 
whilst at the same time ensuring that the accounts in the data were retained (see Ritchie & 
Spencer, 1994:179). Achieving coherence, structure and valid meaning from the data meant 
that the data amassed had to undergo numerous processes, viz.: transcription, familiarisation 
and coding.    
 
4.5.1.1 Transcription   
 
Transcription was one of the first in a m yriad of practical steps this research had to 
undertaken, in order to analysis the data. Indeed, all interviews including the focus group 
interview were transcribed. The initial strategy was to put ‘everything’ that respondents said, 
that was conceivably comprehensible, into text, verbatim. As expected, these transcripts 
lacked coherence and a smooth flow, at least in their very early stage.  
 
In retrospect, one could attribute this ‘incoherence and lack of flow’ to two main points. First 
was the nature of interviews. In general, the less structured a set of data was, the more likely 
that a ‘lack of coherence and smooth flow’ would surface in the resultant transcripts. The first 
data set that involved interviews with Somali respondents were less structured since 
interviewees were often at liberty to say what they wanted within the time frame of those 
interviews. Second, the switching from one issue or topic to another where an interviewee 
would talk about a particular issue and suddenly switch to another – one that was seemingly 
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more important and pressing than the one at hand – to buttress his/her original argument. In 
doing so, interviewees had sometimes the tendency to veer from the meanings and contexts of 
a given discussion.    
 
Moreover, by putting ‘everything’ verbatim, grammar, punctuations, sentence construction, 
etc., became a seco ndary concern.  A s a r esult, the transcripts ended up w ith numerous 
statements, sentences and meanings that were incomplete.  N evertheless, because 
transcription(s) had to undergo further changes, this concern for language and ‘lack of 
coherence and smooth flow’ began to recede, as analysis proceeded.  
 
In concurring with Silverman (2000:149), one could say transcripts lent this research 
‘something to start with’. They may have been laborious, boring and or time-consuming, but 
they offered the researcher something to work with, something tangible, something that kept 
him busy and focused for weeks and months to come. It was only after all interviews were 
transcribed that the analysis process was able to proceed to subsequent stages, i.e., 
familiarisation and coding.   
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4.5.1.2 Familiarisation 
  
The transcribed data was not only unstructured but bulky and cumbersome. In light of this 
unwieldiness, it w as incumbent, upon the researcher, to familiarise himself with that data. 
Familiarisation came by ‘reading’ through it ‘repeatedly’; listening to audiotapes from time to 
time, for clarity purposes; and, paying particular attention to the main ‘recurrent themes’ in the 
data (Ritchie& Spencer, 1994:179; Braun & Clarke, 2006:79; 86). The reasons why this 
researcher had to familiarise himself with his data was not different from those described by 
Ritchie & Spencer (1994). According to Ritchie & Spencer (1994:179), researchers need to 
familiarise themselves with the range and ‘diversity’ of their data for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, researchers need to ‘gain an overview’ of material they gather. An overview gives the 
researcher a hint of how things have developed thus far, and how things may turn out to be 
later on. Secondly, thanks to familiarisation, researchers form hunches about key issues and 
emerging themes from the data they look at. Thirdly, familiarisation sets these themes firmly 
in context – by taking stock and gaining a feel for the material as a whole.  
 
4.5.1.3 Codes and Coding Process 
 
Coding represented the most important analysis stage in this research. Codes connote ‘tags’ 
assigned to ‘units of meaning’, ‘names’ put on ‘incidents and events’, or, ‘labels’ attached to 
‘a section of text’ (Miles & Huberman, 1994:56; 62). They were ‘themes’ or ‘issues’, which 
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the researcher identified as important in the data for analytic purposes (Braun & Clarke, 
2006:79; see King, 1998; Ritchie & Spencer, 1994; Miles & Huberman, 1994). 
  
Initially, the analysis of this research was mainly preoccupied in identifying themes in their 
textual context. These themes were then ‘tagged’ against data segments (i.e., chunks of texts 
that varied in sizes). What constituted a ‘theme’? Themes were significant words, concepts, 
phrases or passages in the data that were used as co des (Payne & Payne, 2004, M iles & 
Huberman, 1994, King, 1998). In line with Miles & Huberman (1994:56), ‘any piece of data’ 
– a word, a sentence, a paragraph, etc – all became a ‘candidate’ for one or more codes in the 
analysis of the data.  
 
Coding also involved the process of extracting themes (identified as the same or related with 
one another) from their original texts and grouping them thematically for further analysis. This 
process was carried out across and through all the transcripts.   
 
4.5.1.3.1 Developing Thematic Coding 
 
A great deal of the coding process (analysis) of this research was taken up with identifying 
‘themes’ that could be ‘labelled’ against a segment of the data. In this research, that process 
(of coding) developed successively, since data collection occurred in stage (see above). The 
120 
 
first stage commenced after the first data set involving interviews with Somali research 
participants were transcribed and familiarised with. The process of coding (i.e. identifying 
‘themes’ that could be ‘labelled’ against a segment of the data) was then replicated in 
subsequent data sets, i.e., with interviews involving Swedish officials and the focus group 
interview, respectively. 
 
Coding in this research was on-going, dynamic and subject to revision, i.e., modification to 
themes occurred all the time. Whilst some themes were retained, many were further developed 
in the course of analysis. Yet others had to be discarded in the end.  Some of the themes 
retained for analysis, were the same or similar to a priori themes. A priori themes constituted 
the somewhat pre-determined, preliminary set of codes that the researcher imposed on t he 
research. They were often the ‘actual’ subjects covered in the interviews. A priori themes, like 
the research questions, stemmed from the conceptual framework of the topic integration.  
Most of the themes that emerged from the data were, however, subject to further development. 
Nonetheless, those themes that failed to yield sufficient data, after all themes relating to a 
particular argument or phenomenon have been collated together, were discarded.    
 
In the process of modification, some themes merged to form overarching (main) themes. 
Others became sub-themes that gave structure and consistency to the stories constructed.  
Nonetheless, although, many themes became narrower and more specific with analysis (and 
subsequent interpretation of data), many others retained their relatively broadness. There are 
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pros and cons. As Crabtree & Miller (1992: 99) noted, adoption of broader themes enable 
‘large amount of data to be coded rapidly’; ‘broader contexts’ to be retained; and ‘more text 
for interpretation’ becoming accessible to researchers. On the flipside though, using broad 
categories of codes may ‘fail to capture specific meanings’ that could add ‘uniqueness’ and 
‘richness’ to the data (Crabtree & Miller, 1992: 99). Moreover, a given segment could ‘contain 
multiple ideas’, to which the adoption of broader themes or codes would be poorly prepared to 
capture (see Crabtree & Miller, 1992:99).  
 
Naturally, when and where to finish coding was an issue in this research. Here, we took solace 
in Lincoln & Guba (1985:341), who suggest that coding is ‘over’ when the analysis becomes  
‘saturated’, i.e., when ‘all incidents’ are ‘classified’ and categories’, and when there are 
sufficient numbers of regularities that emerge from the data (see Miles & Huberman 
(1994:62). This echoes Payne & Payne (2004:36), who argue that ‘the iteration’ of the 
qualitative analysis ‘continues until the researcher is satisfied that the data has been fully 
explored and interpreted’. 
 
Thanks to thematic analysis, it was possible to examine, analyse, and interpret each theme 
across all transcripts. It was also possible to lift data from their original context and rearrange 
them according to appropriate thematic reference, as well as map and interpret the data as a 
whole (cf. Ritchie & Spencer, 1994:181).  
 
122 
 
4.5.1.3.1.1 Using Thematic Analysis 
 
Thematic analysis was chosen as the appropriate analytic method for analysing the qualitative 
data of this research. The reasons were twofold. The first related to its flexibility over 
alternative analytic approaches, e.g., grounded theory and content analysis (to which this 
researcher has looked into), and, the second, related to its compatibility with this research’s 
ontological and epistemological positions. There is a link between the two factors: the 
flexibility thematic analysis offered meant it was compatible with the philosophical 
underpinning of the research.    
 
The ontological and epistemological positions of this research hold that, people, as social 
actors, cannot be considered as ‘ external’ to their ‘reality’ (see Bryman, 2001:16).  T his is 
because, as social actors, people help in the construction of their ’reality’. This in turn, makes 
their perceptions, meanings, actions, knowledge, etc, enormously important when attempting 
to ‘reconstruct’ that reality through research, i.e., in order to understand their social reality. It 
is arguable, therefore, that such a ‘reality’ cannot be fully captured by researcher who opt for 
alternative ontological and epistemological positions, e.g., objectivists who, by c ontrast, 
advocate that ‘social phenomena and their meanings exist independent of social actors’ 
(Bryman (2001:16). 
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The ontological position adopted by t his research was constructionism. The task of this 
research was, therefore, to examine and understand the multiple social constructions of 
meanings, experiences, perspectives and knowledge of the respondents (social actors) of this 
research. Thus, from a constructionist ontological viewpoint, this research viewed the ‘reality’ 
of people as ‘socially constructed’ (Robson, 2002:27; see Morgan & Smircich, 1980). It 
affirms that people’s ‘perspective, meaning and experience are socially produced and 
reproduced’, not something separable from the individuals (see Burr (1995 as cite in Braun & 
Clarke, 2006:85).  
 
The epistemological position of this research was interpretivism which meant, it preoccupied 
itself with ‘subjectivity’, ‘understanding’, ‘agency’, and ‘the way people construct their social 
world’ (see Grix, 2004:82). The way of ‘knowing’ or obtaining knowledge thus proceeded 
from the ‘subjective’ interpretations of the social actors (Barinaga, 1999:1; Denzin, 1989:27). 
 
4.5.1.3.1.2 Thematic Analysis vis-à-vis Alternative Approaches 
 
Thematic Analysis has advantages over alternative analytic approaches for its flexibility, 
especially, in comparison to content analysis and grounded theory, hence, its choice for 
analysis (Braun and Clarke, 2006; Boyatzis, 1998; King, 1998; Crabtree & Miller, 1992). 
Content analysis is the ‘accepted’ method of investigating’ research data, particularly, in the 
area of mass media (Joffe & Yardley, 2004:56). In content analysis, all codes are 
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predetermined and their distribution in a g iven text, or series of images, are analysed 
statistically (King, 1998:26). In grounded theory, by c ontrast, there are no pr edetermined a 
priori definitions of codes. Note in the analysis of this research, some a priori themes were 
retained and coded against segments of the research data as were emergent themes. Following 
King (1998), content analysis was considered too abstract whilst grounded theory, too 
technical, and prescriptive to use.   
Figure 4.1: Flexibility of Thematic Analysis 
 
Source: Developed as part of this study. Courtesy: Adapted partly from the descriptions of 
King (1998) and Miles & Huberman (1984). 
 
For illustrative purposes, we decided to represent graphically the position of the thematic 
analysis approach in relation to content analysis and grounded theory (i.e., two main 
approaches in analysing qualitative data in social science research). In a co ntinuum with 
content analysis and grounded theory placed at the opposite extreme ends, thematic analytic 
approach not only occupies the centre point but also spreads towards the flanks of both 
directions from that centre-point (as shown by the arrows, in the above Figure 4.1). What can 
we learn from this? Evidently, this highlights the existence of variations within the thematic 
Content Analysis                   Thematic Analysis                             Grounded 
Theory 
 
│___________________________________©____________________________________│ 
‘Purely phenome-                                                                     ‘Soft-nosed’ logical positivism’                   
nological position’ (too abstract)                                                         (too prescriptive)                                 
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analysis approach itself (King, 1998; Braun & Clarke, 2006). By variation we mean 
researchers using the thematic analytic approach hardly subscribe to a ‘one size fits all’ kind 
of analysis approach when analysing qualitative research data. As observed from the above 
continuum, some of those researchers using thematic analysis operate close to the content 
analysis approach (a purely phenomenological, abstract position), while others get close to 
grounded theory (which may incline toward a ‘soft-nosed’ logical positivism), hence, the 
flexibility and choice for thematic analysis as the appropriate analytic approach for analysing 
the research data of this thesis.   
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
The qualitative research data dealt with research participants’ accounts about their experiences 
and perceptions regarding the integration of Somalis in Sweden. It meant staying close to the 
reality of the respondents and how they saw that reality. It was in essence by drawing from 
these experiences and perceptions – i.e., research participants’ ‘subjective understandings and 
interpretations’ regarding the topic of inquiry –, that this research attempts to answer the 
(research) questions it posed (cf. Denzin, 1989:27).  
 
The first section dealt with the choice of methodology, sampling and data collection methods 
and processes. The appropriateness of qualitative research methods were highlighted, among 
others, its appropriateness to study sensitive topics and minorities, its use of small samples 
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(where sampling frames are not readily available) and its tendency to preserve the 
chronological flow of events within the phenomenon under investigation. The method used for 
gathering information was interviewing. These were semi-structured (in the case with Somali 
respondents) and structured (in the case of Swedish officials). A focus group session was also 
included as a method for data collection.  The sampling strategy adopted was purposive, non-
probability given the size of the sample. Sampling was arrived at through the use of the 
snowball technique. Data was collected in stages. The first stage involved individual 
interviews with twenty-eight Somalis, the second, ten officials, and the third, a focus group 
that comprised of eight persons. The impact of the researcher’s identity (biography) and status 
on the research and data collection processes was also highlighted.    
 
The Second Section dealt with analysis which occurred in stages, viz.: transcription, 
familiarisation, and coding. Attempts were also made to justify the choice of analytic 
approach, i.e., thematic analysis, for the research. Two main points were highlighted. One, the 
flexibility thematic analysis offered in comparison to alternative analysis approaches. The 
second was the compatibility of thematic analysis to the research’s ontological and 
epistemological positions.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
5 EMPLOYMENT (LABOUR MARKET) AND EDUCATION 
 
This chapter identifies unemployment and ‘unsuitable’ education as factors that impinge upon 
the socio-economic integration of Somalis in Sweden. By ‘unsuitable’ education we mean 
education that is either ‘poor’, ‘low’ or ‘non-relevant’ to the new setting.    
 
Labour market participation and education are two key domains of integration. Together they 
form the basis for the discussion in this chapter. With regard to labour market relations, 
‘unemployment’ instead of ‘employment’ takes the centre stage in this deliberation for the 
central reason that the former is a serious problem that afflicts Somalis in Sweden. In respect 
to education, this chapter focuses on the prevalence of ‘illiteracy’ and ‘unsuitable’ education 
among Somalis. Attention will also be paid to the ‘emergent perception’ that Somalis have 
done ‘little’ to improve their educational status despite being in Sweden for a considerable 
amount of time.  
 
5.1 Unemployment (Rather than Employment) 
 
Before exploring the issue of unemployment among Somalis in Sweden, it is useful to look 
firstly at some broader aspects of ‘unemployment’. First a brief definition of the concept, 
unemployment is given. Second a short overview of the different types of unemployment – as 
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gleaned from the literature that was reviewed is provided – with the intent of isolating the 
type(s) of unemployment that afflicts Somalis in Sweden.  Extra emphasis is given to the state 
of the Swedish economy in the 1990s recession and its subsequent re-structuring, respectively, 
as factors that contributed and perpetuated unemployment among Somalis in Sweden.  
 
5.1.1 Defining Unemployment 
 
The classical definition of the ‘unemployed’ is perhaps best captured by the ILO’s ‘Thirteenth 
International Conference of Labour Statisticians’ (1982:§10, 1-6) which adopted resolutions 
on the statistics of the economically active population, employment, under-employment and 
unemployment. According to this Conference, the ‘unemployed’ comprise of persons who 
during a reference period were “without work”, i.e., were not in paid employment or self-
employment. Secondly, these persons were “currently available for work”, i.e., were available 
for paid work or self-employment. Thirdly, these persons were “seeking work”, i.e., have 
undertaken specified steps in a recent period to seek paid employment or self employment. 
Specified steps refers to the registration of persons with employment exchanges, the sending 
of applications to employers, and the necessary follow-up required to secure employment or 
self-employment for themselves. Unemployment is thus a state in which a person is without 
work, available for employment, and is currently seeking work. 
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5.1.2 Types of Unemployment 
 
Economists often distinguish three types of unemployment, viz.: frictional, classical and 
structural unemployment. Frictional unemployment, also referred to as voluntary 
unemployment, is where the individual is unemployed because s/he wants to find a job of 
his/her choice (Abraham, 1983). People may refrain from taking up certain available jobs (and 
remain unemployed) in the hope of securing another with better remuneration or opportunities 
for advancement. This type of unemployment is, therefore, deliberately chosen by the person 
and can easily be eliminated if the individual takes up a job currently available. When it comes 
to Somalis in Sweden, this type of unemployment could be ruled out in the sense that what 
mattered most was ‘to secure a job of any kind’, as one respondent put it. And as another puts 
it, ‘they were not in the business of discriminating against jobs’.   
  
Classical unemployment is often associated with rising wage costs, decrease in product 
demand and falling productivity, in which case firms and business are forced to shed workers 
(Lilien, 1982). This type of unemployment affected Somalis indirectly, indirectly in the sense 
that Somalis were ‘bystanders’ when it came to the Swedish labour market during the 1990s – 
when this type of unemployment was at its acutest. In the 1990s, Sweden faced one of its 
worst economic down-turn since the Great Depression of the 1920s and 1930s. As relative 
newcomers who required time to learn Swedish and to adjust in society accordingly, Somalis 
had little opportunity in finding work in the prevailing circumstances of the day.   
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Structural unemployment occurs where there is a mismatch between the jobs available and the 
qualities of the potential employee or where a g ap exists between the skills needed by 
employers and the skills the workforce possess (Abraham, 1983). One of the reasons could be 
that of a skills deficit in potential workers. This type of unemployment is most appropriate to 
Somalis in Sweden.    
 
Both classical and structural unemployment are involuntary. Unlike frictional unemployment, 
classical and structural unemployment are viewed as macroeconomic concepts (rather than a 
microeconomic one) which means they are not, often, the outcome of decisions made by the 
individuals (or small firms) concerned but by forces independent of their decisions or desires 
(see Sawyer & Spencer, 2008). 
 
5.1.3 Unemployment as a theme 
 
Unemployment was among a priori sub-themes under the major theme, ‘work’, which was 
imposed on this research. In terms of ‘work’, this research was interested in looking, among 
other things, at the current occupations and occupational statuses (employed or unemployed, 
permanent or temporary), skills and work experiences of Somalis in Sweden. In addition this 
research was also curious about whether or not previous skills and work experiences acquired 
from abroad or in Somalia prior to their arrival in Sweden was ‘valued’ (i.e., taken into 
consideration) by employers. The rationale of doing this was to comprehend how the situation 
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of Somali respondents looked like in order to form a ‘hunch’ about the way the larger 
population (Somalis in Sweden) actually fared in terms of its labour market integration. 
 
5.1.4 Extensive and continuous 
 
This research has found that Somalis had to contend with extensive and continuous [unbroken] 
unemployment period(s) – i.e., very long unemployment spells which resulted into a kind of 
quasi-permanent situation which excluded many Somalis from the Swedish labour market. 
This scenario is best articulated by one Somali research participant who laments: 
Unemployment, rather than employment, has been 
part of our normalised existence in Sweden. 
 
Part of this unemployment period is justifiable, as noted previously, since Somalis like other 
immigrants are required to acquire language, educational and cultural competences to facilitate 
their transition into the new setting. This period in which they must acquire these forenamed 
imperatives is conventionally referred to as the ‘establishment phase’. However, for Somalis 
their ‘establishment period’ seemed to be lengthier than was probably the case for most other 
groups in Sweden.  
 
Indeed, the evidence gathered from our sample shows that nearly all Somali research 
participants had to contend with extremely long spell of unemployment. Moreover, a sizeable 
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number of Somalis have yet to gain a foothold in Swedish labour market, ten to fifteen years 
down the line as per the time the interviews were conducted in Dec. 2006 – Jan. 2007 (see 
Table 5.1). This means a number of Somalis have not had a single paid job since they arrived 
in Sweden. Furthermore, the weak position of Somalis in Swedish labour market is reflected in 
the uncertain nature of the job tenures they have (as temporary or part-time workers) which 
further indicated that many Somalis who are currently ‘employed’, lack secure viable jobs. By 
viable job, we mean a job with a relative long tenure (at least six months) with which an 
individual is able to support him/herself or his/her family without the recourse to benefits or 
allowances from other sources e.g., unemployment benefits or social assistance, among others.  
 
Although at the time of the interview there were few ‘part-timers’ among the respondents (i.e., 
four out of twenty-eight), this research has found that that many Somalis had over the years, 
only had access to temporary employment. By temporary employment, we mean the ‘on-and-
off’ type of relationship that seemed to characterise the way Somalis immigrants related to the 
Swedish labour market. 
 
Indeed, working as part-timers or taking up jobs whose tenure was of an ad hoc, short-term 
and less secure was in itself not a bad idea. These jobs are particularly convenient for those 
Somalis engaged in education. For some students embarking on education entailed many years 
of poor economic conditions as all they had as an income was their study assistance (a meagre 
resource to live on). Besides, some of these students had family obligations, hence, the need 
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for extra income. The most common types of temporary or part-time jobs that Somalis 
undertook included, working as interpreters and as Somali language instructors (in schools 
with Somali pupils).  
 
Returning to my own albeit unrepresentative sample, important clues are revealed. The sample 
itself confirms the widely held impression that unemployment among Somalis in Sweden is 
‘perverse’. As Table 5.1 shows, only fifteen of the twenty eight Somali research respondents 
were employed. Of these fifteen, nine were employed on permanent basis (of which only one 
was female), four on a  temporary or part-time (none of which were women) basis and two 
were employed in a municipal-run project (none of which were women). Two students (one 
male and one female) were engaged in full-time studies. Eleven Somalis were openly 
unemployed. Among these eleven (comprising of six men and five women) there were seven 
of them (five women and two men) who have never been in employment since coming to the 
country – the majority of whom were in Sweden for between 10-15 years at the time of 
interview. 
Table 5.1 An Overview of ‘Employment Statuses’ among Somali Research Respondents 
by Jan. 2007.  
Sex Permanent 
Basis 
Temporary/Part- 
Time Basis 
Project 
Basis 
Student Open  
Unemp-
loyment 
Total 
Male 8 2 2 1 6 19 
Female 1 2 0 1 5 9 
Total 9 4 2 2 11 28 
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The situation was an improvement from the 1990s. Indeed, the majority of Somalis who had 
jobs at the time the interview was conducted (fifteen if one includes those who had permanent, 
project or temporary employment) got their jobs in and around the year 2000 and onwards. 
This could reflect on the relatively improved position of Swedish economy towards the end of 
the 1990s. 
 
5.1.4.1 The Swedish Economy 
 
The state of Swedish economy in the 1990s and its dismal state of affair was a recurrent topic 
in many of the interviews in this research. Indeed, two important aspects came out of the 
analysis of the data pertaining to the sections on the Swedish economy. The first one related to 
the sluggish performance of the Swedish economy, especially in the 1990s. The second one 
related to the reconstruction of the economy once it emerged from the recession of the 1990s. 
Both these two developments have had profound effects on Somalis vis-à-vis their relation to, 
as well as participation in Swedish labour market. A consensus thus emerged among 
respondents, Somalis and Swedish officials alike, that the economic situation at the time – and 
its effects afterwards – was a significant factor in influencing and perpetuating unemployment 
among Somali immigrants in Sweden throughout the 1990s and beyond.  
 
The dire economic crisis Sweden faced in the first half of the 1990s was, indeed, 
unprecedented in recent memory. As Eliason & Storrie (2006) wrote:  
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At the beginning of the 1990s, Sweden experienced a 
macroeconomic chock unparalleled since the Great 
Depression. The gross domestic product (GDP) fell 
by 6% from the cyclical peak in the first quarter of 
1990 to the trough in the first quarter of 1993. B y 
this year unemployment had risen to 8%, while the 
total employment fell by 13% between the first 
quarters of 1990 and 1994.   
   
The most dramatic episode occurred in 1992 w hen the Swedish Government abandoned its 
‘fight to defend’ the currency (the Krona), during which period the Swedish Central Bank 
(Riksbanken) had to raise interest rates briefly to a staggering 500% – sending ‘shockwaves 
through the European Monetary System’ (Ipsen, 1992). Moreover, falling GDP and lower 
unemployment resulted in a sharp deterioration of public sector finances. In the year 1994, the 
central government budget deficit exceeded 15% of GDP (see Hauptmeier, et al., 2006:20). 
Thus 1990s Sweden was one of economic slowdown and severe economic crisis.      
 
5.1.4.1.1 Relatively New 
 
The economic slump of the early 1990s coincided with a period when many Somalis came to 
Sweden in relatively large numbers. This recession lasted for several years. In all those years, 
Somalis were at the mercy of the Swedish labour market where the demand for available jobs 
outstripped their supply. Indeed, with insufficient overall demand for labour and fewer 
opportunities open to the unemployed, vulnerable people like Somalis – comprising then 
mainly of refugees – became even further marginalised. Moreover, the problem for Somalis 
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was further compounded by t he lack of vital human resources such as Swedish language 
competence and education to compete in the labour market. Language competence and 
education were, as it were, the very tools of the trade that had to be acquired before Somalis, 
like all newcomers, could acquire jobs in Sweden.  
 
The prolonged period of economic slump meant the Swedish labour market was inaccessible 
for Somalis in Sweden. Indeed, throughout the interviews of this research, particularly with 
Somali respondents, sentiments such as ‘there were no jobs in this country’; ‘there was a lack 
of jobs in Sweden’; ‘jobs were closed in the 1990s’, etc, commonly recurred to describe the 
connection these respondents were making between the pervasive nature of unemployment 
among Somalis and the Swedish economy in the 1990s. Below were among the plethora of 
sentiments used by some respondents as pertaining to this period of concern, i.e., the 1990s.   
 
Irshad, a 41 year old male respondent: 
I came in the middle of an economic depression. 
Sweden was in dire economic situation. What could I 
do in that situation? I felt helpless in the sense that I 
could not do anything about my unemployment state.   
 
Abdiwahid, a 33 year old male respondent: 
We realised how precarious the situation was. Few 
employers even bothered to look at us as potential 
workers.   
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Hanan, a 42 year old male respondent: 
There were numerous lay-offs. Firms were shedding 
workers like trees do to their leaves in autumn. We 
were refugees. Many of us were nowhere near 
fulfilling the requirements of Swedish labour market. 
We were truly disadvantaged. 
 
5.1.4.1.2 The Era of Economic Recovery  
 
The Swedish economic recovered towards the late 1990. What emerged from this recovery 
was a r e-structured economy. Rapid changes to the nature of work and labour market had 
occurred. The types of jobs that characterised the previous economy were replaced with others 
created, primarily, in the high-tech industries and Information technology (IT) – where 
continuous innovation ushered the growth of new industries and services. It should be noted 
that in the previous economy, industrial and manufacturing jobs formed the bulk of 
‘immigrant jobs’ – which many Somalis hoped to acquire when the economy recovered from 
the recession of the 1990s. 
 
The Swedish labour market thus become inclined towards a situation where the demand for 
higher skills levels had extensively increased and the demands for lower skills labour 
considerably decreased (cf. Campbell, 2000). At the same time, many Somalis lacked the 
requirements to adjust and become better suited to the changing nature of the new economy. 
Indeed, because Somalis lacked the required skills and or skills levels for the jobs being 
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created in this new, emergent, re-structured, high-tech, post-industrialism economy, they were 
as disadvantaged (sometimes more disadvantaged) as they were before the economy was re-
structured (i.e., during the economic recession of the 1990s).  
 
In reflecting the changing nature of jobs and the adjustments that was required, and comparing 
his previous work in Somalia, Jeelle, a 53 year old male respondent, had this to say:   
There is difference between the kind of job I did in 
Somalia and here. Even though I have worked at an 
agricultural processing plant in Somalia, we still 
employed a great deal of labour intensive tasks as 
opposed to the knowledge-savvy, highly mechanised 
and automated economy we find in Sweden. One has 
to be highly trained to do the kind of jobs available 
in Sweden. That is why many jobs are out of reach 
for many of us Somalis here.  
  
All in all, the generation of, and demand for, blue collar factory or manufacturing has rapidly 
fallen in Sweden. These jobs had hitherto acted as the gateway for immigrants into Swedish 
labour market. Even when these jobs are available, the competition has become stiffer as there 
would normally be more demand than supply. 
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5.1.4.1.3 The New Millennium 
 
The Swedish economy that experienced several years of deep recession showed signs of 
sustained recovery towards the end of the 1990s (Eliason & Storrie, 2006). Indeed, the general 
perception among Somali respondents seemed to confirm this, although there were still those 
few voices that doubted this to be the case. To many, the Millennium had ushered ‘some rays 
of hope’ for them (Somalis). This was because relatively, more and more Somalis, especially, 
Somali men, were entering the Swedish labour market, many of them making their debut into 
this labour market. This entrance was particularly visible in the transport service sector in 
Stockholm where more Somali men were seen in ‘uniform’ driving busses and taxis in the 
city. This scenario contrasts with the bleak years of the 1990s where Somalis ‘stayed away 
from the labour market en masse’, as one research respondent puts it.  
 
Nonetheless, the few who doubted the ‘new Millennium Thesis’ had their own views as t o 
why Somali men were securing jobs in the transport sector of Stockholm. To them, this was 
more ‘accidental’ than an improvement in the economy. They argued that many (non-Somalis) 
who previously worked in this branch had moved on to other more lucrative jobs or careers 
leaving ‘room’ for Somalis and others in similar positions. Moreover, they argued that these 
changes amounted to only very minor changes to the overall situation of Somalis in the labour 
market since many Somalis still languished in unemployment despite the improvement in the 
Swedish economy.  
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5.2 Literacy and Education Problems  
 
Problems in literacy and education were raised by Somali respondents as issues that impinge 
upon the integration of Somalis in Sweden. In particular, the prevalence of illiteracy and 
‘unsuitable’ education became the basis for discussing the literacy and educational problems 
that bedevil Somalis in Sweden. A third additional observation that emerged from the 
deliberation with Swedish officials with regards to Somalis in Sweden was the assertion that 
Somalis had done ‘little’ to improve their own educational status since coming to Sweden. Or, 
as they put it, Somalis have not made use of the Swedish education system, as desired or 
expected. According to some officials, greater participation in the educational system in 
Sweden would invariably have had the potential to propel Somalis into better position(s) in 
Sweden than is the case today.   
 
Accordingly, this section will commence by l ooking into the claim of ‘illiteracy being 
prevalent and widespread among Somalis in Sweden’. The second issue will look at the claim 
that the education Somalis possessed was ‘unsuitable’ in the new setting. Lastly, the possible 
reasons why Somalis have not improved their education by failing to grasp the opportunities 
accorded to them in Sweden will be discussed.       
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5.2.1 Illiteracy 
 
The initial attention to focus on ‘illiteracy’ in this research was borne out of two sources. The 
first was the assertion made by four Somali research respondents that illiteracy was not only 
prevalent but also widespread among Somalis in Sweden and by i mplication inhibited their 
labour market integration. The second source was borne out of the examination of the 
trajectories of five Somalis (out of the twenty-eight interviewed in this research). These five 
Somalis came to Sweden without any formal education (i.e., had not attended schools in 
Somalia or elsewhere prior to their arrival). Moreover, a closer look into the progress they 
made in terms of education in Sweden showed they have not made any significant inroads into 
the schooling system of Sweden, despite being in the country for a substantial length of 
period. This suggests that there may be underlying literacy problems within this group.  
 
The issue of illiteracy as being prevalent and widespread among Somalis was confronted with 
the Swedish officials interviewed as well as our focus group participants. Whilst the first part 
(i.e., its prevalence) was acknowledged, its being widespread among Somalis was disputed. 
Maria, an official involved in coordinating courses for a group of people ‘who have not 
attended school in their home countries’ (i.e., individuals who could be classified as illiterates) 
had, for example, no d oubt about the prevalence of illiteracy among Somalis in Sweden. 
Nonetheless, Maria had doubts when it came to the second claim (i.e., of illiteracy being 
widespread among Somalis):  
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From what I observe and gather from the teachers, 
incidents of illiteracy among Somali immigrants 
attending these courses, past or present, is not 
uncommon. However, how widespread the 
prevalence is among the general Somali population 
is difficult to ascertain, in my opinion, since we 
only deal with a very tiny portion of that 
population.  
 
In addition, officials acknowledged that illiterate Somalis would face ‘additional’ difficulties 
to those already faced by educated Somalis such as unemployment and discrimination. They 
claimed, in a scenario where even those Somalis with relatively high education have problems 
in gaining a foothold in Swedish labour market, the fate of illiterate Somalis becomes even 
more precarious. Some of these officials concluded that illiterates were more likely to remain 
illiterate, given their reluctance to start schooling or to become literate. Among the reasons 
given were their apparent lack of ‘study habits’ and the lack of motivation.  
 
Surprisingly, however, there seemed to be an understanding among officials why Somalis who 
cannot read and write often shun learning despite the opportunities available in Sweden for 
them to become literate and to subsequently pursue education and procure employment. As 
Eriksson (a social worker with Märsta Social District in Stockholm) puts it:  
One cannot simply become literate overnight, or with 
relative ease, despite the opportunities accorded to 
them by society. If one has not gone to school as a 
child in Somalia, doing so here in Sweden now as an 
adult would be a daunting experience. Of course 
there is the element of embarrassment involved. 
They also lack the habit of learning as w ell as 
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motivation to do s o. For those very reasons, they 
rather stay away from school than start it as an adult.  
 
5.2.1.1 Illiteracy against the Backdrop of a Knowledge-based Society 
 
A number of official respondents were keen to point out that illiteracy had no pl ace in this 
digital age and in modern Sweden. After all, Sweden legislated for compulsory schooling in 
1962. Since then nine-years of comprehensive schooling for all its children aged between ages 
7 and 16 is now compulsory. Moreover, these officials argued that illiterates would have 
difficulties in making any headway in Sweden because Sweden is a knowledge-based society 
– meaning the nation and society has moved from an industrial to post-industrial era or stage. 
This new development requires highly skilled workers and has less need for the low-skilled. 
Jobs that require less education or skills have thus become even more competitive making it 
unlikely or harder for illiterate persons to a gain foothold in Swedish labour market. Eva, a 
youth employment adviser with the Rinkeby Social District of Stockholm, makes a reference 
of how both scarcity and competition for menial jobs makes illiterates excluded from the jobs 
that one could say they could have a chance of doing:  
Even menial jobs such as cl eaning are getting 
complicated in Sweden. Cleaners are expected to be 
literate in Sweden. They would be expected to read 
and follow label instructions on chemical agent 
containers. The cleaner has to be environmentally 
conscious, become attune to the way employers or 
contractors want cleaning agents and other 
chemicals used for health and safety reasons, be 
able to write warning signs to lead people away 
144 
 
from slippery floors, and so on a nd so forth. That 
requires more than just scrapping floors.  
 
Helena, an immigration officer had a similar follow up: 
This is a very well informed society. Most jobs, even 
menial ones require workers to digest multiple 
information, engage with the different cadres in 
various departments, and do some sort of 
administrative work such as filling forms. It is 
difficult to live as an illiterate in such a highly 
literate and informed society.  
 
5.2.1.2 Not Unique to Somalis 
 
To reiterate, whilst acknowledging the prevalence of illiteracy among Somalis, some Swedish 
officials questioned the generalised assertion that illiteracy was widespread amongst Somalis 
in Sweden. Instead they argued that illiteracy was more or less present in all recent arrivals, 
e.g., Iraqis, Afghanis, etc, hence, its prevalence was not unique to Somalis as a group. 
Moreover, another reason why illiteracy was perhaps not an ‘eye-catching’ a phenomenon 
among Somalis was that the community was beset by a  host of other problems, notably 
unemployment, which tended to ‘dwarf’ illiteracy in terms of the focus people would 
otherwise have put upon it.  
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 Nonetheless, Swedish officials agreed to the fact that certain specific groups within the 
Somali group could be identified as candidates where illiteracy could be an issue. These 
include the elderly, women and young people (especially, those who arrive as adolescents in 
Sweden). As noted, from a labour market perspective, the elderly did not arouse much 
concern. As a number of respondents (Somalis and Swedish officials alike) pointed out, 
immigrants over the age of fifty and those who have not had a steady foothold in the Swedish 
labour market were more or less ‘written-off’, in the sense that it would probably be unlikely 
for them to be of interest to employers in Sweden. Indeed, even ‘native’ Swedes who were in 
their fifties and who were unemployed would normally struggle to regain their foothold into 
Swedish labour market since a younger skilled workforce would be more attractive to 
employers. 
 
The second proposition put forward by officials was that illiteracy was more of a problem for 
Somali women than Somali men. Officials were often talking from their experience of 
working with Somali clients. A number of these officials noted that Somali women were more 
predisposed to be illiterate than Somali men. They argued that whist Somali men may try hard 
to acquire education and work; many women were more or less disengaged from that process. 
One reason was that Somali women were traditionally disadvantaged, as more emphasis was 
given to boys than girls when it came to who should go to school given the meagre resources 
within Somali families. Once in Sweden, this disadvantage has not ended. Other possible 
reasons include Somali women taking a greater responsibility for children and household work 
which could hamper their plans to study (see Chapter Nine).   
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With regard to illiteracy being a problem to Somali youngsters arriving in Sweden, officials 
linked the predicaments of these youngsters to their background in Somalia – where they had 
no opportunity of schooling, since the education system in that country had collapsed. 
Nonetheless, officials generally agreed that, in contrast to the other two groups (i.e., the 
elderly and women), Somali youths were in a better position to change their predicaments for 
the better in Sweden. This was because young people learn the Swedish language and acquire 
social and cultural competences of the host society with relative ease. They also connected 
with their peers (‘native’ Swedes) much easier in comparison to their adult counterparts. 
 
5.2.1.3 Difficult concept to pursue 
 
Illiteracy is a term that has a precise definition. It means the inability to read and write. If one 
goes by the definition of illiteracy as being the state of not knowing how to read and write, 
then that becomes untenable as far as many Somali adults in Sweden were concerned. This 
notion was vehemently projected by a number of discussants in our focus group session. As 
one discussant questioned, generating nods from his co-panellists:  
Tell me, how many Somalis could not read and write 
when we were in Somalia? I think the answer is very 
obvious, very few.   
  
From the discussions of the focus group, there are two factors that rendered the pervasiveness 
of illiteracy among adult Somalis untenable. The first was attributed to Swedish for Immigrant 
(SFI), the Swedish language instruction course immigrants undergo in Sweden. The second 
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had to do with the ‘Somalisation’ campaigns in Somalia in the 1970s to eradicate illiteracy 
which led many Somalis to acquire basic literacy and numeracy skills. 
  
Arguably, one reason why ‘illiteracy’ was an inappropriate word to employ was because 
almost all Somali adults in Sweden who have been in the country for a considerable period, 
three, five, or more years, (as many of the respondents had done), would have participated in 
Swedish language instruction for immigrants (SFI). SFI is mandatory for immigrants who live 
off benefits, especially introduction allowances and social assistance – the two main forms of 
‘income’ for new arrivals as well other individuals who had no recourse to employment 
related benefits (e.g., unemployment- , sickness benefits). The reason why they were not 
entitled to the latter (i.e., work-related benefits) was because they had no, or a weak, foothold 
in the Swedish labour market, hence, their ineligibility. Receiving Introduction Allowances 
(given to refugees in their first few years in Sweden) and Social Assistance (Socialbidrag) was 
contingent upon the attendance by recipients of language and other programmes earmarked to 
improve their position in continuing with education or to help them find work. Accordingly, 
through SFI, most adult Somalis were expected to have gained some literacy and numeracy 
skills, rendering the notion of illiteracy being widespread among Somalis in Sweden obsolete. 
 
The notion of illiteracy as being widespread among Somalis was also rejected by the focus 
group panel on the ground that many adult Somalis (even those who had not attended school) 
would have taken advantage of the ambitious Somalisation programmes (within Somalis) of 
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the 1970s where many Somalis were said to have learnt how to read and write. Indeed, despite 
Somalisation programmes falling short of their stated goals, and despite the difficulties these 
programmes faced in terms of financial, human resources and the obvious logistic problems 
involved in trying to reach nomadic pastoralists who were constantly moving from one place 
to another, these literacy campaigns to eradicate adult illiteracy, were heralded as a success 
(Abdi, 1998; Warsame, 2001). Nonetheless, one obvious weakness of this argument was that it 
did not take into account that many Somalis were born long after these campaigns concluded. 
This is especially true for those who were born in the late 1980s onwards, and who had come 
of age when the entire education system in Somalia had collapsed in the wake of Somalia 
itself ceasing to function as a state. It should be noted that Somalia has had no functioning 
central government since the overthrow of Barre’s regime in 1991.  
 
5.2.2 ‘Unsuitable’ Education 
 
With regard to education, the following notions were affirmed:  First, Somalis suffered not so 
much from illiteracy but from problems of ‘unsuitable’ education. Second, few Somali come 
to Sweden with easily transferable educational qualifications when they arrived. Third, once in 
Sweden, Somalis had not ‘done enough’ to raise their educational levels to a ‘ satisfactory’ 
level both quantitatively and qualitatively to increase their chances for successful integration. 
Before we examine these ‘subjective’ assessments, let us look briefly at factors that seem to 
lend credence to the disadvantage position of Somalis vis-à-vis their educational levels in 
Sweden.   
149 
 
First, many Somalis seem to possess pre-secondary education which demonstrates the 
‘unsuitability’ of their education in Sweden. This is evident when comparing pre-secondary 
education levels of Somalis and ‘native’ Swedes.  F or example, 2007, 39% of Somalis 
possessed pre-secondary education compared with 15% of ‘native’ Swedes (SCB, 2007). In 
addition, as Table (5.2) shows, the figure of 39% (i.e., of Somalis with pre-secondary 
education) could even be higher given that there is no information registered on t he 
qualifications of 18% of Somalis in Sweden (SCB, 2007). One could only guess that a sizeable 
number among the 18% of Somalis (with no information registered on them) are likely to 
possess pre-secondary education.  
 
Second, few Somalis enter higher education in comparison to other immigrant groups in 
Sweden. Only 25% of Somali 25 year olds (born in 1981) began their university education in 
the Academic Year 2006/7, compared with 55% of their Iranian counterparts. The percentages 
of new entrant 25 ye ar olds from Poland and Bosnia-Hercegovina were much higher than 
Somali new entrants in the same year at 41% and 49% respectively (see Table 5.3). 
Table 5.2 Comparison of Pre-education Levels between Somalis and ‘Swedish Born’ In 
Sweden. 
Background  Pre-secondary 
Education (%) 
No Infor-
mation (%) 
Somalia 39 18 
Swedish Born 15 0 
 
Source: SCB (2007) 
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Table 5.3 Comparison of Higher Education Entrants for 25 year old students with 
Foreign Background (2006/7). 
 
 Background Percentage 
Bosnia-
Hercegovina 
41% 
Iran 55% 
Poland 49% 
Somalia 25% 
 
Source: SCB (2008) 
 
Undoubtedly, ‘pre-secondary’ education is not enough for people to gain a foothold in 
Swedish labour market. The claim that the education of Somalis in Sweden is ‘unsuitable’ 
could thus be partly justified by the fact that a huge percentage of Somalis have only ‘pre-
secondary education’. In addition, many Somalis remain disadvantaged long after their 
immigration into Sweden. One reason is because they have not improved their position 
significantly in terms of education. Subsequently, this impacts on their integration in Sweden. 
Indeed, there was an impression among Swedish official respondents that Somalis who came 
with some form of education (particularly, secondary and post-secondary education) from 
abroad have not only stuck with those previous qualifications, but they have also failed to 
grasp the opportunities to evaluate those qualifications so as to bring them (i.e., the 
qualifications) in line with their Swedish counterparts.   
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All this happened against the backdrop where education was provided free of charge up to and 
including university. Study assistance (earmarked for student maintenance) was also available 
until the age of 55. Besides, there were numerous avenues in which people could go a bout 
educating themselves in Sweden. One could, for example, start from the most elementary of 
stages by attending classes (often in study circle forms) organised by adult education 
organisations (such as ABF, Medborgarskola, etc) or go t hrough folk high schools 
(folkhögskolor). Folk high schools are boarding schools and are free of charge. One could also 
go through municipally-run adult education schools (KOMVUX), which is one of the most 
common educational avenues for Somali adults in Sweden. KOMVUX provides education 
ranging from the very basic education, grundvux (for beginners), to secondary level 
certificates. KOMVUX is renowned for its flexible learning forms, e.g., evening classes, etc., 
where the needs of working students and others who cannot attend day-time classes for a 
variety of reasons are met. 
 
5.2.2.1 The Way Forward 
 
Somalis, like other immigrants, have to acquire sufficient command in Swedish language 
before they can obtain some form of qualifications or skills that can help them gain a foothold 
in the labour market. Education thus represents the next natural move to embark upon. Indeed, 
Somalis (like other refugees) coming to Sweden would normally have two options when it 
comes to the pursuit of education in their new setting. They could either start their education 
in Sweden from ‘scratch’, to borrow from one respondent, or supplement their previous 
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education (obtained from abroad) with Swedish courses or credits so as to bring them in line 
with equivalent of Swedish qualifications. Let us explore these two options further. 
 
‘Starting from scratch’ is a rather straightforward decision or process to undertake. It entails 
shelving previous qualifications (obtained from abroad) prior to coming to Sweden and 
starting one’s education afresh. Starting from ‘scratch’ gives individuals the option to start 
primary level education and work their way through up to university. Alternatively, 
individuals could end up in other institutions that provide specialised (vocational) education 
and training geared towards employment. For those who had no or low education levels when 
they arrived in Sweden this is the only option. Nonetheless, others (among Somali 
respondents) who had obtained education from abroad have also opted for this option instead 
of supplementing them with Swedish courses.    
 
The other option open to Somalis who came with qualifications was to enhance their previous 
qualifications to obtain equivalence with Swedish qualifications. Before any supplementary or 
upgrading of previous qualification can proceed, these qualifications have to be evaluated or 
validated. The duty of determining whether or not these qualifications correspond to Swedish 
equivalence standards lies with the National Swedish Agency for Higher Education (HSV), 
the body that oversees institutes of higher education in Sweden. 
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The evaluation of qualifications is important in two senses. One it confirms the individual’s 
past attainment. Second, it helps employers and institutions of learning in decisions pertaining 
to recruitment and enrolment respectively. However, as past research and reports demonstrate, 
the recognition of foreign qualifications by HVS hardly translates into immediate employment 
or entry into institutions of higher education. This is because foreign qualifications are often 
likely to be relegated to lower status in comparison to their Swedish counterparts. As Dingu-
Kyrklund (2005) maintains, validation of foreign qualifications are often rendered weak or 
ineffective because the educational curricula completed abroad are considered inferior and 
thus not accepted as equivalent to the Swedish ‘standard’. 
 
Moreover, where immigrants find jobs using their certificates or diplomas obtained abroad – 
without supplementing them to attain Swedish equivalence – they are likely to obtain jobs that 
have much lower status than they would acquire in their home countries. As one Report by the 
then Swedish Integration Office (Integrationsverket) confirms:      
It is not uncommon for foreign trained nurses to 
work as auxiliary nurses or health support workers in 
Sweden (Rapport Integration, 2005).    
 
Relying on the facts gleaned from research respondents, Somalis and Swedish officials alike; 
there were four basic reasons why qualifications obtained by Somalis from abroad had to be 
‘evaluated’. Firstly, there were obvious differences in schooling systems, curricula, content 
and qualities of education between Sweden and Somalia. Secondly, there were wide 
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technological differences between Somalia and Sweden (bringing the element of ‘quality’ to 
the forefront in explaining why qualifications from Somalia were likely to be viewed as 
inferior to those in Sweden). Thirdly, the need to learn and become attuned to the 
requirements in Sweden would require one to acquire educational and cultural competences 
peculiar to the new setting. The latter related to the particular properties Swedish employers 
were looking for from immigrant applicants (e.g., Somalis). These properties were both 
objective qualities (e.g., formal ‘Swedish’ qualifications) and subjective (e.g., the possession 
of social and cultural competences of the host society that is often acquired through Swedish 
education). 
 
Despite the stated need for evaluation of qualifications obtained from abroad, only three 
Somalis in our sample (out of twenty eight persons) actually reported sending their 
qualification to HVS. Firstly, all three reported receiving recognitions that were far short of 
their previous qualification levels (i.e., when they were abroad). This was in line with results 
from the previous research and reports mentioned. Secondly, and more importantly, the fact 
that only three out of many (among the twenty-eight Somali respondents) applied for 
evaluation, clearly indicates an under-use of HVS’ services pertaining to evaluation of 
qualifications obtained from abroad – when it comes to Somalis in Sweden. This latter 
statement was supported by the views expressed by some Swedish officials interviewed who 
commonly deployed semantics like ‘reluctance’, ‘resignation’, ‘resistance’ and 
‘unwillingness’ to put across their point on the issues pertaining to evaluation, education and 
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by extension the labour market participation of Somalis in Sweden. Elisabet, an immigration 
officer with previous experience of working with Somalis in Rinkeby, states:  
As a matter of fact, Somalis seem to stick to their 
previous qualifications and competences which are 
unsuitable here in Sweden. I have no idea why they 
are reluctant.   
 
Mona, a social worker at Rinkeby had also this to say:  
I don’t know why they are unwilling to send their School 
certificates, diplomas or degrees to HSV for evaluation.   
 
Let us now juxtapose the opinions and experiences formed by officials to what some Somali 
research respondents had to say on the issue of evaluation of previous qualifications. Here one 
may deduce the ‘reluctance’, ‘resignation’ and ‘resistance’ that some of the officials pointed 
out.  
Hanan, a 42 year male old respondent: 
Whether or not you come with a degree does not 
matter that much as no one would recognise it in 
Sweden.  
 
Bashir, a 39 year old male respondent:  
Nobody would after all recognize my previous 
qualification 
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Rukiya, a 29 year old female respondent:   
It would hardly have helped to secure me a job here.   
 
Abdirizak, a 33 year old male respondent:  
The kind of education you have prior to coming to 
Sweden is somewhat irrelevant.  
 
Hassan, a 37 year old male respondent:  
My qualification from Somalia was worthless. Why 
bother send it to the authorities [HVS]. After all it 
[qualification] would be held with low esteem either 
way, whether I send it or not.  
 
The question that comes to mind is, were these qualifications ‘actually’ obsolete? As evident, 
from the perspectives of some Somalis, evaluation amounted to a futile exercise with some 
insisting that the only way forward for them was to start ‘everything’ relating to education 
from ‘scratch’. However, this claim was vehemently rejected by some Swedish officials. 
Although officials agreed qualifications acquired outside Sweden may not be equated or 
treated as equivalent as Swedish ones, they, nonetheless, argued that qualifications obtained 
abroad gave the individual ‘a launching pad or the springboard needed when starting a new 
life a new setting, and from which it became easier to sprint’, as one official respondent put it. 
As another official argued, ‘one needs not start everything all over again if s/he does not want 
to change course all together’.    
157 
 
5.2.2.2 Further Observation  
 
This research can confirm that, one issue that makes it problematic for Somalis to verify the 
qualifications obtained from their home country had to do w ith the special difficulties they 
faced in terms of problems in their country of origin, Somalia. It was no secret that many 
Somalis came to Sweden without documentation (passports, certificates, diplomas, etc). 
Accordingly, they often lacked the evidence to back up their claims regarding past 
educational, professional, and work experiences. Moreover, because Somalia was a country 
where the entire state apparatus and all its institutions, including education, had collapsed, it 
became harder for Somalis who came without papers to ever prove the qualifications they 
attained or the work experiences they may have accrued in Somalia.   
 
With regard to qualifications, the following three points were noted. The first one was where 
(e.g., which country) the qualification was obtained from. As this research has indicated 
doubts were often raised about the educational standards of Third World countries, which 
include Somalia. One contributing factor was the perceived disparity in the quality of 
training/qualification between Sweden and these countries. Obvious technological gap(s) or 
differences were commonly cited as the basis of the inferiority of qualification accrued from 
Third World countries. As one official, Eriksson, a social worker with Märsta Social District, 
emphasis:    
To be qualified as a doctor in today’s Somalia or 
Afghanistan would mean qualifying in a setting 
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devoid of basics. Training in such an atmosphere is 
beset with a lot of problems both in terms of 
personnel to train doctors, and the lack of tools and 
material needed to train doctors. These are some of 
the reasons why doctors from Third World Countries 
have to re-educate themselves in Sweden.   
 
Secondly, a lot has to do with Swedish labour market ‘selectivity’. The Swedish labour market 
does not validate all types of qualifications obtained abroad. Focus was often laid on 
professions where shortages of qualified personnel existed, and where those who supplement 
their previous qualifications were more likely to secure employment. Examples of these 
professions included doctors, dentists and sometimes engineers. Nonetheless, few Somalis 
possessed qualifications that could easily be transferable to the Swedish setting. This is one 
reason why the showing of Somalis in these professions was said to be non-existent or very 
insignificant, indeed. 
  
Thirdly, for most newcomers certain professions seemed ‘impenetrable’. These included law 
and to some extent journalism. These are two professions where fluency and a high command 
in Swedish language was almost a prerequisite to enroll. The situation could be different for 
second and subsequent immigrant generations. However, for first generation immigrants, there 
were few, if any, Somali lawyers or journalists in Sweden. For example, to their knowledge, 
none of the research respondents has known or come across a Somali lawyer (let alone one 
working in a reputable firm).  
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In our sample we had Hirab, a 55 year old male respondent, who qualified and worked as a 
lawyer in Somalis. He was realistic about his prospects of working as a lawyer in Sweden: 
How could I master Swedish fluently and with a very short 
time to ague in the court of law on behalf of a cl ient? 
Definitely, it could take me ages to do s o. Even if I did, 
would I be hired? I believe this would be highly unlikely 
because other hurdles would crop up.  
 
Hirab was alluding to structural barriers such as unemployment and age discrimination in the 
Swedish labour market. 
 
5.2.2.3 Factors that impact upon Education 
 
There were a number of factors that were identified that could be said to have contributed to 
their failure of Somalis to grasp the opportunities accorded to them by society in relation to 
education, and by e xtension their failure to improve their position in society. These factors 
include, ‘commitment to family’, ‘abrupt transition’ from pre-industrial to a post-industrial 
society, the precarious situation in Somalia, and their ‘temporariness’ of some in Sweden (i.e., 
in relation to the eagerness of some to wanting to relocate to another country). 
 
‘Commitment to family’ was a factor espoused by a number of Somalis as an obstacle to their 
educational plans in Sweden. The issue was not just about ‘families’, but about ‘very large 
families’ that far exceeded what nuclear families in Sweden constitute. In fact, many nuclear 
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Somali families in Sweden are very large, i.e., comprising of eight, ten, or more persons. 
Naturally, looking after many children impacts on the ability of parents to educate themselves, 
especially when it comes to mothers, partly because of the time and energy they need to 
devote to the upbringing of their children, and, partly because they would have little time and 
energy to spare for their own education.  
 
The poignancy of this description – the preoccupation with children and household – was 
summed up by one Somali respondent who talked about having ‘their hands being full’, when 
referring to Somali women raising large families, including herself. Isir, a 32 year old single, 
female respondent, with no c hildren also lends credence to the inability of ‘mothers with 
young children’ to educate themselves in Sweden. As she states:   
Our biggest problem with regard to education is 
taking care of large families as mothers whilst at 
same time fulfilling our own ambitions as 
individuals. Women are often torn between two 
irreconcilable choices. Many have thus given up on 
their ambition to educate themselves at the expense 
of familial obligations.  
 
Another, Rukiya, a 29 year old female respondent, links her own inability to educate herself 
not only with the number of children she has to raise but also how she ‘planned’ her family. 
The closer spacing of my five children was clearly a 
hindrance to my own dreams to educate myself. 
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The number of children a f amily has and their ‘spacing’ them were clearly problematic to 
these families, not least when it came to education and labour market participation of the 
women involved. Often, many of the children in these families were small; with two small 
children in the same nuclear family not uncommon. Naturally, some of the burden was 
relieved through child care and day centres. But all the same some of the children would 
require time with their mothers as they were too small to start day centres, according to 
women like Rukiya. 
 
Technological gaps between Sweden and Somalia were also cited by several respondents. This 
had to do more with the coping ‘abilities’ of Somali individuals in a society (i.e., Swedish) 
that was in a post-industrial, postmodern stage in its development. In a post-industrial, 
postmodern society like Sweden, innovation, transformation and modernisation in education, 
technology, the economy, etc, were constantly pursued. Hence, for some Somalis, the society 
in which they found themselves was one in which they found hard to cope with given their 
own background (some of whom may originate from rural areas in Somalia).   
 
This inability of Somalis to cope with a transforming innovative Swedish society is captured 
by Abdirizak, a 33 year old male respondent: 
It is not that they are uneducated or unwilling to 
study. I am sure they would like to improve their 
situation. However, their problem is that of trying to 
cope up with an ever changing society. 
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For many Somalis, especially, those coming from rural pre-industrial backgrounds, such a 
transition was not only difficult but had occurred in an abrupt manner. The allusion, therefore, 
was that because these Somalis had not lived in industrial societies, making a leap from pre-
industrialism to a postindustrialism almost overnight was in itself fraught with many 
difficulties. As Hassan, a 37 year old male respondent put it:    
It is not as if people are making a transition from one 
goal post to another or to a scenario that is static. 
That would have been easier to catch up w ith. The 
issue rather is one where the society we came into 
requires us as individuals to not only change but to 
be also become more astute to trends that are 
constantly fluid and in changing state. The pace is so 
fast and one must respond accordingly. To catch up 
with that pace one has to literally sprint.  
 
The ‘precarious situation of Somalia’ also figured prominently in the discussion with Somali 
respondents. This related to the pressures Somalis faced from relatives left back home in 
Somalia. These ‘pressures’ were portrayed as impacting on the motivation, as well as, the 
ability of Somalis to concentrate on their education in Sweden.   
 
To reiterate, Somalia is a f ailed state. To understand what a f ailed state entails we turn to 
Mazrui (1995). Mazrui (1995) asserts that, in order to understand what a failed state is about, 
one has to examine the basic functions of the state first. Mazrui (1995) distinguishes six basic 
functions, viz.: sovereign control over territory; sovereign supervision of the national 
resources; effective and national revenue extraction from people, goods and services; the 
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capacity to build and maintain an adequate national infrastructure (roads, postal services, 
telephone systems, and the like); the capacity to render such basic services as sanitation, 
education, housing, and health care; and the capacity for governance and the maintenance of 
law and order. Accordingly, when these vital functions are non-existent, one can talk of that 
state as being a failed state. That is where the Somali nation finds itself today. 
 
Somalis in Sweden may not have ‘taken over’ all those basic functions of their collapsed state 
but they do shoulder a lot more than was expected most of individuals on their own individual 
capacities. If not contributing in material terms, such as the remittances they send (often from 
the benefit they and their children receive from the municipality or state) their minds are 
constantly preoccupied with what was happening to their families back in Somalia. They also 
worry a great deal about what went on in Somalia, regarding the interminable conflict in 
Somalia. Accordingly, this constant worry about what happens to their relatives and their 
homeland affected their ability to invest and concentrate on their education in Sweden.  
 
Last but not least, there was also a sense of ‘temporariness’ among some Somalis in Sweden, 
and this was cited as a reason why some Somalis may not invest in education. Indeed, a 
number of Somalis respondents talked of their desire to relocate from Sweden to other 
countries deemed more favourable in terms of their labour market situations. Furthermore, 
these individuals felt that, the countries in which they wanted to relocate accommodated their 
Somali cultural and religious (Islamic) way of life than was the case in Sweden. In addition, 
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three of our own Somali research respondents sent their wives and children to other countries, 
also, citing cultural and religious reasons for doing so. All in all, the lack of stability and 
security (i.e., the ‘temporariness’ of Somalis in Sweden) would undoubtedly have an impact 
on their ability to make progress in education.    
 
5.3 Conclusion 
 
This Chapter highlighted two main domains of integration: employment and education. First, 
long-term unemployment has come out as a major problem that afflicts Somalis in Sweden. 
The unemployment among Somalis was compounded, first, by the economic slump in Sweden 
in the 1990s, and later, by the restructuring of Swedish economy (as the economy improved 
from late 1990s onwards).   
 
Secondly, ‘illiteracy’ and ‘unsuitable’ education were explored. Whilst there was contestation 
as to how widespread illiteracy was among Somalis in Sweden, its prevalence among certain 
groups of Somalis, notably, the elderly and women received some validation from the 
respondents. In relation to the ‘unsuitability’ of education, Somalis were said to stick with 
their previous qualifications and have done less to evaluate those qualifications in order to 
bring them in line with Swedish qualifications. This would have been the necessary step or 
direction to undertake so as to improve their position in terms of education and the labour 
market. Moreover, external factors that impact on the education of Somalis were discussed. 
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These included, ‘commitment to family’, ‘abrupt transition’ from pre-industrial to a p ost-
industrial society, the precarious situation in Somalia, and their ‘temporariness’ in Sweden 
(i.e., in relation to the eagerness of some to wanting to relocate to another country).  
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CHAPTER SIX 
6 HOUSING  
 
This chapter identifies residential segregation as a factor that impinges upon the integration of 
Somalis in Sweden. The chapter begins by giving a brief definition of residential segregation, 
highlighting its dimensions and types. It then embarks on exploring at length, the causes, 
maintenance and perpetuation of residential segregation between Somalis and Swedes. Here 
residential segregation is explained largely as a process that is both individually and 
structurally driven. It is individually driven in the sense that some Somalis have contributed to 
their own residential segregation by wanting to live in close proximity with one another. It is 
structurally determined in the sense that their segregation is linked to forces that are external 
to their individual preferences. These include socioeconomic factors (e.g., unemployment, low 
incomes, etc) and policy changes that had ‘unintended’ consequences on r esidential 
segregation in Stockholm.      
 
6.1 Residential Segregation 
 
6.1.1 Definition of Residential Segregation 
 
Residential (or housing) segregation relates to geographical locations where people live 
separately in neighbourhoods, suburbs, etc. Residential segregation is often defined in 
literature as the degree to which a minority group’s (or groups’) residential patterns differ 
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from those of the majority group. It often occurs along many lines, e.g., according to language, 
ethnicity, nationality, religion, race, class or socio-economic status, gender, age, etc 
(Schelling, 1971). Nonetheless, whatever the motives of residential separation maybe, it 
always entails social and physical separation of one group or multiple groups of people from 
another or others (Murdie & Borgegård, 1998).    
 
6.1.2 Dimensions of Residential Segregation 
 
Massey & Denton’s (1988; 1989) provide the theoretical and empirical grounds for 
understanding residential segregation. Through their five dimensions or indices, social 
scientists are able to measure the degree to which a given minority group is residentially 
segregation from the majority group (Acevedo-Garcia & Osypuk, 2008); Kramer & Hogue, 
2009). These five dimensions refer to evenness, exposure, clustering, centralisation, and 
concentration (Massey & Denton, 1988:283). To Massey & Denton ‘evenness’ is the most 
ideal degree of divergence; it comes about when the proportion of a minority group in a 
suburb equals the proportion of that group in the whole city (Massey & Denton, 1988:283). 
‘Exposure’ relates to the prospects of a minority group having [residential] contacts with 
members of the majority group (Massey & Denton, 1988:287). ‘Clustering’ refers the extent 
by which areas inhabited by minority members adjoin one another or cluster, spatially 
(Massey & Denton, 1988:289). ‘Centralisation’ connotes the degree to which a group settles in 
or close to the central business districts (CBD) of cities (Massey & Denton, 1988:291). 
‘Concentration’ refers to the relative size of space inhabited by a minority group. As more and 
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more members of a group move into an area, the concentration in that space is bound to 
increase. Massey & Denton (1989:373) conclude ‘a high level of segregation’ on the latter 
three dimensions is problematic because it o ften ‘isolates a minority group from amenities, 
opportunities, and resources that affect their socioeconomic well-being’.  
 
6.1.3 Types of Residential Segregation 
 
There are different types of residential segregation, the most common being demographic, 
socio-economic and ethnic. Examples of demographically determined segregation include 
separations that result from age or gender. Areas that host military bases or educational 
institutions, for example, tend to have neighbourhoods that are age-segregated (see Cowgill, 
1994). Areas that house large industrial complexes (as in parts of contemporary Asia) 
normally have male and female cohort workers housed in purpose-built accommodations that 
segregate people along age or gender lines. Another type of demographically determined 
segregation arises with neighbourhoods where senior citizens predominate: sheltered housing 
for the elderly or gated retirement villages, etc (see Sherman, 1975; Cowgill, 1994; Hårsman 
& Quigley, 1995); Townshend, 2002).  
 
Socio-economic segregation arises when people of different social classes settle into different 
areas largely because of differences in the socio-economic status of people (Borjas, 1997; 
Jurgen, 1998). Certain areas become exclusive domains for the well-off whilst others are 
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dominated by the working class, those living on low-incomes and or who are socially 
excluded members of society. Indeed, immigrants and others low-income groups have a 
propensity to reside in segregated areas, precisely because many of them cannot afford 
accommodation in high status residential areas, as a consequence of their own socio-economic 
status.   
  
Finally, ethnic segregation occurs when people of different ethnicity, cultures and religions are 
significantly represented by c hoice (individual preferences) or conditioned because they 
happen to belong to a group, e.g., through discrimination (Hårsman & Quigley, 1995; Molina, 
1997; Hårsman, 2006; Bråmå, et al., 2006). 
  
6.1.3.1  Where Somalis Stand vis-à-vis Dimensions and Types of Residential Segregation in 
Stockholm:  
 
With regard to the dimensions of residential segregation, ‘clustering’ and ‘concentration’ seem 
applicable to the Somali case in Stockholm. This is because Somalis tend to ‘cluster’ in the 
two adjacent suburbs of Rinkeby and Tensta, where the ‘concentration’ of immigrants is very 
high in relation to most suburbs in the City (for maps, see Appendix 2). By virtue of living in 
these suburbs, Somalis are isolated from better amenities, opportunities, and resources that 
affect social and economic integration (cf. Massey & Denton, 1988; 1989).  
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I would argue that ‘evenness’ and ‘centralisation’ as m easures of the degree of residential 
segregation do not apply to Somalis in Stockholm. ‘Evenness’ is ruled out in the sense that 
Somalis are concentrated in the suburbs of Rinkeby and Tensta. In relation to centralisation, 
central business districts (CBD) in Swedish urban areas tend to be exclusive and in high 
demand, not least because of their closeness to shopping and cultural life, among others, 
hence, less segregated. The number of Somalis in Stockholm’s CBD is thus very insignificant 
in relation to the City’s periphery.   
 
With respect to the types of residential segregation, socio-economic- and ethnic residential 
segregation are relevant to Somalis in Stockholm as opposed to demographic segregation. 
These two types of residential segregation also overlap in the case of Somalis – a reason why 
their segregation is explained both by their socio-economic position vis-à-vis members of the 
host society, as well as, by the fact that they belong to an ethnic group different from that of 
the majority group.     
 
6.2 The Negative Impact of Residential Segregation 
 
The discussion on r esidential segregation that impinges upon S omali integration in Sweden 
has Rinkeby and Tensta – two adjacent suburbs located in the Northern part of Stockholm City 
– as its backdrop. Rinkeby and Tensta are not only overwhelmingly inhabited by immigrants 
(ca 90% and 86% respectively, USK, 2008), but they are also home to the majority of Somalis 
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in Stockholm. Described often as ‘problem areas’, these suburbs entail multiple problems for 
Somalis (as for other inhabitants), especially, from an integration perspective.  
 
The most commonly endorsed problems or themes associated with Rinkeby and Tensta by the 
research respondents (Somalis and Swedish official alike) were: (1) the lack of connectivity 
with the host population; (2) unemployment; (3) poor services in comparison to other suburbs 
e.g., Kungsholmen, Norrmalm, Södermalm, etc (for map, see Appendices 2 & 6); (4) high 
staff turnover in vital service areas (e.g., education, health, social services, etc); as well as, (5) 
perceived high crime rates.   
 
6.2.1 The lack of Connectivity with the Host Population 
 
To begin with, residential segregation hinders interaction between Somalis and members of 
the host population. As a consequence, Somalis have fewer opportunities to practice speaking 
Swedish, which is imperative for their integration in Sweden. The inability to acquire 
language competences also impacts on how they fare in education and the labour market (cf. 
Murdie & Borgegård, 1998).  
 
Moreover, the lack of connectivity with members of the host society means that Somalis are 
excluded from the informal social networks of Swedes. These informal social networks (or 
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‘contacts’, as they are known) have become decisive, in that, it is often through 
recommendations by those in the individual’s informal networks that s/he acquires a job in the 
labour market. Connectivity with ‘native’ Swedes was also seen as vital, in that, it has the 
potential to break down barriers and enhance tolerance and understanding between people.  
  
6.2.2 Unemployment 
 
There is clear evidence that many who live in segregated areas are also unemployed. This is 
particularly true for Rinkeby and Tensta. In 2008, for example, nearly 9.4% of inhabitants in 
Rinkeby were ‘openly’ unemployed (i.e., as people who are unemployed and not engaged in 
education/training programmes); 19.6% of people receive social assistance; and a further 14% 
receive disability pensions in 2008 (USK, 2008). The corresponding statistics for Tensta was 
9.5% (openly unemployed); 21.5% (received social assistance) and 12.7% (receive disability 
pensions). This can be compared with non-segregated suburbs like Norrmalm, Södermalm and 
Kungsholmen. In Norrmalm, for example, only 1% of its inhabitants received social 
assistance, and 4.5% disability pensions (USK, 2008). In Södermalm, people who received 
social assistance and disability benefits were 1.8% and 5.5% respectively. In Kungsholmen, 
the corresponding statistics were 1% and 4.8% respectively.  
 
Moreover, between 2005 and 2007, onl y 49% of foreign-born persons were economically 
active in both Rinkeby and Tensta. Contrastingly, foreign-born persons in the non-segregated 
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suburbs of Kungsholmen, Norrmalm and Södermalm, the corresponding statistics were 69%, 
65% and 65% respectively in terms of economic activity (SCB/USK, 2008). The above 
statistics are summarised in Table 6.1, below. 
 
Table 6.1 Open Unemployment, Social Assistance, Disability Benefits and Economically 
Active Foreign-Born Persons. 
   
Open 
Unemployment 
(%) 
Social 
Assistance   
(%) 
Disability 
Benefits (%) 
Economically 
Active Foreign- 
born Persons (%) 
Rinkeby 9.4 19.6 14 49 
Tensta 9.5 21.5 12.7 49 
Norrmalm 2.1 1 4.5 69 
Sodermalm 2.7 1.8 5.5 65 
Kungsholmen 2.5 1 4.8 69 
 
Source: SCB/USK (2008) 
 
Undoubtedly, unemployment entails a host of problems for any citizen. These may include 
physical and mental health problems (Gore, 1978; McCord & Freeman, 1990; Fang, et al., 
1998; Montgomery, et al., 1999; Kivimäki, et al., 2003) as well as, loss of income and social 
status (Bartley & Owen, 1996). This relationship can also be deduced from the above 
statistics. For example, because of the high rates of unemployment in Rinkeby and Tensta, 
174 
 
their inhabitants are more likely to be afflicted by loss of income and status (as they are 
‘forced’ to live off social assistance, as a consequence). In addition, past research has also 
found that a relationship exists between residential segregation, high unemployment rates and 
high health risk problems (cf. Klinthall, M, 2008). 
 
Furthermore, unemployment among adult immigrants is thought to have a socio-psychological 
impact on c hildren in these suburbs. Indeed, a number of research respondents made 
connections between the perceived prevalence of high unemployment among [adult] Somalis 
to the negative impact that it has on their children. It was argued, for example, that parents 
who work, were predisposed to become good role models for their children, rather than 
parents who face unemployment. Irshad, a 41-year old male respondent asked this rhetorical 
question:  
What impression will parents, relatives and 
neighbours who are unemployed and have nothing to 
do other than mill in and around suburb squares have 
on children? What will the children whose parents 
have never worked in Sweden say or feel in the 
company of their peers when they talk of their 
parents’ work or career, of the holidays they are 
planning or those destinations they have been to? 
 
Irshad continues:  
What about those other children, who by growing up 
in these suburbs, think of unemployment as 
something of a norm, and employment, as something 
unusual? That surely will have an impact on their 
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educational performance and career aspiration now, 
and in the future.  
 
Mona, a social worker at Rinkeby Social District reinforces some of Irshad’s observations:  
Unemployment has become normality here [meaning 
these suburbs]. The tradition to work has not taken 
root here. Social assistance which was intended as a  
temporary relief and specific to certain uninsured 
vulnerable groups in society has become the only 
source of income for many in these suburbs.  
 
6.2.3 Poor public services   
 
Among the numerous problems that residents in these suburbs were said to experience is poor 
and deteriorating public services. Public services in these suburbs were described as 
substandard, in relation to those provided elsewhere in the city (i.e., in less segregated areas). 
One example was in the area of education where a n umber of research respondents were 
convinced that the relative poor educational services in Rinkeby and Tensta reflected 
negatively on the educational performances of children in these suburbs (cf. Högdin, 2007). 
 
Another issue of concern for the research respondents was the constant in-flow of newly 
arrived immigrant children who continually enroll in these schools. It was felt that this 
invariably lowered the standards of schools (and their performance) as more and more 
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resources, in terms of money and manpower, were often diverted to uplift the levels of the new 
arrivals at the expense of existing pupils. 
  
Indeed, research respondents viewed education not only as pivotal for the integration of 
Somalis in Sweden, but also as a prime facilitator of social mobility. As Hanan, a 42 year old 
male respondent puts it: 
To jolt ourselves from our present predicament, we as 
Somalis need to enroll into educational institutions in 
huge numbers.   
 
6.2.4 High staff turn-over  
 
Research respondents also alluded to the problem of high staff turn-over that contributed to 
deficient service provisions in Rinkeby and Tensta, especially, in the vital sectors like 
education, health and social services. The working conditions of teachers, nurses, doctors, 
social workers, etc, in these areas were often described as being less favourable than those of 
their counterparts in less segregated areas. One factor that contributed to this high staff turn-
over was the ‘huge work-loads’ that those working in the areas had to contend with. Helena, 
an Immigration Officer who formerly worked in Rinkeby Social District of Stockholm 
recounts:  
I can tell you, our work-load was double that of those 
in some social districts in this City and certainly those 
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of the surrounding municipalities in Greater 
Stockholm.  
 
Eva, an official who counsels young unemployed immigrants in Rinkeby reaffirms:  
I have lost count of how many of my colleagues left 
our Social Services Department since I started 
working here three years ago.  
 
6.2.5 Perception of high crime rates 
 
Another perceived disadvantage associated with Rinkeby and Tensta was the relatively high 
prevalence of crime in these areas in relation to other less segregated suburbs. There is 
evidence from Statistics Sweden’s (SCB, 2007) to suggest that as being the case. SCB (2007) 
compared crimes committed in Rinkeby-Kista area (new administrative boundary) with that of 
the City of Stockholm (overall area). The evidence shows that in all the 22 crimes listed, 
Rinkeby-Kista led the City of Stockholm by 18 out of those 22 per in numbers/1000 (see 
Appendix 11). 
    
Nonetheless, a number of Somali research respondents, particularly those who live in Rinkeby 
and Tensta, had different opinions. They argued the prevalence of relatively high crime rates 
in their suburbs vis-à-vis other areas in the city, had to do more with perception than reality. 
Indeed, some of these respondents said they felt ‘safe’ and ‘secure’ in Rinkeby and Tensta 
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than they would in Swedish dominated areas. One possible explanation was because they had 
friends and relatives in these particular suburbs. It had invariably less to do with crime rates in 
these suburbs contrary to other areas. 
 
There were a number of contributing factors towards the negative image of the suburbs, the 
most prominent of which was the media portrayal of these areas. This was emphasised by a 
number of respondents. Among them was Abdiwahid, a 33 year old male respondent, who 
stated the following:   
They say yobs here are on the loose and operate with 
impunity, terrorising inhabitants and visitors alike... 
by harassing people, snatching ladies’ purses, mobile 
phones, and so on. However, I have not witnessed the 
crimes people have been talking about. Neither I nor 
anyone I know has been subjected to these kinds of 
crime. This whole saga of Rinkeby being crime prone 
is something manufactured by t abloids. There is no 
serious journalism involved, only their usual rumours 
and innuendos.   
 
Mariam, a 30 year old female respondent, who once lived in Rinkeby but moved to a 
temporary accommodation in a hostel located in a popular inner-city residence (CBD), adds:  
Outsiders may feel threatened or intimidated when        
they come to Rinkeby. This fear has more to do with 
hearsays and personal prejudices. I can confirm there 
is nothing to fear in Rinkeby. For me, Rinkeby was 
like home. I had many I could relate to in Rinkeby in 
a way that I cannot do in other areas.  
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Whatever the views of Rinkeby and Tensta by Somalis and other inhabitants maybe, what was 
imperative here was the perceptions of ‘native’ Swedes. If ‘native’ Swedes felt ‘threatened’ or 
‘intimidated by the inhabitants of these suburbs or problems of crime (whether perceived or 
real), then that would be enough to deter them from moving ‘back’ into these areas as 
residents.     
 
6.3 Individual Preference 
 
Individual preference is a contributing factor that caused, maintained and perpetuated 
residential segregation between Somalis and Swedes. Individual preference here is construed 
to mean the desires and actions by Somalis of wanting to live in close proximity with one 
another. There were a number of factors that explained ‘individual preferences’ as being the 
main overriding reasons behind the residential segregation of Somalis. First, the fact that 
Somalis increasingly chose to settle in Stockholm and subsequently in segregated suburbs 
even though many of them had an option to live elsewhere (e.g., in the communes many of 
them moved from) was indicative of their ‘individual preferences’. Many of the Somalis who 
moved to Stockholm were initially resettled in other communes – mainly away from the major 
metropolitan regions under the ‘Whole of Swedish Strategy’ (Hela Swerige Strategin) – also 
known as Swedish Refugee Dispersal Policy (see below). 
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Many Swedish officials (respondents) were of the view that Somalis moved to Stockholm 
‘without proper planning going into their decisions to do s o’, to borrow the words of one 
official. Firstly, many Somalis was said to have moved on their own volition and without the 
coordination by, or approval of, officials either in the previous communes they moved from or 
in their ‘new’ commune (Stockholm). Indeed, some officials, who talked from their own 
professional experience, argued that many Somalis moved to Stockholm despite strong 
opposition from the authorities in the communes they moved from. This was because Somalis 
were abandoning an on-going introduction programme in place in those communes. These 
officials viewed induction programmes as something that was in the interest of Somalis (and 
their children).  
 
Moreover, the abandonment of the ‘plans-in-place’ often entailed the simultaneous 
abandonment of many issues around that plan, e.g., apartments, introduction- and activation 
programmes for adults, schools and day care arrangement, etc. These plans were often 
elaborate and holistic in approach taking into consideration the needs of adults and children of 
immigrants simultaneously. Furthermore, resettlement also entailed finances; multi-agency 
cooperation; schools and kindergartens; Swedish language instructors for adults; home 
language tutors for children; the recruitment of teachers, etc. In other words, a lot of time and 
efforts went into resettling Somalis in the communes they were initially allocated to.  
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In the eyes of the majority of Swedish officials going against these ‘plans’ was, therefore, 
‘regrettable’. To them Somalis were abandoning ‘ideal’ places from an integration viewpoint 
in relation to the suburbs they moved into in Stockholm. Abandoning a place that entailed a 
‘better future’ and coming into what was clearly ‘problem areas’, was thus seen as i llogical. 
As Göran, an official at Rinkeby Social District who coordinates refugee reception and their 
introduction into society alludes to:  
Somalis may have moved to Stockholm without 
asking themselves whether the place they are moving 
to had a better or lower quality of life for themselves 
and their children in relation to the place they 
move(d) from.  
 
It was also argued that once Somalis had moved to Stockholm, they still had alternative 
options to settle in other suburbs with relatively fewer immigrants than either Rinkeby or 
Tensta. This was because there were financial guarantees to people who could not afford their 
rents for diverse reasons. These include people who have no recourse to work-related benefits 
(e.g., pensions, unemployment-, maternity-, sick-, or disability benefits) because they have not 
met eligibility criteria for those benefits. Most refugees or immigrants who have not been in 
the country for a considerable amount of time, or those who have encountered ‘persistent’ 
long-term unemployment since arrival as a number of Somalis have done, would fall under the 
category of people who fail to accrue work-related benefits. Thus, unemployment, lack of 
income and ineligibility to work-related benefits does not necessarily entail those afflicted are 
devoid of any safety nets in Sweden. Indeed, the Social Services Act or Socialtjänstlagen 
(SOL) in Sweden guarantees that all people living legally in the country receive a basic 
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national minimum subsistence allowance (or social assistance) known as Socialbidragsnorm 
or simply as Riksnorm.  
 
Nonetheless, this basic subsistence allowance is conditional. For example, an unemployed 
person has to demonstrate that s/he is actively seeking work or is engaged in some form of 
economic activities such as Swedish language instruction and other skills enhancement 
courses or training. If the individual is not able to be at the disposal of the labour market due 
to sickness, substance abuse, etc, s/he has to be produce an updated medical record in the case 
of sickness and be willing to undergo rehabilitation in the case of substance abuse.   
    
Third, the continued ‘insistence’ by some Somalis to reside in Rinkeby and Tensta, despite 
becoming or being aware of the negative consequences such areas entail for their own 
integration and those of their off-springs shows that Somalis have or are contributing to their 
own self-segregation. This was a r eflection shared by Björn, who works as an employment 
advisor with the Rinkeby Social District of Stockholm: 
Initial preference was one thing, but when the dust 
settled and people realised the problems inherent in 
the suburbs they came to settle in, one would have 
expected a change of heart. This does not seem to be 
the case w ith some Somalis in these areas. They 
continue to prefer to live here for some reason.    
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Other officials have also taken issue with the ‘the absence of a hankering’ or ‘desire to’ live in 
other areas by Somalis (deemed favourable from an integration viewpoint) as a clear 
indication that Somalis prefer to live in these segregated areas. Officials associated alternative 
or less segregated suburbs with such attributes as closer interaction with members of the host 
society, accessibility to better services, ‘brighter’ future for the residents and their offspring, 
amongst others. Yet Somalis did not [in the eyes of these officials] seem eager to move to 
these alternative suburbs.  
 
6.3.1 Differentiation: Different Reasons, Different Circumstances  
 
Although the overwhelming majority of Somalis who came to Stockholm did so out of 
preference, it was imperative not to assume that all Somalis ‘preferred’ to live in close 
proximity with one another. Indeed, there were clearly two other groups who came to 
Stockholm for different reasons and under different circumstances, as identifiable from the 
research data, viz.: ‘officially accepted respondents’ (a group that was accepted by Stockholm 
Commune from the outset), and ‘family re-union respondents’ (a group that came to 
Stockholm or Sweden for a ‘family reunion’). These two groups had little or no ‘preference’ 
of where they eventually settled but were more or less compelled by the authorities or their 
circumstances (in the case of family reunions) to move into or settle in Stockholm. To 
elaborate we will first of all, look at the group that ‘preferred’ to reside in Stockholm before 
we discuss these other two groups.  
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6.3.1.1 ‘Preference Respondents’ 
 
This group had the experience of living outside Stockholm metropolitan area prior to being 
granted residency status in Sweden. Indeed, they were part of the relatively large Somali group 
that came to Sweden in the early 1990s. This was a period when refugee reception centres 
blossomed all over the country, thanks in part to the huge influxes of refugees into the country 
particularly from the former Yugoslavia. Refugees were placed in centres across the whole of 
Sweden, from Malmö in the south to Kiruna in the north (for map, see Appendix 9).  
 
When these Somalis were granted permits to stay, they were either placed in the communes 
where their refugee centres were located, or in other communes outsides the major 
metropolitan areas such as Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö (in line with Swedish Refugee 
Dispersal Policy). However, Somalis subsequently moved to Stockholm after spending some 
time in their communes of placement. Moreover, the move to Stockholm almost always 
entailed an automatic move into Rinkeby and Tensta, two adjacent immigrant clusters which 
also happened to be home for the overwhelming majority of ‘Stockholm’ Somalis. 
 
6.3.1.2 ‘Officially Accepted Respondents’ 
 
This group had little or no e xperience of living in other communes other than the fact that 
some of them came through refugee receptions centres located there, before the authorities 
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placed them in Stockholm. This group thus comprised of people who were accepted by the 
Stockholm Commune for resettlement from the outset. Undeniably, there were people among 
this group who wanted to live in Stockholm and who, luckily, were asked to move there 
because Stockholm Commune was planning to accept a certain number of refugees in that 
given year or period to which they became part. By the same token, there may have been 
others in this group who involuntarily ended up in Stockholm. 
 
6.3.1.3 ‘Family Re-unions Respondents’ 
 
Most of those involved here were women. Indeed, it was common for men to seek refuge in 
Sweden first and to reunite with their families later. Evidence from the respondents in this 
research confirms this trend. All but one of the nine Somali women participants came to 
Sweden to be re-united with their husbands. The other came as a child who accompanied her 
mother and other siblings to join her father, who was already living in Sweden.  
 
Whilst some in this group came directly to Stockholm (from Somalia, etc), others did spend 
some of their initial years in Sweden in other communes together with their families before 
they moved (with their families) to Stockholm. One notable factor that affected the latter 
group was that, they had little say in the decisions that led them and or their families to move 
to Stockholm. In most cases, the ‘motivating’ factor(s) for the relocation on the part of these 
women to Stockholm was normally tied to their families’ ‘social’, ‘cultural’ and ‘religious’ 
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needs that could not be obtained from the communes they moved from. Indeed, decisions 
involving the move to Stockholm were taken by men on behalf of the whole family, including 
these women. This was unsurprising in the sense that Somali women have traditionally played 
the complementary role of supporting their husbands and children. Unfortunately, their needs 
and own careers do suffer greatly because of this ‘sacrificial’ role in the family.  
 
To consider this small sample as an example, the women interviewed have been in Sweden for 
a considerable length of time – enough for them to individually establish themselves in terms 
of acquiring the Swedish language, educating themselves to an appropriate level and obtaining 
employment. However, most of these women (six out of nine) seemed to have prioritised the 
needs of others in the family (e.g., their children and husbands) over their own personal needs. 
This has undoubtedly acted as an  obstacle to their integration process in Sweden. From the 
deliberation of participants, and examples of some of the women interviewed the familial 
priorities that seemed to preoccupy many Somali women in Sweden included conception, 
mothering, and child-care. 
 
6.3.2 The Incentives for Choosing a ‘Somalian’ Community 
 
For Somalis, there were a number of incentives for choosing to reside in close proximity with 
one another. Indeed, a great deal of the deliberation or ‘preference’ for segregated areas by 
Somalis focuses on the advantages accrued by living in those areas. Whilst the significance of 
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some incentives (e.g., some of those that motivated Somalis to move to Stockholm initially) 
may have faded, the importance of others continues to apply or persist.   
 
Among the most recurrent themes endorsed in highlighting the reasons of preferring to live in 
close proximity with one another included: “birds of the same feathers flock together”; 
“readily available information”; “fled Isolation”; “having large Families”; “religious factors”; 
and, the availability of a Somali ‘enclave economy’.  
 
6.3.2.1 ‘Birds of the same feathers’ flock together 
 
For many participants, there was nothing unique for members of a certain group (e.g., 
national, ethnic, cultural, etc) in wanting to live in close proximity to one another. Sentiments 
expressed by participants included: ‘this was natural’; ‘there was nothing unique in this…’; 
‘this was a universal phenomenon’, among others, in order to drive home their point.  In other 
words, it was perceived by the participants that it was ‘natural’ for immigrants to look for 
people from their ethnic community or country of origin when they first come to a foreign 
country whose language, values, culture, and religion were often different from their own.  
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The following account by Abdirashid, a 51 year old male respondent who came to Sweden in 
the 1970s reflects on the above: 
When I first came here, some decades ago, the first 
thing I asked for, and I thought was of importance 
and a matter of urgency for me, if you may allow me 
to recall, was where I could locate my fellow Somali 
landsmen.  
 
Sara, a social worker at Skärholmen District of Stockholm, says: 
If people moves to a place it is only natural that they 
seek to live where their countrymen live. Even 
Swedes do that when they are abroad. It gives us a 
feeling of security. 
 
Elisabet, a migration official who earlier worked in Rinkeby Social District reinforces the 
above: 
If I were to move abroad and knew there were many 
Swedes in a particular area, I would probably have 
done the same as Somalis are doing here.  
 
6.3.2.2 Readily available information  
 
Another important advantage accrued by m oving into Stockholm was the acquisition of 
readily available information provided by fellow ethnic Somalis living there. Undoubtedly, 
many Somalis suffered from language disadvantages in the beginning. Their connection with 
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members of the host community in terms of joint socialising and recreational sessions, 
educational and labour market was often severely curtailed as a r esult. Apart from the 
bureaucratic assistance they obtain from officials, the main reliable source of information they 
needed could only be obtained from members of their ethnic group.  
 
Axiomatically, when one is still relatively new, many issues are complex and problematic. 
Where and how does the individual start from? Where could s/he seek social and economic 
assistance? How, where and who to contact for vital services? On starting language courses, 
which schools or localities have the best reputation in terms of how they deal with newcomers, 
impart knowledge, etc? What about those Somalis who preceded newcomers: What were their 
experiences? How did they go about establishing themselves in the new environment? How 
could one make headway at all, given the enormity of the difficulties (e.g., lack of acceptance, 
unemployment, etc) that Somalis, in general, faced?  
 
These were vital questions many newcomers wrestled with. The answers to these questions 
provided the information that they needed to access the opportunities provided for them in 
their new society. Undoubtedly, in the absence of such vital information, it would have taken 
even longer for the individuals concerned to establish themselves in Sweden. As one 
participant puts it, ‘go there’, ‘do that’…’ were the usual phrases that ‘direct’ newcomers to 
find their place in the new society – thanks largely to their fellow country-men who preceded 
them. In other words those who preceded the newcomers often furnish the latter with 
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accessible information. It was, as it were, fellow countrymen offering a helping hand to their 
compatriots.  Hirab, a 55 year old male respondent, reaffirms:    
… regarding the vitality of the right  information, the 
individual, on his own cannot disentangle the 
information labyrinth… its sheer enormity, and its 
‘piecemeal’ manner… all these cannot, reasonably, 
be tackled by the newcomer on his or her own. That 
is why it is important to have a fellow countryman 
who has already being through the same experience. 
It does ease a lot, especially, with regard to the very 
initial (re)settlement period.  
 
Again participants were keen to point out that this was not something specific to Somalis but 
one that was a universal phenomenon.  
 
6.3.2.3 Combating Isolation 
 
More concretely, a few respondents indicated that they moved from smaller communes to 
Stockholm to seek the company of family and friends since they felt isolated in their existing 
communes. For example, Barni, a 36 year female respondent, and her children came to a 
provincial town in Northern Sweden to join her husband who had been previously resettled in 
that town. After a year’s stay in the town (i.e., from the time of their [family] reunification), 
this family decided to move to Stockholm. The reason for their move to Stockholm was 
related to the isolation they felt in the city they moved from. Barni recalls: 
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I felt isolated … my whole family felt, this 
indescribable sense of alienation. There were no 
Somalis in nearly the whole city. In fact we knew of 
only three Somali families who lived in smaller 
centres several miles from where we lived. They too 
were preparing to move to other towns. We simply 
could not continue living in that city any longer 
because we felt so isolated.  
 
6.3.2.4 Large Families 
 
Moreover, household type and composition of Somali families often compelled some Somalis 
to ‘prefer’ areas where they could be ‘tolerated’. As argued, Somalis with large families would 
be more comfortable in living in immigrant dominated suburbs than in areas where native 
Swede predominate. That was one reason, for example, why both Muktar (44 year old male 
respondent) and Diriye (39 years old male respondent] moved with their families to 
Stockholm and subsequently to Rinkeby. Their families comprised of eight and nine children 
respectively.  
 
Indeed, large families of these sizes appear anomalous to Swedes, where the typical [Swedish] 
family is often allegorised as ‘the’ couple with two children (at most!) and their three ‘V’s – 
Vovve, Volvo and Villa. Vovve is a puppy in colloquial Swedish. However, there were also 
practical reasons why rearing large families in Sweden could be prohibitive, at least as far as 
native Swedes were concerned. First, Swedish partners were more likely to be employed 
rendering a large family impracticable. Furthermore, reasons such as overcrowding, financial 
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burden and the scarcity of time all weigh in decisions ‘native’ Swedish parents make to plan 
their families.  
 
Contrastingly, many Somali parents who opt for large families, seemingly, do not have the 
same considerations that conditioned Swedes to plan their families around their careers or 
their contemporary lifestyle. Indeed, some Somalis were ‘metaphysical’ about planning the 
size or composition of their families. Diriye had this to say on family planning, for example:  
It is God who provides for his creatures from their 
cradle to their grave. It is He who sustains all lives on 
earth, both human and plants.  
 
6.3.2.5 Religious factors 
 
In Rinkeby and Tensta, Somalis have formed ethnic organisations, and created ethnic-oriented 
institutions such as ‘make-shift’ mosques and informal religious schools where they teach 
their children how to write, read and memorise the Quran. All this was an attempt to recreate a 
sense of community in the new environment where Somali religious life could flourish. This 
acted further as a magnet that drew more Somalis into these areas.   
 
Informal Quranic schools are popular with the overwhelming majority of Somali parents since 
they view religious education as a religiously ordained obligation. Quranic schools, known in 
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Somali as dugsi are run informally and staffed by r eligious instructors called mu’aalims 
(teachers). The mu’aalim’s traditional role also includes that of discipline. Mu’aalims also 
have the tacit approval of parents to discipline their children. Some corporal punishment or 
intimidation may often be involved in the effort to inculcate moral imperatives into pupils.    
 
An implicit assumption amongst some Somali research participants, who are themselves 
parents, was that Swedish learning institutions (e.g., public day-care centres and schools) were 
engaged in some kind of indoctrination that ‘turned’ children against their religion, culture and 
even their parents. They saw it, therefore, incumbent upon themselves to undertake ‘counter-
indoctrination measures’ to save their children from ‘an impending and imminent peril of 
assimilation’, to use the paraphrase of one Somali female respondent. Quranic schools and 
their Mu’aalims thus play the important role of working towards attaining the ‘counter-
indoctrination measures’ Somali families seek for their children in Sweden. 
 
6.3.2.6 ‘Somalian enclave economy’  
 
One fundamental cultural and religious need that attracts Somalis to Rinkeby and Tensta 
include ‘traditional’ goods, such as Halal food or products, clothes, cultural-specific 
accessories, etc.  As this research reveals, it is in these areas where a small Somali enclave 
economy is beginning to blossom.  
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Indeed, it is in these suburbs where one finds the Hawala (a ‘semi-formal’, systematic) 
banking system. Somalis use Hawala to send remittances to their relatives in Somalia and 
other places of the world where formal banking hardly reaches. The Hawala is renowned for 
its speed, efficient and reliability. As a number of these Somalis concurred, money sent to 
relatives in the most remote corners of Somalia or neighbouring countries can be received in a 
matter of hours. To understand how the Hawala works, we draw from a recent example by 
Interpol (as shown in Figure 6.1). Interpol (2010) argues that trust between the sender (Abdul) 
and the Hawala agent (Yasmeen) is crucial. Once that trust has been established, Yasmeen 
contacts the Hawala agent (Ghulam) at the other end (e.g., Abdul’s country of origin) and 
instructs him (Ghulam) to pay the money (received from Abdul) to his relative (Mohamad). 
When the transaction is finalized, Abdul receives a ‘text-message’ that confirms the money he 
sent has been paid to Mohammad.  
Figure 6.1: How the Hawala Transaction Works.  
 
   
Source: Adopted from Interpol (2010). See Bibliography for ‘Link’. 
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Somalis also engage in Ayuta, a cooperative system where people get together to lend each 
other money. These cooperative comprise of two to a dozen people, who agree to lend each 
other money. When these groups are initially formed, the candidate who is seen as having the 
most pressing needs receives the loan that is provided by the rest of the group. Each candidate 
contributes the same amount. The remaining candidates then wait for their turn with only one 
of them receiving the agreed amount at the end of each month. Indeed, Ayuta is a rotating 
system. It is purely dependent and built upon trust between members. It continues until the 
group dissolves itself.  
 
One reason why Ayuta is popular with Somalis is because few financial institutions lend 
money to Somalis given many of them lack security against a loan (e.g., property; viable 
employment or income, etc). Ayuta is the only way individual Somalis (e.g., those 
unemployed, on benefits, etc) can get hold of or borrow a substantial sum of money at a given 
point in time. Ayuta is also popular from a religious viewpoint because no interest is paid on 
money borrowed this way.   
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6.4 Socioeconomic Factors 
 
Residential segregation between Somalis and Swedes was also explained by socio-economic 
differences. Among the recurrent themes endorsed by the majority of research participants as 
factors that inhibited Somalis from residential integration (with Swedes) included: (a) the 
relative lack of language competences, and education; (b) their poor participation in the labour 
market; and, (c) the relative short duration of their residence in Sweden. Other factors 
pertaining to socioeconomic differences between Swedes and Somalis were the roles played 
by class and social distance (in an ethnically hierarchal society). In the latter case, Swedes 
enjoy a favourable position in relation to Somalis who were placed lowest in a hierarchy based 
on ranking Swedes with all minority groups in Sweden, including, the more established ones. 
The social position a group enjoys in the hierarchy thus determines its residential patterns vis-
à-vis those of native Swedes.  
  
6.4.1 Language and Education 
 
The acquisition of language competence and education were seen as clear imperative in the 
overall integration of Somalis in Sweden. Axiomatically, many respondents regarded these 
resources as crucial for Somalis to attain upward social mobility in Sweden. It was through 
upward social mobility, they argued, that Somalis could, for example, attain residential 
integration, all things being equal. However, many respondents were of the view that Somalis, 
in general, lacked sufficient language- (including cultural) competences. Moreover, their 
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education levels were also seen as low comparative to ‘native’ Swedes, as well as, the more 
established immigrant groups in Sweden. These also affected their socioeconomic status 
which in turn impacted on their residential patterns vis-à-vis those of native Swedes.  
 
Indeed, language was seen a prerequisite to the integration of Somalis (and to immigrants, in 
general). As many research participants have put it, it is the key to everything. It facilitates 
cultural understanding and social connectivity with the host society. Through a good 
command of the Swedish language, Somalis are, for example, likelier to acquire reasonable 
educational attainment and subsequently gain a greater foothold in the Swedish labour market, 
and hence, potential residential integration with the majority population. Likewise, education 
was seen as an important component of integration. However, it was argued that the 
educational levels of Somalis were low in comparison to the host society. Furthermore, many 
Somalis were said to have ‘stuck’ to their previous qualifications accrued from abroad, 
without supplementing those qualifications to suit to Swedish conditions – which in turn 
impacted on their labour market participation.  
 
6.4.2 Labour market situation  
 
A connection was also made between labour market participation of Somalis and their 
residential segregation in Stockholm. Because the labour market participation of Somalis in 
Sweden was relatively low, it w as unsurprising, therefore, that they were residentially 
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segregated. Indeed, a major impediment to the integration of Somalis in Sweden was 
unemployment (see Integrationsverket, 1999; Carlsson, 2006). The unemployment Somalis 
suffer was said to be widespread, persistent and long-term. Moreover, a relatively high 
proportion of Somalis have yet to secure a single job since they arrived in Sweden 15-20 years 
ago. Furthermore, the prospect of these long-term unemployed Somalis securing employment 
in Sweden both in the near or foreseeable future was deemed slim not least because of changes 
in the labour market in recent decades.  
 
Indeed, the changing nature of jobs was singled out as contributing to this dire situation. The 
jobs that are being created in the Swedish economy are now less labour intensive and require a 
highly skilled labour force. This scenario was precipitated by structural changes that occurred 
to the Swedish economy towards the end of 1990s. Structural changes in the Swedish 
economy have resulted in a decrease in labour intensive jobs (i.e., demand for low-skilled 
jobs) and an increase in more skilled jobs. This is where Somalis are disadvantaged since they 
have yet to keep pace with these changes. The changing nature of the Swedish economy 
requires constant readjustment in which people are required to acquire new skills or upgrade 
their existing knowledge base.   
 
Moreover, the nature of jobs for the limited number of Somalis who work does not provide the 
rewards necessary to change their current residential patterns. This was because they perform 
jobs whose tenure was less secure, i.e., jobs that were casual, part-time, temporary and often 
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poorly paid. Indeed, a number of respondents argued that greater labour market participation 
by Somalis would not necessarily improve their housing mobility. As Eva, a youth 
employment adviser with the Rinkeby Social District of Stockholm puts it: 
The jobs that mattered are those that enabled 
people to integrate residentially with Swedes. 
They are the types of jobs that had to be 
rewarding in terms of pay and security. Clearly, 
under current circumstances, these types of jobs 
seem to be out of reach for many Somalis.   
 
6.4.3 Length of Residence Issues  
 
The length of time a p erson has been in Sweden was seen as decisive for one to integrate 
residentially with the host community (cf. Le Grande & Szulkin, 2002). Accordingly, for 
immigrants like Somalis to establish themselves in segments of the housing market (i.e., as 
homeowners or owner occupiers), they would normally need to live in Sweden for a 
considerable length of period.  
 
Indeed, it requires a considerable duration for people to establish themselves in the housing 
market even in the best of circumstances, irrespective of whether one is an immigrant or not. 
This was underscored in the following sentiments by Eriksson, a social worker with the 
Märsta Social District of Stockholm:    
Even for those Swedes, many of whom were not       
born with a silver spoon in their mouths, contrary to 
200 
 
the misgivings about them by immigrants ... even for 
them [Swedes] it w ould require a considerable 
amount of time before they could own their own 
apartments or houses. They would as a rule go first to 
school, work hard, save for their first down payment 
and only then consider whether or not they would 
really be able to commit to or sustain a mortgage that 
could tie them for another considerable amount of 
time. 
 
When it came to Somalis, the majority of them have been in Sweden for what amount to be a 
relatively short period. A great part of this very short period was also spent on the quest to 
acquire language and educational competences. Indeed, even in the best of circumstances, the 
attainment of adequate human capital resources and the subsequent realisation of employment 
were bound to take a relatively long period of time.   
 
Some respondents were skeptical that first-generation Somalis would ever attain residential 
integration with ‘native’ Swedes given their contemporary socioeconomic status. To these 
research participants, the length of time an individual needed to ‘truly’ integrate residentially, 
could only be measured ‘in terms of generations’ and that was bound t o be a long time. 
Hassan, a 37 ye ar old male respondent, went even further by a rguing that residential 
integration with Swedes was only plausible through assimilation. Says Hassan:     
I believed a true, complete or total residential 
integration can only be achieved if and when Somalis 
were to assimilate. We still have a few generations to 
go before such integration can be obtained. 
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6.4.4 Class, Social Distance and Residential Segregation 
 
In the research interviews, the notions of class, social distance and ethnicity hierarchies in 
relation to socio-economic status and residential- integration or segregation of Somalis vis-à-
vis the majority society were also highlighted. Indeed, class and ethnicity were often seen as 
closely bounded phenomena that impacted on the residential patterns of Somalis and Swedes. 
Both phenomena had an influence on where people settled; whom one associates with; who to 
choose as neighbours; what schools children attended; what mode of transport people used or 
had access to, etc.   
 
The overarching argument was that Somalis and Swedes followed different residential patterns 
because they belonged to separate social class groups – in which Swedes were portrayed as the 
higher social group and Somalis as the lower social group. Here is where the notions of Social 
distance and ethnic hierarchy were introduced into the discussion. In this ethnic rank order, 
the ‘distance’ between Somalis and Swedes were said to be the ‘furthest’ in relation to many 
other communities in Sweden. Björn, who works as employment advisor with the Rinkeby 
Social District of Stockholm explains:   
There is a sort of pyramid in which immigrants like 
Somalis were represented on the lowest spectrum 
whilst Swedes and the other more established 
immigrant groups on t he higher strata... with native 
Swedes topping the stratum.  
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This was in keeping with earlier studies that show that the social position a group enjoys in the 
[ethnic] hierarchy determines its residential patterns vis-à-vis those of native population (see 
Hagendoorn & Pepel, 2003). Indeed, to many research participants, residential patterns by 
social class and ethnic hierarchy seemed predictable with Swedes settling in the more affluent, 
reputable suburbs, whilst Somalis in the less reputable, segregated suburbs.  
 
Although this hierarchy was discussed in relation to residential segregation/integration, it 
could also be applied to many areas such as education, income, employment, health, life 
quality, etc. It was thus arguable that Somalis were starting from a lower hierarchal position in 
relation to many, if not all, of the socioeconomic factors selected for deliberation in this 
section (and in other parts of this thesis) in comparison to ‘native’ Swedes and the more 
established immigrant groups in Sweden. It should be noted though, that discussion 
overlooked the existence of ‘poorer’ Swedes, and the fact all Swedes do not belong to one 
social class.   
 
6.4.4.1.1 ‘Extricate Yourself by Making a Housing Career’  
 
The suburbs Somalis currently reside in (Rinkeby and Tensta) were in themselves seen as 
obstacles to their socioeconomic integration in Sweden. Hence, for Somalis to integrate 
residentially with ‘native Swedes’, they had to extricate themselves from these segregated 
areas and move to other more desirable areas or suburbs in other parts of the city. Desirable 
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suburbs, here, connoted those with a majority of ‘native Swede’, deemed also as affluent areas 
and with better reputations. Also noted was that, suburbs with at least a 50:50 native-
immigrant ratio or composition were viewed satisfactorily from an [residential] integration 
viewpoint by a number of research respondents.  
 
For many respondents, ‘total’ residential integration with Swedes, as illustrated by the above 
quotes, was unattainable under current circumstances, given the many problems Somalis 
encountered in Sweden. Moreover, integration, not least residential integration, is seldom 
achieved at once. It occurs in stages and is often contingent upon the simultaneous attainment 
of other types of integration, e.g., acculturation and labour market integration, among others.  
 
Concretely, one way Somalis could ‘extricate themselves’ from their current residentially 
segregated status and move to other more desirable suburbs was by ‘making’ a housing 
‘career’. Some used the terms ‘housing career’ and ‘housing mobility’ interchangeably. 
Following the precedents of other non-Somali immigrants, making a housing ‘career’ often 
entailed buying an apartment and becoming owner-occupiers in other suburbs or parts of the 
city that were less segregated. In this way these non-Somali immigrants could ‘extricate 
themselves’ from areas like Rinkeby and Tensta, to use the paraphrase of one research 
respondent.   
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Indeed, Rinkeby was particularly talked of as an example of suburbs or places where 
immigrants traditionally stayed ‘temporarily’ until such a time when they were able to move to 
the other relatively more reputable suburbs of their choice. However, when it came to Somalis, 
it was argued, their stay or presence in Rinkeby has already taken a more quasi-permanent or 
permanent status with little or no prospect for them to ‘extricate themselves’ to areas or 
suburbs where they could integrate residentially with ‘native’ Swedes. Göran, an official at 
Rinkeby who coordinates refugee reception and their introduction into society, sums up:  
Rinkeby has functioned as a sort of temporary 
encampment where different immigrants groups 
have in the past came and gone. It has always 
functioned as a place where people settled 
down at first, acquired education, gained 
employment and then moved on to other areas 
within the city. However, I have a feeling that 
Somalis are stuck here and it may take them a 
very, very long time before they would be able 
to move to other areas.  
 
As can be deduced from Göran’s assessment, Rinkeby has functioned as a sort of springboard 
from where various immigrant groups had come to settle initially but subsequently left for 
other more reputable, less segregated suburbs. Indeed, Göran’s sentiments represented the 
kind of widespread pessimism, especially among Swedish officials, about the prospects of 
Somalis moving out of suburbs like Rinkeby in the foreseeable future, thereby, following the 
precedents set by earlier immigrants before them who had ‘come and gone’, to use the words 
of one respondent, in reference to this suburb.  
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There was, however, another dimension in the argument that did not come to the fore. 
Officials like Göran did not seem to distinguish between labour migrants (a great potion of 
whom were of European stock) and refugee migrants who came onto the scenario much later. 
Moreover, Göran and others made no reference to the fact that labour migrants came at a time 
when the economy was booming and when immigrants could make housing ‘careers’ with 
relative ease as opposed to refugees whose circumstances were fundamentally different from 
the former.  
 
It would be difficult for recent arrivals, whose arrival coincided with the economic downturn 
and a restructured economy where the abundance of labour intensive manufacturing and 
industrial jobs no longer obtained; and, who are more likely to be unemployed than not, to 
make housing ‘careers’. 
    
All in all, as the respondents argued, there were many socioeconomic differences between the 
two communities to warrant class- or ethnic based residential segregation. They pointed to the 
great disparity in the residential opportunities open to the two communities which flowed from 
differences in their socioeconomic positions in society. These included differences in human 
capital resources (e.g., language and education), income and employment (including 
differences in occupation or the nature of jobs). It was, therefore, no coincidence that Swedes 
were better predisposed socioeconomically since they had access t o better paying job and 
greater spending powers in line with their lifestyles (or social class).   In short, Swedes had the 
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power to influence their own destinies with regard to where to settle (e.g., type of suburbs) and 
who to associate with (e.g., what type of neighbours to have). By contrast Somalis were 
considered disadvantaged. Many remained unemployed and on public support. Those few who 
did work ended up in unskilled occupations with low remuneration and less secure tenure. All 
these, in turn, have made it d ifficult for Somalis to residentially integrate with Swedes and 
vice versa.  
 
6.5 Unintended Consequences from Policy Changes   
 
This section provides a background context to demonstrate how a number of unintended 
consequences that derive from the changes in policy can impact on the residential patterns of 
immigrants and ‘native’ Swedes. It also shows how these changes, which preceded the arrival 
of Somalis into the Swedish scene, affected their residential patterns vis-à-vis the ‘native’ 
Swedes.      
 
Indeed, specific policy changes in housing, immigration and immigrant integration that took 
place between 1960 and 1990 have had a negative consequence on the residential patterns of 
residents in the Stockholm metropolitan area. In particular, attention will be focused on the 
‘unintended’ consequence that resulted from the One Million Housing Programme (known in 
Swedish as Miljönprogrammet). This programme was initiated in 1965 and ended in the mid 
1970s. It aimed to eradicate housing shortages in the metropolitan areas. The reason why large 
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metropolitan regions were the focal points of the One Million Housing Programme was 
because it was in these areas where housing shortages were most acute. Pertaining to Swedish 
immigration and immigrant integration policies, the research looks at the consequences that 
resulted from (a) the policy change from labour migration to refugee migration from the mid 
1970s, and (b) changes that resulted from the abandonment of the so called Whole Swedish 
Strategy, commonly known as Swedish Refugee Dispersal Policy in the Mid-1990s.  
 
Needless to say, these policies were often designed and implemented with good intentions. 
Nonetheless, in line with existing literature (see Särnbratt, 2006; Roos & Gelotte, 2004; 
Lövgren, 2002; Murdie & Borgegård, 1998), the emphasis from this research reinforces that 
all these policies had some unintended consequences that further generated, maintained and 
reproduced residential separation between native Swedes and immigrants (including Somalis) 
in Stockholm. 
 
6.5.1 The One Million Housing Programme  
 
This was an ambitious housing programme project. This followed a decision by the Swedish 
parliament in 1965 to construct one million housing units from 1965 to 1975 (Hall & Vidén, 
2005). The One Million Programme was very much embedded in the Swedish social welfare 
system, and driven through by the ruling Social Democratic Party (Hall & Vidén, 2005). The 
aims of the programme were as follows:  (1) to eradicate homelessness; (2) to ensure that 
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people acquired decent homes at reasonable non-market rents or purchase for owner-occupier 
in certain areas; and, (3) to protect citizens from the excesses of the market (see Hall & Vidén, 
2005, Roos & Gelotte, 2004). 
 
Indeed, many commentators link housing initiative to what is often dubbed the Golden Age of 
the Swedish Welfare State in the 1960s. This was a p eriod when Sweden witnessed 
unprecedented, sustained economic and industrial growth. As Coronel (2002:1) states, it was a 
period when ‘the Swedish social democratic model managed to successively deliver its 
promises of low unemployment, low inflation, and a relatively egalitarian distribution of 
wealth’. The prevalence of acute housing shortage, particularly in the larger metropolitan 
regions where many industries were also located (see Anderson & Solid, 2003), had the 
potentiality of derailing this positive economic trends, hence, the One Million Housing 
Programme initiative.   
 
In the end, the Programme achieved its target of constructing one million dwellings and even 
surpassing it by a  few thousand units. The final production comprised of both low rise and 
high rise buildings (see Roos & Gelotte, 2004). Thanks to the One Million Programme, the 
face of many city landscapes were transformed: some suburbs were built entirely from scratch; 
for others, it entailed expanding existing dwelling units, increasing their numbers as well as 
modernising them; and, for other it meant the demolition of old buildings and neighbourhoods, 
and replacing them with new units. Moreover, office blocks to house essential welfare state 
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services were built in these suburbs as an integral part of the Programme. There were schools, 
health centres, local administration offices, social services, social security offices, employment 
exchange offices, police stations, etc. Furthermore road links, shopping centres, and recreation 
spaces were all incorporated into the planning of the Programme and its implementation. The 
underground rail system was expanded to connect these suburbs to other parts of the city.  
 
Indeed, the new suburbs that sprang up were almost ‘self-sufficient’ – towns within towns – 
complete with all vital amenities. They were soon to be called ABC-Område or the ABC-
Areas, where A stood for Arbete (work), B for Bostad for (housing/accommodation) and C for 
Centrum (centres/square). Thus one could essentially work, live and shop in the same suburb. 
 
6.5.1.1 The Impact of the One Million Programme 
 
All in all, the One Million Programme project was positively responded to by the population, 
particularly, by those families and workers who lived in overcrowded conditions. However, as 
time went by the ‘aura’ surrounding some of the ABC areas began to fade. One factor that led 
to this more negative assessment was the ‘tipping-out’ of Swedes from these suburbs, among 
them, Rinkeby and Tensta (see below). These two suburbs are of interest to this research 
project because they are now home to the overwhelming majority of Somalis in Stockholm.  
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6.5.2 Immigration and Integration Policies  
 
6.5.2.1 From Labour to Refugee Migration 
 
Changes in immigration and refugee dispersal policies also had a further influence on how the 
residential patterns in some part of Stockholm were ultimately shaped. Indeed, the 
development of residential segregation in Stockholm was partly a result of the movement of 
relatively large numbers of immigrants into some of its suburbs from the mid 1970s onwards. 
This was partly caused by the shift of focus on Swedish Immigration policy from labour to 
refugee migration. 
 
Undoubtedly, there were significant differences between labour migrants and refugee. First 
and foremost, labour migrants who came to Sweden were often relatively young able bodied 
men with no or few family members accompanying them into the country. Often, they 
migrated with the intention to work, make money and return to their countries of origins. 
Moreover, labour migrants were regarded as guest workers – temporary sojourners – by the 
host community. They were seen more as an asset than a liability to society, and were, 
certainly, viewed and held in a more favourably light than refugee migrants.  
 
Refugees, on t he other hand, fled from political persecution, social-, economic-, and 
environmental deprivations, among others, in their countries of origin. They came to seek 
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refuge and settle down in Sweden. In contrast to labour migrants, refugees would later be 
joined by the families once they were granted permission to stay in Sweden. Moreover, the 
economic participation of refugees were low in comparison, with many becoming dependent 
on social assistance and other non-income-related welfare benefits for their maintenance – a 
phenomenon that makes them unpopular in the host society.   
 
6.5.2.2 The ‘Abandonment’ of the Swedish Refugee Dispersal Policy 
 
As part of the immigrant integration policy, the Refugee Dispersal Policy was an important 
policy tool that was employed to disperse refugee across the whole of Sweden, and, in 
particular, away from metropolitan regions where immigrants were concentrated in a limited 
number of geographical areas. The concentration of migrants was seen as having a negative 
impact on the integration of immigrants (see Andersson & Solid, 2003), as well as community 
cohesion.  
 
The Swedish Refugee Dispersal policy was ‘abandoned’ in the mid 1990s, although it still 
functioned as a guiding principal for decisions on refugee resettlement as l ate as 1998 (see 
Borgegård, et al., 1998)  
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6.5.3 The ‘Tipping’ of Swedes from Rinkeby and Tensta: An Unintended Consequence 
 
One consequence of these policy changes was called ‘tipping’. ‘Tipping’ occurs when new 
immigrants enters a neighbourhood in such significant numbers that earlier residents (here 
Swedes) opt to leave (see Schelling, 1971). In our case, ‘tipping’ refers to the flight of Swedes 
from suburbs like Rinkeby and Tensta – now home to the overwhelming majority of the 
Somali population in Stockholm. The consequence of ‘tipping’ has led to the steady creation 
of residential vacancies in these areas, which created further opportunities for housing agents 
to steer ethnic minority applicants into these segregated areas. Indeed, although, Somalis came 
onto the scene much later, and certainly after the ‘tipping’ of ‘native’ Swedes from Rinkeby 
and Tensta had already occurred, it was nonetheless, the creation of residential vacancies as a 
result of ‘tipping’ that led many Somalis to live in these areas when they moved into 
Stockholm.  
 
6.5.3.1 Reasons for ‘tipping’ 
 
Arguably, there was a slow but steady ‘displacement’ of ‘native’ Swedes in these suburbs as 
immigrants moved in over time. The most common recurrent reason associated by the 
majority of research respondents with the ‘tipping’ of Swedes from these suburbs, was the 
socioeconomic ‘elevation’ of Swedes. Indeed, the general consensus among research 
respondents was that the socioeconomic status of Swedes improved, thanks to the Swedish 
Welfare State which helped them make the ‘apparent leap from working- to middle class’, to 
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use the paraphrase of one Swedish research respondent. The observations below reinforce this 
idea.  
  
Maria, an official involved in coordinating courses for a group of people who have not 
attended school in their home countries in Rinkeby had this to say:  
These suburbs were no longer in tune with the tastes 
of what was becoming an increasingly emergent 
middle-class Swedish population. 
 
Eva, a youth employment adviser with the Rinkeby Social District of Stockholm adds:  
Many native Swedes no l onger had the reason to 
continue living in these unfriendly apartment blocks. 
Their preference for low-rise apartments and villas 
suited their newfound lifestyles... that was one of the 
reason they abandoned suburbs like Rinkeby and 
Tensta. 
 
Eriksson, a social worker with the Märsta Social District of Stockholm was more precise:  
The flight of Swedes from Rinkeby and Tensta was a 
direct consequence of their improved socioeconomic 
status. A point had come when most Swedes decided 
it was not in their interest to continue residing in 
these suburbs 
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Eriksson continues: 
Frankly, because of the particular housing ‘bundles’ 
available in these suburbs, their architectural design, 
their family-unfriendliness ... all these worked against 
these areas for Swedes to resettle back into them.                                                                                        
 
Many of these officials argued that once ‘tipping’ has started, it is irreversible. It was a 
reflection shared by Göran, an official at Rinkeby who coordinates refugee reception and their 
introduction into society:   
It is inconceivable that Swedes would return to these 
areas again, not even when you empty these blocks of 
immigrants. For Swedes to return to these areas, you 
have to level them to the ground, redesign and build 
these whole suburbs from scratch to suit the whims 
and wishes of Swedes.  
 
6.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter concludes that housing and particular residential segregation is problematic for 
the integration of Somalis in Stockholm (as in other metropolitan regions). The residential 
segregation afflicting Somalis is partly caused by their ‘preference’ in wanting to live in close 
proximity with one another. For example, many Somalis had moved to Stockholm (and 
subsequently to segregated suburbs, e.g., Rinkeby and Tensta) from other communes they 
were initially settled because they wanted to live in areas where had other friends, family 
members or simply where other Somalis settled in relative numbers. There were a number of 
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reasons why Somalis wanted to live in close proximity with one another. These included the 
acquisition of ‘readily available information’, e.g., to secure an easier transition in Sweden; 
‘fleeing’ or ‘breaking’ the isolation some experienced in the communes they were moving 
from; having ‘large families’ (regarded as abnormal in less segregated areas); and, religious 
and cultural factors.    
 
Residential segregations afflicting Somalis are also structurally determined. This is caused by 
differences in socio-economic status between Somalis and ‘native’ Sweden. As this research 
has found, socio-economic disparities between the two exist in many spheres, e.g., language 
competence, education, employment, income, etc. The length of residency in Sweden also 
features as a reason why those Somalis, especially those wanting to extricate themselves from 
segregated suburbs are disadvantaged. Another structural factor relates to policy changes in 
housing and immigration that had unintended consequences on t he residential patterns of 
‘native’ Swedes and immigrants. The outcome of these policy changes led eventually to more 
refugees and immigrants settling into already segregated suburbs.  
 
Whatever the precise reasons for its cause, residential segregation has adverse effects on those 
‘afflicted’ (e.g., Somalis). As this research has found, the negative impact of residential 
segregation on the inhabitants of Rinkeby and Tensta, two adjacent segregated suburbs and 
home to the majority of Somalis in Stockholm were varied and numerous. They included the 
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lack of connectivity with the host population, unemployment, poor services and [perceived] 
higher crime rates (in comparison with other parts of the City).   
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
7 INSTITUTIONAL FORM OF DISCRIMINATION 
 
This chapter identifies institutional forms of discrimination in Swedish labour market and 
housing as barriers to the integration of Somalis in Sweden. Institutional discrimination refers 
to discrimination that is embedded in, as well as emanating from, the institutions or 
organisations of society, as opposed to the kind of discrimination that comes from individuals 
and small groups (e.g., right wing groups) in society. With regard to the Swedish labour 
market, this chapter narrows its focus on the discrimination that is embedded in the 
recruitment processes of employing organisations. With respect to housing, the discriminatory 
ways in which accommodation was allocated by housing corporations or housing agents, who 
played the role of gatekeepers, came out as the striking example of institutional discrimination 
prevalent within the housing sector.  
 
7.1 Conceptualising Discrimination 
 
Discrimination entails treating the ‘other’ in a less favourable light. It occurs in all societies, 
and has done so since time immemorial. People are often discriminated against on a number of 
grounds – racial, ethnic, national, cultural, religious, class, gender, sexual orientation, 
disability, physical appearance, and so on. Nonetheless, whatever the motive to discriminate 
may be, discrimination often results in negative life-experiences for those affected.   
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In the literature, discrimination is rarely mentioned without reference to the notion of 
prejudice, which is often viewed as the precursor to discrimination. Prejudice is a stereotyped 
inner belief or attitude (i.e., a preconceived bias) held by one person against another (Carter, 
1986; Marshall, 1997). To Carter (1986:205), prejudices are adopted by i ndividuals when 
‘assessing’ or evaluating another group because the group is deemed different from one’s own 
group. Often, the person who belongs to the group that is different is presumed to possess 
‘negative’ qualities by those persons or groups that harbour the prejudice(s). According to 
Feagin & Eckberg (1980:20), prejudices are seen as the crucial factor that causes 
discrimination against the singled out-group. Indeed, as argued by a  number of respondents, 
prejudices held against minority groups such as Somalis in Sweden, were without doubt, the 
underlining reasons why many discriminatory behaviours or actions occurred in societal 
institutions (e.g., labour market, housing, etc).  
 
By contrast, discrimination is a behaviour that occurs when one’s attitudes, i.e., prejudice, is 
acted upon to produce an inequitable treatment (Carter, 1986:205). As Kinloch (1974:54) puts 
it, discrimination is ‘applied prejudice in which negative social definitions are translated into 
action’. Discrimination is thus about translating one’s deeply-held negative attitudes or 
prejudices against another individual into action. 
 
Discriminatory acts may be ‘intentional’ or ‘unintentional’. The intentionality aspect of 
discrimination draws us to another common distinction many scholars make when describing 
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discrimination, viz.: direct and indirect discrimination. To Jenkins (1986), direct 
discrimination is born out of the intent to discriminate. It is deliberate, intentional and more 
overt in nature. In direct discrimination, the discriminator is motivated to discriminate. The 
discriminator may discriminate because s/he holds grudge against (or hostilities towards) a 
particular minority because of its racial, ethnic, cultural or religious affiliations. S/he may also 
be motivated to discriminate in order to protect his/her (own group’s) social, economic and 
political privileges (see Feagin & Eckberg, 1980:10). 
 
Conversely, indirect discrimination is less nebulous than direct discrimination. With indirect 
discrimination, the discriminator is not motivated directly by a conscious intent to harm 
his/her victims (Feagin & Eckberg, 1980; Jenkins, 1986). In fact, the discriminator is not 
aware that s/he acts or has acted in a manner that is discriminatory at all. As Jenkins (1986) 
confirms, the discriminator is totally unaware that his/her actions are perceived as 
discriminatory by the person or group it is directed at. ‘Mariam’s case’ (see below) illustrates 
how indirect discrimination occurs in the recruitment process of employing organizations in 
Sweden.   
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7.2 Analysing Discrimination   
 
Discrimination was initially discussed by respondents in conjunction with two other concepts. 
These were xenophobia and racism (refer to Appendix 1, for more on ‘race’ and ‘racism’). All 
three concepts were a priori concepts. They were imposed on this research with an intent to 
find out whether Somalis experienced all these three negative phenomena prevalent in the 
wider society; and if they were, how and why Somalis thought these phenomena impacted or 
inhibited their integration in society.    
 
However, unlike discrimination, the concepts of xenophobia and racism did not yield adequate 
data to warrant appropriate analysis. There were probable reasons why Somali research 
respondents wanted to say more on discrimination than xenophobia and racism in society. 
Firstly, it was conceivable that without the reduction or elimination of discrimination in 
society as pertains to Somalis (or other afflicted minorities), it would probably make little 
sense to tackle xenophobia and racism which were not only seen as expansive but largely also 
more diffuse in comparison (to discrimination). For practical reasons, therefore, it made sense 
to focus on discrimination where legislation was relatively clear, defined, specific and more 
pronounced (e.g., in spheres such as education, employment, health, housing, etc) than was the 
case with the other two phenomena (i.e., xenophobia and racism). Certainly, in the area of 
institutional discrimination, many respondents thought legislation could be vigorously pursued 
or enforced in order to combat discrimination in society.  
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Likewise, the attempt to solicit support from Swedish officials with regard to xenophobia and 
racism also yielded little results. One probable reason could be that xenophobia and racism 
may have been too sensitive to warrant comfortable discussion in supposedly egalitarian 
Sweden. It is also probable that majority of people in Sweden (to which these officials were 
part) would assume, at first glance, that xenophobic and racist views, attitudes, traits or 
behaviours belonged not to mainstream but to the fringes of society (see Appendix 1). 
 
Accordingly, whilst the significance of xenophobia and racism may have faded as central 
factors that impinge upon the integration of Somalis in Sweden, the prevalence of (perceived 
and personally experienced) discrimination in Sweden became the focal point for most 
discussions and subsequent analysis of the data pertaining to these virtues that adversely 
impact on the integration of Somalis.  
 
7.3 Perceptions and Experiences of Discrimination 
 
There was a widespread perception amongst Somali research respondents about the prevalence 
of discrimination that was directed against Somalis by c ertain institutions in society. That 
perception was borne not only out of the respondents’ own personal experiences of 
discrimination but also about what happened to others in similar positions in society. 
Regarding, personal experiences, all Somalis respondents, for example, said they experienced 
discrimination from society and its institutions (e.g., organisations) in one form or another.  
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The knowledge of discrimination about what happens to others came from a number of 
sources. Somalis were either told firsthand by those afflicted or had witnessed such instances 
themselves, thereby, making their own assessment about the nature and degree of the 
discrimination directed against other people. Sometimes discrimination against others (e.g., 
‘fellow’ Somalis) was based on hearsay that was often spread by word-of-mouth among 
Somalis. Many times, however, the knowledge about the prevalence of discrimination was 
informed and reinforced by e xperiences of family members, relatives, friends and 
acquaintances.  
 
The reason why what happens to others was emphasised in the analysis relating to data on 
discrimination was because on a number of occasions, Somali research respondents wanted to 
discuss what happened to others, e.g., friends, family members, etc, rather than talking about 
their own experiences in relation to discrimination. ‘There was this friend of mine’; or ‘this 
relative of mine; or ‘there was this immigrant’, etc, were the ways many respondents wanted 
to highlight the prevalence or encounters of discrimination in society. Whether or not these 
respondents wanted to deflect the incidents (of discrimination), project them on others or 
simply felt bad about relaying their own direct experiences was sometimes difficult to tell. 
Hanan, a 42 year old male respondent, for example, typifies how some Somali wanted to 
explain the existence of discrimination in society:  
Take the example of two of my former college 
friends, one Somali and the other a Swede, both 
of whom I personally showed a job advertisement 
I clipped from a local newspaper. What I know is 
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that my Somali friend had more job experience 
and was relatively better educated than my 
Swedish friend. Unsurprisingly, my Swedish 
friend was offered the job whilst my Somali 
friend continues to languish in unemployment.  
 
Another major source of knowledge about the prevalence of institutional discrimination 
against immigrants (Somalis included) comes from the Swedish media which regularly 
highlights ethnic discrimination in society. Indeed, many Somali respondents commonly 
referred to media reporting on incidents of discriminatory acts or behaviour directed against 
immigrants as a vindication of the existence of institutional discrimination against them 
(Somalis) and immigrants in general. Two common investigative TV programmes that 
received accolades from some Somali respondents were Kalla Fakta and Uppdrag Gransking 
on TV4 (Swedish Channel 4) and SVT1 (Swedish Television One) respectively. Undoubtedly, 
for many years now, discrimination in society has been the subject on these TV programmes. 
Their investigative journalists have uncovered the prevalence and the scale of this 
phenomenon in society. Through numerous sting operations, for example, journalists were 
able to unearth many of the discriminatory practices immigrants were likely to face in society, 
particularly, with regards to labour market relations and the housing sector.  
 
The most common approach used by investigative journalists was to let immigrants reply to an 
advertised vacancy or vacancies and record the response from the firm. These TV programmes 
have demonstrated on many occasions, that there was a higher probability that the response 
from employers to immigrants would be a negative one. ‘Regrettably, we have just filled the 
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advertised position [vacancy]’, says one Somali research respondent, ‘would be the most 
common answer that await immigrant applicants’. Then journalist(s), often ‘native’ Swedes(s) 
posing as applicant(s), with the same or sometimes as less qualified and less experienced than 
the immigrant who has just been told the vacancy had been filled would contact the same firm 
– sometimes speaking to the same person who spoke to the immigrant applicant. Again these 
investigative programmes have exposed on many occasions that there was a more probable 
positive response to ‘native’ Swedes (here the journalist) from employers than would be the 
case for their immigrant counterparts.  
 
The other area where investigative journalists have commonly looked into was similar 
discriminatory practices in the housing sector. Even here, investigative journalists have from 
time to time undertaken similar sting operations where journalists let immigrant meet agents 
for rental apartments, especially in non-immigrant density neighbourhoods. Again, it would be 
more likely for native Swedes to obtain preferential treatment in those apartments – even 
where immigrants and ‘natives’ may have been in the same income-brackets.  
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7.4 Institutional Discrimination 
 
Institutional discrimination is associated with the kind of discrimination that is institutionally 
imbedded, i.e., the kind of discrimination one finds in organisations that are supposed to serve 
all persons who are legally settled in Sweden irrespective of background (Cater, 1986; Feagin 
& Eckberg, 1980; Jenkins, 1986). According to Cater (1986:205), institutional discrimination 
arises when laws or policies directly discriminate against certain individuals or groups; or 
indirectly, when prejudice becomes the ‘convention of institutionalised behaviour and occurs 
under the guise of legitimacy’.   
 
Although Somali respondents noted they faced negative discriminatory treatments in a number 
of Swedish institutions, they reserved the greatest emphasis for those they encounter in the 
Swedish labour market and housing sector.   
 
7.5 Institutional Discrimination in Swedish Labour Market 
 
Within the context of Swedish labour market relation, there were two scenarios under which 
Somalis felt they were subjected to institutionalised discrimination. The first of these patterns 
was reported at workplaces by S omalis. The second one, which constituted the bulk of the 
report, and to which we have already alluded to, is the one inherent in employment screening 
procedures of employing organisations. It is here where potential [Somali] employees felt they 
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were systematically ‘sidelined’ in preference for other candidates, notably, ‘native’ Swedes or 
others deemed to have less ‘objectionable’ characteristics in the eyes of recruiters.  
 
It was no coincidence that Somali research respondents attached greater emphasis and weight 
on discrimination inherent in employment screening procedures (i.e., recruitment process), and 
comparatively less on those (discrimination) that occurs at the workplace. The reason was 
because a sizeable number of them have yet to gain a firmer foothold in Swedish labour 
market – many of who were either unemployed or had insecure workplace rights – a scenario 
that seems reflective of the wide Somali population in Sweden (see Chapter Five). It was also 
probable to assume that the few employed Somalis considered themselves, or were considered 
by fellow Somalis (especially the unemployed) as being ‘relatively lucky’, under prevailing 
circumstances. Amin, a 36 year old male respondent, shares his reflection and asks:  
Why grumble about discrimination at workplace 
when so many of our compatriots languish in 
open-ended long-term unemployment? 
 
7.5.1 Discrimination at workplace 
 
Despite the negligible attention paid by respondents with regard to discrimination in the 
workplace, there were, nonetheless, a f ew of them who reported such instances and felt 
strongly about the kind of negative treatment they had to endure as a result of this. One such 
person was Hanan, a 42 year ole male respondent, who claimed discrimination against 
immigrants in the firm he worked for could both be ‘seen and sensed’. He also talked about 
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how he felt isolated and marginalised because of being unfairly discriminated against. Another 
respondent, Awer, a 42 ye ar old male respondents, also noted ‘tendencies that were not 
normal’ what he called, ‘little things here and there’ that he felt were of discriminatory in 
nature. When prompted for how he was discriminated against, Awer, the only ‘black’ 
employee in his company, said he felt as though his co-workers sometimes doubted his 
competence. Awer was further bemused by the fact that very few of his colleagues came to 
him for advice or consultation on work related matters. To Awer, his co-workers would rather 
confide in other colleagues than him. Awer explains: 
There are many times when I felt the attitudes of 
my fellow workers brought my very competence 
into disrepute. I know of some colleagues who 
would not ask me questions which they would 
readily ask my Swedish colleague sitting beside 
me. I do not  know why… I can only speculate. 
May be they think talking to me would lower 
their dignity or self-esteem.  
 
Another of those who described discrimination at the workplace was Hassan, a 37 year old 
male respondent. Whilst acknowledging the prevalence of discrimination in the workplace, 
and, indeed, saying he was involved in incidents at workplaces that could be interpreted as 
discriminatory, Hassan was keen not to attribute that as being representative of what he called 
the ‘traditional Swedish workplace’, but rather to the attitudes of some work colleagues who 
were ‘relatively not that educated’, ‘have not travelled extensively’, and thus, ‘unfamiliar with 
other cultures’. To him many of the ‘unsubstantiated claims with xenophobia and racial 
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undertones’ he heard in his former workplace years ago, could be pinned down to the ‘few 
“narrowly-viewed” and relatively uneducated work colleagues’ he worked alongside.   
 
Arguing from a slightly different angle, Mariam, a 30 year old female respondent cites that 
lack of career advancement or expectation (on her part) in her workplace as symptomatic of 
discrimination in the organisation she works for. According to Mariam: 
It would be difficult for us who were employed to 
advance our careers in the current atmosphere. 
Frankly, I believe if I stayed in my present 
workplace, I would be stuck in my present 
position for ever.  
 
7.5.2 Discrimination inherent in the recruitment process 
 
The feelings among many Somalis was that they were being excluded from greater 
participation in Swedish labour market precisely because of the discriminatory practices 
embedded in the routine operations of many employing organisations. Indeed, for Somalis, 
nowhere was discrimination more pertinent than in the recruitment process of employing 
organisations in Sweden. It was here they claimed they were unfairly and blatantly 
discriminated against since it denied them ‘the due consideration they deserved’, to use the 
phrase of one Somali respondent.   
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The respondents appeared resigned to the continuation of discrimination given the regularity 
with which they experienced such action during the recruitment process. This is captured in 
the following sentiments.  
 
Abshir (a 40 year old male respondent) says:  
As Somalis we are destined to the bottom list in 
the selection [recruitment] process by employers.  
 
Diriye (a 39 year male respondent) adds:    
Available vacancies obviously go t o the natives 
first. The next in line for consideration are other 
Scandinavians and people of Western origin. It 
when all others who are preferred as workers are 
exhausted that they turn to us as a last resort.  
 
Fanan (a 45 year old male respondent) claims: 
One reason why so many of us are unemployed is 
not because jobs are unavailable but because we 
are not preferred. 
 
7.5.2.1 Partiality in Recruitment 
 
Before we explore this issue, it is useful to briefly explain what Somali respondents meant by 
the ‘recruitment process’. They were referring to a process that conventionally begins when 
people apply for jobs that were advertised or came to their knowledge through a tip off or by 
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other means. Customarily, the next step in this process entails the sending of applications to 
the employing organisation. The ’normal’ response from the potential employer’s side (or the 
employing organisation) was to let the applicant know that they received his/her application 
through a letter of acknowledgement. In a letter of acknowledgement the employing company 
often states that the application would be looked at and the applicant would be communicated 
with in due course.  
 
In the meantime the recruiting company compiles shortlists of candidates they wish to invite 
for interview. Many companies often write to applicants to inform them of whether or not they 
were of interest to their firms. Those who are not short-listed for interviews, receive what 
might be termed a ‘with regret’ letter that justifies, often in brief terms, why the company 
thinks they were not the suitable candidates for the job (or short-list for interview), and again 
going by convention, wish those unsuccessful candidates luck with their future job searches.     
 
Interviews are arranged, and subsequently conducted, for those whom the company deems to 
be of interest. These candidates then receive feedbacks about the interviews. Sometimes 
people are selected for employment at this stage, other times they may need to proceed further 
for the next rounds of interviews. Ultimately, for the successful candidate his/her referees are 
contacted. Provided those references are positive, then the selected candidate is invited to take 
up the job.  
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A number of Somali research respondents argue that there was little neutrality or impartiality 
in the recruitment process of most employing organisations that they have had contact with. 
They argued the outcomes of the jobs they apply for are often decided before hand, meaning 
they did not undergo the due processes that an impartial recruitment process would otherwise 
have entailed. Indeed, to the vast majority of Somali respondents, the view was that they were 
hardly even allowed the chance to compete favourably with other applicants (e.g., those from 
the host society).  
 
One of the commonest claims by Somalis of discrimination was where job applications they 
sent to employer were ‘automatically destined for the waste-paper-basket’, in the words of one 
respondent. These Somalis also referred to the ‘volumes’ of applications they send to 
employers and the lack of response from employers. Somali respondents also maintained that 
they hardly ever progressed beyond the initial stages of the recruitment process let alone to 
making the short-list of candidates to be interviewed for jobs. Somalis saw this as a clear 
example of institutional discrimination they meet at the selection or recruitment process of 
most employing organisations in Sweden. 
 
7.5.2.1.1 Applications Destined for the Waste-Paper-Basket 
 
To reiterate, many Somalis felt they were hardly given the chance to prove themselves in the 
first place by r ecruiters. They argued employing organisations ‘frequently’ and 
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‘systematically’ ignore their job applications. The sheer ‘volumes’ of applications Somalis 
send to employers and the apparent lack of acknowledgement from employers has convinced 
many Somalis that Swedish employers discriminate against them in a more systematic 
manner.  
 
An extreme illustration of the practice involved Abshir, a 40 year old male respondent, who 
said he sent four hundred applications in a three month period, few of which led to job 
interviews. What was troubling with Abshir’s case was that he was relatively well integrated 
into mainstream Swedish society. He holds a Masters degree in economics from a Swedish 
university and cohabits with a native Swedish woman. He hardly mixes with other Somalis 
since he lives in a su burb that has few Somalis. One would expect Abshir to be more 
favourably predisposed than most Somalis in Sweden – having two advantages over most 
Somalis –, i.e., that of higher education and that of being socially and cultural well connected 
to members of the native community. Yet all these were in Abshir’s own words to no avail. 
Says Abshir:  
I have sent literally hundreds of applications but 
all in vain. And, let us face it; I have been pretty 
realistic about the stark realities of not securing a 
job commensurate with my academic 
qualification in Sweden. It is  not a question of 
choosing. What is mind boggling, however, is 
when I apply for jobs where I considered myself 
overqualified and yet I was denied.  
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Abshir’s ‘realistic’ assessment regarding the general trend for immigrant with academic 
qualifications is supported in the literature as being something obvious. It typifies an example 
of how immigrants with academic qualifications, who, even after they have acquired education 
or skills in Sweden still continue to face severe handicaps in the Swedish labour market 
(Rydgren, 2004).  
 
7.5.2.1.2 ‘Bearing’ a Foreign Names  
 
One other recurrent issue in connection to the ‘frequent’ and ‘systematic’ discrimination 
inherent in the recruitment process of most recruiting organisations with respect to Somali 
candidates was their ‘names’. Indeed, a n umber of Somali research respondents seemed 
convinced that employing organisation hardly looked at their applications once employers 
recognise that the ‘name-bearers’ were, from their (employers’) viewpoint unsuitable for their 
organisations. That made them not to make progress in the recruitment process. This is 
reflected in the sentiments of the following Somali participants: 
Hirab, a 55 year old male respondent, affirms: 
Strange-sounding names makes it easier for 
recruiters to easily prejudge and easily sideline 
them for those other candidates deemed more 
suitable for the company in question.   
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Ahmed, a 42 year old male respondent, makes a follow up points:   
Bearing certain foreign names in Sweden is an 
obvious handicap. I’m not referring to Smith, 
James, Timothy, Jacqueline or Mary. Rather I’m 
talking about Mohamed, Hassan, Fatuma, Suleqa, 
and the like... the sort of names that disqualify an 
individual from eventual recruitment or 
subsequent career paths.   
 
To remedy this, the solution would have been to change names to more Swedish/Western-
sounding names. However, none of the Somali respondents had contemplated changing his/her 
name to ‘less strange ones’ from the perspective of Swedish employers. Indeed, there were 
numerous recounting by these respondents of friends from other ethnic groups who have 
changed their names to sound Swedish or European with the intent to improve their chances in 
the Swedish labour market. Asked why they did not contemplate change their names, many 
Somalis talked about how strongly they felt against doing that – as that was tantamount to 
changing their own identity (as both Somali and Muslim) which they were not prepared to do.   
 
Undoubtedly, the reasons why some immigrants resorted to changing their name to Swedish- 
or European sounding ones was to secure advancement in the recruitment process. Reaching 
the interview stage mattered greatly for immigrants who felt discriminated against because of 
their ethnic origins. Coming to the interview stage was immensely important in that it enables 
the immigrant to proof what s/he was ‘worth’. One could impress upon employers that s/he 
spoke fluent Swedish, was culturally assimilated, display qualities that went beyond ‘mere’ 
names, etc. Also, the very act of changing names itself could be conceived by employers that 
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the immigrant had a desire to integrate into society which could work in favour of job 
applicants. 
 
7.5.2.1.3 ‘Hitches’ at the Interview Stages 
 
The general impression was that few Somalis made it to the interview stages of the 
recruitment process of many employing organisation. As we have noted, getting to the 
interview stage is in itself significant progress, a positive sign an individual’s job hunting 
endeavours is about to bear fruit. Nonetheless, even at interview a number of Somalis reported 
the negative experiences they encountered in which they felt they were unfairly and 
impartially treated.  
 
Examples cited to illustrate this claim included where employers sounded ‘encouraging and 
interested’ to applicants over the phone at first but where the attitude changed at the interview 
session itself. Hanan, a 42 male respondent recounts:  
No sooner had I arrived at the interview venue, 
than I noted an abrupt change in the facial 
features of the employer.   
 
As others attested, matters were not limited to the body language of the interviewer. The 
‘aggressiveness of the questioner or the way questions were framed or put’, ‘the whole tone of 
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the conversations’, ‘the way interviewers focus more on the weakness rather than strengths of 
candidates’, and so on and so forth, were relayed as testimonial to the kind of discrimination 
Somalis felt they were subjected to during job interviews.    
 
7.5.2.1.4 Mariam: The Case of Mistaken Identity 
 
In our attempt to establish a conceptual understanding of discrimination, we noted how 
indirect discrimination occurred, i.e., how discriminators were often unmotivated, directly, by 
a conscious intent to harm his/her victims; how unaware the discriminator may have acted in a 
manner that was discriminatory; and how unaware they were of whether their actions could be 
conceived of as discriminatory to their victims (see Feagin & Eckberg, 1980; Jenkins, 1986). 
‘Mariam’s case’, here, clearly illustrates that the discrimination Somalis suffered was not only 
direct (as remunerated by the numerous examples presented above) but may sometimes also 
be indirect and less nebulous. Mariam is a 30 year old female respondent. 
 
The incident Mariam was involved in happened just before she was about to be ushered in for 
a job interview by an employer/recruiter. As it turned out, the recruiter mistook Mariam for a 
‘native’ Swede before the two physically met or finally sat down for the interview. 
Mariam, like all the names used in this research 
was a fictitious one. Mariam’s real name, 
however, was one of those few Somali female 
names that were shared with Swedes and other 
Westerners. Moreover, Mariam spoke faultless 
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Swedish with the right ‘accent’ to match. She was 
perhaps the only Somali woman respondent in 
this research who had made all attempts to 
advance herself in terms of her proficiency in 
Swedish, employment and was about to take up 
her studies at university in a few months’ time.   
 
Mariam remembers how weeks earlier she saw a 
job advert in a local newspaper and decided to 
apply for it. She did so by submitting a written 
application. She also made the attempt to call the 
employer to follow up her application a few days 
later. Following that telephone call, Mariam felt 
reassured she was the kind of candidate the 
employer was looking for given that she ‘had the 
right experience for the job’. 
 
Then came the fateful day, the day of interview – 
a day she recalls how she dressed immaculately 
and wore the makeup that matched her 
impressive ‘business-like’ attire. Mariam said she 
made sure that she was at the employer’s office a 
half hour before the interview could start, adding, 
she was well aware of the fate that awaited her 
should she come late for the interview – as that 
would reflect badly on her and eventually 
compromise her chances of securing the job she 
was interested in at the time.   
 
Mariam said her first ‘shock’ came with the way 
the employer ‘behaved’ in the reception where 
she and others sat. It is here where the ‘mistaken 
identity’ comes in. The employer called Mariam’s 
‘real’ name (the name she shared with Swedes). 
Responding to the call by the employer, Mariam 
stood up to meet this manager with the ‘natural’ 
cordiality and facial expression hopeful job 
interviewees wear to impress upon their eventual 
employer. But alas! All along the employer was 
looking at the ‘other direction’ for this ‘other 
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person’ which Mariam purportedly was not. As 
Mariam recalls the employer looked left, right 
and straight into the eyes of others who sat at the 
reception but paid little attention to her presence.  
 
Eventually, it dawned on the employer that the 
person whose name she called was none other 
than Mariam’s. Mariam also talked of how 
clearly the employer was taken aback by this 
realisation, the realisation that Mariam was not 
the Mariam she was after. ‘How good Swedish 
you speak! I thought actually you were a Swede’, 
was what the employer had to say to ‘break the 
ice’, according to Mariam. 
 
Mariam said the encounter with the employer 
was heart-breaking for her. To Mariam, this 
incident was a clear example of the kind of 
prejudices and discrimination Somalis and many 
other immigrants must contend with on frequent 
basis in today’s Sweden. She knew her chances of 
securing that job was very minimal and, indeed, 
as it turned out, she did not secure it. 
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7.5.3 Is it really Only about Discrimination? 
 
Swedish officials acknowledged the existence of institutional discrimination as a barrier to 
labour integration in Sweden. Nonetheless, they laid emphasis on the ‘suitability’ of Somali 
candidates for many of the jobs on the labour market to which many Somalis were said to 
‘have many shortcomings’, to use the phrase of one Swedish official. By suitability, Swedish 
officials were referring to relevant qualifications and skills (or credentials) and previous work 
experience. In addition, there were two other factors that figured in the deliberation with 
Swedish officials in this regard. These were ‘gaps’ in the employment histories’ of Somali 
applicants, as well as, the ‘fear of the unknown’ factor. To Swedish officials, the combination 
of these four factors (i.e., relevant qualifications, work experiences, gaps in ‘life histories’ and 
‘fear of the unknown) influenced decision of whether to hire Somali workers.  
 
7.5.3.1 The Relevance of Qualification 
 
  
Qualifications play a decisive role and are, certainly, an important factor for making decisions 
when recruiting workers. Accordingly, to a number of Swedish officials, one reason why 
Somalis ‘fared badly’ in the recruitment process of employing organisations was because they 
[Somalis] lacked the necessary relevant qualifications for the jobs they apply for.  
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When Swedish officials talked of relevant qualifications, they meant those obtained in 
Sweden. To them relevant qualifications coupled, of course, with good command of the 
Swedish language were the ideal traits employers in Sweden looked for in applicants. These 
officials, were convinced, once Somalis were competent (i.e., qualified) and had a reasonable 
command of the Swedish language, they would acquire employment, like all others, 
irrespective of background. Indeed, many Swedish officials claimed they did not envisage 
‘much’ discrimination, if the qualifications Somalis possessed matched the jobs they applied 
for. However, if Somalis failed to fulfill the job requirement in question because they are 
evaluated against competent Swedish workers, then that in their eyes, could not be viewed as 
discriminatory but ‘fair play’ in accordance with the law. Björn, an employment advisor with 
the Rinkeby Social District of Stockholm, narrates from own professional experience:   
When I worked as an employment exchange officer 
years ago, I had this client from Somalia who 
despaired and was on the verge of giving up his job 
searching work. He claimed he had applied for 
countless jobs but to no avail. Time and again he 
would claim discrimination as the reason why he was 
not able to secure employment.  
 
I reassured him, that his predicament had nothing to 
do with discrimination. Rather, he was searching for 
jobs in a branch that was already saturated and where 
he had little work experience. I advised him to 
change to another branch where his chances of 
acquiring jobs were higher. Thankfully, he took my 
advice and after six month of training, this client 
landed a job.   
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To Björn, and other officials, what pays off for most people irrespective of background were 
the acquisition of qualifications, persistence, hard work, a positive attitude and energetic, 
serious job searches. 
    
7.5.3.2 Relevant Work Experience 
 
The lack of relevant work experience was among the reasons given by Swedish officials as an 
important factor that influences the labour market participation of Somalis adversely. Like 
relevant qualifications, relevant work experience was equated with that which had been 
acquired in Sweden. To emphasis their point, officials frequently juxtaposed relevant work 
experience (which mattered immensely to Swedish employers) with the futility of Somalis 
using their previous work experiences (accrued from their home country). According to 
Eriksson, a social worker with the Märsta Social District of Stockholm: 
It would seem no one wants to hear what they have 
done prior to their arrival in Sweden in terms of work 
or other life experiences. No one, for that matter 
glances or wants to glance at their previous baggage. 
That is history, something of the past. What matters 
is here and now.  
 
Indeed, the reason why many Somalis (or immigrants) remain under-employed in Sweden was 
seen as testament to the little esteem Swedish employers hold for work experience (and 
qualifications) obtained from abroad. One recurrent example of underemployment involve 
highly educated immigrants who have difficulties in finding work in the areas of their 
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expertise prior to their arrival in Sweden. Eva, a youth employment adviser with the Rinkeby 
Social District of Stockholm testifies: 
We have highly educated taxi-, bus- and train drivers 
in Stockholm who have taken up these professions 
because they have given up f inding work in the 
professions they trained for in their homelands.   
Two reasons were given by Swedish officials why Somalis were disadvantaged when it came 
to acquiring relevant work experience – or ‘any’ work experience for that matter. Firstly, 
many Somalis have remained unemployed, and continue to do so for a quite a considerable 
amount of time, and hence, have little or no opportunity to gain work experience. Secondly, 
many Somalis have been engaged in learning Swedish language and acquiring education for 
many years, inhibiting their opportunities to gain work experience. In part, engaging in 
learning language and pursuing education was necessary for people to establish themselves in 
Sweden, as education and language were indispensable tools to be equipped with for any 
immigrant in a new country.   
 
Some Swedish officials were, nonetheless, sympathetic to the predicament of Somalis who 
had stuck to their work experience from their home and who were not able, for whatever 
reason, to accrue one in Sweden. These officials noted, when people’s past work- and life 
experiences were not taken on board, they (people) were bound to be frustrated since that 
amounted to the ‘erasure’ of a significant part of people’s life trajectories.  
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Göran, an official at Rinkeby who coordinates refugee reception and their introduction into 
society had this to say:  
Imagine going though university, acquiring a degree, 
getting work, putting a career behind you, a ll of 
which are achievements you and your family would 
have felt proud of. Imagine if no one  appreciated 
those accomplishments? That is the prospect our 
immigrants, including Somalis, have to face up to in 
Sweden.  
 
Moreover, others were also sympathetic in the sense that Somalis had to endure considerable 
amount of time learning Swedish and acquiring education after they have arrived in Sweden, 
yet had to be treated as though they were making their debut into the labour market. 
 
Nonetheless, there were others officials who were not as ‘sympathetic’ as their counterparts. 
One of them was Eriksson, a social worker with the Märsta Social District of Stockholm, who 
argued that the lack of experience was something many ‘native’ Swedes have to wrestle with, 
not least those who have recently completed their education, and who equally, find it difficult 
to obtain jobs because they lack relevant or no work experience. ‘Conventionally’, argues 
Eriksson, ‘most employers would be hesitant to hire people with little or no experience 
irrespective of their ethnic backgrounds’.  
 
Admittedly though, ‘native’ Swedes making their ‘debut’ into Swedish labour market would 
have added advantages over Somalis or and other immigrants in similar circumstances. Firstly, 
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Swedish youth, would most certainly have acquired some form of education or qualification, 
and would have no problem with language issues. Secondly, they would have little issues with 
acquiring reliable references as opposed to Somalis with no foothold in the labour market (and 
sometimes in the wider society). 
  
7.5.3.3 ‘Gaps’ in the ‘Employment Histories’ of Somali Applicants  
 
Another additional hurdle for Somalis, to which Swedish officials referred to were the many 
‘gaps in the life histories’ of Somali candidates. These ‘gaps’ were said to work against 
Somalis in their bid to acquire a foothold in the labour market. There were a number of 
important factors that contributed to these ‘gaps’. One of the first reasons was connected to 
their plight as people fleeing wars, persecution and other forms of hardships. Migration itself 
involves formulating and planning an escape route. It seldom goes smoothly by moving from 
one destination to another. It often involved, as it did for many Somalis, staying in or adopting 
other points in the transit route as halfway houses before eventually making it to Sweden.  
 
Secondly, a number of Somalis had to spent some considerable amount of time in refugee 
reception centres in Sweden where they were said to ‘idle’, thereby, remaining unemployed 
for a long time before they were given permission to stay in Sweden. Note, until recently, 
refugees were not eligible to work before they were given ‘official’ residence in the country.  
 
245 
 
Thirdly, as mentioned earlier, once Somalis acquired permission to stay in the country and 
were subsequently placed in communes, they had to embark on l earning Swedish language 
and acquire some form of formal education. Nonetheless, learning Swedish and acquiring 
education takes time, all adding up to the ‘gaps’ in the employment histories of Somali 
applicants.   
 
Fourthly and most importantly, once Somalis had learnt Swedish and acquired some form of 
education in Sweden, that in itself rarely translated into better opportunities in the labour 
market (see Chapter Five). Accordingly, it was not uncommon to find Somalis who have been 
out of work for many years, often, continuously. Others may have had an ‘on and off’ 
relationship with the labour market by working part-time or on a temporary basis with long 
spells of unemployment in between. Also noted was the case of many Somalis who have not 
secured a single employment since coming to the country a decade or so ago.  
  
Noticeably, these ‘gaps’ were cumulative in nature. This meant the totality of their impact 
hugely worked against Somalis when it comes to competing with other workers in the labour 
market who have not had the same or similar experiences as Somalis in Sweden.  
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7.5.3.4 ‘Fear of the Unknown’    
 
From the perspective of Swedish officials, another reason why Somalis had problems in 
securing employment was because Swedish employers, at present, have little knowledge about 
Somalis as a group, in general, and as workers, in particular. Accordingly, it was argued, that 
this apparent lack of knowledge about Somalis only contributes to the hesitancy of recruiters 
in employing Somalis. Contrastingly, Swedish officials portrayed ‘Swedish’ workers as people 
‘known’ to employers – people who were ‘reliable’ and ‘predictable’. As Mona, a so cial 
worker with the Rinkeby District of Stockholm blatantly put it: 
Would you go f or the person you a re confident 
about, and, know at least something about, or, a 
person you know little about? One can understand 
why employers become hesitant since they know 
little about Somalis.  
 
It was argued, the reason why ‘mutual fear’ persisted between Somalis and Swedes, as well as 
the dearth of knowledge about Somalis by Swedes was the lack of ‘natural meeting places’ or 
forums. The insinuation was that people meet at work places, institutions of learning, 
recreational centres, etc. They also met through family or friends, through leisure and 
professional clubs, etc. However, when it came to the interaction between Somalis and 
‘native’ Swedes, none of these practices were common. The assessment by these officials was 
that as long as there were no ‘natural’ meeting places between the two communities, Somalis 
would experience prejudices and discrimination (e.g., in the labour market) a little longer.  
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Nonetheless, whilst some officials were hopeful that this ‘fear’ would recede with time, others 
were not. Those who were optimistic argued that, for employers to allay their fear about 
Somalis, they [employers] had to acquire a reasonable level of confidence in them. To them 
fear was a human trait, and ‘employers were human’, to use the wording of one official. 
Accordingly, when employers overcome their fear of people like Somalis, their attitudes 
towards them would change for the better.   
 
Those less optimistic like Eriksson, a social worker with the Märsta Social District, 
maintained that ‘fear’ cannot recede as l ong as there are ‘no qualitative contacts’ between 
native Swedes and Somalis. Eriksson upheld that the two communities had to familiarise 
themselves with each other for such ‘fear’ to disappear. For Eriksson, however, the onus was 
more on Somalis than the host society:   
It is up t o individual Somalis to help in that 
endeavour since society cannot impose its will on 
them.   
 
Maria, an official who coordinates literacy courses for immigrant adults in Rinkeby, was more 
assertive in her claim that Somalis (as other immigrants in similar positions) were to ‘blame’ 
because they often held themselves back in ‘their own cocoon’. To Maria, Somalis hardly 
made any efforts to make friends and contacts with Swedish natives. Sounding benevolent but 
paternalistic, she recommends: 
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Start making friends with native Swedes. Start 
drinking coffee with normal Svensson [the average 
Swede]. Svensson will soon discover that you too are 
normal people. I think a lot boils down to being 
strangers to each other. 
 
Officials were also keen to point out that ‘fear of the unknown’ was not something uniquely 
Swedish. They argued, ‘fear’ was a t wo-way phenomenon where immigrants, including 
Somalis, had their share of ‘fear towards Swedes’. Indeed, there were many examples of 
Swedish officials trying to highlight the negative attitudes immigrants harbour towards 
‘native’ Swedes or the Swedish society in general. These example included, the fear towards 
the Swedish System which in the eyes of groups like Somalis had the potentiality to ‘destroy’ 
their families, culture and religion; or their perception [Somalis’] about Swedish sexuality, i.e., 
of Swedes taking a more relaxed attitude towards sex and sexuality; of equality between 
Swedish men and women which threatens patriarchal patterns inherent in cultures like that of 
Somalis, etc. These fears, according to these officials, make Somalis to ‘retreat to their own 
comfort zones’ – to use the words of one official. To these officials, Somalis must also 
overcome their own fears. 
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7.6 Institutional Discrimination in Housing 
 
This section deals with the prevalence of discrimination in the rental housing sector. The 
phenomenon of discrimination was raised as an important factor that explained why residential 
segregation between Somalis and Swedes existed (refer to Chapter Six, for more details). 
Rental housing is emphasised here because the overwhelming majority of Somalis (including 
all the twenty eight Somali respondents interviewed) lived in rented apartment owned by 
municipal corporations. 
 
7.6.1 Queuing System 
 
Rental housing is often allocated through a queuing (waiting-list) system (bostadkö). It is  
operated by a handful of housing authorities (bodstadsförmedlingar) in Stockholm. The most 
prominent of these housing authorities are Stockholm Stads Bostadsförmedling and Bostad 
Direkt. These authorities liaise closely with municipal housing corporations (e.g., Familje 
Bostäder, Svenska Bostäder, and HSB) so that the latter can let all their housing stock. 
Housing authorities are the enablers of partnerships through which contracts between housing 
applicants and municipally owned corporations occur.  
According to a number of research respondents, most of the discrimination with regard to the 
allocation of housing occurred within the queuing system. It was in the queuing system 
housing agents played the role of gatekeepers. These agents determined, for example, who 
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were allocated apartment(s); and, where those apartments were located whether in segregated 
or less segregated suburbs. In doing so, housing agents not only discriminated against 
immigrants housing applicants, but also discriminated in favour of native applicants (cf. 
Ahmed, 2007). Indeed, it was through this queuing system that housing agents were able to 
steer immigrants like Somalis into segregated areas and in so doing away from the more 
reputable suburbs (i.e., less segregated one). By the same token through positive 
discrimination and favouritism, native Swedes were steered away from the less reputable 
segregated suburbs into more reputable less segregated suburbs.  
 
7.6.1.1 Supposedly fair 
 
The queuing system is supposedly fair: Applicants are allocated accommodation on a first-
come-first-serve basis, provided that they fulfill the eligibility criteria – spelt out by the 
housing authorities. These include: Is the applicant employed? Does the applicant have a 
viable and or sustainable income? In the absence of work or viable income, has the applicant a 
guarantor whose income and employment meets the eligibility criteria on be half of the 
applicant?                                                                                   
 
Nonetheless, these eligibility criteria serve often as mere guidelines giving housing agents the 
power to use their discretion to consider a host of other issues that may favour or disfavour the 
potential applicant. These include: What connection has an applicant to the suburb in which 
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s/he wants to rent an apartment? Does the applicant have a family in that suburb? This is most 
appropriate for young applicants who have recently come of age, and who want to move from 
(their parents’) home but wish to maintain a closer proximity to their family. 
 
Dispensations are also made for vulnerable groups in society (e.g., those with health problems, 
disability, alcohol and substance abuse, etc). In some cases, even homeless families with small 
children may fall under this category of vulnerability. All these groups are usually supported 
by the Municipal Social Service Departments. Indeed, until recently the Municipal Social 
Service Departments had a greater say in the allocation of a small number of apartments they 
rented on behalf of their clients. The aim was to reintroduce these clients back into society so 
that they could lead normal lives. Housing companies also reserved some of their apartments 
for Social Services for the purposes stated above. This has since dwindled because of: (a) 
shortages in accommodation; and, (b) public housing companies are now more profit-making 
oriented rather than ‘socially concerned’ providers.  
 
7.6.1.2 Unfaireness 
 
Despite the formal criteria and dispensations, it was argued that the queuing/waiting list 
system was an arena where both overt and covert discrimination seemed to occur when 
allocating accommodation to applicants (see Molina, 1997). For a number of respondents, it 
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was an inescapable reality that the queuing system was manipulated by agents, and in doing 
so, had an impact on residential segregation.  
 
7.6.1.3 ‘Fluid’ Eligibility Criteria 
 
Also reported by a number of respondents, was the way in which these housing agents tended 
to manipulate the queuing system for housing by ‘making’ the formal eligibility rules either 
‘lax’ or ‘stringent’ depending on ‘who’ the applicants were and ‘where’ they wanted to settle. 
For example, the eligibility criteria for accommodation was more likely to be stringent if 
Somalis applied for apartments in Swedish dominated areas and less stringent or ‘lax’ if they 
applied for apartments in immigrant dominated areas. This was one reason why some Somali 
research respondents thought Somali tenants got more offers or ‘openings’ in segregated 
suburbs when their turn in the queuing system came. Indeed, as a number of Somali research 
respondents reported, they settled in Rinkeby and Tensta precisely because, that was where 
they got referred to for accommodation when they applied for housing the first time they came 
to Stockholm.  
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7.6.1.4 Withhold Vital Information 
 
 
One of the tendencies that housing agents employed to discriminate was to withhold 
information on residential vacancies in less segregated suburbs from immigrant applicants, 
even when these applicants made clear their preferences for those areas. Instead, immigrant 
applicants were regularly fed with information on residential vacancies that arose in 
segregated areas. Indeed, this is a fact that resonates with Hårsman & Quigley (1995) who 
confirm that housing agents contribute to residential segregation by denying immigrants the 
whole range of options that would otherwise have been available to them.  
 
Naturally, for people who were in immediate need of accommodation, waiting for their areas 
of residential preference became difficult, especially, when they perceive that no positive 
outcome would be forthcoming, not least because of discrimination.  
 
This was a perception shared by Isir, a 32 year old female research respondent:  
If a person is desperate for accommodation, then 
choice takes a seco ndary consideration. S/he grabs 
what comes along even when s/he is aware that 
taking that decision may entail other problems.       
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7.6.2 Attributes to Discrimination in Housing 
 
Research respondents speculated on w hat agents took onboard, consciously or consciously, 
when making decisions regarding housing applications. These included: ‘Swedish avoidance’, 
the ‘socioeconomic realities’ of immigrants; ‘the relative high turn-over’; ‘commercial 
considerations’; ‘a willing clientele’; and, ‘a willing system to assist’. 
 
7.6.2.1 Swedish Avoidance  
 
Housing agents were well aware that Swedes wanted to ‘avoid’ living in immigrant dominated 
suburbs (cf. Bråmå, et al., 2006). Given this ‘avoidance’, housing agents nearly always tended 
to allocate apartments to ‘native’ applicants by meeting their preferred suburb of choice as far 
as possible. Indeed, as it was noted earlier, Swedes were ‘tipped’ from immigrant dominated 
suburbs in the past (see Chapter Six). The futility of referring or encouraging Swedes to settle 
into segregated areas even when there were residential vacancies available was predictable. 
This was captured in the sentiments of the Abdirizak, a 33 year old male respondent: 
Swedes would not return to these unfriendly housing 
blocks. It is just too uninviting for them. 
 
In line with the above, some respondents went even further to prescribe how Swedes would 
return to segregated suburbs like Rinkeby and Tensta. As claimed by some of them, Swedes 
would return to these suburbs only when they are demolished; the suburbs are built from 
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scratch; their entire infrastructure and services provisions are revamped; and, Swedes become 
the majority, etc. That being unlikely, the continued avoidance of Swedes was inevitable.  
 
7.6.2.2 Socio-economic Realities 
 
The argument about ‘socioeconomic realities’ related to the ‘knowledge’ housing agents had 
on immigrants like Somalis, impacted on their decision-making processes vis-à-vis housing 
applications. The knowledge was two-fold. One was prejudicial and was often based on the 
preconceived negative attitudes toward immigrants like Somalis. The other was more 
concrete, based on the personal details of prospective applicants.  
 
Prejudicial knowledge  
 
In the world of housing agents, immigrants like Somalis are regarded as outsiders. Among the 
prejudices, agents held was that Somalis, in general, lack socio-economic-, linguistic- and 
cultural integration into society; that Somalis were by and large, unemployed and were likely 
to be on publ ic support, and so on a nd so forth. All these, consciously or unconsciously, 
worked against Somali applicants.  
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Contrastingly, housing agents had higher expectations from ‘native’ applicants. The 
assumption was that, the ‘native’ applicant was, naturally, competent linguistically, socially 
and culturally; that s/he was likely to be employed (or in the process of acquiring 
employment); that s/he was likely to have viable income (or in the process of acquiring 
income) etc. All these consciously or unconsciously worked in favour of the ‘native’ 
applicants. 
 
Concrete knowledge  
 
Housing agents often had access to applicants’ personal details such as em ployment status, 
their incomes, etc, as part of their basis for making decision on housing applications (i.e., 
eligibility criteria). Through this information, housing agents would become aware of the 
‘economic realities’ of immigrants like Somalis (e.g., as unemployed, with little or no income, 
etc) and take that ‘reality’ into account. Given that many Somalis are economically 
disadvantaged, it would probably be unlikely for agents to allocate them apartments located in 
the more affluent, less segregated suburbs. 
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7.6.2.3 The relatively High turn-over of Tenancies 
 
Another reason why immigrants like Somalis were regularly referred to segregated areas was 
because of the relatively high turn-over of tenants. High residential turn-over contributed to 
segregation, in the sense, that housing agents were, for example, able to steer immigrants away 
from Swedish areas. Without such relatively high residential turn-over, agents would probably 
‘work a little harder’ to refer immigrants to less segregated areas, to use the paraphrase of one 
respondent.   
 
7.6.2.4 Commercial Considerations  
 
Some research participants speculated that ‘commercial considerations’ had a hand in 
‘steering’ immigrants like Somalis into already segregated areas. First, residential vacancies in 
segregated areas have to be ‘filled’. Those available to do s o could only be found among 
immigrant communities. It could, therefore, be argued that this was a market that primarily 
targeted immigrants in which housing agents acted from a seller’s perspective, hence, 
contributing to the maintenance and perpetuation of residential segregation between 
immigrants and ‘native’ Swedes.  
 
What is the consequence of not renting apartments? This would have obvious negative 
financial consequences for the housing companies concerned. It was a commonly held 
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impression among a number of respondents that housing companies would rather have 
buildings razed to the ground than have them vacant for a considerable length of time, since 
maintaining them unoccupied would probably be more expensive. Note, even where municipal 
housing companies have social housing (as this differentiates them from purely market 
oriented companies), and all that this may entail; their aim was still to stay afloat, and, also to 
have comfortable ‘profit’ margins.   
 
7.6.2.5 A Willing Clientele and a Willing System 
 
It was perceived that agents normally assumed that immigrants like Somalis (‘even those who 
were least willing’), were prepared to settle in immigrant dominated suburbs if they have no 
other alternative unlike Swedes whose ‘avoidance’ and ‘belligerence’ against these 
(segregated areas) is definite.  Moreover, agents assumed immigrants like Somalis had good 
‘reason’ to settle in suburbs like Rinkeby and Tensta given that there were likely to have their 
social networks in these suburbs than in areas where Swedes predominate. 
  
Moreover, it was assumed housing agents counted on a  ‘liberal’ welfare system that assist 
immigrants like Somalis – many of whom are more likely to be unemployed, and dependent 
on social assistance – with their rental expenses, hence, the laxity over eligibility criteria for 
housing allocation.       
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7.7 Conclusion 
 
Discrimination is a major barrier to the integration of Somalis in Sweden. It has far-reaching 
consequences for individuals, communities (or groups) and the nation at large. These 
consequences are psychological, socio-economic and political. 
 
Psychologically, discrimination impacts on the individual’s motivation and self-drive and self-
esteem. That in turn affects the individual’s stability in the sense that it would be difficult for 
the person to invest, psychologically, in Sweden for him/herself or for the sake of his/her 
children. Discrimination also has the potentiality to drive people into an inward looking 
mentality whereby they identify more and more with their group and less and less with the 
host society. This is because people who are discriminated against often assume or feel that 
they are collectively victimised because they belong to a certain group (i.e., ethnic, national, 
religious, gender, etc). Turning to our case, from an integration viewpoint, the identification 
with or attachment to one’s own group increases the risk for Somalis to further isolate 
themselves from mainstream Swedish society. 
 
Socio-economic discrimination prevents Somalis from reaching their full potential in society. 
It also hinders them from participating in societal activities such as education, employment, 
etc, as f ull-equals. Indeed, discrimination in society, flies in the face of most major policy 
areas e.g., education, employment, health, housing, etc. In particular, it hugely undermines the 
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efforts Somalis make to achieve desirable outcomes in education, employment, housing, etc, 
that are on par with members of the host society.  
 
Politically, discrimination contributes negatively to inter-group relationships. Indeed, it is 
often the source of conflict between groups in society; has the potential to sew the seeds of 
discord between people, creating a wedge between them; and, makes those discriminated to 
accumulate grievances against those who discriminate. By contrast, the accomplishment of a 
more fair and equitable condition for all creates a more harmonious and cohesive society. 
However, these virtues may never be realised as l ong as w idespread prejudices and 
discrimination against minorities (e.g., Somalis) prevail. 
 
By and large, discrimination contravenes the fundamental objectives of Swedish Integration 
Policy. One of those objectives is specific and aims to prevent and combat discrimination, 
xenophobia and racism in society. Discrimination is also detrimental to the very essence of 
integration process itself since it compromises the willingness of Somalis to integrate into 
Swedish society. The willingness of a group to incorporate or be incorporated into society is, 
after all, one of the most important determinants of integration (Weiner, 1996). Speedier 
integration on the part of Somalis is thus ruled out as long as they experience discrimination in 
society.   
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
8 CULTURE AND RELIGION 
 
This chapter highlights ‘excessive’ cultural and ‘religious’ differences between Somalis and 
‘native’ Swedes as problematic to their integration in Sweden. The main ‘differences’ in 
culture stems largely from the intensity individuals attach to the role of the ‘family’. Whilst 
‘native’ Swedes attached less emphasis on family bonds (and more on personal independence, 
self-reliance and ‘autonomy from family’), for example, Somalis emphasis the importance of 
family/clan network relationships over their individual goals – making it virtually impossible 
for individual Somalis to turn away from their family/clan or undertake an independent life. 
 
With respect to religion, this chapter highlights the anxiety of the host society about Islam, the 
religion Somalis subscribe to, as a major source of contention which in turn has great 
implications for their integration into mainstream Swedish society. In particular, the lack of 
demarcation between Somali cultural practices (equated to state) and Islam (religion) coupled 
with the relatively high degree of religiosity among Somalis in the backdrop of a highly 
secular Swedish environment makes interaction with members of the host society almost 
impossible. Moreover, Islam is perceived in Sweden as a ‘threat’, both literally and 
figuratively, hence the immense opposition and suspicion towards Islam as a religion. The 
literal ‘threat’ of Islam views Islam as a security threat (given global tensions, e.g., terrorism, 
etc). The figurative ‘threat’ views Islam as incompatible with Swedish way of life.  
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8.1 Culture 
 
Culture is a complex and contested concept (Williams, 1983:87). It is used differently and 
means different things to different people, hence, the difficulty in ‘conjuring’ its ‘essence and 
meaning in a few words or phrases’ (Jenks, 2003:1). Indeed, culture encompasses a broad 
array of societal issues, i.e., from ‘everything’ one ‘needs to know to become a functioning 
member of that society’ to ‘the entire way of life of a people’ (Swindler, 1986:273; Sewell’s, 
1999; Benhabib, 2002). It includes peoples’ behaviour, pattern of thought, actions, unique 
experiences, traits, values, customs, beliefs, morals, rituals, conventions, principles, standards, 
law, artefacts, etc (see Benedict, 1935; Malnowski, 1944; Sorokin 1947; Marshall, 1998). It 
entails ‘a concrete and bounded world of beliefs and practices’ (Sewell, 1999:39); and, a 
‘clear’ and ‘delineable whole’ that is often ‘congruent with a population group’ (Benhabib, 
2002:4). More specifically, culture is defined as: a ‘system of symbols and meaning’ 
(Schneider, 1972:38, Keesing, 1974:79-81; Geertz, 1983) that is ‘learned’ (Coon 1954) and 
socially ‘transmitted’ from one generation to the other (Kroeber, 1952; White, 1947), through 
the process of socialisation (Brown and Selznick, 1955) and social interaction (Parsons & 
Shils, 1951). Through these processes, individuals learn how to become members of their 
respective cultures or society. They do s o by i nternalising the norms, values, meanings and 
symbols of their culture or societies.   
 
‘Culture’ is important because it determines behaviour, ‘feelings and motivation’ (Strauss & 
Quinn, 1997:5). It is also the standard by which ‘people are judged’, i.e., sets the rules for 
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what is ‘appropriate or inappropriate’ in society (Axelrod 1986:1097, see Fent, 2006). 
Moreover, culture is ‘part of the way people give meaning to their world’ (Phillips, 2007:15).  
 
Last but not least, ‘culture’ is both the unifier and differentiator of peoples across the world. It 
is a unifier in the sense that it not only provides a ‘clear coherence and order’ to its adherents, 
but it is also the ‘basis for which stable identities’ in a society is formed (Featherstone & Lash, 
1999:1). It is the differentiator in that it is what demarcates one group of people from the other 
(cf. Bhopal, 1997). This dual and contrasting function of ‘culture’ (i.e., of unifier and 
differentiator) resonates with Benhabib (2002:1), who concludes that ‘culture has become a 
ubiquitous synonym for identity’ (i.e., as the ‘marker and differentiator’ of different groups of 
people).  
 
8.1.1 Culture: A  priori assumption 
 
Culture formed the basis for some important a priori assumptions in this research. The first 
assumption held that: Somali culture deviated significantly from Swedish mainstream culture. 
This assertion explained why many of the fundamental ‘differences’ between Somalis and 
Swedes existed in the first place. The second assumption viewed cultural differences with 
‘native’ Swedes as the reason(s) why Somalis find it d ifficult to integrate into mainstream 
Swedish society. In respect to the latter, it was assumed that excessive deviation from Swedish 
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cultural standards explained the unfavourable socioeconomic position of Somalis (in 
education, employment, income, etc) in Sweden.  
  
As it turned out, the overwhelming majority of research respondents concurred that Somali 
and Swedish cultures were very or excessively different. Many of these respondents 
emphasised the lack of commonalities between the two cultures by deploying similar 
semantics such as: the two cultures were ‘at odds’, ‘incompatible’, ‘distant’, ‘far apart as they 
can possibly be’, ‘being in clash’, ‘being in conflict’, etc. A few respondents went even further 
to suggest that the two cultures had nothing in common. Abdirashid, a 51 ye ar old male 
respondent reinforces the above:   
I cannot think of one area where the two cultures 
are similar. It is not only about culture. Look, they 
are also difference in ethnicity, religion, historical 
experiences, you name it.   
 
Indeed, the bulk of the deliberation on culture with the research participants compared and 
contrasted many of the wide ranging purported differences between the two cultures. These 
cultural differences were said to exist in almost all societal spheres, i.e., ideological, religious, 
social, economic and political, among others. In particular, differences in family relationships, 
religious beliefs, gender relationship patterns and attitudes towards authority (the family/clan) 
were among some of the recurrent examples highlighted as ‘evidence’ of the where Somalis 
differed with Swedes culturally. For more on gender relations, refer to Chapter Nine.    
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8.2 Individual Autonomy versus Inter-dependence 
 
The main ‘difference’ between the culture of Somalis and ‘native’ Swedes, however, stemmed 
largely from the intensity individuals attach to the role of the ‘family’ and the influence of the 
latter on the lives of the former. ‘Native’ Swedes, for their part, attached less emphasis on 
family bonds. Instead they emphasised individual independence, self-reliance and autonomy 
(from families). In the Somali community, on the other hand, there are intense networks of the 
family/clan relationships which make it v irtually impossible for an individual to turn away 
from family/clan or undertake an independent life. In other words, Somalis' first loyalty was 
not to the wider society but to their own families/clans. This was likely to give rise to tensions 
since Somalis were expected to behave like ‘responsible’ Swedish citizens, who were 
personally responsible for their actions/inactions and obligations to the wider society rather 
than their clan.   
 
8.2.1 Swedes as ‘Individually Autonomous’   
 
‘Modern Swedish family relationships’ are characterized by ‘individual autonomy’ (for adults 
and children), the ‘celebration of the couple’ (not the ‘family’), ‘independence from the 
family’, ‘gender equality’, ‘democracy’, ‘shared responsibilities, negotiations and ‘decision-
making’, ‘fairness’ and ‘equity’ (Ahlberg et al., 2008:79; Liljeström & Özdalga, 2002:13; see 
Hobson, 2003). These outcomes are inextricably linked to Swedish welfare, whose policies 
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have played an important role in restructuring ‘family’, it roles and influence over its 
members, over the years.  
 
Indeed, the welfare state has been proactive (through its family policies) in extending generous 
social and economic rights and benefits to all its citizens. This in turn has rendered ‘native’ 
Swedes to rely less on their ‘families’ and more on ‘society’, i.e., welfare state (cf. Liljeström 
& Özdalga, 2002:13; see Trägårdh, 1990). Arguably, this has also strengthened the alliance 
between ‘individual’ Swedes and the welfare state. 
 
In this research, the main tendencies attributed to ‘native’ Swedes included an emphasis on 
personal independence, self-reliance, owning and creating one’s destiny, among others – 
making the individual less bounded to his or her family, its collective norms and rules. Indeed, 
as argued, Swedes were largely responsible for shaping and ‘owning’ their personal destinies. 
To a number of research respondents, Swedes relied upon their own potentialities rather than 
‘wait for salvation’ from his or her own ‘family or kinsman’, as one official respondent puts it, 
indirectly alluding to the latter as being the case of Somalis in Sweden. Swedes, it was further 
argued, set, achieved and solely ‘owned’ their own personal goals, attainments or 
accomplishments (cf. Hsu, 1963; Hofstede, 1994; Triandis, 2004). The goals and 
accomplishment referred to here, included education, career, spousal and marital relationships, 
among others.  
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Moreover, it was often said of ‘native’ Swedes that they ‘acted as they pleased’, ‘made their 
own decisions’ and ‘owned the outcomes’ or ‘consequences’ for the decisions they made, to 
borrow some of the paraphrases of the respondents. Another common assertion among 
respondents was that, Swedes were free to associate or disassociate with whom they chose at 
will, precisely because relationships were often less bonded in nature. All these traits were 
illustrative of the fact that Swedes, in their individual capacities, were less constrained by 
obligations from or towards the family, for example.   
 
8.2.2 Somalis as a Clan-based society 
 
Somali culture differs from Swedish culture because it is a clan-based culture. Among 
Somalis, the goals of the group (clan) are prioritised over individual goals. The individual is 
obliged to become subservient to his/her family and clan. According to a number of 
respondents, Somalis, as individuals, did not ‘own their destinies solely by themselves’, to use 
the paraphrase of one respondent. As argued, it was not uncommon for Somali families (and 
their clans, whenever required) to take a key and decisive interest or role in the individual’s 
path to education and career, or in influencing and determining who that individuals marries or 
associates with (e.g., friends, business partners, etc), among others.  
 
Thus mutual interdependence and reciprocity were important pillars in the Somali clan/family 
arrangements. Indeed, the whole clan constellation obligates Somalis to become intrinsically 
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collective in orientation. This was reinforced by Hirab, a 55 year old male respondent, who 
explains:  
 One is not only indebted to but is also expected to 
pay back to his or her relative in one way or 
another, should that benefactor’s hour of need 
arise.  
 
Moreover, subservience to the family and the clan was part of the socialisation process of 
Somalis. From the very early ages, Somali children, for example, learn to identify with their 
clans. They do so by learning to memorise their genealogical family roots – which often spans 
over many centuries. In doing so, Somalis expect their children to trace connections to people 
they are related to (e.g., through a common ancestor).     
 
Indeed, Somalis children become socialized to ‘care for’ as w ell as to respect numerous 
persons who take the titles of ‘uncles’, ‘aunties’, ‘cousins’, and many more, family relations, 
as a manifestation of the ‘interdependence’ between individuals. Note even clan members who 
stand genealogically remote to the child will assume such ‘close family relation titles’ among 
Somalis.     
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8.2.3 Revisiting Inter-dependence versus Independence (Individual Autonomy)  
 
As deducible from the above, the notions of dependence (or inter-dependence) and 
independence (or self-reliance and autonomy from the family) were ascribed to Somalis and 
Swedes as so me of the main tendencies that differentiated Somali and Swedish cultures, 
respectively. It was also clear, from the deliberations with Somali respondents and Swedish 
officials, that the two respondent groups emphasised the pros and cons of these tendencies 
from the vantage points of their own socialisation processes and cultural experiences. For 
Somalis their preferences and sympathies lay with inter-dependence (or dependence) among 
groups rather than individualism, self-reliance and autonomy from the family. Conversely, 
Swedish officials emphasised the importance of the latter rather than the former tendency in 
society. To illustrate, a number of Somali respondents, for example, highlighted the negative 
connotations of ‘independence’, ‘self-reliance’ and ‘personal autonomy’ by individuals. Such 
a tendency was often regarded by some Somalis as ‘asocial’, ‘egoistic’ and ‘selfish’. Swedish 
official respondents, by contrast, viewed the sanctity of ‘independence’, ‘self-reliance’ and 
‘personal autonomy’ as something ‘non-negotiable’, something ‘worth cherishing’ and ‘worth 
striving after’. 
  
As alluded to previously, differences in socialisation processes and cultural experiences are 
invariably responsible for which world view an individual or group adopts. Whilst Somalis 
inculcated ‘inter-dependence’ (or ‘mutual dependency’) into their children, from the very early 
ages of childhood, Swedes emphasised ‘independence’, ‘self-reliance’ and ‘autonomy from 
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the family’. Focusing on the latter, as an illustration, it was discernible from the deliberation 
with respondents that “age Eighteen”, – the year for Swedish maturity – was regarded by most 
Swedes as the point when ‘true’ ‘independence’ (or ‘self-reliance’), including its symbolism 
and imperativeness among Swedes comes vividly into the fore. This is the age when most 
Swedes expect (or are expected) to move out of their parental home to their own 
accommodation. Eighteen also signals for Swedish youngsters to prove their ‘independence’ 
and the challenge that they can live separately without necessarily becoming dependent on 
their parents. This was reinforced by Fawz, a 38 year male old respondent:      
Swedes who turns eighteen knows well that they 
live on bor rowed time since they, their parents 
and society expects them to move away from the 
parental home at the earliest opportune time 
possible. For most Swedish youngsters, living 
independently is the initiation rite of passage to 
adulthood.   
 
Unsurprisingly, some Swedish official respondents viewed ‘inter-dependency’ or 
‘dependency’, as is the case with Somalis in negative light. They argued, for example, that 
such a tendency went against the ethos of Swedish autonomy since it wrecked the self-worth, 
esteem, respect and confidence of individuals in society. It was, as they argued, tantamount to 
‘surrendering one’s destiny to the dictates of others’, as one respondent puts it.  
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8.3 The Clan Phenomenon 
 
This sub-section argues that the clan, an overwhelming important phenomenon in Somali 
culture, feeds into the overall incompatibility between Somalis and Swedish cultures. This is 
partly because the clan epitomises a cultural orientation that greatly contrasts with the Swedish 
way of life. Moreover, and more importantly, the clan is the basis of the protracted divisions 
and antagonism among Somalis themselves, and by i mplication, acts as an obstacle to their 
successful integration into mainstream Swedish society.  
 
A clan is defined as a  unilineal kin group that claims its origin from a common ancestor 
(Farber, 1968, Lewis, 1999). A clan can either be patrilineal or matrilineal (Farber, 1968; 
Beals & Hoijer, 1965; Kroeber, 1938). The patrilineal clan traces it descent from a common 
male ancestor whilst the matrilineal clan traces its origin from a common female ancestor 
(Farber, 1968). Somali clans are patrilineal in nature.    
 
Somali society is made up of several clans. Each clan subdivides into several sub-clans which 
subdivide into several sub-sub-clans. A sub-sub-clan consists of numerous extended families. 
An extended family consists in turn of a number of closely related nuclear families – often, 
brothers and male consanguineal cousins and their families (Faber, 1968). The nuclear family 
is the lowest stratum in the hierarchal Somali family clan constellation as shown in Figure 8.1. 
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Loyalty among Somalis is, therefore, first and foremost to their clan families and not to the 
wider society.    
Figure 8.1: Hierarchy and Loyalty in the Somali Clan Constellation. 
 
Source: Developed as part of this Study. 
The clan is and has always been overwhelmingly a key and integral part of Somali society. It 
serves as the main social structural and organisational unit around which many aspects of 
societal life, be it individual, familial, social, cultural, economic, political, religious, etc, are 
organised. Thus for Somalis, the clan is more than a mere form of human relationship or inter-
relatedness, (i.e., family or kinship).  
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Indeed, as the analysis in this research reveals, the role of the clan to Somalis are numerous 
and varied. First and foremost, the clan is the basic transmitting mechanism for Somali culture 
(i.e., the conveyor of Somali tradition), and the means, by which societal norms, customs, 
morals and ethics are communicated to and preserved for present and future Somali 
generations. This makes the clan an essential and significant expression of the Somali way of 
life. It plays an important role in explaining how Somalis see and approach the world around 
them.  
 
Secondly, the clan is the arena for cooperation, mutuality, dependency or interdependency, 
and reciprocity among Somalis. Most of these notions (mutuality, reciprocity, etc) occur 
across the whole clan constellation from the clan-level to the sub-clan to sub-sub-clan to the 
extended family, and finally, to the level of the nuclear family. Although coordination across 
these entities may be set into motion when necessary, some matters (e.g., specific individual or 
family goals) may be dealt with autonomously of the clan (at sub-clan, sub-sub-clan or 
extended family levels). Others may be coordinated with the clan.  
 
Thirdly, the clan acts as a social differentiation mechanism – a boundary-marker – that enables 
people to identify differently with different clans. Indeed, all Somalis are by association 
members of one clan or the other. They associate with one another, e.g., they get involved in 
social, economic activities and political activities, among others, based on t heir clan 
affiliations. The reason is because there is often greater trust and mutual obligation, as well as, 
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the means to enforce or rectify breaches in trusts or contracts between members of the same 
clan, than would be the case, between members of different clans.  
 
Fourthly, the clan is the traditional legal authority or institution in Somali society. It spells out, 
reinforces and regulates relationships among members – to which members are obliged to 
respect and comply. The legal power the clan wields is sustained by the authority of clan male 
elders (cf. Lewis, 1999, Farber, 1968). Note, though, clan rules and regulation are unwritten. 
Nonetheless, they are spelt out orally and transmitted from one generation to another. 
 
Fifthly, the clan is prominent in matters of compensation. This is often the case where victims 
and their families have to be compensated in the event of severe crimes such as indecency, 
rape, injury and murder. Due to the degree, gravity, seriousness, and sheer consequences 
involved, certain types of issues (crimes) are not normally resolved at the levels of the family 
through the sub-clan level. Indeed, there are customary rules, praxis and precedents that 
provide guidelines of how matters of compensations are dealt with both within clans and 
between clans.   
 
Sixthly, the clans often act as a strong social control mechanism. Undoubtedly, inherent in the 
Somali system, is a strong social control mechanism. The hierarchy in Figure 8.1 demonstrates 
that these multiple units, from the clan downwards to the nucleus family, demand multiple 
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loyalties from individuals. These units have enormous influence over the behaviours, choices, 
priorities, orientation, etc, of individual clan members. Thus individual may, consciously or 
unconsciously, have to ‘check’ and weigh the consequences of their behaviour, choices, 
priorities, etc, before they act or embark upon an action.   
 
The functions of the clan among Somalis should not be underestimated. It was certainly not 
limited to the previous list (points 1-6). Among the recurrent clan functions, also included, the 
clan as, the basis for accruing identity and a sense of pride; safeguarding individuals from 
isolation and loneliness (given the expansive network to which individuals could draw rich 
and deep relationships from); furthering the  interest and welfare of its members; standing up 
for the rights of a member where others who had obligations (e.g., family) failed to meet those 
obligations; the clan as according physical and emotional security to its members; 
guaranteeing the right of members throughout their lives; providing deterrence and defense 
against external aggressions from other clans, and where possible enter into pacts and détentes 
with other clans to further and maintain peaceful coexistence with them. 
 
8.3.1 The Clan in Pre-migration Context 
 
Although the clan has benign functions, it is also the source of widespread conflict and 
divisions among Somali clans. In Somalia, clans have often competed and clashed over 
meagre resources. They jostled for positions and influences with the aim to dominate and or 
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gain greater stakes in the socio-economic and political spheres of society. Successive regimes 
in Somalia also ensured that clans were at loggerheads for their own political ends. Clan 
divisions were manipulated, and clan identities politicised. For example, whilst loyal clans 
were rewarded with economic gains and political power, those perceived as d isloyal clans 
were denied the same opportunities (World Bank Report, 2005, Report No. 36032). As a 
consequence, clan politics became highly polarised over the years, culminating in a civil war 
fought along clan lines from 1991 onwards. 
 
8.3.1.1 The Clan eclipses the State 
 
A number of research respondent accentuated the importance Somalis attached to their 
respective clans was so great that it often ‘eclipsed the state’ itself, to borrow the paraphrase of 
one respondent. The reasons were twofold. First, the clan had the interest of its members at 
heart whilst the ‘state’ had not. The distinctiveness of the clan (see above) reinforces this. 
Secondly, the state, by contrast, was a relatively new phenomenon, a phenomenon that came 
about with the departure of colonialism in the early 1960. As argued, the modern nation state 
and its institutions, as inherited from colonial rulers, were ill-suited in harnessing the cultural, 
social, economic and political aspirations of the population. Moreover, the state came to serve 
the interests of a tiny elite who were more concerned in advancing their self-interest rather 
than that of the wider public.  
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In all, it is fair to conclude that the brief history of Somalia’s experimentation with statehood 
was, unfortunately, unsuccessful. It was an experimentation mired by di ctatorship, 
suppression, corruption, misappropriation of public resources and nepotism – tendencies that 
compromised good gove rnance and eroded people’s trust in government – which ultimately 
contributed to the ensuing intermittent and protracted civil war fought along clan lines, which 
in turn led to the demise and eventual collapse of the state itself. 
 
8.3.2 The Clan in Post-migration Context 
 
The overwhelming majority of Somali research respondents endorsed clanism as problematic 
to their integration into Swedish society. Clanism here connoted the belief in one’s clan 
supremacy – the idea that one’s clan is socially, culturally, spiritually, even biologically 
superior to other clans. 
 
As argued, clanism had a negative impact not only on the inter-Somali clan relationships, but 
also on t he integration of Somalis (as a group) into the mainstream Swedish society. With 
regards to the first, clanism created and fostered divisions and antagonism between and within 
different Somalis clans. In respect to the latter, Somalis needed to be internally cohesion as a 
group, before one could talk of integrating into mainstream Swedish society successfully. 
Clearly, a ‘fragmented’ group would have more difficulties in integrating into another more 
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cohesive group, hence, the need of the former to attain stability and internal cohesion within 
itself before integration with the latter can occur.   
 
8.3.2.1 Inter-Clan Relationships  
  
As reported, clan divisions and antagonism among Somalis in Sweden was particularly rife in 
early and mid 1990s. This period coincided with the influx of Somali refugees in relatively 
large numbers into Sweden. It was also a period when the memories of the civil war were still 
fresh in the minds of many. Many had, undoubtedly, witnessed the harsh justice inflicted upon 
them by rival clans. Some were direct victims, and bore physical wounds. Others had family 
members or close relatives maimed or killed by rival clans. The common denominator for 
these refugees was the mutual animosity they felt towards each other (as members of different 
clan family) in Sweden. Hassan, a 37 ye ar old male respondent recalls how charged the 
atmosphere between Somali rival clans was in the 1990s: 
The mood then was one of acute antagonism, 
rivalry and suspicion. People who were friends, 
neighbours, classmates or work colleagues back in 
Somalia were suddenly not in talking terms in 
Sweden.  
 
It should be noted, however, that the ‘friendliness’ or ‘neighbourliness’ among different clan 
members in Somalia, as described above by Hassan, may have been superficial since 
hostilities between these clans remained latent in ‘peace times’, but nonetheless, became 
activated once the Civil War broke in Somalia broke out.  
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8.3.2.2 T-Centralen: The Arena of Clan divisions and Antagonism  
  
In order to illustrate this tension the role of Stockholm’s main Central Train Station, popularly 
known as T-Centralen, as an arena (i.e., one location) in which clanism operated (including 
clan loyalties, rivalries, divisions and antagonism) amongst Somalis in Sweden in the early 
and mid 1990s is highlighted. T-Centralen was the main venue where many members from 
different Somali clans, particularly, from the larger clan families, notably, the Hawiye, Darood 
and Isaaq congregated to socialise (for more on Somali clans, see Appendix 12). It was where, 
members of these clan families ‘laid claim’ to specific localities (e.g., cafés and restaurants) in 
or within the precincts of the Central Train Station, as places where only their members could 
meet.   
 
Naturally, these localities were public spaces and open to all. Nonetheless, there were 
unwritten codes amongst Somalis that, if they belonged to a ‘rival’ clan, then that or those 
facilities were ‘no-go areas’ for them. Ironically, the Swedish owners of those facilities knew 
little (if nothing) of the internal dynamics and intrigues that transpired between the various 
Somalis using their premises.      
 
As reported, Somalis went to the T-Centralen (Central Station) to catch up the latest hearsay 
about what was happening in Somalia. Among the questions of interest for these Somalis 
included, how their respective clans faired in the conflict (i.e., were they winning or losing?); 
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whether their clan was on t he offensive or defensive; whether their clan was planning a 
counter-offensive; what their warlords were saying or up to, etc.  M oreover, the need to 
congregate separately in different venues was also borne out of the need for privacy. Gossip 
and jokes against rival clan or clans, usually offensive in nature, were often made, hence, the 
need to self-segregate along clan-lines. Furthermore, the 1990s was a period when the many 
Somalis were new to the country, had not learnt Swedish and remained overwhelming 
unemployed. It was a period when Somalis had little to do. T he past-time thus served to 
counter the void in the lives of most Somalis.   
  
As alluded to previously, whilst most Somalis went to ‘their’ respective rendezvous purely to 
socialise and as a ‘ break’ from ‘biting isolation’, as o ne Somali research respondent put it, 
others went there to back their respective clans in Somalia, both morally and materially. The 
latter group was keen for their respective clans to come out of the Somalia conflict 
victoriously. Among them were ‘clan leaders’ in Sweden who went round raising money from 
their clans. These funds would then end up in the hands of clan warlords in Somalia and help 
in their endeavour to outdo other rival clans militarily. In doing so, one could argue that 
Somalis in Sweden (as were others from the Diaspora elsewhere) fuelled the inter-clan 
conflicts in Somalia. 
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8.3.2.3 The Ease of Inter-Clan Conflict 
 
As we have seen, the 1990s was a period when inter-Somali clan contacts were at their lowest 
ebb. Few Somalis dared to reached out to meet and or exchanged ideas with members of rival 
clans. However, the atmosphere between ‘rival’ clan members in Sweden has since changed 
markedly (although this does not mean that the prevalence of clanism among Somalis has been 
eliminated). There are two probable reasons that may have contributed to this development. 
First, the contact with a new setting and a new society has made many Somalis to reflect on 
whether there is a need for the type of rivalries described above. Indeed, as one Somali 
respondent pointed out, the ‘petty divisions we have are not recognized by t he ordinary 
Swedish citizen, and if they were, these would be perceived as undesirable’. Secondly, for 
many Somalis, the results of clan conflict in Somalia were pretty obvious. Clan conflict has 
clearly resulted in more misery, death and destruction for all irrespective of which clan one 
belonged to. The nation [Somalia] and its institutions have collapsed giving Somalia the status 
of a failed state. Thirdly, as time passed by, and with many Somalis pursuing language and 
adult education courses, others finding work and becoming established in the sense of having 
families and children to look after, the urge for wasteful ‘past-time’ has declined as a  
consequence. Indeed, the visibility of Somalis in places like Stockholm Central Station (T-
Central), other than for purposes of travel has been severely reduced. In part, Somali ethnic 
organisations and individually-run rendezvous in suburbs such as Rinkeby and Tensta where 
Somalis predominate, have been instrumental in reducing the need for meeting at the Central 
Train Station, among others. Nonetheless, there is a tendency that the rendenvous in the 
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suburbs are still frequented along clan lines despite the reduced tensions among ‘rival’ clan 
members in Stockholm in recent years. 
 
8.4 Religion: Schism between the Sacred and the Secular 
 
This section highlights the schism between Islam (a religion Somalis ascribed to), and 
Swedish secularism (which is strongly secular), as a major source of contention that has great 
implications for the integration of Somalis and Sweden. In particular, the lack of demarcation 
between Somali cultural practices (equated to state) and Islam (religion) on one hand, and the 
apparent relative high degree of religiosity among Somalis in the backdrop of a highly secular 
Swedish environment, on t he other, were endorsed as problematic by t he overwhelming 
majority of respondents. Somalis, as it were, had to separate between the sacred and the 
secular if they were to receive the desired interaction with members of the host society, and to 
receive acceptability from the latter.   
 
As underscored, Sweden is a highly secularized society. It is a country where religion and 
religious symbols displayed in the public domain hardly bode well with majority in society. 
Also as accentuated, when the religion in question happens to be Islam, and the symbol, 
Muslim veils, hostility towards it gets even more compounded, given the immense opposition 
and suspicion towards Islam that is prevalent in Swedish society.   
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Indeed, Islam was broadly endorsed as being incompatible with Swedish way of life. The 
reasons were many and varied. For the purpose of constructing a narrative I have termed these 
reasons ‘the indictments against Islam’. The ‘indictments’ were as following: First, Islam was 
seen in Sweden as a ‘threat’, both literally and figuratively. The literal threat associated Islam 
with intolerance, violence, terrorism, etc. The figurative threat related to the kind of threat 
Islam posed to Swedish way of life (principles, norms, values, etc). Second, Islam was faulted 
for stifling people’s personal freedoms and liberties. Third, Islam was blamed for its unfair 
treatment of women. Fourth, Islam came under criticism for its ‘grandiose’ nature, including 
its tendency of not confining itself purely to spiritual matters; its transnational focus and 
outlook, as opposed to local; and, its ambitions for imposing Islamic penal code, known 
commonly as Sharia Law, perceived by many in the Sweden as ‘draconian’.   
 
Whilst many Somali respondents confirmed the opposition and negative attitudes towards 
Islam in Sweden, they did however point to two further issues to highlight why Islam was seen 
unfavourably in Swedish society. The first was the ‘dearth of knowledge about Islam’ in 
Sweden, and the second, distortion of Islam by the media. These two points were interrelated, 
from the viewpoints of Somali research respondents in that, because many people in Sweden 
‘did not have much knowledge about Islam’, they were likely to digest any material printed or 
broadcasted about Islam by the media – which, according to them [respondents], was after all, 
likelier to be biased against Islam and Muslims. For narrative purposes, I called these two 
accounts (i.e., the dearth of knowledge and distortion by the media), ‘rebuttal to the case 
against Islam’. 
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The latter part of this section deals with the veil. The veil as it relates to the Swedish and 
general contexts will firstly be deliberated before attention is briefly turned to how Somalis 
related to contemporary development of ‘more veiling’ amongst Somali women in Sweden.   
 
The veil attracts strong views and opposition from the host society. It is the contention of this 
research that the more visibly veiled an individual is, the more difficulties s/he faces in terms 
of achieving socio-economic (not to mention cultural-) integration in Sweden. Likewise the 
more veiled members of a group were, the more difficulty it becomes for them to be accorded 
or receive acceptance by the host society.   
 
It is no coincidence, therefore, that many negative attributes were attributed to the wearing of 
veils in Sweden. Some of the recurrent attributes include the following: Firstly, the veil was 
oppressive to women. Secondly, the veil inhibited meaningful interaction with Swedes. 
Thirdly, the veil was an obstruction to ‘practitioner – client relationship’ (in the context of 
health and social services settings). Fourthly, the veil presented numerous practical problems 
to the wearer in the streets, workplaces, etc. Fifthly, the veil posed potential ‘security risks’ to 
the populous or the nation. Sixthly, the veil affronts the ideal image and aesthetics of Swedes. 
Seventhly, the veil becomes even more ‘contemptuous’ when worn by children under the age 
of consent.  
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All in all, by choice or accident, the Somali community in Sweden happened to be a minority 
where Islam is not only a major node in its culture or high in its socio-cultural and religious 
order, but also where the two (Somali culture and Islam), are interwoven and inseparable. This 
makes Somalis come across to the host society, the establishment and the media as a minority 
group that prioritises the sacred over the secular which in turn had dire consequence for their 
acceptance by the wider host society. Thus the desire to live after the sacred (Islamic) rather 
than secular principles and practices only appears to compound and feed into the broader 
divergence, incompatibility and differences between Somalis and native Swedes. 
 
8.4.1 Putting Secularism into Perspective 
 
In order to understand Swedish secularism, and its intense opposition towards religion in 
general and Islam in particular, one has to understand what the term secularism means.   
   
In literature, secularism is often evoked to infer ‘a decline of religion’ (Sommerville, 
1998:249) at ‘individual’, ‘organisational’ and ‘societal’ levels (Yamane, 1997:109); 
‘disengagement’ from religion (Sommerville, 1998:249); ‘beliefs and practices related to the 
“non-ultimate” aspect of human life’ (Yinger, 1967:19); and or, ‘rationalisation’ 
(Sommerville, 1998:249; Yamane, 1997; Bruce, 1992; Glasner, 1977). ‘At institutional level’, 
secularism refers to the ‘separation of state and the church in public domains’ – where, 
‘religious activities, ideas and groups are vehemently discouraged (Sommerville, 1998:250-
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51). This resonates with Rotenstreich (1962: 21, as cited in Weissbrod, 1983:189) who argued 
that ‘no concepts, ideas or values’ are ‘validated by religion’ or ‘revelation that stem from 
outside the human sphere’. To Ashforth & Waidyanath (2002:360), because of the ‘premium 
Western societies place on individualism’, people were bound to display ‘skepticism towards 
organizations that make spiritual claims – particularly to an ultimate truth rather than to a 
process of discovery’.  
 
Secularism is dialectically opposed to religion. The two compete for the same truth or reality, 
albeit from different departure points. For example, whist ‘everything material and abstract’ in 
religion ‘is derived’ from the supernatural, in secularism, ‘everything’ resulted ‘from human 
endeavour’ (Rotenstreich, 1962: 21, cited in Weissbrod, 1983:189). This echoes Ashforth and 
Waidyanath’s (2002:339) suggestion that religion and secularism are both ‘mutually 
excluding’ and ‘impenetratable’. This is also affirmed by Sommerville (1998:250-51) who 
says, the ‘secularist mindset takes’ a f irm position against religion’, that the secularist 
‘actively doubted’ and ‘displayed disbelief’ in religion. .  
 
In the literature, a connection is often made between secularism and modernity. As 
Sommerville, 1998:249) argues, ‘secularaisation and modernisation theories are intermeshed’. 
Basing his work on Durkheim and Weber, Yamane (1997:109) asserts, modernisation has 
‘transformed the relation of man and god’. In Schultz’ (2006:171), ‘classical theory in 
secularization contends that as so ciety becomes increasingly modern (usually as knowledge 
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expands through the processes of scientific rationality), religion becomes less and less 
important in that society’. To Schultz (2006:171), ‘as people “advance” technologically and 
scientifically, they no longer need the magic of the past to offer explanation or meaning’.  
 
Adapting from Yamane (1997:109), one could argue that, the impact of secularism in Sweden 
is pervasive, rendering the ‘place of religion’ in the social ordering of society as extremely 
minimal. Again in line with Yamane (1997:109), one could argue that both ‘structure of 
religious organizations’ such as Christianity’, and, the ‘orientation of individuals’ (Swedes) 
have changed, adapting to the realities in society.  
 
8.4.2 Sweden, the Secular Society 
 
In line with Yinger (1967:19), secularism in Sweden comes across as t he ‘anti-thesis of 
religion. It is a sort of ‘closed world-view that functions more or less like religion’ (cf. Yinger, 
1967:19). Indeed, research respondents often talked of secularism as ‘a way of life’ in Sweden 
(cf. Yinger, 1967:19), or as being a core value of the Swedish society and its welfare 
system/state.  
 
Officially, though, the State and the Church are separate. This separation occurred as recently 
as 2000 (Gustafsson, 2003). However, the influence of the latter on people’s live in Sweden 
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waned a long time ago (described by some respondents, in terms of, at least ‘half a century’ or, 
‘one century’ ago). In reality this goes even further back in history to the 1600s when Sweden, 
like many other ‘Western societies, moved away from religious or divine authority’; witnessed  
‘the triumphalism of secularism over religion’ (Schultz, 2006;170); and, ‘threw off the 
shackles of that great old-time religion’ (Schultz, 2006;171).  
 
As the respondents stated, Sweden was perhaps one of the most secular country on earth. It is 
a country where people hardly refer to ‘god for help’, to use the words of one respondent; 
another saying, ‘religion is held at arm’s length in Sweden’. Paradoxically, for others the only 
time a ‘ decorum of religion’ came into beam was in connection with ‘traditional’ 
(emphasising ‘not religious’) celebrations. Examples of these celebrations cited included 
Christmas and St. Lucia Day. Other occasions religion comes into beam in Sweden included 
baptism, weddings and funerals. To these respondents celebrating or taking part in these 
celebrations or occasions had very little to do with religion or people’s religious beliefs. On 
the contrary, these occasions have now become an integral part of Swedish cultural and 
traditional practices.    
 
Moreover, in Sweden, religion is relegated to the private domain. Accordingly, the state and 
its institutions do not interfere in how people want to worship (privately), and clearly steer 
away from becoming drawn into religious matters. However, although the state and its 
institutions were neutral when it came to people’s faith, nonetheless, they favoured the 
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upholding of secularism as guiding principles in their day-to-day dealings with the general 
public.  
 
Furthermore, as argued previously, the general public in Sweden (and not only the state and its 
institutions) guarded their secular traditions fiercely. This was because Swedes associate 
themselves closely with their Welfare System – a system that upholds secular laws and 
traditions above divine ones. Indeed, it was noted that Swedes belonged, as it were, to one big 
‘secular’ family, as epitomised by the notion of folkhemmet (or people’s home). Folkhemmet 
is a conception used to evoke the image of harmony, consensus and solidarity across the 
classes in Sweden (see Baldwin, 1990; Scott, 1988, Scuzzarello, 2008). The underlying 
argument was that, religion, rather than bring in people together (e.g., across ethnicity, class, 
etc), often had the potentiality to create a wedge and disharmonious relationship between 
them.  
 
Besides, there were many issues and ideas embedded in religion that were at odds with the 
Swedish secular system. The family, child-rearing, education, interaction across gender, 
community mobilisation to a given cause  were some of the examples cited by the respondents 
as potential flash points with Islam, since these were also the same sphere of influence and 
focus for the Welfare State.  
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Undoubtedly, the ‘encroachment’ of Islam on Swedish secularism made many Swedes unease, 
hence, their opposition to Islam. It was a sentiment shared by Elisabet, an Immigration Officer 
who formerly worked in Rinkeby Social District of Stockholm:      
We have Islam that has appeared suddenly from 
the horizon where its adherents are demanding 
special treatment. That by implicit means an 
infringement on the preserve of secularism... and 
that is why Islam is not viewed in a good light by 
most Swedes.  
 
Indeed, Islam and Swedish secularism were presented as bipolar opposites. The two were 
portrayed as having no ‘neutral’ ground or basis for reciprocal respect and accommodation 
towards each other. As some Swedish official respondents pointed out, Swedes were all too 
aware of the consequences when politics and religion were ‘mixed’, as that would be ‘as 
combustious as adding petrol to fire’, as one of these respondents put it. This was often 
exemplified with ‘look what was happening in Muslim countries?’ These officials argued that 
the ‘constant’ socio-economic and political chaos witnessed in many Muslim societies, had a 
direct relation to their inability to separate politics from religion.  
 
8.4.3 Religiosity among Somalis 
 
A number of research respondents, particularly Swedish officials, observed that there was a 
prevalence of ‘a higher degree of religiosity’ among Somalis in Sweden when compared to 
other Muslim minorities in Sweden. Numerous examples were highlighted to support the 
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prevalence of deeper religiosity among Somalis in Sweden. They included: religiosity as 
gleaned from day-to-day conversations with Somalis; the demand for special dispensations at 
work or work placements (e.g.); declining to participate in certain work tasks; displaying 
outward religious codes or symbols; and ‘declining to greet’ people of the opposite sex. There 
were also two additional observations to highlight the religiosity of Somalis in Sweden. The 
first asserts, Somalis were ‘stubbornly religious’, and the second, that ‘life in exile exacerbated 
religiosity’ among Somalis in Sweden.    
 
8.4.3.1 Religiosity as Gleaned from day-to-day Conversations 
 
One of the more ‘obvious’ examples of religiosity among Somalis could be gleaned from day-
to-day discussions amongst Somalis. As some Swedish officials observed, Somalis saw 
‘nearly all issues’ through the prism of Islam. To these officials, ‘fate’ and the ‘supernatural’ 
figured regularly in their conversations with their Somali clients. Indeed, this could also be 
confirmed from the way some Somalis respondents talked of issues on a number of occasions 
during the course of interviews. References of divine nature often highlighted the acceptance 
of or the inevitability of ‘fate’, as an explanation or reasons why things happen. ‘If God 
wishes’; It’s Gods will’; ‘God has written that’; ‘It is God’s case’; etc., recurred frequently to 
illustrate how pervasive religious references in the day-to-day conversations among Somalis 
are. As pointed out, references to God underline the kind of attitude or cultural mind-set 
among Somalis that elevates fate or destiny whilst minimising the role or importance of 
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personal planning, control of one’s destiny and or other issues associated with rationality, 
choice and individual discretion. 
  
8.4.3.2 Demand Dispensations 
 
Another example illuminated by Swedish officials as an illustration of the prevalence of 
religiosity among Somalis, particularly, in relation to other ethnic Muslim groups in Sweden 
(e.g., Bosnian, Iranians, Turks, etc) was with regard to the ‘demands’ (by Somalis) for 
dispensations from employers, institutions of training, etc, on religious grounds. Among the 
most recurrently cited ‘demand for dispensation’ included; taking breaks from work for 
prayers; taking time-off to attend Friday Afternoon prayers; insisting on having prayer rooms 
at work places, etc.  
 
From the discussion with Somali respondents, it was apparent that it was not only ‘those few 
most pious’ Somalis who demanded taking ‘pauses’ from work tasks (or in other employment-
simulated work environment such as ‘back-to-work’ trainings or activation programmes aimed 
at improving their employability) in order to say their daily prayers, but ‘quite a sizeable’ 
number of mainstream Somalis in Sweden.  
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These ‘demands’ were also an issue for officials who coordinate activation programmes. 
Activation programmes were normally initiated and ran, either separately or jointly, by 
municipalities and or the Swedish Labour Market Board (AMS). Confirming the view that 
Somalis displayed more religiosity than other Muslim groups in Sweden, Maria, an official 
involved in coordinating courses for a group of people in Rinkeby, who have not attended 
school in their home countries, pointed to the futility of trying to ‘encourage’ Somalis to 
remain on their courses, or ‘benches’ – as she put it – on Fridays as they take unauthorized 
breaks to attend Friday Afternoon prayers. Friday Afternoon prayers are viewed by Muslims 
as having important significance. Maria lamented:        
 We have a difficulty in keeping our rules on 
Fridays when people start streaming out in the 
middle of lessons at about 11:30 AM to ready 
themselves for Friday prayers. 
 
From the experience of some Somali research participants, breaking from work for prayers 
was highly resented by Swedish employers. It was a ‘behaviour’ that was contrary to 
acceptable norms, standards, expected work ethics, etc, of Swedish work traditions and 
environments.  
 
8.4.3.3 Declining to Participate in Certain Tasks 
 
The refusal by Somalis to participate in certain work tasks when sent out on work placements 
was also viewed as a sign of their [Somali] deep religiosity in comparison to other Muslim 
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groups on training programmes. Examples of work placement cited included warehouses and 
supermarkets that handled pork (forbidden under Islam). This ‘refusal’ pertained to all types of 
tasks related to the handling of pork to include, processing, packaging, storing, selling, 
transporting, etc, of pork.    
 
To a number of Swedish officials, this only made it difficult for Somalis to gain a foothold in 
the labour market. From their perspectives, it would have been a rational thing for Somalis to 
take up jobs, even if those jobs went against their ‘interest’ not least to accrue the necessary 
job experience. As argued, gaining experience was a f irst step in finding a job that was 
enjoyable or in line with one’s conviction. Officials found the alternative (i.e., to remain 
unemployed), as serving no one’s interest, be it the individual concerned or the wider society. 
Another argument was that, it was always easier for a person already in work to change jobs 
than it was for an unemployed person to secure work.  
 
8.4.3.4 Outward Display of Religious Codes/Symbols  
 
The kind of garments Somalis wore, were also cited as examples to illustrate the relatively 
deeper degree of religiosity among Somalis. For the more pious Somali men, it was observed, 
they wore buggy shirts, and ‘short trousers’ that covered just above their ankles. Also 
mentioned was that religious men tended to have long beards. For Somali women it was the 
veils (some of which were full-veils) they wore that indicated the depth of their religiosity. 
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Seeing school-going children, some of them very small in hijabs (Islamic head covers) was 
also taken as not only an example of parents imposing their religious values on children but 
also one that reflected on the increased religiosity among Somalis (see the sub-section on the 
‘veil’, below). Indeed, the insistence of displaying these outward religious expressions among 
Somalis, particularly, in the public domains indicated to officials that religion played too 
significant a role in the lives of Somalis.   
 
8.4.3.5 ‘Declining to Greet’  
 
Another example raised by Swedish officials in line with the observances of Somalis vis-à-vis 
deeper degree of religiosity, related to the tendency of some Somalis to decline to shake hands 
with officials in the latter’s encounter with the former in their professional capacities, and, 
especially, where these encounters involve people of opposite sexes. Elisabet, an immigration 
official who had previously worked in Rinkeby Social District of Stockholm, recounts:   
I can recall when it first occurred to me… there 
was this man who would not reciprocate in 
stretching his hand to greet me as I ushered him 
into my office. I did not know what to make of it 
at first. There were, of course, many emotions that 
went through my head at the time. The 
spontaneous one was anger. However, I was in a 
professsional role which made it natural for me to 
keep negative emotions at bay, but nonetheless…   
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Other officials confirmed the phenomenon of declining to take the hand of person of the 
opposite sex among Somalis as not uncommon, pointing to their awareness of the similar 
occurrences in other social districts as well as in Employment Exchanges and Social Security 
Offices in Stockholm. These officials were acutely aware of the difficulties this presented to 
Somalis who declined to shake hands with potential employers (e.g., recruiters), and by 
implication, their prospects in the labour market. 
 
8.4.4 Stubbornly Religious 
 
Among the observations made by Swedish official respondents about Somalis was that they 
[Somalis] were ‘stubbornly religious’, to borrow the phrase from one respondent. This 
‘stubbornness’ reinforced the perceived relative deep degree of religiosity among Somalis – a 
phenomenon that helped instigate and compound the problems Somali faced in society. The 
determination with which Somalis demanded their ‘religious rights’ on one  hand, and their 
‘inflexibility’ in not budging when they meet opposition to their demand, on the other, was 
portrayed as illustrative of the ‘obstinate’ nature of Somalis in matters pertaining to Islam.  
 
The purported religious ‘stubbornness’ of Somalis was detectable from the irritation it caused 
to officials. Mona, a social worker at Rinkeby Social District, was one of the officials who was 
critical of Muslims in general, and, whose insinuations pertained as much to Somalis. To 
Mona, ‘all these demands’ both at individual level (e.g., dispensation from work to pray, 
297 
 
prayer room at workplaces, Friday afternoon prayer attendance, taking a day off to celebrate 
EID, etc.), and at the structural level, such as those that call for the establishment of religious 
institutions (e.g., independent Muslim schools, madrassas or local Quranic schools, ‘more 
mosques than already exists’, own burial sites, etc), served only ‘to enhanced the wedge that 
already existed’ between Muslims and the host society, and should therefore be resisted. These 
institutions, in the eyes of Mona, would also create separatism making attempts to integrate 
Muslims into mainstream Swedish society even more difficult in the future.    
 
Revisiting the ‘obdurate nature’ of Muslims, to which Somalis were part, Mona painted a 
hypothetical scenario of how Muslims were goal-oriented, bent on achieving their end-goals 
against the background of ‘Swedish naivety’. To her this had the potentiality of leading to 
‘disastrous consequences’ for Swedes in the future ‘if something was not done to curb the 
advances’ of Muslims in this country. Mona talks of ‘determined’ nature of Muslims in the 
wake of what she called ‘Swedish credulity’:   
When you hear Muslims want to build a mosque,           
the chorus always goes something like this…‘let 
them built their mosque, it harms no one’. Then 
one hears they built their mosque. Do you t hink 
that is the end of the saga? Here come the 
secondary demands. They need their own burial 
grounds, own public holidays, own jurisdiction to 
apply in certain areas such as inheritance laws… 
there may come a time when some Muslims might 
even be tempted to start issuing their edicts on 
wide-ranging societal issues.      
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To Mona, it was the natives who always ceded ground in the face of this ‘steady escalation’ 
from Muslims. As Mona it:  
It was not right for the native population to give in 
to the habits and customs people who come to 
Sweden. On the contrary, those who come to this 
country must conform to our laws of this land, 
and our Swedish way of life. As it stands of now, 
it is the host community that has to compromise 
its values in order to meet the demands of 
Muslims in this country.    
 
8.4.5 Religiosity and Life in Exile 
 
The analysis of this research points to the premise that the relative deep degree of religiosity 
noted among Somalis in Sweden has indeed been exacerbated by their life as ‘exiles’ in 
Sweden. As established from the accounts of research participants, migration has caused 
dislocation among Somalis in Sweden given that they were uprooted from their familiar 
environments (e.g., from families, friends culture, religion, etc) and ‘thrown into’ an 
unfamiliar one – one that was dissimilar in many ways. As a consequence, many Somalis felt 
isolated in Sweden. Moreover, they ‘felt unwanted in the new settings’, not least because 
many of them remain unemployed and are regarded by many in the host society as ‘outsiders’, 
to use some of the phrases from research participants.  
 
As a result, a number of Somalis were said to have found solace in their religion, Islam. It was 
also arguable that by turning more to Islam, Somalis were able to reconnect or re-discover 
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their identities, find meaning as well the stamina to cope or withstand the challenges they 
faced in their adopted country. This characterization is similar to Weissbrod (1983:188), who 
confirms, ‘religion provides the cohesive values that seem indispensible in times of social 
upheaval’. The negative side, however, was that deeply religious Somalis tended to insulate 
themselves from mainstream life making the endeavours to integrate them into society much 
more difficult. 
 
8.4.6 The Indictment against Islam  
 
This sub-section deals with the more general issues surrounding Islam as perceived in Sweden. 
The themes outlined here were endorsed as the reasons why (a) Islam was seen as being 
incompatible with Swedish way of life, and, (b) why Swedes were vehemently opposed to and 
suspicious of Islam. We refer to these reasons as the Indictment against Islam in Sweden.  
 
The indictments against Islam pointed to the following: (1) Islam was a ‘threat’ in Sweden, 
and, to the Swedish way of life; (2) Islam stifled people’s personal freedoms and liberties; (3) 
Islam treated women unfairly; (4) Islam was ‘grandiose’ in nature in the sense that it (a) had 
the tendency of not confining itself to purely spiritual matters, (b) was transnational in focus 
and outlook, as opposed to local, and, (c) had an ambition of imposing Islamic penal code 
(Sharia Law) to all, Muslims and non-Muslims alike.    
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8.4.6.1 Islam as a ‘Threat’  
  
Islam is perceived in Sweden, as in many other Western countries, as a ‘threat’. This threat is 
both ‘literal’ and ‘figurative’. The ‘literal threat’ was associated with acts committed by 
Muslims to harm both life and property in the West (to which Sweden was part). Here Islam 
was perceived to ‘thrive in’, ‘advocate for’ and ‘use’ violence as a means to achieve its end-
goal. That end-goal seemed defused but was often characterised by Swedish official 
respondents, as the desire for Islam to ‘rule the world’, to borrow the phrase of one of these 
respondent. The ‘figurative threat’, on the other hand, pertained to the threat Islam purportedly 
posed to the ‘Swedish way of life’, its values and civilization or, more broadly, to 
‘Swedish/Western democracy ideals, including, personal freedoms and liberties. I w ill limit 
my deliberation here to Islam as a ‘literal threat’ since the ‘figurative threat’ forms large part 
of subsequent ‘indictments’ (see below) that will follow shortly.   
 
This ‘indictment’ was linked to contemporary world politics where Islam has more or less 
become synonymous with terror, violence and militancy. As Ziebertz & Riegel (2008:11) 
agree, the last decade, especially, ‘since “9/11”’, and the “war against terror”, many 
discussions have evolved from the topic of Islam’.   
 
Cautious not to generalize, some Swedish official respondents introduced the term Political 
Islam to underscore that the struggle with Islam was not between the West and Muslims (the 
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majority of whom were refered to as ‘peace-loving like everyone else’) but one between the 
West and a tiny minority within the Muslim community who ascribed to Political Islam – a 
minority that was bent on reaching its goals through violent means.   
 
Admittedly, what made the struggle with Political Islam precarious was that, it was much an 
idea as a m ovement. This made Political Islam an elusive enemy. It had no standing army, 
armaments or clear command and control structures. As one Swedish official lamented, ‘no 
military might would be able to crush Political Islam’, suggesting, ‘the only way to defeat it 
was by winning the hearts and minds of the broader Muslim majority.’  
 
Moreover, ‘Political Islam’ and its adherents adapted to situations accordingly. For example, 
in the event of a cr ack-down on i ts organizations, these organizations had the tendency to 
dissolve, their members ceasing to become active or vocal and easily moving into the wider 
Muslim communities. When the crack-down comes to an end, organizations and their 
members may reappear in one form or another or go underground, which then becomes harder 
to detect from law enforcement perspectives.   
 
Also introduced into the deliberation of ‘Islam as a threat’ was that of conceiving Muslims in 
Sweden or the West as t he enemy from within, ‘the fifth column in society’, as it were. 
Nonetheless, there was less unanimity among respondents on this characterization. Indeed, 
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there were few respondents who were philosophically cynical, arguing that, it was human 
nature ‘to have’ or ‘try to look’ for an enemy ‘even where there are none’ to borrow some of 
their phrases. The following sentiments reinforced their arguments: 
 
Helena, an Immigration Official:  
I am sure if it was not Islam or Muslims, we 
would have found another monster to blame.  
 
Eva, a youth employment adviser: 
Had the Soviets been as strong and threatening as 
they were decades ago today… I am damn sure 
we wouldn’t have focused so much on Muslims as 
we are doing now.  
 
All in all, although Sweden and other Scandinavian countries have largely been spared from 
terrorist actions of a more serious global kind (e.g., those that occurred in Bali, New York, 
London and Madrid, etc), nonetheless, with increased globalisation, the fear from terrorism is 
as palpable in Sweden as it is in other Western countries.   
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8.4.6.2 Stifles Personal Freedoms and Liberties   
 
It was argued that Islam had the tendency to curtail individual freedoms and personal liberties 
(e.g., freedom of worship, press, association, etc). The proponents of this arguments asserted 
that these virtues matter hugely in democratic societies like Sweden, and are hence, non-
negotiable.  To them, Islam ‘deserved’ to be ‘monitored’ in order to safeguard the ‘hard-
earned liberties’ people in Sweden have come to take for granted. This is reinforced by Björn, 
an employment adviser with the Rinkeby Social District of Stockholm:   
We cannot compromise or jeapordise our 
freedoms. Civil liberties are ingrained in, as well 
as inseparable from, our Swedish way of life. To 
give up on our freedoms and liberties just because 
others may feel uncomfortable would be 
inconceivable to say the least.    
 
The proponents of this argument were critical of the prevalence of self-censorship in the 
Swedish media that emanated from the latter’s strive not to offend Muslim sensibilities, 
among others. To them this was uncalled for since freedom of expression (a fundamental pillar 
in Western democracies) and Muslim sensitivity were largely irreconcilable. Moreover, the 
chasm between the two (freedom of expression and Muslim sensibilities) was linked to the 
inability of Muslims to separate the sacred from the secular – a ‘constant’ source of 
consternation in the relationship between Muslims and their Western host societies.  
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In particular, how to protect freedom of expression, especially, when that expression went 
against the mainstream views, beliefs and or sensitivities of Muslims presented a dilemma in 
the West, including Sweden. This dilemma’ was illustrated by how  Muslim passions often 
‘ran out of control globally’ in the advent of rifts between the Western and Muslims as a result 
of the above (see Appendix 13 for ‘cited’ examples).   
 
8.4.6.3 Treatment of Women 
 
The ‘treatment’ Muslim women suffer under Islam was another recurrent theme. Among the 
attributes endorsed to describe this ‘treatment’ included the way Muslim women were 
subjected to discrimination and direct segregation; the way they were denied ability to make 
own decisions both at the micro (family) and macro (societal) levels; how Muslim women 
were denied to hold positions of influence and authority in society; the way women came 
under the guardianships of male protégé or minders; and, how women were ‘normally 
confined’ to the house, among others. Muslim women had thus far fewer choices to make in 
order to exploit their full potentials in society to the maximum. They were often left out in 
pursuing education or their own careers, and often, ended up in early marital relationships.   
 
There were other concrete examples cited in relation to the unfairness meted out to Muslim 
women under Islam. One of these was in relation to Islamic inheritance law where women or 
girls could only inherit half as much as their male counterparts (boys) acquired. Another 
example was that which involved compensations to victims where woman receives only half 
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the amount of what a man would get. Yet another example cited was how Muslim women 
were often stuck in abusive marriage relationships because their families and communities 
viewed divorce in a bad light. 
  
Contrastingly, Swedish officials argued that Swedish women were ‘emancipated’. They 
argued both men and women in Sweden enjoyed equal rights and status in society. To 
exemplify this, the almost near equal representation of men and women in Swedish labour 
market and education were viewed, by S wedish officials, as being indicative of their 
favourable position in society. Indeed, because of their favourable position, Swedish women 
have attained a greater degree of personal, social and economic independence. It was 
concluded that the position of women in Sweden was favourable because society has managed 
to ‘take out religion out of the equation’, to borrow the phrase from one official respondent. 
By the same token, the reason why Muslim women took less prominent or visible roles in their 
respective societies (and in Sweden) was a consequence of their inferior treatment under 
Islam.  
 
8.4.6.4 The ‘Grandiose’ Nature of Islam 
 
The ‘grandiose nature’ of Islam encapsulated three interconnected themes. The first postulated 
that Islam was not confined to matters that were purely spiritual. The second, that Islam was as 
much transnational – in its ambitions, focus and strategy – than it was local. Third, Islam in 
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the West was associated with Sharia Law, its penal code, which was viewed as draconian and 
incompatible with Western ideals.  
 
8.4.6.5 Not Confined to Spiritual Matters 
 
As pointed out by a  number of respondents, Islam was not a religion that was confined to 
spiritual matters. It was a way of life, as Muslims themselves readily point out. Indeed, Islam 
may encompass issues of spiritual nature such as daily prayers, giving alms to the poor, 
fasting, etc; however, it also dictates many other aspects of the lives of its adherents. These 
include cultural, socio-economic and political spheres, among others. It also determines the 
relations Muslims and non-Muslims would have vis-à-vis such societal spheres.  
 
8.4.6.6 Never Local but Transnational  
 
In addition, Islam was seen as a r eligion that was hardly local. Rather Muslims were ‘by 
nature’ likely to be transnational and, thus have transnational loyalties. Notions such as the 
Ummah (a single global Muslim community) or the Khalifate (a world Islamic state with no 
borders) whose ultimate goal was to rule the world using the Sharia (dreaded and perceived in 
the West for its harsh punitive measures) were all examples cited to portray the idea that Islam 
was more of a global enterprise than it was local.  
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Indeed, for the more pious Muslims, a true Muslim is by definition a global, citizen. His/her 
loyalty thus lies with the global Ummah. One example of global solidarity to this effect, and 
to which respondents alluded to, related to Jihad (or Holy War), where Muslim men were 
known to fight alongside fellow Muslims abroad, even where they were considered by their 
countries of adoption as being on the enemy’s side. Another poignant example pointed to the 
case where a number of Western Muslims have fought (or continue to fight) in Afghanistan, 
Bosnia, Chechnya, Iraq and other hotspots in order to take part in what they [Muslims] 
regarded was an obligation to stand by fellow Muslims against non-Muslim invaders. 
 
8.4.6.7 Sharia Law 
 
As a number of Swedish official respondents pointed out, many in Sweden opposed Islam 
because of its Sharia law. Sharia is a legal system based on ‘the principles of Islamic law’ 
(Ashwami, 1998:49). Although Sharia law encompasses all aspects of life such as so cial, 
economic and political, it is its legal penal code which is most dreaded in Sweden as in the 
West. Sharia’s penal code defines crime and specifies punishments accordingly. Indeed, the 
extreme examples of the forms of justice lifted here included those against blasphemy, 
adultery, theft, etc. Under Sharia law, blasphemy is punishable with death; adultery by 
stoning; and, theft by amputation of hands and legs. It is the severity through which Islamic 
penal code hands its verdict against these ‘crimes’ – not to say those of blasphemy and 
adultery which hardly count as ‘offences’ in the West – that makes Islam and its laws sound or 
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look draconian to the average Swede. The following sentiments reinforced the opposition to 
Sharia law in Sweden.   
 
Eriksson, a social worker with the Märsta Social District of Stockholm had this to say:   
Islamic jurisdiction is intolerable. It is incompre-
hensible that such laws could be entertained by 
any society.       
 
Eva, a youth employment adviser with the Rinkeby Social District of Stockholm affirms:  
The slightest mention of Sharia law send jitters in 
most Swedes.   
 
Indeed, some officials suspected that Sharia Law has support among ‘religious’ Muslims 
(including religious Somalis), and found it ironic that people who sought asylum in Sweden 
would ‘turn around’ to demand that the host society cedes ground to the very draconian laws 
fostered under their [Muslim] dictatorial systems, governance or set of beliefs in the name of 
religious autonomy. In retrospect, it was evident from the analysis of data that these officials 
were referring more to Muslims demanding religious rights and dispensations to accommodate 
their Islamic faith (in workplaces, etc) than the introduction of Islamic laws in Sweden.   
 
Sharia law was also frequently juxtaposed with Swedish laws and its penal codes. To drive 
home the element of compassion with regards to the latter, it w as often stressed that the 
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underlying objective of Swedish Penal Code was rehabilitative rather than punitive retribution. 
As one respondent forcefully put it, ‘the ultimate aim was to rehabilitate criminals rather than 
punish them for the sake of punishment’. And, although, the climate has harden in Sweden in 
recent decades vis-à-vis criminals (see Tham, 2001), ‘the law still reciprocates with mercy 
where remorse is shown’ by the culprit, to use the phrase of one official.  
  
8.4.7 The Rebuttal of the Case against Islam   
 
Somali research respondents agreed with many of the characterisation of Islam in Sweden, and 
the grounds of its ‘indictment’ against it (see above), at least in so far as the perspective of 
many in the host society were concerned. Naturally, they disagreed with how their faith, Islam, 
and issues surrounding it were perceived or portrayed in Sweden. Instead, they put greater 
emphasis on two further accounts which could count as ‘rebuttal’ to many of the ‘indictments’ 
leveled against Islam in Sweden. The first rebuttal pointed to a ‘dearth of knowledge’ about 
Islam in Swedish society. The second criticised the ‘distortion of Islam by the media’.   
 
8.4.7.1 The Death of Knowledge about Islam  
 
Many Somali research respondents felt that the overwhelming majority of the Swedish 
population, the establishment and the media, all suffered from a dearth of knowledge about 
Islam. A number of accounts were highlighted to back this assertion. Firstly, people in 
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mainstream society seemed to make little differentiation about how Muslims orientated 
themselves to their religion, i.e., whether they [Muslims] subscribed to a more moderate or 
extremist interpretation of their religion. As noted, Swedes lacked appreciation of the different 
schools of thought (or interpretations) within Islam. This is reflective of how Isir, a 32 year old 
female respondent put it:   
There is a sort of fallacy in this country that all 
Muslims subscribed to one version of Islam, 
which I think is unfortunate because this makes it 
easier for all Muslims to be tarred with the same 
brush.   
 
A recurrent theme amongst both Somali and Swedish official respondents was the need for 
differentiating between the ‘few extremists’ from the majority Muslims (often characterized as 
‘moderate’, ‘peace loving’, and people ‘who wanted go about the lives as anyone else in this 
country’.  Also pointed out was the need to correct the perception in society that religious 
extremism and fundamentalism were the sole propriety of Islam. As asserted, these traits were 
as prevalent in Islam as they were in other major world religions including, Christianity, 
Judaism and Hinduism.    
 
Furthermore, Islam may be a monolithic religion, but the way it was interpreted or practiced 
by its adherents differed across the world. Indeed, different Muslim societies around the world 
have incorporated Islam into their existing culture making it possible for differences and 
nuances within or between Muslims communities to be observed.   
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8.4.7.2 Media Distortion 
 
The media has been strongly criticized for its intense and negative focus on Islam. Many 
Somali respondents were, indeed, concerned about the catalytic role the media plays not only 
in fanning hostility towards Muslims but also in perpetuated the constant ‘fear’ about, and 
hostilities toward Islam in Sweden. They argued the media frequently associated Islam with 
terrorism, oppression against women, and or to the apparent lack of integration by Muslims in 
Sweden. As Hassan, a 37 year old male respondent underlines:      
The Muslim is the extremist, the perpetrators… 
the one over-represented in crime statistics. The 
immigrant as this or that… The demonisation of 
the Muslims in Sweden is a fact of life, thanks in 
part to the media.  
 
8.4.7.3 Connection between the Dearth of knowledge in Society and Media Distortion about 
Islam 
 
A link was made between the dearth of knowledge about Islam and distortion of Islam by the 
media. As alluded to, because Islam was generally and relatively unknown to many Swedes, 
they [Swedes] tended to believe what they read, heard or watched on mainstream media’ and 
take that ‘at face value’, which, as argued, was ‘often biased’ against Muslims, to borrow 
some of the phrases respondents used.      
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Indeed, the impartiality of the media and journalism itself was at times questioned when it 
comes to reporting about Islam or Muslims. As Ahmed, a 42 year old male respondent 
forcefully put it:   
  Journalism may pride itself in reporting 
impartially in its quest for truth. However, when it 
comes to matters relating to Islam, it’s gloves are 
off. The portrayal of Islam in Western media 
simply leaves a lot to be desired.   
 
Mariam, a 30 year old female respondent, had a slightly different point to make. She argued 
that the distortion of facts often fitted in with the sensalisation agenda of tabloids to boost their 
sales:   
Tabloids were after selling. Whatever material 
that was sensational sold. Unfortunately, Islam 
fell under that category, of sensational material. 
 
In all, there was a realisation, almost a resignation among some respondents that the negative 
focus as well as the depiction of Muslims as the ‘other’, was something that they will have to 
live with for years to come. However, they were hopeful that, as knowledge about Islam and 
Muslims begins to increase in society, and as the roles of second and subsequent Muslim 
generations in society becomes more visible and assertive, some of these negative 
contemporary characterisations would gradually wane.    
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8.5 The Veil 
 
There are perhaps fewer contentious issues with Islam than that of wearing veils by Muslim 
women in Sweden. The reason is because the Muslim veil is seen as a strong religious symbol 
that makes as much a religious statement as it does a political one. The opposition towards the 
veil is thus multidimentional. This multidimentionality is reflected by the plethora of negative 
examples attributed to the veil by a number of respondents, notably Swedish official 
respondents.  
 
In general, the sentiments and examples attributed to the veil indicated not only its adverse 
implications for the integration of Muslims (Somalis included) in Sweden but also its 
perceived ‘inappropriateness’, particularly from a Swedish cultural perspective. The semantics 
used by r espondent to describe the ‘inappropriateness’ of the veil in Sweden were varied, 
indicative of the multidimentional nature of it within the Swedish society. Figure 8.2, below, 
summarises the many negative tags attached to the wearing of the veil in Sweden. 
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Figure 8.2: Negative Tags Attached to the Veil   
 
 
    Source: Developed as part of this study.  
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8.5.1 The Attributes to the Veil 
 
The ‘inappropriateness’ of the veil in Swedish society was illustrated with a number of 
specific themes (see above Figure). Among the themes most endorsed by research respondents 
included, the veil as: oppressive to women; inhibiting meaningful interaction with Swedes; an 
obstruction in ‘practitioner – client relationship’ (in the health and social services, etc); 
presenting maneuverability problems to the wearer (e.g., in workplaces, etc); potentially 
posing ‘security risks’ to the population and the nation; and, as affront to the ideal image and 
aesthetics of Swedes. Moreover, as asserted, Muslim veils became even more ‘contemptuous’ 
when worn by children under the age of consent.  
 
8.5.1.1 Oppressive to Women 
 
The most common adverse attribute to the veil was that which associated it with the 
oppression of women. As alluded to by a  number of respondents, Islam was viewed as a  
‘woman-unfriendly ideology’, and a religion bent on rolling the gains made through the 
emancipation of women in general, and Swedish gender equality, in particular. The veil was 
therefore, conceived of as a mechanism employed by I slam to subjugate women, and to 
inhibit them from exercising their personal freedoms, as well as achieving their full potential 
in society.  Moreover, the fact that the veil was viewed as having been ‘imposed upon women 
and not men’, and ‘by men upon women’, was enough to convince many critics of the 
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discriminatory nature of veils. As one Swedish official concludes, ‘the veil was in place to 
“allocate” and to “remind” women of their lower status in society.  
 
8.5.1.2 Inhibits Meaningful Interaction with Swedes 
 
The veil was also seen as inhibiting ‘meaningful’ interaction between Muslims minorities and 
the host society. It was, at it were, a marker that defined how individuals (including across 
gender) and groups in society related to each other. As a rule of thumb, the less a group 
adheres to wearing the veils, the more interaction that group expected from members of the 
host society and vice versa. The reasons for the rule of thumb needed no deeper indulgence or 
analysis, with respondents often saying ‘people in this country generally disapprove of the 
wearing of veils’ as one put it. As another exasperated Somali respondent put it, ‘they 
disapprove of you without getting to know you in more substantive manner just because you 
wear the veil’.   
 
Indeed, from integration viewpoint, to wear or not to wear the veil has become a benchmark – 
the litmus test – for how Muslims in Sweden (including Somalis), as individuals and as a 
group integrate or are integrating into mainstream society. This is because many in the host 
society regard the veil as inhibiting both the socio-economic integration of Muslims (including 
Somalis) into the host society. In particular, the wearing of the veil was viewed as having 
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implications for the participation of Muslim women in the economic activities in society, 
especially with regards to education and labour market participation. 
 
The veil was also viewed as an obvious obstacle to the cultural integration of Muslim 
immigrants in Sweden. As alluded to by a  number of research respondents, Swedes have a 
strong tradition of encouraging conformity and uniformity in society to minimize differences 
and conflicts. Those who stand out are normally regarded as outsiders. According, the veil has 
become the instrument to gauge whether a group accepts the Swedish way of life or can be 
acceptable to the host society. Less veil wearing indicates that, that would be the case for both 
scenarios, whilst veiling or increased veiling by a  group would indicate the opposite (i.e., 
lesser acceptance of, and by the host society). The following sentiment reinforced the notion 
of the veil as representing the ‘other’.   
 
Björn, an employment advisor, had this to say of the veil: 
To me the veil conveys difference. It is  like 
saying, we are different and we will stay different 
forever. By going around with such clothing, one 
can only assume that they do not want to 
integrate. They have simply turned their backs on 
society. 
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8.5.1.3 Obstructs ‘Practitioner-Client relationship’  
 
The veil, especially the full-veil, presented a ‘ dilemma’ for officials when they encounter 
Muslim women in their official capacities, and more so where such an encounter occurred in 
practitioner-Client relationships. From the angle of a number of Swedish official respondents, 
it was, necessary to build working relationships with a client, not least, because of the former’s 
role as a change agent. Nonetheless, building such a relationship with, and more importantly 
attaining desirable outcomes in a client’s favour, becomes more problematic when clients are 
veiled. This was reflected by Sara, a social worker: 
Having a direct eye-contact with the person one 
deals with is an absolute necessity. Factual expre-
ssions are as important communication method as 
verbal expression from my viewpoint. You can 
discern which state the person is in… whether that 
person is healthy, happy, sad, angry, and so on. 
Emotions hidden behind masks… I mean veils, 
are difficult to detect. That is why I think the veil 
is problematic. 
 
8.5.1.4 Presents a number of Practical Problems 
 
The veil presents numerous practical day-to-day problems such as crossing a busy road or 
boarding buses, trains, etc, to practical problems encountered at workplaces. Driving a car can, 
for example, become a dangerous endeavour for the veiled individual to undertake given the 
narrow peripheral view of that individual in comparison to other who do not wear the veil. 
Nonetheless, it was in working environments such as factories, etc., that the wearing of the 
319 
 
veil was seen as both ‘inappropriate’ and ‘dangerous’. It was argued, the individual who wear 
veils, put her work colleagues and even her workplace (work setting) all at risk, from a health 
and safety perspectives (due to the wearing of the veil). Moreover, it was conceivable 
employers viewed the productivity of workers wearing veils (particularly, full-veils) as falling 
short of their expectations. It was also assumed that the individual who wore a veil was likelier 
to encounter difficulties in manouvring around as they carried on with their work tasks, among 
others. Nevertheless, a slight distinction was made between ‘whole’ veil and the Hijap that 
covered only the head and ears of the wearer. Elisabet, an immigration officer, was among the 
officials who made this distinction:  
I have no qua rrel with some veils, especially the 
ones that only cover the hair. However, it is the 
wearing of the whole gown… that makes it 
impractical for them to perform the work assigned 
to them in workplaces. 
 
8.5.1.5 Security Concerns 
 
The veil also prompts security concerns. As alluded to previously, in this era of heightened 
security, the veil has come to represent a sort of challenge to law enforcement agencies both 
nationally and internationally, for the mere fact that they have to tread carefully between their 
duties of protecting the public and that of being considerate of people’s religious beliefs and 
sensibilities. From a security point of view, there were precedents of people who meant harm, 
and, who concealed themselves and their intentions in veils before attacking their targets. This 
particular example was related to the global scene and not Sweden. Nonetheless, it was 
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indicative of the fact that global concerns have become local when it came to the veil, as we 
saw elsewhere with the concerns about Islam in general (see above).  
 
Two other bone of contentions with the veil related to (a) the refusal of Muslim women to 
have their photos taken without their veils in relation to identity and passport applications, 
and, (b) where Muslim women refused to ‘unveil’ their faces when requested to by 
immigration officers or other law enforcement agencies at ports of entry such as airports, 
seaports, border entry-points, etc, for reasons connected to security concerns.   
 
8.5.1.6 Against the Ideal Image and Aesthetics of Swedes 
 
Muslim veils were portrayed as being contrary to the ideal image and aesthetics of Swedish 
society. The veil in Sweden was viewed as abnormal not because it was different but because 
it was simply ‘unattractive’, ‘outmoded’ and ‘unfashionable’, to use some of the terms some 
Swedish official respondents associated with the veil. Indeed, to a number of these officials, 
the veil in Sweden belonged to the distant past – an example of past bondages that held 
women back, and which was out of tune with contemporary Sweden. As one official research 
respondent emphasised, that distant past was the ‘the era when priests were the masters of the 
land, and that no l onger obtains here’. Other officials associated the veil with poverty and 
downtroddenness, traits that were incompatible with a modern affluent Sweden.   
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As mentioned by a number of respondents, we live in a society and era where fashion and the 
fixation of or about image is commonplace. What people wore, how they wore them, the 
signal their clothes radiate, etc, were constantly scrutinized, consciously or subconsciously, in 
society. Accordingly, the ideals and images of the ‘veiled’ woman contradicted that of the 
‘ideal woman’ with the ‘ideal cloths’, ‘as we are fed into through the mass media’, as one 
respondent puts it. The ‘ideal’ woman was characterized as ‘attractive’, ‘assertive’ and ‘goal-
oriented’, which contrasted with the ‘veiled’ woman, who, as argued, was viewed in society as 
a ‘non-existent’, ‘unattractive’, ‘subdued’, ‘submissive’ and ‘unattractive’ entity that was tied 
down by an ‘inferior’ culture.  
  
In addition, veils were faulted for their colour. The colour of the veils was depicted as 
‘depressing’ since they were black, a co lour often associate with loss and mourning. Veils 
were also blamed for being ‘all-weather’, since they were worn constantly and on a ll 
occasions. As one respondent put it, ‘it hardly mattered, whether it was a sunny day or not’. 
Moreover, the fact that there was no room in distinguishing casual wear from business when it 
came to the veil reinforced the latter’s characterization of being ‘out of place’ in Sweden, from 
the viewpoints of some Swedish official respondents. 
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8.5.1.7 Contemptuous when worn by children under the age of consent 
 
One observation established from the accounts of respondents was that the wearing of veils by 
children, under 15 (i.e., under the age of consent in Sweden), was now becoming 
commonplace in Sweden. For members of the host society, children in veils were something 
hard to comprehend. For one, this would be seen as tantamount to denying children their rights 
to their own childhood. Children, it was poignantly argued, could not cope with pressures and 
the bounds of control the veil entailed, among others. Moreover, the veil was portrayed as 
curtailing the potentials of the young person’s ability to learn and to take part in some 
important aspects of societal life such as sp orts and physical education in schools, among 
others. As exemplified by some respondents, Muslim girls (including Somali girls) were 
known to have declined to take part in activities such as swimming, physical education and 
athletics – a vital part of school curricula - at the behest of their parents or significant others.  
 
8.5.2 Somalis and the Veil 
 
The vast majority of Somali women wear the veil. This could be confirmed from the women 
respondents of this research, where seven out of nine wore the veil. Some of these women 
wore the head-veils (a scarf), other had the Hijab, a veil that covered their heads and ears, and 
a few had full-veils. The adherence to or interpretation of wearing the veil among Somalis thus 
varied from person to person, and from family to family. Generally, although, most Somali 
women wore the veil out of religious obligation, other did so because of influences from peers 
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or other group pressures (e.g., the family, clan, etc). For others, the veil is, as one respondent 
pointed out, something all ‘sound grown up women’ have being socialised with and got used 
to, suggesting the cultural imperative of wearing the veil among Somalis.  
 
In Sweden the wearing of the full-veil began to appear more and more among Somali 
immigrants. More women who did not wear the veils whilst in Somalia began to wear the full-
veils in Sweden. As noted earlier, life away from familiar environment, as w ell as, the 
difficulties associated with being exiles seemed to have contributed to the choice of Somali 
women to wear veils in Sweden. Indeed, as a number of respondents pointed out, many 
Somalis have found solace in their religion since it compensated for the longing and isolation 
inherent in their ‘new’ lives in Sweden.     
 
8.5.2.1 The Full-Veils Divides Opinion 
 
Somalis in Sweden were divided over the issue of full-veils. The proponents of full-veils 
supported the wearing of full-veils on the ground that it was a religious obligation. The main 
reason of full-veils, they argued, was to ‘protect’ women from ‘unwanted gazes’. The 
presumption was that women who dressed ‘lightly’ drew unwarranted attention from ‘the 
prying eyes of men’, as one respondent put it. Others were categorical in arguing that 
[married] women under Islam were to be adored only by their husbands’, reinforcing the 
literal interpretation for wearing the veil. Overall, the attempts to prompt proponents of the 
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full-veil to elaborate more on their assertions about the full-veils were not forthcoming, since 
they affirmed that matters pertaining to full-veils were divine, fixed and, therefore, non-
negotiable.   
  
Opponents of full-veils, were, however, more forthcoming in their views. They opposed the 
full-veils on three grounds.  Firstly, they argued the full-veil was something foreign to Somali 
culture and religious practices, and a relatively recent phenomenon that was introduced from 
Middle-Eastern cultures (note though, not Islam). Secondly, they maintained full-veils were 
obvious target of discrimination that emanates both from individuals and institutions in 
society. Thirdly, by wearing the full-veil, individuals drew, what respondents termed undue 
and unnecessary attention to themselves. In other words, it was counter-productive to the 
reasons of wearing veils in the first place, which was to ‘protect’ oneself from ‘unwanted 
looks’, as one of them put it. As alluded, because full-veils were viewed as something 
abnormal in the host society, those who wear full-veils in Sweden would attract more 
alienation (mostly negative).   
 
It was the second account, the veil and discrimination that attracted more emphasis from the 
opponents of the full-veils among Somalis. These opponents asserted that all types of veils, 
not least full-veils, were obvious target for discrimination in society. Veils, as one of these 
respondents said, ‘activated’, deep seated prejudice against Muslims in society.  
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Indeed, as affirmed by several Somali women respondents, it was not uncommon for them to 
be asked whether they wanted to continue wearing their veils by e mployment exchange 
officers, instructors of courses they participated in (i.e., activation-, employability 
enhancement programmes, language courses, etc) and others in position of authority in similar 
settings which involves contacts with Swedish officials or institutions. Arguably, officials who 
have contacts with Somalis were only too aware of the difficulties veils presented to the 
latter’s labour market integration in Sweden.  
 
There were two examples in the labour market relations where the veil was an obstacle. The 
first occurs when an individual appears in a veil during an interview session. As pointed out, 
wearing a veil was all it took for employers not to consider the applicant for short listing in 
relation to the recruitment of workers. The decisive nature of the veil was reinforced by the 
conviction of few of these respondents who asserted that veils often took precedence over 
people’s academic and professional qualification, as well as, previous work experience, when 
employers pondered over who to recruit. The second example cited when the veil became 
problematic was at workplaces, where those who wear veils could often face other 
discriminatory practices. For example, women with veil were likely to be shunned by fellow 
colleagues, denied chances in career development such as skill enhancement, training or 
promotions, etc.    
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8.5.2.2 The Full-Veil, a Generational Issue 
 
It was unanimously endorsed by research respondents that second generation Somalis would 
not ‘hold on to’ veils with the same grip as their parents, hence, a phenomenon destined to 
fade over time. Accordingly, younger and subsequent Somali generations might have different 
outlook to many of the contemporary cultural and religious issues that face first generation 
Somalis. It has already been noted how Somali girls coming of age in Sweden, were beginning 
to ‘flout’ the way they related to the veil. The ‘flouting’ of the veil was not only seen as ‘a 
sign of change’, but one that was to be encouraged and admired in the eyes of some official 
respondents. 
  
Nonetheless, young Somalis girls still had to walk a thin line between pleasing their parents 
(as well as the Somali community, in which part of their socialization occurs), and, becoming 
mindful of the Swedish way of life to which they were an integral part. Indeed, the way 
Somali girls dressed were often judged by both their peers – which included Swedish natives –
, and their parents or significant other who would like them to adhere to the ‘requirement’ 
placed upon them culturally and religiously.   
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8.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter looked at how ‘divergent’ culture and ‘religious’ practices by Somalis impacted 
upon their integration in Sweden.  In respect to culture, the main ‘difference’ between Somalis 
and ‘native’ Swedes stemmed largely from the intensity individuals attach to the role of the 
‘family’ and other related socio-cultural structures (e.g., the clan as in the case of Somalis). 
Whilst Somalis emphasised ‘inter-dependence’, ‘native’ Swedes valued ‘independence’, ‘self-
reliance’ and ‘individual autonomy’. For example, in terms of family bonds, the attachment of 
individuals to their families was less intense amongst ‘native’ Swedes than amongst Somalis. 
In the Somali community, on the other hand, there are intense networks of family/clan 
relationships which make it virtually impossible for an individual to turn away from 
family/clan or undertake an independent life. In other words, Somalis' first loyalty was not to 
the wider society but to their own clan. This was likely to give rise to tensions since Somalis 
were expected to behave like ‘responsible’ Swedish citizens, who were personally responsible 
for their actions/inactions and obligations to the wider society rather than clan. 
 
With respect to religion, religiosity among Somalis in the backdrop of secular environment 
created friction with the mainstream society. Swedish secularism was potentially hostile to 
religion and religious symbols displayed in the public domain. When that religion appears to 
be Islam and the symbol, Muslim veils, that hostility becomes even exacerbated as a 
consequence. Coincidently, the Somali community in Sweden happened to be a minority 
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where Islam was high in its social order. That in turn feeds into the broader divergence, 
incompatibility and differences between Somali immigrants and native Swedes. 
 
From the standpoint of host society – as interpreted and relayed by some respondents –, Islam 
is a force that ‘pulls’ people towards the opposite and an ‘undesirable’ direction, from an 
integration viewpoint. It was an ‘ideology’ that excessively deviated from the values and 
beliefs of the host society, hence, its incongruence with prevailing dominant culture. It is fair 
to conclude, therefore, that unless Somalis realign themselves to Swedish secularism, they 
would continue to have problems in their endeavour to fully integrate into Swedish 
mainstream society.      
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CHAPTER NINE 
9 GENDER ROLES/PATTERNS 
 
This chapter identifies patriarchal gender relation patterns inherent in Somali culture as 
‘problematic’ to the integration of Somalis in Sweden. Patriarchy here connotes a social 
condition in which women are dominated by men in society (see Alsop, et al, 2002; Bhobal, 
1971; Eisentein, 1981; Whyte, 1978). In Whyte’s (1978) classic Study of Women in Pre-
industrial society, this domination comes in various forms. It entails denying women the 
ownership or control of property, power within kinship and community contexts, domestic 
authority (including sharing decision-making with males), controls over women’s marital and 
sexual lives, the devaluation of women’s labour, and more generally, the lives of women in 
society, among others. Bhopal, (1997:1) sums up patriarchy as a condition that (a) inhibits the 
‘access’ of women to socio-economic and political spheres of society, (b) outlines the manner 
of roles and ‘labour divisions within family and society takes form’, (c) and ‘prescribes’ the 
social expectations about the behaviour of women in society. 
 
This chapter stipulates that patriarchy within the Somali community not only excessively 
deviates from the normative gender relations standards (i.e., the social expectations about the 
behaviour of women) in Sweden but it i s also incompatible and challenging to the Swedish 
way of life. Nonetheless, this Chapter reveals that there is evidence to suggest that Somalis in 
Sweden have begun to ‘renegotiate’ the patriarchy inherent in their culture, thanks largely to 
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influences from a proactive social welfare system (that promotes gender equality through its 
diverse policy initiatives) and a society (i.e., Swedish) with different normative practices, 
expectations and attitudes with regards to gender issues.   
 
The chapter further contends that this ‘renegotiation’ amounts not only to a re-think of the 
traditional Somali gender patriarchal patterns, but it is also one that causes a great deal of 
consternation to Somali families in particular, and the Somali community in Sweden, at large. 
As a caveat though, it is important to register that this ‘renegotiation’ is happening at a very 
slow pace. Moreover, there is little to suggest that the host society and its institutions, 
including policy makers and law makers, especially, in the sphere of immigrant integration 
have yet to take notice of this development. One probable reason is linked to the levels of 
Swedish gender equality whose threshold was regarded by t he overwhelming majority of 
respondents as very high, especially, in comparison to many countries, and more so, to the 
world in which Somalis operate. 
 
9.1 The A priori assumptions 
 
There were number of a priori assumption with regards to the embeddedness of patriarchy 
among Somalis in Sweden. First, Somalis were highly gendered, i.e., men and women were 
‘allocated’ separate roles within the household, the family and society in general. Second, the 
normative practices and expectations pertaining to gender relations among Somalis, demanded 
331 
 
women to be subservient to their families, husbands and other male relatives. Third, as a 
traditional constellation, patriarchy hugely disfavoured Somali women.    
 
In contrast, it was assumed that, patriarchal patterns akin to Somalis were rare and also 
considered atypical in the Swedish context. That did not, however, imply that patriarchy did 
not exist in Sweden. On the contrary, patriarchy exists in all societies, including Sweden, and 
has done so since time immemorial. Nonetheless, what matters, arguably, is the degree to 
which a g iven society commits itself to changing the structures and conditions that sustain 
patriarchy. It is the researcher’s contention that Sweden can be regarded as being among the 
few nations, if not the most successful, in terms of demolishing many of those structures and 
conditions that habitually sustain patriarchy in society.   
 
Given the above context, one could ask, can Somalis align their patriarchal gender patterns 
and behavior to prevailing Swedish norms (on gender relations)? To answer this question one 
has to look into the interrelated aspects of ‘gender equality’, gender roles’ and, ‘inter-personal 
relationships pertaining to the courting processes’. Indeed, it was possible, analytically, to 
make a relationship between these three themes. It was possible to argue, for example, that for 
Somalis to renegotiate their traditional Somali patriarchal patterns and relations, and, to 
subsequently attain relative gender equality, they had to modify the way they (men and 
women) shared or divided roles and responsibilities within the household, as well as children, 
among themselves. Moreover, to attain relative gender equality, modification in the inter-
332 
 
personal relationships in the context of courting was necessary. For Somali women that meant 
attaining a relative degree of personal freedom in the way they chose their partners without 
recourse, approval or interference by male overseers and ‘families’. These modifications were 
necessary not only for Somalis to attain a greater degree of equality among themselves but 
were also crucial in the way they [Somalis] related to, and were perceived by, others in the 
wider Swedish society, not least when it came to their [Somali’s] integration into society. 
 
9.2 Patriarchy amongst Somalis – A Contextual Understanding   
 
Many respondents had identified gender equality as an important element in Swedish cultural 
identity (cf. Björnberg, 2002, Sörensen & Bergqvist, 2002). Accordingly, it was argued, for 
Somalis to integrate into mainstream Swedish society, they had to align their normative gender 
practices, behaviour and expectations to the prevailing Swedish norms and values on gender 
matters. That requires the attaining of, what many respondents endorsed as, ‘fairer’, more 
equal gender roles by and among Somalis, particularly, in the household. It also required the 
attainment of personal freedoms and liberties by S omali women, both in terms, of socio-
economic independence (i.e., the ‘relief’ from male breadwinners and the family) and the 
ability for Somali women to make own decisions and choices with regards to their potential 
partners (i.e., without recourse to family or male minders).    
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However, ‘gender equality’, gender roles, and the discretion to choose potential spouses (by 
Somali women) are issues that are culturally and contextually located. They cannot, therefore, 
be fully understood, without looking into the contexts in which they flourished or came into 
being in the first place. In other words, in order to understand the present, (i.e., issues relating 
to gender relations as well as patriarchy among Somalis in Sweden), one has to delve into the 
past, (i.e., the patriarchal patterns or conditions that Somalis were familiar with prior to their 
arrival in Sweden).  
 
9.2.1 Gender Roles and Division of Labour 
 
Somalis come from a p atriarchal society that was highly gendered. By gendered, we mean 
‘differences’ between men and women that were ‘socially and culturally constructed’, as 
opposed to ‘biological’ differences (Dean, 2007:212; see Harré, 1998). Whether at home or in 
civil service, commerce, animal husbandry, farming, etc, women and men in Somalia were 
assigned different roles and were expected to behave differently. Gender roles and division of 
labour among Somalis were not only explicit but they were also taken for granted. 
 
Broadly, the man was the ‘father’, the ‘husband’, the ‘head of the family’, the ‘breadwinner’, 
the ‘sole decision maker’, the ‘initiator’ or ‘active creature’ in social relations, family and 
society. As a b readwinner, the man was bestowed with power (including dominance) and 
prestige that flowed from his status. His was ‘respected’ and his standing and authority was 
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central to the family. As often described, it was he who ‘went out of the house at dawn to fend 
for the whole family and returned with the bounty at dusk’. The roles to feed and clothe 
members of the family were not limited to his nuclear family but to his entire kith and kin.  
 
Contrastingly, the woman was the ‘mother’, the ‘wife’, the ‘head of the household’, the 
‘bearer’ and ‘rearer’ of children, the ‘obedient servant’, the ‘passive entity’ or ‘receiver’ in 
social relations, in the family and society. The woman was often talked of as t he mother. 
Statements such as: “The mother was responsible for looking after the children”, or the “the 
mother was responsible for the house”, showed that the power women wielded in Somali 
society was confined only to their homes (i.e., the private sphere), and not ‘out there’ which 
was construed to mean the public (as opposed to the private) domain. 
 
Moreover, the inferior position of Somali women vis-à-vis their male counterparts ensured 
that they [women] were entirely excluded from leadership and decision-making roles both in 
the family and in the community at large. In the family it was the man who took the role as 
head of the family. In the community, women were automatically excluded from the council 
of elders, the traditional governing authority charged with making decision on behalf of the 
community, as well as, the mediation of disputes among Somalis (both in the family and 
community). In this context, the Somali adage women have no beards summed it all, entailing 
women were not wise enough to be bestowed with serious tasks that affected the overall 
affairs of the community.  
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9.2.2 Patriarchy: part of the socialisation process 
 
Patriarchy among Somalis was part of the socialisation process and started early in life. Boys 
and girls were groomed accordingly: boys as future breadwinners and girls were prepared to 
serve those boys as obedient wives and ‘good’ mothers for their children. Moreover, 
respective gender roles (and tasks) were not only assigned to boys and girls at a tender age but 
were also expected to behave differently in ways that mirrored gender differentiation in 
adulthood. 
 
There were two recurrent examples in the way these differentiations played themselves out to 
reflect on the roles and expectations from children as they grew up. One example was how 
girls were assigned tasks in the house in order to help and learn from their mothers (or other 
female relatives) whilst boys often accompanied their fathers (or other male relatives) to the 
‘outside’ to help and learn from the latter.    
 
The other examples highlight how girls and boys played or were allowed to play, depicting not 
only how different roles were inculcated upon girls and boys from the very early childhood 
but also how social controls curtailed the freedoms of girls and how the ‘lack of’ social control 
‘enhanced’ those of boys. One example in which this manifested itself was in play situations. 
Whilst girls were denied spontaneity to be curious or play freely as they grew progressively, 
boys were, on the other hand, given more or less a ‘free hand to do pretty much what they 
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wanted’, to use the paraphrase of one Somali female respondent.  Somali boys were, as other 
respondents put it, accorded considerable freedoms to ‘play and dare’ and to ‘stretch to their 
limits until told otherwise’. After all, boys were expected to be ““men”, brave, strong and in 
control of situations in the face of adversity’, as another added. The latter sentiment links to 
Somali nomadic pastoral lifestyle which expected men to operate in harsh environmental 
conditions.    
 
As reinforced by m any respondents, girls were often ‘reminded or ‘commanded’ by their 
parents, relatives and ‘even visitor’ to: ‘Sit like a girl!’, ‘Stop jumping like a boy!’, ‘You are a 
girl!’, ‘You are a woman!’, ‘You are not a boy’, and so and so forth. All these constrictions 
visited upon girls were intended (consciously or unconsciously) to underpin the notion that 
girls were, indeed, different and had or would have different ‘roles’ to those of their male 
counterparts in society. It also confirms girls faced a rather stringent monitoring regime whilst 
boys seemed to have little in comparison.  
 
9.2.3 Patriarchy Sustained 
 
Patriarchy among Somalis meant boys grew up to expect and become self-sufficient. Girls, on 
the other hand, were socialised to depend on their families, and eventually on their [potential] 
husbands for nearly all aspects of their needs, personal, social, economic, etc. Three reasons 
were overwhelming endorsed by the majority of Somali respondents as having ‘traditionally’ 
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contributed to the sustenance and perpetuation of patriarchy among Somalis. These included, 
‘unfair resource allocation’ (within the family) which pitied girls against boys; ‘early 
marriages’; and, ‘child-bearing and rearing roles’. All these factors seemed to suggest that 
patriarchy sealed the fate of many Somali women from a relatively early age.   
 
9.2.3.1 Resource Allocation 
 
As alluded to previously, patriarchy favoured Somali men over Somali women. It gave men 
power, domination and access to material resources both in the family and the community, 
whilst denying women the same opportunities. To illustrate this, when it came to resource 
allocation within the family, the reasons were twofold. First, resources in many families in 
Somalia were meagre, which meant priorities over who has to benefit (among the children) 
had to be made. Second, girls were married off early, which implied they had ‘stakes’ in their 
future matrimonial relationships, hence, the logic for denying girls resources in the family.    
 
Indeed, given the meagreness of resources for most Somali families, all children could not 
benefit from resource allocation. Those left out happened, often, to be girls. Nowhere was this 
more clearly illustrated than in the case of children’s education where families were more 
likely to pay school fees for boys than girls – and as a co nsequence, where boys were more 
likely than girls to go to school, and certainly, to higher education in Somalia. Below are some 
of the sentiments that reinforce the above. 
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ABarni, a 36 year old female respondent:  
The discretion of where to put family resources 
rested on m y parents. Whilst our brothers, were 
encouraged and supported to realise their full 
potentials, less could be said of us as s isters. 
Unfortunately, this was not a phenomenon limited 
only to my own family but a practice replicated in 
the majority of families across Somalia.   
 
 Hanan, a 42 year old male respondent relayed his own experience:  
Take my own family comprising of four boys and 
three girls, as an example. Resources in the family 
were, indeed, geared towards the advancement of 
boys rather than the girls in relation to education. 
As a r esult, all my three elder brothers ended up 
studying at university whilst I obtained my degree 
from abroad. None of my three sisters, by 
contrast, had attended university. The highest two 
of them attained was only secondary education.  
 
The second reason was culturally specific and was linked to the assumption that girls were 
more likely to get married early and become ‘part of another family’ (i.e., potential husband’s 
family). This implied that girls had lesser stakes in their paternal families than their brothers 
since the latter ‘stuck with’ their paternal families ‘for life’, as one respondent put it. Indeed, 
the expectation was that girls would sooner or later leave their paternal families and become 
‘members’ of their future husbands’ families. Their offspring would carry the name of their 
husband’s family. In contrast, boys always ‘stayed’ with their paternal families, carried the 
name of their fathers and families; inherited and took responsibilities for the ‘wellbeing’ of 
their own families, not ‘other families’ as girls purportedly did.  
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9.2.3.2 Early Marriages 
 
Early marriages are part of the reason for the perpetuation of the inferior position of women in 
relation to their male counter-parts in Somalia. Indeed, it was not uncommon for Somali girls 
to ‘finish’ their education after puberty for marital purposes. Once these youngsters entered 
marriage, there was little opportunity for them to continue education later in adult life. One 
reason for this is that adult education system in Somalia was very limited in scope (see Abdi, 
1998). For another, adult education was often geared towards the eradication of illiteracy 
rather than for the purpose of pursuing comprehensive or further education, as in the 
developed world. Besides, once married, young women became engaged, more and more, with 
their families and children, in their roles as mothers and wives – a situation they would find 
hard to extract themselves from to pursue education.    
 
9.2.3.3 Child-bearing and rearing roles 
 
For Somalis having many children was considered not only a source of prestige but also as a 
potential source of labour (within the family). This was particularly the case for nomadic 
families who tended livestock (e.g., camel, cattle, goats and sheep). Often, the practical and 
immediate need for labour within these families was so pressing that having more children 
became the rational, long-term, option to offset the acute labour shortages they faced. It should 
be noted that, with pastoral families, child labour began as early as the age of five with tasks 
assigned to children increasing successively as they grew older. Besides, polygamy, 
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commonly practiced in Somalia, made it possible for Somalis to have more children in a rather 
short period.  
 
The role of bearing and rearing many children thus adversely affected the position (and rights) 
of women in the family/society vis-à-vis their male counterparts. It ensured that women 
become constantly engaged in these tasks rather than their ‘own personal’ development in 
order to improve their position in society contrary to those of their male counterparts. 
 
9.3 ‘Renegotiating’ Patriarchy in Sweden    
 
Having looked at the context under which patriarchy applied in pre-migration condition for 
Somalis in Sweden, we now turn our attention to Sweden, where Somalis are slowly 
attempting to ‘renegotiate’ the terms of patriarchy under a new sets of conditions. Two 
overarching factors were endorsed by the overwhelming majority of Somali respondents, as 
having facilitated the ‘renegotiations’ of patriarchy inherent in Somali culture in Sweden. The 
first was a proactive welfare state which was regarded as being ‘favourable’ to women, 
including their issues, concerns, courses and conditions, among others. The second was 
attributed to a ‘new setting’ (i.e., Sweden) and a society (Swedish) that lived by different 
normative standards, behaviour and practices from those Somalis were familiar with as 
pertains to gender patterns and relations. This sub-section explores these two factors in more 
details.   
341 
 
9.3.1 A Socially ‘Proactive’ Welfare State  
 
The role of the Swedish Welfare State in undermining traditional Somali patriarchal 
tendencies was viewed as major. Among the widely held conception among respondents was 
that the Swedish Welfare State had displaced the ‘traditional’ roles of Somali men as 
breadwinners. Another widely held conviction was that the welfare state had influenced 
traditional gender roles and the domestic divisions of labour. Both these two factors were tied 
to the notion that Somali women no longer needed to be economically dependent upon Somali 
men (i.e., male partners or husbands). That independence has also changed the dynamics of 
power relationships in the household where Somali men are now ‘compelled’ to participate to 
some extent. 
 
9.3.1.1 Displacement of the Bread-winner Status 
 
Although the respondents have not used academic or social policy terms, what they were 
explaining related to concepts widely employed in comparative Social Welfare discussions, 
such as, ‘decommodification’, and ‘defamilisation’ as the prime goals of the Swedish Welfare 
State labour market, taxation and redistributive policies. Decommodification’ entails a process 
where the State intervenes to ensure that citizens ‘maintained a livelihood without reliance on 
the market’ (Esping-Andersen, 1990:21-2). The provision of free universal coverage in 
education, health care, generous child and housing benefits, on one hand, and the provision of 
generous maternity-, unemployment-, sickness-, and disability benefits (as high as 80% of 
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previous earnings for a considerable amount of time in Sweden), on the other, all ensure that 
individuals attain considerable independence from the market (see Ginsburg, 2001:199-200; 
213-216).  
 
‘De-familisation’, on the other hand, is a process that ensures welfare state provisions lessen 
the reliance of individuals (including women) on their families, e.g., male breadwinners (Finch 
& Masin, 1993; Finch, 1989). It is important to note that de-familisation is partly necessitated 
by the changing nature of family structures and obligation in postmodern societies like 
Sweden, where it is, for example, self-evident for women to educate themselves and 
participate to a the labour market, to a greater extent (see Dean, 2007). Figure 9.1 shows a 
schematic representation of how the above two processes (‘decommodification’ and 
‘defamilisation’) is achieved.  
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Figure 9.1: A Schematic Representation of how Decommodification and De-familisation 
are achieved by the Welfare State. 
 
Source: Developed as part of this Study.  
 
Nonetheless, it is important to point out that Somali women are poorly represented in the 
Swedish labour force. Many would not, therefore, benefit directly, from most of those welfare 
provisions that are income related. However, many of them would still be eligible for other 
benefits intended to assist the less well-off (often marginalised) members of society such as 
 
Decommodifi-
cation 
 
Defamilisation 
The Welfare    
State 
Labour market, 
Taxation and 
Redistributive 
Policies 
 
Universal Nursary Coverage;  Free Schooling and University Education;  
Universal Health Insurance Care; Generous Child & Housing Allowances; 
Maternity-, unemployment-, sickness-, and disability benefits at high rates 
of  their previous monthly  salaries or incomes  
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social assistance, housing allowances and child benefit. These benefits still allow many Somali 
women to live a relatively independent live without recourse to a male breadwinner and the 
family, if they opted to do so.     
 
9.3.1.2 Domestic Division of Labour 
 
The roles of Somali men in relation to domestic divisions of labour have also come under 
increasing challenge in Sweden. Somali men were, for example, expected or ‘compelled’ (as 
some respondents put it) to take greater responsibility for minding children and household 
chores (e.g., cooking, dishwashing, laundering, cleaning, etc). Ironically, some Somali male 
respondents felt these ‘changes’ amounted to roles now becoming ‘inverse’ – with men taking 
over ‘women’s jobs’, and women acquiring ‘men’s jobs’.   
 
Traditionally, the involvement of Somali men in household chores was a cultural taboo, hence, 
a practice few of them contemplated engaging in, prior to their arrival in Sweden. As 
illustrated by a number of Somali respondents, household chores by men was ‘culturally 
unheard of’, or, ‘unworthy of men doing’, to use some of their phrases. The ‘few instance’ 
where Somali respondents thought men could engage in household chores was when or where 
they [men] were compelled to do so by c ircumstance. An example of the one of these ‘few 
instances’ was where single men lived in faraway places and had no means of finding servants 
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or maids to employ. Even under such circumstances, it was stressed Somali men preferred to 
eat in restaurants rather than cook their own food.    
 
Performing household chores – because it was a taboo – was also stigmatising. Indeed, the 
man who performed women tasks (such as cooking, cleaning, laundering, etc) was called a 
qorqod – a derogatory term that associated the man with ‘women work’ among Somalis. 
Paradoxically, Somali women were vehemently opposed to the idea of their male relatives 
(fathers, husbands, brothers, uncles, etc) getting involved in household chores precisely 
because of the stigma involved. As one Somali female respondent put it, no Somali woman 
wanted to be related or associated with a Qorqod.  
 
Another new aspect for Somali men in Sweden vis-à-vis their relative changing gender roles 
regarded their roles and responsibilities for their children. As argued previously, Somali men 
were increasingly taking turns in minding children, and took sole charge for them when 
women (wives) were ‘out’ working or attending courses (language courses, activation 
programmes, etc). Among the recurrent child care tasks Somali men engaged in were, feeding 
of children, changing nappies, dropping and picking up children at nurseries and schools, 
taking children to different activities, e.g., football, swimming, etc.  
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The increasing participation of Somali men in household chores and taking a greater role in 
children’s lives divided opinion, among Somali male respondents. Some saw this new 
development as something positive and beneficial for the whole family, especially, in 
situations where the extended families that played a helping hand with housework, child care, 
etc, were no longer available in the new environment. Nevertheless, there were others who 
said they were ‘forced’ or ‘compelled’ to engage in households due to the prevailing 
circumstance.     
 
Not surprising, there was a unanimity in the verdict of Somali women respondents concerning 
the ‘new’ roles Somali men in Sweden were now embracing (willingly or unwillingly) –, i.e., 
by taking greater responsibility in sharing household chores and in the affairs of children. 
According to these women, this new development was not only positive but something that 
was long overdue.  
 
9.3.2 A New Setting: A New society 
 
Sweden as a n ew environment was also unanimously endorsed by S omali respondents as 
having had a catalytic role in the ‘renegotiation’ of gender roles among Somalis. Indeed, for 
Somalis, Sweden not only had different normative behaviours and expectation regarding 
gender relations, but also was one of the least gendered, if not the least gendered society in the 
world. As scholars such as Wängnerud, & Sundell (2010:9) confirm, ‘Sweden is regularly 
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singled out as among the most women-friendly in the world’ and comes on ‘ top of lists 
ranking countries according to gender equality’. This resonates with Williams (2008:1), who 
argues these ‘women friendly policies are both a source of envy and an exemplar we can 
present to our own [UK] policy-makers’.  
 
Accordingly, two impressions seemed to strike Somali research respondents vis-à-vis Sweden. 
The first related to the inculcation of gender equality into Swedish children and the 
simultaneous ‘conscious’ erasure of patriarchy from their ‘psyche’, at the very early tender 
age. The second observation related to the ‘visibility’ of Swedish women in the public domain 
as a manifestation of how Sweden has gone furthest, internationally, with regard to gender 
equality and gender relations, in general.   
 
9.3.2.1 The Inculcation of Gender Equality into Children 
 
Gender equality among Swedes was regarded as part of the Swedish socialisation process. It 
was argued, for example, that Swedes inculcated the values of gender equality into their 
children earlier on in life (note how gender differentiation among Somalis also becomes 
cemented from early childhood). Moreover, both girls and boys in Sweden were encouraged 
and groomed in such a way that they become independent from the families (whereas Somali 
girls/women became culturally bound to their family and male relatives). 
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To illustrate the above patterns, a glance at the Swedish preschool curriculum highlights how 
attempts were made to implant the notion of a fairer, more gender equal society into Swedish 
children earlier on in their childhood. Indeed, one of the stated goals of Swedish preschool 
curriculum is to counteract traditional gender roles and patterns in society. Arguably, given 
that pre-schooling (Forskola) in Sweden has an ‘important role as one of the actors of 
socialisation in society’; and, given that ‘77% of children between 1-5 years old in Sweden are 
registered as pre-school-attendees’ (Ärlemalm-Hagsér & Pramling Samuelsson, 2009:89), 
there is an ample reason to believe that patriarchy has lessened in Sweden in comparison to 
many countries or societies in the world, as a  consequence. Moreover, the same values are 
imparted by parents to children at home – an even greater reason why Swedes take the value 
of gender equality for ‘granted’.      
      
9.3.2.2 Visibility of Women 
 
The issue of ‘visibility’ of Swedish women in the public domain was something that struck 
many Somali research respondents as impressive. It was a widely held convention among 
respondents, for example, that women constituted not only a large proportion of street-level-
bureaucrats in Sweden but that they also wielded ‘immense power’ in society. As observed, 
most of the respondents had contacts with the public sector (as clients, students, employees, 
etc), where women predominate, hence, their impressions they formed was borne out of their 
experiences.    
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A general proposition adapted by respondents was that the ‘visibility’ of Swedish women in 
society was directly correlated to their economic participation in society. As alluded to 
previously, the more women participated in the economic life of a country, the more ‘visible’, 
more equal women and men became. This in turn had the propensity to mitigate or do away 
with patriarchal patterns in society.  
 
As inferred by a  number of respondents, the above preposition seemed applicable to the 
Swedish case, where women, traditionally, had a high economic participation rates, in 
comparison to many countries in the world. Indeed, Statistics on economic participation rates 
for Swedish women seems to justify the above assertion. Within Sweden, for example, 
Swedish women seem to have outperformed their male counterparts in higher education. As 
Table 9.1 shows, in 2007, 49% of Swedish women aged 25-44 had undergone higher 
education in comparison to 38% men in the same age-group. Between the ages of 45–64, 35% 
of women had higher education compared to 30% of their male counterparts in the same age-
group. When it comes to participation rates in overall economic activities (which includes full-
time students), the percentage is 90% for women compared to 95% for men in the age-group, 
25–44 years (Table 9.2). For those in age-group 45–64 years, the percentage is 81% for 
women as compared to 85% men.  
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Table 9.1 Level of education in age groups 25–44 and 45–64 by region of birth, in 2007. 
Percentage distribution 
_________________________________________________________________________  
25–44 years                 Level of education                                                             Total          
                                     _______________________________________ 
Region of birth             Compul-       Upper              Higher          No info. 
                                      sory.             Secondary       Education 
                                       _______       ________       ________       _______ 
                                        W      M         W       M         W      M       W        M               W         M 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
Sweden      6        9        45      52       49     38        0        0              100       100 
Nordic countries                                                                                                                                                                                                          
except Sweden                10       13       45       50        42      34         2         3               100        100 
Europe except                                                                                                                                                                                     
Nordic countries             17       18       36       42        44      37         3         3               100         100 
Asia                                 24       24      34       37         40      38        2         2                100        100      
Others                             18       13       43       41         37      43        2         3                100       100 
Total                                 8        10       44      51         47      38        1         1                100       100 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Percentage distribution 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
45–64 years                Level of education                                                             Total 
                                    _______________________________________ 
Region of birth            Compul-    Upper             Higher             No info. 
                                    sory.          Secondary      Education 
                                   _______     ________       ________       _______ 
                                   W      M       W      M          W       M         W       M             W       M 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
Sweden            17       24      48     46        35        30         0         0             100    100 
Nordic countries                                                                                                                                                       
except Sweden              27       34       44      44         29         20          1           2              100     100 
Europe except                                                                                                                                                 
Nordic countries          27        19       39      47         32         32           2          2              100    100       
Asia                           34       19      30     38        29        40         7         3             100    100 
Others                        21      20       36     37        39        41        3          2             100    100 
Total                            19     24      46     45        34        30         1         1             100    100             
Source: Labour Force Surveys, Statistics Sweden (2008) 
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Table 9.2 Economic activity rate by region of birth and age 2007 
 ____________________________________________________________________ 
Region of birth                        25–44 years            45–64 years  
                                                        __________                 ___________ 
                    W             M            W             M 
___________________________________________________________________ 
Sweden            90            95            81            85 
Nordic countries                                                                                                                                                                
except Sweden                         87            94             70              75 
Europe except                                                                                                                                                                              
Nordic countries                      78             91             62              73 
Asia                                    67           84            57            72 
Others                                    78           89            74             81 
Total                                   87           94            78              84 
 _____________________________________________________________________ 
NB: The above table includes the relative labour force figure for persons who are full-time students 
and who have looked for work or have been able to work. This is in accordance with the new 
definition for unemployment that applies from October 2007 onwards. 
 
Source: Labour Force Surveys, Statistics Sweden (2008) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
353 
 
9.3.2.3 Gender Equality in Sweden: The Impact on Somali Women’  
 
Somali women see how women in Sweden compete on the same level playing field as men. 
Somali women also see how women in Sweden are participating in society, with some of them 
taking up leading positions in government, commerce and academia, among other. They are 
also discovering the many opportunities and advantages available for them in Sweden which 
was denied to them in Somalia. They know, if all things remain equal, that girls in Sweden 
could fully achieve their potential, if they make the necessary efforts.  
 
Thus, by reflecting upon the new setting and the circumstances for women in Sweden, Somali 
women look at their own position and may realise that they are, or were, being held back by 
obstacles embedded in the social structures of their [Somali] community – a social structure 
that provided them with fewer opportunities, saw them married off early in life without their 
consent, reduced their roles to that of mothers and wives, and so on. Moreover, Somali women 
were subject to elaborate social control as they were collectively bounded to the families, 
extended families as well as to relations within the clan system.  
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9.4 Further Outcomes  
 
The combined catalytic roles of the ‘proactive’ Swedish welfare state and Swedish society 
have led to a number of outcomes that have undermined Somali patriarchal patterns in 
Sweden. The following outcomes were frequently cited by respondents to that effect: the 
virtue of ‘relative independence’ of Somali women; the greater propensity of spousal conflict 
(especially, where ‘rigid’ patriarchal relations remained ‘unmodified’); and, the weakening 
influence of social control by Somali families. In many ways, the perceived attainment of 
relative independence by Somali women was viewed as a precursor to both familial discord 
(and eventual breakdown), and the weakening of social control among Somalis in Sweden (see 
below).   
 
9.4.1 Relative Independence 
 
Many respondents reported that Somali women have gained more relative independence in 
Sweden, when compared to women in Somalia, especially, in matters pertaining to their own 
personal, social and economic (financial) affairs. Moreover, Somali women were said to make 
decisions on these matters without recourse, reference or approval from their family or male 
overseers (e.g., brothers, husbands, etc), as would have been the case in Somalia. As alluded to 
previously, ‘independence’ provided women with the leverage they needed to decide for 
themselves, set their own demands, have more ‘rights’ and say in spousal relationships, and 
for those ‘courting’, a say in who to have a relationship with.   
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A number of Somali male respondents saw this new phenomenon of relative independence 
gained by Somali women in Sweden in a negative light. Many of these respondents argued 
that ‘independence’ by Somali women was detrimental not only to ‘them’, as men, but also to 
Somali families (particularly, to children), as well as, to the Somali community more generally 
in Sweden. Indeed, such ‘independence’ was largely viewed as a  recipe for ‘more’ marital 
conflicts or marital discords among Somalis in Sweden, since it challenged the rights of men 
to act as head of their families. The linkage between ‘independence’ by women, challenges to 
the dominance of men over women and the perceived inevitability of familial discord as a 
consequence, was summed up i n the sentiment of one respondent who stated: “one cannot 
have two heads in the same household”.  
 
When it came to the family, ‘independence’ by women was regarded as detrimental for two 
main reasons. First, it was seen as ‘something’ that was ‘not good’ for children and their up-
bringing. The insinuation among some male respondents was that a ‘good’ mother was 
‘always’ ‘obedient’ or ‘loyal’ to her husband and family. Another issue was that, children who 
belonged to women who ‘displayed’ greater degree of ‘independence’ (from their husbands 
and families) were likely to have emotional and behavioural problems, since such 
‘independence’ resulted from deficits in the cultural and religious identity of these women.  
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With respect to, ‘independence’ being detrimental to the Somali society in Sweden, some male 
respondents argued it undermined the authority of men and the family – two important entities 
in Somali culture. ‘Independence’ by women was simply ‘un-Somali’, for those who espoused 
this assertion. Women were after all, it was argued, supposed to be subordinate to their 
husbands and families. Others opposed greater ‘independence’ by women on the ground that it 
was tantamount to ‘losing their [Somali] culture’. These respondents linked ‘independence’ by 
women to a p ossible increase in intermarriage between Somalis and non-Somalis. 
Intermarriage, they argued, was a ‘threat’ to the Somali way of life and Islam, and hence, their 
opposition. 
 
Naturally, many women respondents (and even some of their Somali male counterparts) did 
not share the views of those who expressed opposition to the relative ‘independence’ gained 
by Somali women in Sweden. They vehemently argued that ‘independence’ by women was an 
inevitable consequence of the new realities Somalis in Sweden find themselves in. There were, 
they argued, a whole new set of demands on S omalis in Sweden that rendered the old 
patriarchal patterns obsolete. For them, the sooner Somali men appreciated this ‘new’ 
prospect, the better.   
 
Nonetheless, a number of Somali women respondents said they understood why Somali men 
‘feel begrudged’ in Sweden, to use the phrase of one of them. To these women, Somali men 
espoused a sense of resentment for the ‘new order’ since their situation in Sweden was 
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aggravated by the lack of sympathy and appreciation from ‘many quarters’, alluding to the 
wider Swedish society, the establishment, and the media – as entities hostile to the old patterns 
with which Somali men were accustomed to. Also cited was the loss of status (e.g., as 
breadwinner) and widespread unemployment as factors that compounded the predicament of 
Somali men in Sweden.  
 
9.4.2 The Propensity for Conflict 
 
The propensity for spousal conflict among Somalis was seen by many respondents as an 
inevitable consequence of the new realities facing Somalis in Sweden. It was argued, such 
conflicts were more acute among couples where rigid patriarchal relations existed. The causes 
of spousal conflicts among Somalis were multifaceted. Among the most recurrent sources of 
disputes cited included, (a) ‘rigidity on the part of men’, (b) ‘frustrations by men’, (c) ‘the lack 
of a “family” ethos in Sweden, and (d) ‘involvement by the authorities’ (in mediating 
conflicts).   
 
9.4.2.1 Rigidity on the Part of Men 
 
Many female respondents attributed the ‘rigidity’ on the part of men, in the wake of the new 
circumstances, as the cause of marital disputes among Somalis in Sweden. They argued such 
‘rigidity’ presented challenges for ‘holding families together’. ‘Rigidity’ connoted the practice 
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of living by Somali unmodified normative gender behaviours and expectation, which was seen 
by many as a recipe for marital conflict.    
 
Indeed, the need for moderating the rigid patriarchal patterns within Somali culture in Sweden 
was unanimously endorsed as a predictable outcome, especially, where Somali men failed to 
adjust to the new realities. Accordingly, the need for flexibility and compromise between 
Somali spouses was stressed as the means to maintain their relationships in Sweden. This need 
was necessitated by the fact that the old gender patterns (e.g., roles, relations, etc) as lived and 
practiced in Somalia would not, and cannot, work in Sweden, hence, the need for moderation. 
Helping or sharing responsibility in household chores and in child care with their female 
counterparts, were seen as good examples of modifying patriarchal patterns.   
 
The need for flexibility was reflective in the sentiments of Muktar, a 44 ye ar old male 
respondent who used the word ‘stone’ as a metaphor for ‘inflexibility’ and wondered where 
that led, referring to subsequent breakdowns in spousal relationships. According to Muktar:   
We cannot continue with the same old mindset 
back home. If you become a stone, she becomes a 
stone. You can predict the consequence for 
yourself. 
 
Ahmed, a 42 year old male respondent believed the inability of men to get in tune with the 
new realities in Sweden ‘took them nowhere’. For Ahmed:   
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The man who demands his warm food on the 
table, his bed kept neat and regular, yet does not 
reciprocate by r eceiving his own family and 
children with warmth and compassion cannot 
expect his homestead to survive or be without 
tension.  
 
Mariam, a 30 year old female respondent was more forthcoming in her assertion:   
Somali men cannot dictate their terms. They have 
to engage and compromise with their spouses. 
The ‘one-man show’ affairs are over. 
 
Anab, a 33 year old female respondent took a more consolatory tone: 
For the sake of keeping the family together, men 
have to consult with your partner. 
 
As noted above, the discussions relating to the ‘rigidity’ and ‘inflexibility’ on the part of 
Somali men was juxtaposed against a b ackdrop of new realities, i.e., living in Sweden. As 
alluded to, there were different sets of practical demands in this new setting which rendered 
the ‘old’ patriarchal patterns familiar to Somalis ‘unworkable’ in Sweden. One recurrent 
example cited of the practical demands was related to Swedish labour enforcement policy 
which requires citizens to become economically active (i.e., through participation in 
education, activation programmes, work, etc). In particular, Swedish labour enforcement 
policy ties benefits (means tested or otherwise) to citizens’ economic activities. Moreover, the 
relative success, efficacy and implementation of Swedish labour enforcement policy were 
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attributed to Swedish universal nursery coverage which was widely accessible to those who 
needed child-care places for their children. Furthermore, child-care in Sweden was not a 
matter of affordability. People who cannot afford child-care (e.g., people on be nefits) are 
assisted by their local municipalities in accordance with the Swedish Social Services Act 
(Socialtjänstlagen).  
 
Accordingly, both women and men would need to complement each other in light of the 
demands and conditions the new setting of Sweden entailed for Somalis. As summed up by 
Isir, a 32 year old female respondent:   
It is impossible for a woman to be out or attending 
courses all day... mind the children and do a ll 
house-hold work by he rself while the man does 
nothing.  
 
9.4.2.2 Frustrations Expressed by Men 
 
The relative loss of power, status, prestige and worthiness by Somali men in Sweden was 
viewed to have a contributory effect on marital conflicts among Somali spouses. Patriarchy 
had provided Somali men with virtues such as power, prestige, the need and means to control 
and dominate women, etc. These virtues also ‘differentiated’ men from women. Suddenly, 
Somali men have become ‘invisible’ in Sweden. Many had lost their bread-winner status. 
Many remain largely unemployed and rely (together with their family) on handouts from the 
municipality and state. Indeed, ‘powerlessness’, ‘idleness’, ‘rolelessness’, and ‘worthlessness’ 
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were some of the adjectives associated with the new predicament of Somali men in Sweden. 
Many of these traits directly stemmed from their unfavourable labour market situations in 
Sweden (for more on this, refer to Chapter Five).  
 
‘Idleness’ and ‘rolelessness’ were terms that were sometimes used as a  substitute for 
‘unemployment’ among Somali men. These terms had, however, another connotation in 
relation to spousal conflicts. The ‘idle’, as it were, had more time for themselves, and by 
implication, ‘more time for conflict’ between or among themselves. Jelle, a 53 year old male 
respondent had this to say:   
Couples confined to the four squares of their 
living rooms for hours on e nd, may have an 
intensive contact with one another, which in itself 
is not a bad thing. But unfortunately, as is often 
the case, these parties have no ot her outlets to 
vent their frustrations or anger when things do not 
work out between them-selves except on 
themselves.  
 
Irshad, a 41 year old male respondent, adds:   
In a scen ario where people sit idly facing each 
other, all the time... where the intensity of contact 
becomes disadvantageous rather than the 
opposite, minor disputes often get magnified.   
 
Hanan, 42, seemed to suggest some causality by linking unemployment among Somali men to 
their [men’s] frustrations:    
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Because men feel frustrated, there were more 
likely to have mood-swings ... and, they are more 
likely to act out on their partners and the family.  
 
As alluded to, all these factors, unemployment, the loss of power, prestige, the loss of 
breadwinner status, etc, compounded to make Somali men feel less worthy in the new setting 
in relation to their positions before their arrival in Sweden. These factors, by implication, also 
generated a great source of anger and frustrations among Somali men – anger that was likely 
to cause marital conflicts between Somalis spouses.   
 
9.4.2.3 The Lack of ‘Family’ 
 
The lack of ‘family’ in Sweden was endorsed as a source of marital conflicts among Somalis 
in Sweden. For Somalis, the term ‘family’ carried wider connotation since it often 
encompassed not only the nuclear family but also the extended family, the sub-sub-clan, sub-
clan and even the clan. However, for the purpose of this discussion, the researcher limits the 
term ‘family’ to the ‘extended family’ since it was more known to individuals and also served 
as the traditional ‘overseer’ of the nuclear family. 
 
In Somalia, the ‘family’ had specific functions that bolster married couples (the nuclear 
family). Among the most cited examples included, emotional support, sharing responsibilities 
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with the couple and conflict resolution with regards to spousal/marital disputes. Let us explore 
these in more detail.   
 
9.4.2.3.1 Emotional support 
 
In Somalia, the ‘family’ was a place in which there was a rich and varied source of networks 
and support. The ‘family’ was an outlet for couples to express their concerns. It provided 
‘protection’ against the kind of isolation and loneliness Somalis said they experienced in 
Sweden. However, because the ‘family’ was often not physically ‘present’ in Sweden – since 
Somalis mainly immigrated into Sweden as individuals – it’s functions to provide ‘outlets’ for 
couples to express emotions and shield them from isolation were severely curtailed. Moreover, 
even where some Somalis had ‘families’ in Sweden, the roles of the ‘family’ as a p lace for 
emotional support was also significantly reduced. This was because Sweden presented a 
different set of circumstances for Somali ‘families’ to which they had to adjust accordingly. 
As one respondent quipped, ‘everyone in Sweden is tied-up…. no one has time for the other’.       
 
Furthermore, isolation and loneliness were viewed as part of the new experiences for Somalis 
in Sweden. Some of this isolation was a consequence of living in Sweden. After all, Sweden is 
a society where the intensity of bonds between people as individuals is less intensive 
compared to what Somalis are used to under their clan-system. Indeed, Sweden was often 
depicted, rightly or wrongly, as the typical individualistic society where, ‘neighbours and even 
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friends, closed their doors’, or ‘where you had to notify the individual before you paid a visit’, 
to use one of the sentiments by a Somali respondent, in their attempt to describe how isolation 
had become ‘normalised’ even for Somalis in Sweden. This scenario was contrasted to their 
lives and experiences in Somalia, where ‘no one felt boxed-in’, to use the phrase of another 
research respondent. 
 
As alluded to by a number of respondents, there were two reasons why bounds were less 
constraining for individuals in Somalia in comparison to life in Sweden. First, Somali culture 
is based on nomadic pastoralism where land, particularly grazing land, is communally owned. 
Second, the Somali clan system does inculcate collectivist values and outlook of the world, 
hence, renders individualism redundant and ‘unnatural’. It also provides Somalis with 
expanded and varied networks of contacts to which they can draw, among other things, 
emotional, social, and economic support. These two factors prove that the spatial or 
geographical as well as social bounds of Somalis were traditionally extended, as a result of 
their way of life. 
 
9.4.2.3.2 Sharing Responsibilities 
 
The ‘family’ in Somalia had networks of support which alleviated the sort of practical 
pressures Somali couple in Sweden faced. The ‘family’ in Somalia, for example, had the role 
of ‘sharing responsibility with couples’ in the sense that it helped in the up-bringing of 
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children as well as assisting with household chores. As reported by r esearch respondents, 
members of the extended families (from the maternal and paternal families of both couples) 
were always at hand to offer a helping hand in household chores, baby-sitting or just looking 
after the children, among others, irrespective of whether parents (couples) were present – 
thanks largely to the mutual obligations and reciprocity members of the extended families felt 
towards one another.  
 
In contrast, Somali couples in Sweden had to bring up their children and attend to their 
household chores entirely on t heir own. Moreover, bringing up c hildren in Sweden was 
experienced by Somali couples as much more intense compared to Somalia. Indeed, although 
somewhat exaggerated, one respondent even talked of children in Sweden needing ‘24 hour 
supervision’, notwithstanding that children also attend school or parents had to attend to other 
business (education, work, etc). This exaggeration, nonetheless, carried another connotation, 
the fear that Somali children could go ‘astray’ in Sweden, if they were ‘not looked after’. 
‘Astray’ here was used to connote the fear Somali parents had of their children becoming 
assimilated into the host society’s way of life if ‘unchecked’, to use a p hrase of one 
respondent. Hence, the need for greater involvement in the lives of children in Sweden than 
would be the case in Somalia, where couples shared roles and responsibilities with members 
of their extended families.   
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9.4.2.3.3 Conflict Resolution 
 
Traditionally, the extended family level was where disputes between couples were settled. 
However, it was also possible for the extended family to enlist the support of the sub-sub-clan, 
sub-clan and even clan where necessary. As reported, this may not always have been the case 
but where conflicts became protracted and drew in many related people across the sub-sub-
clan and the sub-clan levels, it c ould potentially become a matter of concern for the wider 
clan. The reason why arbitration went to higher levels (i.e., beyond the extended family level) 
illustrates how Somalis tried to forestall family breakdowns in the advent of marital disputes. 
Indeed, many Somali research respondents emphasised how the ‘family’ lent its relentless and 
unwavering support to the parties when things between them did not work. That was often 
contrasted to the scenario in Sweden where such support system was either non-existent or 
where it did, was greatly reduced. As a co nsequence, many argued, the ‘familial’ role of 
solving spousal disputes was now largely transferred to Swedish authorities, to the detriment 
of Somalis (see below).  
 
9.4.2.4 Involvement by State Authorities in ‘Private’ matters 
 
A commonly held view among research respondents was that spousal conflicts among Somalis 
were exacerbated by the involvement of Swedish authorities (e.g., social services, police, 
courts, etc) in the lives of Somalis. These authorities had, in the eyes of these respondents, 
encroached or in some cases ‘ substituted’ the traditional role of the ‘Somali family’ by 
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intervening and resolving spousal disputes. The ‘involvement by S wedish authorities’ links 
with the preceding theme, i.e., that of the ‘lack of extended family’ support in Sweden.  
 
Moreover, many saw the involvement of Swedish authorities in family affairs, a sphere 
considered private and culturally sensitive, as counterproductive. Indeed, there were those who 
genuinely believed that the Swedish authorities exacerbated familial or spousal conflicts 
among Somalis rather than helped to solve them. The following sentiment by Fanan, a 45 year 
old male respondent, was illustrative of the mistrust and suspicion held towards Swedish 
authorities with regards to their involvement in Somali family affairs:    
All they do was to worsen an already tense                                               
situation. Let alone in solving the issue, they                                                  
themselves become part of the problem.  
 
Fanan adds:  
Theses authorities have no vested interest in                                           
keeping Somali families together. They help                                                 
dissolve, not solve familial problems. 
 
Moreover, a number of Somali male respondents expressed the view that the arbitration 
processes followed by Swedish authorities lacked balance or impartiality, since, in their eyes, 
men were nearly ‘always’ blamed for marital conflicts irrespective of the ‘rights or wrong’. 
However, there were other respondents who differed with the above assessment and who 
argued that Swedish authorities, as professionals, were fair and objective in their intervention 
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and judgement in mediating conflicts among Somali spouses. They argued that ‘impartiality’ 
or ‘neutrality’ was not really required. Instead, these respondents voiced their support for a 
more forceful ‘top-down’ or ‘partial approach’, similar to the way the ‘family’ in Somalia 
enforced compliance to ‘help spouses sort out their differences’. Hirab, a 5 5 year old male 
respondent had, for example, this to say: 
At best they [authorities] want to portray a neutral                                        
stance. But neutrality is not needed… One must 
be biased or display unfairness at times in order to 
hold families together… as things may work 
better that way in the end.  
 
Bashir, a 35 year old male respondent, argued in similar fashion:  
Neutrality is like giving up, tantamount to solving                                              
nothing. If they want to solve problems they need 
to walk that extra mile, which frankly I believe 
they have no understanding for.   
  
The majority of Somali male respondents were nostalgic about, and craved for, the traditional 
arbitration system of the ‘family’ in Somalia which ‘coerced’ women to remain in relations 
‘that bit longer’ in the event of spousal disputes. As one respondent confirmed, ‘The family 
gave the parties ample time and opportunity to mend their differences in the course of time’. 
Indeed, it was unanimously endorsed that the Somali arbitration system seldom approved 
dissolutions, and, that it was only when the differences between the parties were deemed 
irreconcilable that such dissolution was allowed to occur. Farhiya, a 43 ye ar old female 
respondent attests to the above: 
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In Somalia, we had cultural rules of mediation 
that had inbuilt checks and balances. Divorce in                                                 
Somalia was always the last thing people resorted 
to. Here [Sweden] one feels as i f divorce is the                                                   
first resort.  
 
9.4.2.5 Men feeling sidelined 
 
Many Somali male research respondents felt the ‘system’ (used as a su bstitute for the 
‘authorities’), purposively and meticulously ignored the concerns of Somali men whilst taking 
on board only the view of Somali women, in the event of a spousal conflict.  Two concrete 
examples were given as to how Somali men felt sidelined by the ‘system’ in favour of Somali 
women. The first pertained to the case where authorities registered the ‘name of the family’ in 
the ‘name of the woman’. This was in reference to the files, records or registers kept on the 
family in social service (especially with regard to social assistance) and social security office 
(who administer housing allowance and child benefits, etc). Indeed, women were the prime 
‘contact point’ for the authorities in the family, in the sense that, most information to and from 
the family were often channelled through the woman. All benefits accrued to the family also 
went directly to the personal account of the woman, giving her a considerable say in the way 
money was used within the family.  
 
The second example related to the scenario where authorities ‘always compelled’ men to 
vacate the home whilst almost ‘always allowing’ women to retain the family house in the 
advent of separation or divorce between the parties. This was also the case i n most Somali 
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families on social assistance, where the man would be expected to move out of the apartment 
irrespective of whether the tenancy was registered in his name or not.   
 
The latter scenario was contrasted to that of Somalia where the woman normally left the 
husband’s homestead to return to her paternal family. Moreover, in most cases, divorced 
women in Somalia would also be expected to leave the children behind with the husband. It 
was only where children were too small, i.e., needing breastfeeding, etc, where a divorcee 
would have custody of children, and even in that case only temporarily as the fathers could 
require the children to be returned to them when they were no longer in need of breastfeeding.  
 
It should be noted that, in Somalia, women hardly ever lived on their own as they would most 
likely have to depend on their husbands for economic support. Once a woman was divorced 
the responsibility to support her automatically fell on their ‘paternal’ families. The husbands 
were bound (through customary and religious obligations) to pay child support only in cases 
where women were allowed to keep children after a divorce.  
 
9.4.2.6 The Involvement of the Swedish Authorities 
 
From the viewpoint of many Somali research respondents, there was a relatively high degree 
of involvement by the Swedish authorities, particularly, by the social services, in the lives of 
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Somali families. The main reason for their involvement was linked to the perceived prevalence 
of high unemployment among Somalis in Sweden. Moreover, many Somalis were not entitled 
to income-related benefits, e.g., unemployment-, sickness benefits, etc, precisely because they 
had no firm or steady foothold in the labour market (refer to Chapter Five). Accordingly, they 
had no alternative but to live off social assistance. 
 
The administration of social assistance (e.g., eligibility criteria, verification eventual 
payments) falls under the jurisdiction of local social workers. To be eligible for social 
assistance, the individual would be required to contact the local employment exchanges or 
alternatively the social security office if the individual is sick or has a disability. The Social 
security office oversees rehabilitation of those who, for diverse reasons, cannot work. Thus, 
social services, local employment exchanges and the social security office regularly cooperate 
to help the unemployed secure work or become engaged in meaningful economic activity 
(education, training, etc) with a view to making individuals become self-sufficient in the long-
run.  
 
9.4.3 Weakening of Social Controls 
 
Another outcome of the influences from the proactive Swedish welfare system and from 
Swedish society has been the perceived ‘weakening of social controls’ among Somalis in 
Sweden. The weakening of relative social control among Somalis correlated to the ‘waning’ 
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influences of the ‘family’ as a powerful institution among Somalis in Sweden. As noted 
before, in the pre-migration context, the ‘family’ was instrumental in perpetuating and 
enforcing compliance to patriarchal gender relations among Somalis. It functioned as the 
mechanism through which marital conflicts were mediated, on one hand, and as an entity that 
relieved pressure on couples by helping with household chores and with child-minding, among 
others. Benign as these functions may have been, the underlying rationale was to maintain the 
status quo. Indeed, the ‘family’ functioned as a strong social control mechanism through 
which the behaviour and compliance of its members (particularly on the part of girls and 
women) were monitored. In this monitoring regime, male family members (e.g., brothers, 
husbands and other male relatives) had an ample say in, or even the final word in the affairs 
and destiny of women (especially unmarried ones) in relation to many areas in life (e.g., 
travel, education, marriage, etc). 
 
Many of these functions have somewhat diminished in Sweden thanks to the fact that this 
society provides Somali women with a set of new conditions and opportunities (e.g., social 
welfare provisions, education, employment, etc) which have empowered Somali women to 
acquire, among other things, the virtue of relative ‘independence’ (from men and the ‘family’). 
Such ‘independence’ has invariably led to more marital conflict in light of changes occurring 
to Somali traditional gender patterns in Sweden (see above).   
 
373 
 
Arguably, the relative ‘weakening of social control’ among Somalis has also contributed to the 
ability of Somali women to ‘renegotiate’ patriarchal patterns inherent in Somali culture. For 
example, the courting rituals occurring among Somalis in Sweden has become redefined 
thanks in large part to these broader changes. This research suggests that Somali women are 
now able to court, and be courted with fewer restrictions from their ‘family’. They have also 
acquired a relative degree of anonymity and can retain that anonymity throughout the courting 
period(s) if the wished to do so. Moreover, women are now able to invite those whom they are 
courting to their own accommodations/apartment giving them more say in the practicality and 
direction of the courting process in a way and manner that suits them. Modern 
communications such as the internet have also aided in the attainment of relative anonymity 
between potential Somali couples.  
 
9.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has highlighted how the patriarchy inherent in Somali culture has historically and 
culturally marginalised Somali women. It outlined the extent to which gender roles and the 
division of labour within Somali families (and to a greater extent, within the Somali 
community) were accepted as normal and unquestionable in pre-migration contexts. 
  
The thrust of this chapter reports ‘renegotiations’ of patriarchy that is largely driven by Somali 
women, thanks to the catalytic role of the proactive Swedish welfare system (that creates 
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favourable condition for women in society) and influences from a society (i.e., Swedish) with 
different ‘normative’ gender norms and practices. These influences have led to a number of 
outcomes that further help undermine traditional Somali patriarchal gender patterns, which in 
turn create conditions for its ‘renegotiation’ in Sweden. These outcomes include: the 
acquisition of relative ‘independence’ by Somali women (from males and family), the 
propensity of spousal conflict (where ‘rigid’ patriarchal patterns continued unmodified) and 
the weakening of social control among Somalis (which enables women to choose their 
partners without recourse to family approval).          
 
Nonetheless, a d ilemma still remains about the extent to which Somalis would like to 
compromise with respect to the prevailing gender roles and cultural practices in Sweden. As 
this research has found, ‘compromise’ or ‘flexibility’ did not mean the full alignment of 
Somali gender patterns with normative Swedish gender behaviours and expectations. It was 
about ‘meeting somewhere in-between’, leaving behind the traditional Somali patriarchal 
patterns but not reaching the gender equality levels associated with Swedes to a full extent. It 
was as i f many Somali respondents were saying ‘they needed to compromise but just 
sufficiently’.  
 
All in all, the renegotiation of patriarchy by Somalis in Sweden is still at a nascent stage and is 
largely unrecognised by the host society and its institutions thanks to the very high threshold 
of gender equality that exists in Sweden. Thus, from the viewpoint of the host society and its 
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institutions, patriarchy among Somalis in Sweden still remains largely intact, unchanged and 
problematic to their integration into mainstream society.  
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CHAPTER TEN 
10 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
The aim of this concluding chapter is to summarise the mains themes raised in this research. It 
also aims to provide a number of policy recommendations relating to immigrant integration, 
particularly, in relations to Somalis immigrants in Sweden. A brief account of how this 
research has contributed to the existing body of knowledge will be outlined as will proposal 
about the way forward with regard to future research. 
  
10.1 Summarising the Main Themes 
 
The themes raised in this chapter constitute the main ‘integrative dilemmas’ relating to the 
integration of Somalis in Stockholm/Sweden. These are mainly socioeconomic, e.g., 
employment (labour market), education and housing (including structural hinders, i.e., 
institutional forms of discrimination in the labour market and housing sectors), and cultural 
(emphasis on the family and clan relationships, religion and patriarchal gender roles). These 
themes are discussed as sub-titles organised around the research questions of this research. To 
reiterate, the research questions of this thesis consist of one main research question and two 
sub-questions. The main research question asks: How do Somali refugees in Sweden orientate 
themselves to the prevailing Swedish system of integration? The two sub-questions ask: What 
factors impinge upon t he integration of Somalis in Sweden? And, how do c ultural factors 
intrinsic to Somalis in Sweden inhibit their integration into mainstream Swedish society? 
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10.2 How do Somali refugees in Sweden orientate themselves to the 
prevailing Swedish system of integration? 
 
Before we embark on answering this question, it is prudent to relate back to the concepts of 
‘assimilation’ and ‘multiculturalism – the two core approaches to immigrant integration. This 
research concludes that ‘integration though assimilation’ may represent an old model of 
immigrant integration and may still ‘hang around’ for subsequent Somali generations, 
nonetheless, in this present time in history, assimilation is an option that is excluded, not least, 
because Somalis comprise mainly of first generation immigrants (i.e., refugees and their 
children). It also concludes that the majority of Somali are contented to ‘integrate through 
multiculturalism’ – an option that allows them to keep their Somalian culture and religious 
practices, whilst at the same time participating in the socio-economic life of society – which is 
in line with Swedish official multicultural policy. That said, they are still those Somalis who 
feel ‘multiculturalism Swedish style’ is still ‘assimilatory’, and hence, ‘resist’ it.        
 
10.2.1 Integration through Assimilation 
 
It can be concluded that from the standpoint of many members of the host society, assimilation 
is an ‘ideal’ approach when it comes to integrating their immigrants into society. Convention 
has it that, assimilation if adopted, would be the panacea to many of the ‘integrative 
dilemmas’ that afflicts migrant communities in Sweden. Indeed, assimilation (just as 
multiculturalism), is an ‘option’ that is still ‘open’ to both current and subsequent Somali 
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generations in Sweden, and to which they can voluntarily adopt. The question that begs an 
answer, however, is, can Somalis integrate through assimilation? Or put it another way, where 
do Somalis stand in their ‘assimilation process’ in today’s Sweden? 
 
The reality is that the majority of Somalis in Sweden comprise of first generation immigrants, 
and hence, there is little or no assimilation taking place amongst them. Moreover, even their 
children – many of whom have now come of age – are no different since they, too, are very 
much embedded in the cultural patterns of their parents. Thus ‘integration through 
assimilation’ is an ‘option’ is overwhelming excluded for Somalis presently. 
 
Indeed, Somalis are far off the mark the benchmarks established by Gordon’s (1964) ‘sub-
processes of assimilation’, viz-: cultural, structural, marital, identificational, attitude 
receptional, behaviour receptional and civic assimilation (see Chapter Two). Cultural 
assimilation or acculturation would have entailed the alignment of Somali culture to the host 
(Swedish) society. The goal for Somalis would have been to achieve a common culture and 
language; the same sense of dress codes; as well as, same value orientation, including 
memories, sentiments, ideas and attitudes (see Gordon, 1964). Structural assimilation by 
Somalis would have come about if Somalis were to achieve social, economic and political 
integration that were the same as those of native Swedes. This would only have been realisable 
if Somalis achieved ‘demographic’ and ‘socioeconomic’ traits that were equivalent to those of 
the native Swedes (Keefe and Padilla, 1987:19).  
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Anything beyond structural assimilation, e.g., such stages marital, Identificational, attitudinal 
receptional, behavioural receptional, and civic assimilation (Gordon, 1964) seems only too 
farfetched for Somalis. The reason is because these benchmarks represent the more ‘advanced 
stages’ of the process of assimilation – to which Somalis in Sweden are unlikely to fulfil, in 
the near and foreseeable future.  To recuperate (see Chapter Two), marital assimilation entails 
a process of ‘fusion’, ‘interbreeding’ and ‘intermarrying’ with members of the host society 
(Park & Burgess, 1921:737, cited in Gordon, 1964:63-4). With identificational assimilation, 
the assimilated group would have lost its original, and hence, identified with the wider society. 
Attitudinal receptional assimilation and behavioural receptional assimilation would entail 
internalising the attitudes and behaviours of the core society respectively. In other words, the 
assimilated group would have aligned its attitudes and behaviour to the prevailing norms and 
values in the wider (host) society. Civic assimilation heralds a change in the intrinsic (e.g., 
ethical and  religious values or practices) and extrinsic (e.g., a group’s sense of dress) cultural 
traits for the assimilated group that by now is so ‘dispersed’ that it becomes ‘indistinguishable’ 
from the majority group (Gordon, 1964:80; see Parekh, 2006:200). Civic assimilation 
completes the process of assimilation since there would be no cultural and religious 
differences that exist between the assimilated group and the majority society.  
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10.2.2 Integration through Multiculturalism  
 
In Sweden, the path to immigrant integration is set out more or less in a more systematic and 
methodical way, than in many other countries in the Western Hemisphere. This has to do with 
Sweden’s institutionalised welfare state model where many issues including immigration and 
immigrant integration are mediated. Policy objective on immigrant integration are, for 
example, well developed. There is also an elaborate scheme in place (i.e., programme 
measures, etc) involving a high level of planning and organisation that implements the policy 
of integrating immigrants into society. Moreover, there are a number of state and municipal 
actors engaged in immigrant integration. Thus for newcomers (or immigrants) to become 
incorporated into society and for them to attain the desired outcomes expected of them (by 
society), they ‘have to’ adhere to that ‘path’, closely.  
 
The ‘dilemma’ comes, however, when there are individuals or immigrant groups who, for 
various reasons, are incapable of coping with the high level of ‘planning’ and the quest to 
achieve desired outcomes (from a policy perspective); or, when there are individuals or groups 
unwilling to become incorporated in the first place.  When it comes to Somalis, this research 
concludes that their integration into Swedish society is problematic because they embody both 
of these ‘dilemmas’, i.e., their inabilities to cope with the high level of planning and the quest 
to achieve desired outcomes from an integration policy perspective, as well, the prevalence of 
‘unwillingness’ among many Somalis to become incorporated in the first place. Nonetheless, 
whilst this is the general proposition adopted in assessing Somalis as a group, this research 
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also concludes that individual Somalis orientate themselves differently to the prevailing 
Swedish system of integration, as gleaned from the trajectories of Somali research 
respondents.  
 
Accordingly, the analysis of this research has identified two main different groups in the way 
Somalis orientate themselves to the prevailing Swedish system of integration. One group took 
a more ‘pragmatic’ approach by making the best use of the opportunities provided for them in 
society to the best of their abilities. The other group ‘resisted’ nearly all forms of overtures 
from Swedish society aimed at integrating them into society, mainly, for ‘fear’ of ‘becoming 
assimilated’ into society. For descriptive reasons, we call the first group ‘Pragmatists’ and the 
latter, ‘Resisters’. To reiterate, this assessment is based on the viewpoints of Somali research 
respondents.  
 
10.2.2.1 ‘Pragmatists’ versus ‘Resisters’ 
 
The ‘Pragmatists’ seem to integrate into Sweden by making the best use of the opportunities 
availed to them in society whilst, at the same time, being able to retain much of their Somalian 
cultural and religious practices in Sweden. The background of ‘Pragmatists’ reveal that they 
were urban-dwellers, prior to their arrival in Sweden (compared to many ‘Resisters’ who came 
mainly from rural background).  T heir ages varied ranging, for males, from 22-55 – the 
majority being in their late 30s and early 40s –, compared to female women ‘pragmatists’ 
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whose age ranged from 19-32 years. Their family background(s) in Sweden varied too (as that 
of ‘Resisters’). The most significant observation was that, there were more incidents of 
‘single’, ‘divorced’ and ‘divorced with children’ family-constellations than was the case with 
the ‘Resisters’. There were even two ‘incidents’ of ‘cohabitation with children’ among the 
‘Pragmatists’ (something absent from the ‘Resisters’).  
 
When it came to education, a number of observations were also made. Firstly, many 
‘Pragmatists’ had some forms of education from Somalia (primary, education and university) 
prior to their arrival in Sweden. Secondly, a number of them were able to supplement their 
previous education, and were hence, able to acquire skills that improved their employability in 
Sweden. As part of their pragmatic approach, this group seemed to downgrade their 
expectation of attaining work commensurate to their education (whether achieved outside or 
inside Sweden) in their bid to secure work. Other ‘pragmatists’ have tried the ‘long route’ to 
obtain educational advancement (i.e., by starting from the ‘scratch’ to acquiring a university 
degree) by being persistent and determined to achieve the educational goals they set out for 
themselves when they came to Sweden. For this later group, the dividend often came with the 
reward of employment in the profession of their choice, hence, making a positive mark for 
themselves on the personal level.  
 
The ‘Pragmatists’ viewed Sweden as their place or ‘home’ for now and in the foreseeable 
future. There was a sense of ‘they have arrived’ and looked forward to a ‘promising’ future in 
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Sweden. They were, for the most part, somewhat receptive and harboured somewhat 
favourable attitudes towards the host society and institutions. Here is where one found the 
most ‘balanced’ criticisms of both the host society and the Somali ethnic group in Sweden.  
 
The ‘Resisters, on t he other hand, constituted mostly of people who felt strongly about the 
importance of maintaining Somalis cultural and religious beliefs ‘intact’, in Sweden. Many of 
the ‘Resisters’ were people who came from rural background(s) in Somalis. Their ages varied, 
ranging from 40-53 for males and 25-43 for females. There were more ‘incidences’ of 
‘married with children’, some few ‘divorced with children’, and, no oc currence of 
‘single/unmarried’ or cohabitation when it came to their family constellation. It could be 
concluded, therefore, that marriage as an institution was valued in accordance with Somalian 
cultural (and religious) practices among the ‘Resisters’ compared to the ‘Pragmatists’.  
 
When it came to education, many of the ‘Resisters’ had little (lower primary, primary level) or 
no educational background at all, prior to their arrival in Sweden. ‘Resisters’ could also fit, to 
a greater extent, into the description of those ‘Somalis who have not made use of Swedish 
educational system’. Some in this group seemed to have ‘stagnated’ from the outset since they 
had little to improve their educational status. A few ‘stuck with’ their previous ‘qualifications’ 
and work experiences accrued from Somalia. A number of the respondents who had not 
acquired a ‘single, viable job’ since coming into Sweden, ten or fifteen years ago, at the time 
of interviews fitted into this category of ‘Resisters’, too.   
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Although the ‘Resisters’ may not have qualitatively advanced in terms of education, they 
have, nonetheless, participated in numerous training and skill-enhancing courses (as part of 
Sweden’s labour enforcement strategy of activating its workforce). The attitudes of some 
‘Resisters’, indicated, however, that they participated in these courses often not to improve 
their chances, in terms of education or in the labour market, but merely as a means to fulfil the 
eligibility criteria of some benefits, e.g., unemployment benefit (A-Kassa) and or social 
assistance, that requires claimants to engage in some form of economic activity to receive 
those benefits.  
 
In contrast to the ‘Pragmatists’, ‘Resisters’ harboured negative attitudes towards the host 
society and its institutions (when compared to ‘Pragmatists’). They often blamed and found 
explanation and justification for their predicament in structural barriers, such as 
unemployment and discrimination. Other ‘Resisters’ were less negative or bitter towards the 
host society and its institutions, but were, nonetheless, indifferent. The latter seemed to favour 
the status quo in order to ‘preserve’ their cultural and religious peculiarities from ‘outside’ 
interference (implying society).   
 
There was also a sense of ‘temporariness’ among ‘Resisters’. Many expressed their wish to 
relocate from Sweden. They often said they had no other choice but to remain in Sweden at 
least for now (i.e., temporarily). Thus, for ‘Resisters’, Sweden was not ‘home’ but a transitory 
halfway house where people stayed until they were able to relocate to another country deemed 
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favourable or sympathetic to their cultural and religious practices. Some ‘Resisters’ were 
hampered from relocating to other countries because of financial constraints, other had 
spouses who had not yet become Swedish citizens, etc. A few ‘Resisters’ have, however, 
managed to relocate their families (spouses and children) to countries in East Africa and the 
Middle East for reasons connected to their children’s religious education.   
 
Indeed, a n umber of ‘Resisters’ emphasised the ‘threat’ they and their children faced from 
‘assimilation’ in Sweden. They spoke of the difficulties they encountered in inculcating their 
cultural and religious values to their children, and blamed their ‘continued presence’ in 
Sweden as a factor. They were also vehemently opposed the ‘empowerment’ of Somali 
women (i.e., greater social and economic independence) in Sweden. These ‘Resisters’ were 
often the ones who felt strongly about the renegotiation of patriarchal gender relations by 
Somali women in Sweden (see Chapter Nine).   
 
10.3 What factors impinge upon the integration of Somalis in Sweden? 
 
This research has identified a number of factors that adversely impact on the integration of   
Somalis in Sweden. In answering this research sub-question, we limited ourselves to the 
structural and socio-economic aspects of integration, viz-: employment (labour market) and 
education, housing, and, institutional forms of discrimination. Cultural aspects of integration 
are dealt with in subsequent sub-question (see below). The reason why there is less emphasis 
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on the civic and political aspect of integration in this thesis will be dealt with latter (see 
below).      
 
10.3.1 Employment (Labour Market) and Education 
  
One of the major problems that impinge upon the integration of Somalis in Sweden is 
unemployment. Unemployment rates among groups, e.g., Somalis, are often unavailable from 
official Swedish statistics. However, the economic activity participations rates of groups (e.g., 
education, training programmes, employment, etc,) may at times appear in statistics and 
literature to gauge how well a group is integrating into society. The economic activity rates of 
Somalis in 1999 and 2003 were, for example, put at approximately 27% and 23 % respectively 
(see Invandrarverket, 1999; Carlson, 2006). It is the contention of this research that the overall 
situation of Somalis in Stockholm/Sweden may have slightly improved in subsequent years 
but not as markedly as one would have desired, not least from an integration standpoint.  
 
Widespread unemployment among Somalis in Sweden has persisted from the early 1990s. The 
early 1990s was important in two aspects. First, it was the period when the Swedish economy 
suffered its worst crisis in recent memory. This crisis was characterized by a deep recession, 
falling GDP, high unemployment, redundancies, relocation of industries, etc. Second, this 
period coincided with the arrival of relatively large numbers of Somalis into Sweden. This 
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recession lasted for several years. Somalis, as refugees, and vulnerable people, could only 
become further marginalized under these circumstances.  
 
When the Swedish economy emerged from recession towards the end of 1990s, the labour 
market for Somalis did not improve. This is because the emergent economy was a 
‘restructured’ economy where fundamental changes had occurred to the labour market and the 
nature of jobs. Many of the jobs generated by the economy were found mainly in high-tech 
industries and Information technology (IT), which meant an overall decrease in the numbers of 
low skilled jobs in the economy. Consequently, only the relatively highly educated, highly 
mobile and skilled workers could compete and benefit from this ‘new’ economy. For Somalis, 
this economy spelt even further gloom since their prospect to compete and benefit from it was 
almost non-existent. The inability to adjust to the new conditions meant that their 
unemployment attained quasi-permanent status in Sweden.  
 
This research has also highlighted ‘unsuitable education’ among Somalis as problematic to 
their integration into mainstream society. The prevalence of ‘illiteracy’, which like ‘unsuitable 
education’ had a close bearing to the labour market relations of Somalis in Sweden, was also 
explored. Both ‘illiteracy’ and ‘unsuitable education’ were problematic particularly against the 
backdrop of a knowledge-based society where scarcity (and competition) for menial jobs made 
it impossible for those afflicted to gain a foothold in the Swedish labor market.  
 
388 
 
A further issue that emerged from this research was the notion (particularly among Swedish 
officials) that Somalis had done ‘little to improve their educational status’, both quantitatively 
and qualitatively to increase their chances for successful integration in Sweden. This ‘failure’ 
happens against a backdrop where education is provided free of charge up to and including 
university; where study assistance (earmarked for student upkeep) is available until the age of 
55; and, where citizens have numerous ‘avenues’ to educate themselves, e.g., from study 
circles, to adult education proper (refer to Chapter Five).  
 
This research has, nonetheless, emphasized contributory factors as to why Somalis may have 
‘failed’ to grasp the opportunities accorded to them in society in relation to education, and by 
extension to improve their labour market situation in Sweden. These include, a ‘commitment 
to family’ (e.g., those left behind in Somalia who face enormous problems which they have to 
cope with unaided), ‘abrupt transition’ from pre-industrial to a post-industrial society, and the 
‘temporariness’ of Somalis in Sweden (i.e., people who wanted to relocate to other countries 
deemed sympathetic to their cultural and religious practice than is the case in Sweden). 
 
10.3.2 Housing  
 
This research has underlined residential segregation as a factor that impinges upon the 
integration of Somalis in Sweden. The research has found that the causes, maintenance and 
perpetuation of residential segregation between Somalis and ‘native’ Swedes were both 
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individually and structurally driven. It was individually driven in the sense that Somalis 
wanted to live in close proximity with one another. It is structurally determined in the sense 
that residential segregation between Somalis and ‘native’ Swedes was often caused by 
socioeconomic factors (e.g., unemployment, low incomes, etc) and policy changes that had 
‘unintended’ consequences on r esidential segregation in Stockholm, i.e., factors external to 
‘individual preferences’.      
 
As alluded to previously, ‘individual preferences’ referred to a situation where Somalis 
themselves contributed to their own residential segregation in Stockholm. The reason was 
because many Somalis wanted to live in close proximity with one another. A number of 
factors have led this researcher to believe this was the case. First, many Somalis moved from 
communes outside Stockholm where they were initially resettled. The resettlement of Somalis 
in communes outside the three major metropolitan areas of Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö 
was in line with the Swedish refugee dispersion policy in 1990s. This policy aimed at 
discouraging concentrations of immigrants in a few areas and to counter some of the negative 
impact associated with ‘unplanned’ immigration (social exclusions, unemployment, residential 
segregation, etc). Second, once Somalis moved to Stockholm, they almost always ended up in 
Rinkeby and Tensta, two predominantly immigrant dense suburbs, and home to the 
overwhelming majority of Somalis in the City (i.e., where their friends and acquaintance live). 
Third, Somalis had ‘some’ options to settle in other less segregated suburbs to which they may 
not have explored fully. The option for more choice in residential patterns in Sweden was 
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often made possible through social housing which ensured that rents were standardized 
throughout the city.  
 
This research has found that ‘individual preferences’ were influenced by a number of factors. 
First, it was in these (residentially segregated) suburbs where Somalis could find vital 
information about how they could ‘go about’ in their adoptive country, not least in their initial 
years of residency in Sweden. Second, by moving into areas where their countrymen lived, 
Somalis were able to overcome the kind of loneliness and isolation they experienced in the 
communes from which they moved from, and in which they were initially resettled. Third, 
there were religious and cultural considerations that ‘forced’ many Somalis to move into 
Stockholm. For example, it was the availability of makeshift mosques and informal Quranic 
schools for children in Rinkeby and Tensta that largely prompted many Somalis to move 
Stockholm. Somalis were also drawn into the segregated suburbs in Stockholm because of a 
budding ‘Somalian enclave economy’ that served their cultural and religious needs. It is in 
Rinkeby and Tensta where one finds Halal food, clothes, cultural-specific accessories, etc. It 
is also here Somalis can find and use the services of Hawala’, an informal banking and money 
transfer system. Somalis use Hawala to send remittances to their relatives in Somalia and in 
other places of the world where formal banking hardly reaches.   
 
Residential segregation between Somalis and ‘native’ Swedes was also caused, maintained 
and perpetuated by s ocio-economic differences. The relative lack of language competences 
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and ‘unsuitable’ education, poor participation in the labour market and the relative short 
duration of residency in Sweden made it relatively hard for Somalis to attain residential 
mobility that could lead to their residential de-segregation. 
 
The length of residence by Somalis in Sweden was important in that making a career in 
housing often requires a considerable amount of time. People have to establish themselves by 
acquiring education, building their careers and putting away savings in a bid to buy ow n 
homes, etc. However, when it comes to Somalis, their length of residence in the country has 
been relatively short. Moreover, during their relatively short residencies in Sweden, many 
Somalis were largely preoccupied in the acquisition of language competence and education in 
the hope of gaining a foothold in the Swedish labour market, hence, the difficulty in making 
housing ‘careers’. 
 
Another example of structural factor that causes, maintains and perpetuates residential 
segregation between Somalis and ‘native’ Swedes related to unintended consequences that 
derived from the changes in policy, which eventually impacted on their residential patterns in 
Stockholm. Examples of these included specific policy changes in housing, immigration and 
immigrant integration that took place between 1960 and 1990. These examples are congruent 
with existing literature on housing in Stockholm. 
 
392 
 
With respect to housing, this research underscores the ‘unintended’ consequence that resulted 
from the One Million Housing Programme. This programme was initiated in 1965 and ended 
in the mid-1970s. It aimed to eradicate housing shortages in the metropolitan areas. The One 
Million Housing Programme resulted in the construction of many new suburbs. However, 
many ‘native’ Swedes who initially settled into these suburbs eventually moved to other areas 
deemed more appealing, from an individual or familial perspective. Many immigrants and 
refugees latter moved into these suburbs ‘vacated’ by ‘native’ Swedes.  
 
The main change in Swedish immigration policy which had an intended consequence on the 
residential patterns in Stockholm occurred as a result of the shift in focus from labour 
migration to refugee migration from the Mid-1970s. More refugees and their families coming 
to Stockholm increasingly settled into suburbs where they had relatives and friends, 
reinforcing the concentration of immigrants in a number of suburbs.  
 
Another policy change with unintended consequence that occurred was the abandonment of 
Swedish Refugee Dispersal Policy, also called the ‘Whole Swedish Strategy’ (Hela Sverige 
Strategin), in the Mid-1990s. This meant refugees who were initially dispersed across the 
whole country could now settle in Stockholm.  M ore often, they would settle in already 
segregated areas where they had relative and friends (for more refer to Chapter Seven).  
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Needless to say, there are many negative impact of residential segregation on inhabitants in 
segregated suburbs in metropolitan regions like Stockholm. Firstly, the lack of connectivity 
with the host population entails fewer opportunities to practice speaking Swedish. It also 
means exclusion from the informal social networks of Swedes. These informal social networks 
or ‘contacts’ as t hey are called have become decisive in Sweden since it is through these 
recommendations that people acquire jobs in the labour market. ‘Native’ connectivity also has 
the potential to break down barriers and enhance tolerance and understanding between people.  
Secondly, many inhabitants in these suburbs are unemployed. The number of people living off 
social assistance is often higher in these suburbs than in less segregated suburbs, as a 
consequence of unemployment. There is also an established relationship between 
unemployment and poor health in these segregated areas (see Chapter Six). Thirdly, public 
services (social, health, education, recreational, etc) in segregated areas are often poorer in 
relation to those provided elsewhere in the city (i.e., in less segregated areas). One recurrent 
example was the perceived relationship between relative poor educational services (e.g., lack 
of qualified personnel, deteriorating teaching standards, etc) in these suburbs and negative 
impact this has on the educational performance of children in schools located in these suburbs. 
Fourthly, high staff turn-over in segregated areas contributes to deficient service provisions in 
these areas, especially, with regard to vital sectors like education, health and social services. 
The working conditions of key workers (e.g., teachers, health workers, etc) were likely to be 
less favourable than those of their counterparts in less segregated areas. Huge work-loads for 
those working in these areas was, for example, identified as one reason for the relative high 
staff turn-over in these areas occurred. Last but not least, the perception of high crime rates in 
segregated suburbs impacts negatively on t heir inhabitants. These suburbs often have a 
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reputation of being ‘tough neighbourhoods’, hence, their negative image in the eyes of ‘native’ 
Swedes. That in turn makes meaningful interaction and engagement with their inhabitants (by 
‘native’ Swedes) often unlikely, and hence, having a negative impact on their integration.   
 
10.3.3 Institutional Forms of Discrimination 
 
This research found institutional forms of discrimination in Swedish labour market and 
housing as a barrier to the integration of Somalis in Sweden. Within the context of Swedish 
labour market relation, institution discrimination was inherent mainly in the employment 
screening procedures of employing organizations. It is here where most Somalis often felt they 
were ‘deliberately’ and systematically ‘sidelined’ in preference to other candidates, notably, 
‘native’ Swedes or others deemed to have less ‘objectionable’ characteristics in the eyes of 
Swedish employers.  
 
Partiality within the recruitment processes of many employing organization manifested itself 
in a number of ways. One perception among Somalis was that that job applications were not 
often subjected to impartial processes that should be accorded to citizens according to the law. 
A widespread perception among respondents was that the bearing of a ‘foreign name’ was all 
it took for applicants to be excluded from job short-list or interviews. Hitches also occurred at 
interviews, where a number of research respondents reported they were subjected to intrusive 
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and unfair questioning, a further illustration of the existence of institutional discrimination in 
the recruitment processes of employing organizations in Sweden.     
 
Nonetheless, this research was able to highlight one alternative explanation to institutional 
discrimination in the Swedish labour market. This was mainly outlined by Swedish officials. 
It related to the ‘suitability’ of Somali candidates for many of the jobs created in the Swedish 
economy. ‘Suitability’ here connotes having the relevant qualifications, skills and work 
experiences needed for the jobs in the labour market. Another disadvantage that afflicted 
Somalis related to the ‘gaps in their life histories’ and the prolonged ‘lack of contact’ with the 
labour market – factors that also influenced decisions when it came to recruiting Somali 
workers.  
  
Institutional forms of discrimination were also widespread in housing. It is arguable the 
reasons why some Somalis (as other immigrants) ended up in residentially segregated suburbs 
in Stockholm was precisely because housing corporation/agents allocated accommodation to 
Somalis (as like other minorities) and ‘native’ Swedes according to differential/preferential 
treatments. By ‘manipulating’ the housing queuing system, agents often steered Somalis away 
from the more affluent, more reputable ‘native’ dominated suburbs, and, into already 
segregated suburbs where residential vacancies or ‘openings’ for ‘immigrant clientele’ often 
existed. Withholding information about residential openings in non-segregated areas from 
Somalis by housing agents was also identified as a form of institutional discrimination in 
396 
 
housing. Conversely, Swedish applicants were steered away from segregated suburbs into the 
more reputable suburbs. 
 
10.4 How do cultural factors intrinsic to Somalis in Sweden inhibit their 
integration into mainstream Swedish society? 
 
This research argues that the Somali group in Sweden diverges ‘excessively’ from prevailing 
cultural standards, hence, their difficulty in integrating into mainstream society. In particular, 
it was in the spheres of ‘culture’, ‘religion’ and ‘gender patterns’ (i.e., gender relations and 
roles) where many of these ‘divergences’ with prevailing Swedish cultural standards were 
identified. When it come to ‘religion’, the issue is a little more complicated, in the sense that 
Islamophobia – the ‘fear’, ‘dread’, ‘hatred’ and ‘demonisation’ of Islam and Muslims as the 
‘other’ in Sweden (as is in the rest of Europe), which is a ‘special form of racism’ – may play 
a role in (a) exaggerating the ‘divergences’ between Somalis and native Swedes, and, (b) 
excluding Somalis from the socio-economic and public life of Sweden (see Runnymede Trust 
Report on Islamophobia, 1997:1-5; Marranci, 2004:106; Allen, 2010:65). 
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10.4.1 Cultural Divergence 
 
This research has found that ‘cultural divergence’ stems largely from the intensity individuals 
attach to the role of the ‘family’. ‘Native’ Swedes are encouraged to become stronger 
individuals or citizens, and hence, attach less emphasis on family bonds and more on personal 
independence, self-reliance and ‘autonomy’ (from the family). Somalis, on t he other hand, 
prioritise the importance of family/clan network relationships over their individual goals, 
making it v irtually impossible for the individual to turn away from his/her family/clan or to 
undertake an independent life. This is likely to give rise to tensions since Somalis were 
expected to behave like ‘responsible’ Swedish citizens, who were individually responsible for 
their actions/inactions and obligations to the wider society rather than the clan.   
 
Although the clan has many positive functions among Somalis, it was, nonetheless, 
problematic to their integration in Sweden. For example, inter-clan rivalries and antagonism 
between various clan-families can foster further divisions. This research concludes that, 
Somalis need to demonstrate a relatively high degree of internal cohesion as a group, before 
one could talk of them integrating into mainstream Swedish society successfully. It seems 
clear that a ‘fragmented’ group will have more difficulty in integrating into another larger and 
more cohesive group, hence, the ‘need’ of the former to attain greater internal stability and 
cohesion.    
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10.4.2 ‘Religious Divergence’ 
 
This research identifies the tensions between Islam (a religion Somalis subscribe to) and 
Swedish secularism (which was fiercely secular) as a major source of contention between 
Somalis and ‘native’ Swedes. Somalis have no demarcation between ‘culture’ and ‘religion’, 
the two are intertwined. Also as adherents of Islam, Somalis do not make distinctions between 
private and public spheres, as ‘demanded’ by both Swedish secularism and multiculturalism. 
Moreover, Somalis demonstrate a relative high degree of religiosity as illustrated by their 
requests for ‘additional’ support or rights (e.g., prayer rooms, time off for Friday prayers, etc).   
 
The relative high degree of religiosity among Somalis occurs against a backdrop of immense 
opposition and suspicion towards Islam in Sweden and elsewhere. Islam in Sweden is, by and 
large, regarded as a ‘threat’ both in the literal and figurative sense. The literal threat associates 
Islam with intolerance, violence, terrorism, etc. The figurative threat relates to the kind of 
threat Islam poses to the Swedish way of life (principles, norms, values, etc). Islam was also 
criticized in Sweden for stifling people’s personal freedoms and liberties; its unfair treatment 
of women; its ‘grandiose’ nature (e.g., its tendency of not confining itself purely to spiritual 
matters, its transnational rather than local focus and outlook); and, for its advocacy of Sharia 
Law (perceived by many in Sweden as ‘draconian’). All these factors made Somalis, as 
adherents of Islam (coupled with their deep religiosity, e.g., through their demands for 
‘dispensations’ in public spaces and outward displays of veils by Somali women) particularly 
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vulnerable to the opposition and suspicion held against Islam in Swedish society, and the 
negative scrutiny that this may entail.     
 
The veil was particularly highlighted as a contentious symbol in Sweden. In the Swedish 
context, the veil is often associated with oppression of women. In a country where people 
strongly support gender equality, any hint of rolling back the gains of this achievement is 
fiercely opposed. Other issues relating to the veil include, the way in which it can inhibit 
meaningful day-to-day interaction with ‘native’ Swedes obstruct ‘practitioner – client 
relationship’ (in the context of health and social services settings); present ‘maneuverability’ 
problems in the street and in workplaces; as something that affronts ideal image and aesthetics 
of Swedish society, etc. The ‘contempt’ for the veil in Sweden becomes even more 
compounded when worn by children under 15, the age of consent.  
 
The vast majority of Somali women wear veils, mainly the Hijab (headscarf). These women 
face discrimination and many of them are excluded from participating in economic activities, 
e.g., work for reasons related to their ‘veiling’. This presents a dilemma to their integration 
into society. 
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10.4.3 ‘Divergence in Gender Roles and Patterns’ 
 
This research highlighted patriarchy (and divergent gender relation patterns) as one of the 
cultural features of Somalis which brings them into conflict with prevailing socio-cultural 
standards and norms in Sweden. This occurs against the backdrop of a country and society that 
is regarded as one of the least ‘gendered’ societies in the world; where the participation of 
women in economic activities (employment, education, etc) is rated as among the highest in 
the world; and, where socialisation processes in the family and educational institutions (from 
pre-schooling onwards) are geared towards the eradication of patriarchy in society. Moreover, 
the Swedish welfare system is conspicuously women friendly. The need for male 
breadwinners has been eliminated, thanks to Swedish taxation and redistribution policies 
which ensure that women can live an independent life without recourse to family or male 
relatives.  
 
Patriarchy among Somalis thus stands in stark contrast to Swedish gender equality. It is 
viewed in the host society as not only an affront to gender equality (one very key achievement 
by  Swedish (welfare) society with which Swedes greatly identify), but also an attempt to roll 
back the gains made in society with regard to gender roles and relations. Nonetheless, this 
research also reveals that there is evidence to suggest that Somalis in Sweden are beginning to 
‘renegotiate’ patriarchy inherent in their culture. As a caveat though, this renegotiation of 
patriarchy has not been recognised by the host society because of the latter’s high threshold 
for matters relating to gender equality. Renegotiation of patriarchy among Somalis has largely 
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resulted from the influence of the proactive social welfare system (that promotes gender 
equality through its diverse policy initiatives) and interaction in Swedish society – a society 
with a d ifferent normative practices, expectations and attitudes with regard to gender issues 
than the one Somalis were accustomed to before their arrival in Sweden.  
 
Paradoxically, whilst this ‘renegotiation’ amounted to a re-think in traditional Somali gender 
patriarchal patterns, it has also caused of a great deal of consternation in Somali families in 
particular, and within the Somali community in Sweden, at large. Whilst Somali women have 
much to gain from the renegotiation of patriarchy, Somali men who cling to the ‘old’ way 
have much to lose.  
 
10.5 Can Islamophobia be ruled-out? 
 
This research sub-question has located the ‘problem’ of integration that Somalis face squared 
on their cultural ‘divergence’ with native Swedes (e.g., the intensity Somalis attach to the role 
of the ‘family’ and the ‘clan’, the tensions with Islam by Swedish society, and, patriarchal 
render roles and patterns). Nonetheless, this research can conclude that Islamophobia has a 
role in (a) exaggerating these ‘divergences’, and (b) in excluding Somalis (being 
overwhelmingly Muslims) from the socioeconomic and public life of Sweden (cf. Runnymede 
Trust Report on I slamophobia, 1997). Many of the sentiments or issues that were raised 
relating to Islam and Muslims in this research (e.g., the viewing of Islam as a ‘threat’; the 
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associates of Islam with intolerance, violence and terrorism; the perception that Islam stifled 
individual freedoms and liberties; the believe that Muslims women are treated unfair; the 
perceive ‘fear’ of Sharia Law; and, opposition of Muslim veil in public spaces) may all stem 
from or linked to the prevalence of Islamophobia in Sweden (refer to Chapter Eight).      
 
Islamophobia is defined as ‘fear’ and ‘prejudice’; the ‘dread’ or ‘hatred’ of Islam; the ‘fear’ 
and ‘dislike’ of or towards Islam and Muslim (Runnymede, 1997:1-5; Allen, 2010:65). It is 
the demonisation of all Muslims as the ‘other’ irrespective of whether they observe Islam or 
not (Arbetsmarknadsdepartmentet, 2011:8).  It is an ideology that can be equated with racism 
(Allen, 2010), or as Marranci (2004:106) put it, a special, sophisticated form of racism’.  
 
Islamophobia pervades society in Western Europe including Sweden where there is a 
widespread perception that Islam is incompatible with Western culture and values. This is 
underscored by the British Runnymede Trust Report on Islamophobia (1997:5) which argues 
that ‘views’ about Muslims and Islam in Western society is one that is ‘closed’. According to 
this report Islam is seen as monolithic, static and unresponsive to change; Muslims as separate 
and the “other”; Islam as inferior; Muslims as irrational and barbaric; Muslims as the “enemy” 
– and associated with violence, aggression and being supportive of terrorism; Islam is as a 
political ideology with political and militaristic global agenda; and that, prejudices against 
Islam is seen as “natural” and “normal” (Runnymede Trust Report, 1997:10). The latter is 
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reinforced by Allen (2010:1) who argues that ‘Islamophobia is becoming both increasingly 
prevalent and socially acceptable in contemporary Europe’.  
 
Islamophobia is a factor that impinges upon the integration of Muslims (Somalis included) in 
that it is a ‘practice of discrimination against Muslims’, and, the basis of excluding Muslims) 
from the socioeconomic and public life of the nation (see the British Runnymede Trust Report 
on Islamophobia, 1997). These discriminatory practices are encountered in employment and 
housing (refer to chapters Five and Six) and in provisions of services, e.g., health, education, 
etc.  
 
Moreover, Muslims encounter Islamophobia in the media (see below) and in ‘everyday 
conversations’ in the public (Runnymede Trust Report, 1997:11; see Allen & Nielsen, 2002). 
One reason why Islamophobia pervades society is because, Islam is viewed as a ‘challenge’ 
and threat to Western (Swedish) values and life-styles’ (Marranci, 2004:110). Moreover, many 
fear that multiculturalism, if unchecked, would lead to far-reaching consequences. Already, 
there is widespread perception in Sweden and elsewhere in Europe that Muslims cannot 
integrate into society because they (Muslims) are bent on retaining their cultural and religious 
differences, and hence, their inability to integrate. Another ‘threat’ relates to the ‘fear’ of 
Islam ‘transforming’ the ‘face of Europe’, which stems from the ‘growing’ numbers of 
Muslims in Western Europe, thanks to ‘immigration and high birth rates’ (see Coleman, 
2008:252).  
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Islamophobia has become more pronounced since 11 September 2001 attacks in the United 
States (Allen & Nielsen, 2002), where the fight against terrorism has become entangled with 
Islamophobia, exacerbating the already existing suspicion, fear of and hatred against Islam and 
Muslims (Arbetsmarknadsdepartment, 2011: 14). The media has also ‘perpetrates 
islamophobia’ by portraying Islam in negative light (Poole, 2002:41). As Marranci (2004:105) 
confirms, the ‘image of Islam presented to readers and viewers’ is often one that is ‘distorted’ 
and ‘grotesque’, since, little devotion is given to other nuances such as ethnic and cultural 
differences  among Muslims.   
 
Indeed, in Sweden, there is evidence to suggest that hate crimes motivated by Islamophobia 
has increased in recent years. This is illustrated by a crime survey carried out by Brå (2008) 
which reveals that in 2008, there were 600 cases of anti-religious motivated crimes reported to 
Swedish police – twice the cases reported in the preceding year. According to Brå (2008), 
45% of these anti-religious motivated crimes were assessed as Islamophobic, compared to 
28% as ‘other anti-religious motivated crimes’ and 26% as anti-Semitic.   
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10.6 Civic and Political Integration, a lesser priority  
 
As observed, there is less emphasis on the ‘civil and political’ integration of Somalis in this 
research, when compared to their ‘structural’ and ‘cultural’ aspects of integration in Sweden.  
The reason why civic and political aspects of integration was not been dealt with ‘expansively, 
was twofold. First, few research respondents had viewed civic and political aspect of 
integration as apriority, compared to the socioeconomic integration of Somalis in Sweden. 
Second, few Somalis seemed to have achieved firm ties with the host society to warrant them 
to fully engage in/with the civic and political life in Sweden. By civic and political integration 
one means dimensions of ‘citizenship’ that go beyond ‘mere legal status and rights’ (and 
duties) that are enjoyed by Somalis by virtue of being Swedish citizens.  
 
Indeed, many Somali research respondents have affirmed that they had ‘extensive’ legal status 
and rights in Sweden. The examples they gave was legal protection and expansive civil 
liberties – rights they never had in their country of origin. These ‘rights’ also gave them access 
to basic welfare services and provisions, e.g., education, employment, health and social 
security, as citizens. Nonetheless, it was self-evident, as expressed by a number of research 
respondents, that citizenship carries ‘meanings’ that were ‘larger than’ mere legal rights or 
civil liberties (or the mere ability to fulfill some basic criteria in order to acquire Swedish 
citizenship). Citizenship requires a much deeper meaning or feelings, i.e., real ‘participation’ 
and ‘belongingness’ – linking us to two dimensions of citizenship that was alluded to earlier in 
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Chapter Two. It is in these two dimensions that Somalis was said to have fallen short when it 
came to in their civic and political integration in Sweden.  
 
There were a number of factors that were said to have contributed to this lack of civic and 
political integration of Somalis in Sweden. These include, their ‘lack of socioeconomic and 
cultural integration’; ‘clanism’, the ‘ineffectiveness of Somali ethnic organizations’; and the 
‘temporariness’ of (some) Somalis in Sweden. 
 
The lack of socioeconomic integration (e.g., incomes, education, employment, housing, etc) 
by Somalis in Sweden and the prevalence of structural barriers such as unemployment and 
discrimination contributed to the lack of civic and political integration by Somalis in Sweden. 
Furthermore, the lack of cultural integration by Somalis meant they lacked connectivity or 
established forms of reciprocity and trust (i.e., in social relations) with native Swedes – all 
reinforcing the notion that Somalis lacked a ‘deeper sense of belongingness’, ’shared’ identity 
and ’nationhood’ to engage in the civic and political life of Swedish society.  
 
The clan was also lifted as a factor that is a barrier to the ‘participation’ of Somalis in Swedish 
civic and political life. The reason is because Somalis attach great importance to their family 
and clan relationship and their loyalty is first and foremost to these institutions. The ‘family’ 
and the clan obliges Somalis to ‘help’ their members, particularly, those left behind in Somalia 
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or in other Eastern African countries, home to many Somali refugees. This outward focus 
makes Somalis to engage less, civically, in Sweden.  
 
Another factor that could positively influence the civic and political integration of Somalis 
was the role Somalis ethnic organizations could have played – of which they have fallen short 
of. Ideally, ethnic organisations serve important functions in Sweden. They serve as meeting 
points where people meet and discuss their common good. They act as important vehicle to 
mobilise people for specific goals. They act as a medium in which the state communicates its 
(integration) policy to respective ethnic communities.  They also act as ‘potential vehicles’ for 
bridging between ethnic communities and promoting wider social connections (Ager & 
Strang, 2010:591). Thus, ethnic organizations play a decisive role in promoting ‘participatory’ 
citizenship. 
 
To the majority of research respondents, these functions were said to devoid of many Somali 
ethnic organizations in Sweden. They were criticised for not being up to task. Others took 
issues with their ‘sheer numbers’ and their ‘overlapping roles’ in serving the community. As 
one research respondent reinforced, ‘there are simply too many Somali ethnic organisations 
doing the same thing whilst competing for the same clientele’. Moreover, divisions along clan-
lines among Somalis were said to compound the shortcomings of Somali ethnic organizations 
since, they too, are run and ‘organised’ along clan families, reinforcing the well-established 
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divisions within Somalian community, thereby, counteracting the aims of the Swedish 
government.     
 
Last but not least, the ‘temporariness’ in Sweden was another factor that was said to influence 
the civic and political participation in Sweden. This relates to the propensity of Somalis to 
relocate to a third country they deemed was favourable to Somalian cultural and religious 
practices (see ‘Resisters’, above). For civic and political integration to occur, it requires 
Somalis to ‘psychologically’ invest in Sweden. They should not view Sweden as ‘home’ and 
not a transitory location from where they could ‘come and go’, to use the paraphrase of one 
research respondent.  
 
In all, it can be concluded that, ‘real’ civic engagement or political participation requires the 
acquisition of some deeper feelings, i.e., of participation, belongingness, share values, identity 
and nationhood. These were yet to be achieved by Somalis in Sweden.   
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10.7 Policy Recommendations 
 
This research concludes by providing a number of recommendations and suggestions which it 
hopes would go s ome way in helping with the smooth transition of Somalis immigrants in 
Sweden. The research makes the following recommendations: the need for a mentorship or 
apprenticeship programme; a more vigorous monitoring programme to counter institutional 
discrimination; the need to understand and appreciate ‘divergent’ cultures; the need to review 
the  ‘over-emphasis’ on the ‘individual’ in Swedish integration policy, by taking into account 
the world-view of collectivist clan-based minorities like Somalis; the need for a debate on 
Swedish integration policy itself, which is egalitarian in orientation; the need to involve 
‘native’ Swedes (private citizens) in Swedish integration policy as ‘co-owners’ of immigrant 
integration; and, the need to focus and allocate resources towards to help integrate Somali 
youths into Swedish society. 
 
First and foremost, this research acknowledges the enormous problems that Somalis face in 
integrating into Swedish society. The problems are both individual (low or inappropriate 
education, lack of experience, etc) and structural (e.g., unemployment, discrimination, etc). If 
these problems were to be surmounted, they have to be tackled both on t he individual and 
structural levels.  
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On the individual (as well as structural) level, access to the labour market can be identified as 
a prime integrative dilemma for Somalis in Swedish society. Many Somalis seem to be 
incapable of fulfilling one important requirement presented by Swedish labour market, i.e., its 
need for a skilled work force. As previously noted, even when it comes to menial jobs, 
Somalis with no, or low educational levels, stand disadvantaged as these jobs are relatively 
competitive.   
 
One way of overcoming this problem, at least in the short term, is to offer ‘disadvantaged’ 
Somalis a mentorship or apprenticeship programme through the Swedish Labour Market 
Board (AMS) or their municipalities. The programmes could simulate real-work environments 
and could take place in both private and public enterprises. Through such a programme, 
Somalis could receive not only the necessary guidance, supervision and advice from their 
mentors but they could also learn and gain the ‘skills’ that could help them compete for jobs in 
the labour market. They could also acquire referees for their job-seeking process through such 
a programme. 
 
On housing and the problem of residential segregation, this research acknowledges the 
complexity of the problems Somalis face. The reason is because housing issues are mainly 
market and structurally driven. For that matter Somalis will need to improve their socio-
economic status if they were to integrate residentially with native Swedes or if they were to 
move from the residentially-segregated suburbs (e.g., Rinkeby and Tensta) into other less 
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segregated suburbs in Stockholm. On the individual level, Somalis can still try to influence or 
depart from what kept many of them in segregated suburbs, i.e., their ‘preference’ of living in 
close proximity with one another, by moving to less segregated suburbs. Whether that happens 
or not remains to be seen.       
 
To counter institutional discrimination in the labour market and housing, a much more 
vigorous enforcement of existing laws is required. One recommendation from this research is 
for the Swedish Ombudsman against Discrimination (DO), trade unions, employer 
organisations and tenant representatives to set up a joint task force to study, monitor and come 
up with proposals on how institutional discrimination in respective sectors could be tackled. 
One possible outcome could be, to have liaison officers sent into the field to identify, and, 
engage with those potential victims of discrimination and to encourage the latter to report 
incidences of injustices to the authorities concerned more frequently. Indeed, there are many 
unreported incidents, and hence, the need for these officers to become more proactive.      
 
Secondly, the emphasis on i mmigrant integration should not entirely focus, or become 
primarily limited to, socio-economic integration such as the acquisition of Swedish language 
competence, education, employment and residential integration with mainstream society. 
Whilst these spheres are important, the emphasis on ways to ‘engage’ with peoples’ 
(immigrants’) ‘cultures’ and ‘religions’ should be given equal consideration. Until now, these 
latter phenomena have been relegated to the private domain. Policy makers have ‘pretended’ 
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as though these spheres (cultural and religious ‘differences’) are non-existent. The ‘reality’ is, 
as this research has demonstrated, that ‘culture’ and ‘religion’ are central to the lives of 
minorities like Somalis. Their whole essence revolves round these two spheres. These two 
phenomena are also critical in determining the degree to which a group is accepted or rejected 
in Sweden.  
 
It is the contention of this research that people’s cultural practices and religious beliefs are so 
decisive that, they often impact on outcomes (or indicators of integration) such as education, 
employment and housing. In the case of Somalis in Stockholm, this research has identified 
cases where Somalis ‘refused’ to take up certain jobs in the labour market out of their religious 
convictions, e.g., those that handled or processed certain animal products (see Chapter Five). 
This research has also identified the linkage between ‘individual preferences’ (or ‘self-
segregation’), segregated suburbs, and the ‘cultural’ and ‘religious’ needs of Somalis. This 
relates to where Somalis are drawn to segregated suburbs because it is ‘only’ in those areas 
their religious and cultural needs (and those of their children) can be served or met. 
 
This research does not suggest that ‘cultural integration’ or ‘assimilation’ should be the 
answer to eradicate the ‘integrative dilemmas’ encountered in the spheres of culture and 
religion. Rather, it suggests that policy makers should become aware of how peoples’ 
‘cultures’ and ‘religions’ impact or influences their orientation towards the prevailing system 
of Swedish integration. By ‘including’ peoples’ ‘cultures’ and ‘religion’ into policy objectives, 
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policy makers could achieve an integrated, holistic approach to the question of immigrant 
integration. In practice, however, this may be difficult to implement given that ‘culture’ and 
‘religion’ are contentious, and hence, problematic.    
 
Thirdly, the over-emphasis on t he ‘individual’ (e.g., individual rights, self-reliance, etc) in 
Swedish integration policy needs a review, especially, where a collectivist clan-based minority 
like that of Somalis is concerned. In such a community (at least in so far as f irst generation 
immigrants are concerned), the ‘individual’ cannot be divorced from his/her group since the 
two are closely interlinked and interdependent. Some modifications or at least understanding 
of how certain groups work, behave, etc, would be necessary. For the integration of groups 
like Somalis to be effective the ‘dilemma’ arising from the emphasis on the ‘individual’ as 
opposed to the ‘group’ has to be looked into.   
 
Fourthly, there is a need for a debate on Swedish integration policy itself, which is egalitarian 
in orientation, and for good reasons. Should it be so egalitarian? Should it ‘overlook’ the real 
differences between individuals and groups in society, as it currently does? From this 
researcher’s viewpoint, there is a need to update existing policy so as to realise and respond to 
the different ‘realities’ individual immigrants and groups face in Sweden. There has to be a 
realisation that people do not ‘start from the same starting line’. The educated Hungarian and 
the uneducated Somali from a rural pastoralist background, for example, are treated the same 
by Swedish integration policy. The two would be expected to take the same ‘path’ of 
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integration and expected to do so at the same pace. It is clear that the educated Hungarian has 
of course many advantages over the uneducated rural Somali. S/he would gain quicker access 
to the socioeconomic and cultural life of the host society. S/he would not be constrained by the 
cultural and religious ‘baggage’ in the same way as the Somali (even educated Somalis, for 
that matter) does.   
 
Fifthly, there is need to involve ‘native’ Swedes (private citizens) more fully in Swedish 
integration policy. Contemporary Swedish integration policy is often viewed as a top-down 
approach with little support or input from the population. Indeed, greater public support for 
Swedish integration policy could be invigorated through the dissemination of information 
about the plight of people coming into Sweden, and through their direct participation 
(volunteering, etc). Involving ‘native’ citizens as ‘co-owners’ of Swedish integration policy 
would make them more sympathetic and supportive of Swedish integration and multicultural 
policies than is the case today. ‘Shutting’ them out of the debate, and not bringing forth or 
accommodating them can have dire consequences. This was vividly demonstrated in the recent 
(September 2010) Swedish elections where the right wing Swedish Democratic Party’s 
(Sverigedemokraterna) anti-immigration campaign has struck a chord with a sizeable section 
of the electorate, enabling it for the first time to gain a parliamentary mandate in Sweden.  
 
Moreover, Swedish integration policy should be based on a new, more comprehendible, 
premise and attainable goals in line with what ordinary citizens would like it to be. Authorities 
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should, for example, encourage forums in which representatives of immigrants and ‘native’ 
Swedes can be brought together to discuss and make joint recommendations to alleviate the 
situation of powerlessness among ‘native’ Swedes, who often feel their concerns and inputs 
are not addressed.    
 
Last but not least, focus and resources should be directed towards integrating Somali youths 
into Swedish society. Future integration by Somalis would depend on t heir youngsters 
becoming embedded within the wider Swedish society. Young people are generally more 
receptive to the prevailing system of integration in Sweden. Their attitude towards the host 
society is more positive and forthcoming as they carry less cultural baggage than their parents 
in general. The acceptability by the host society would also be more likely with Somali youths 
once they ‘proved’ themselves in terms of positive educational and labour market outcomes.  
 
10.8 Contribution to Knowledge 
 
This research is among the first qualitative studies that explores the integration of Somali 
refugees into Swedish society. This study should thus be viewed as a pioneering piece of 
research that contributes to our understanding and knowledge about Somalis, a minority group 
that many in Sweden do not know much about, thanks partly to their relative short period of 
residency in Sweden, and partly because of their socio-economic and cultural ‘distance’ from 
‘native’ Swedes. Moreover, because there is limited literature available on Somalis in Sweden, 
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this research does go some way in addressing the prevalent dearth of literature/knowledge 
about Somalis in Sweden. 
 
Furthermore, in deploying and using extensive quotes from respondents, this research has 
given a voice to the voiceless. It brings forth the experiences, perceptions and meanings of 
people who are normally ‘absent’ from the deliberations of issues that directly affects their 
lives. As alluded to previously, Swedish integration policy is egalitarian in orientation, and 
hence, accords little or no attention to ‘differences’. In line with the recommendations this 
research has put forward, it would, therefore, be important for policy makers to ‘hear’ people’s 
voices and understand their ‘psychology’ in order to be effective in their roles as ‘change’ 
agents, and to bring about the positive change or outcome, not least in education, labour 
market, housing, etc., where Somalis are most disadvantaged.    
 
This research also contributed to our methodological knowledge by pointing out that access by 
male researchers to Somali women is constrained by cultural and religious factors. This could 
also be viewed as a l imitation of this research. Indeed, it is a knowledge that helps future 
researchers to be aware and one in which they could build upon or need to focus upon when 
dealing with Somalis. Female researchers wanting to engage with Somali male respondents 
would also find similar constraints.    
 
417 
 
As this research attests, all but two women (seven out of nine) interviewed were interviewed 
in their homes or premises of their choice (e.g., at a friend’s and a relative’s home, and often, 
in the residence of other women). Understandably, most Somali women interviewees objected 
to the idea of being interviewed in a restaurant. Presumably, many of these Somali women 
were ‘uncomfortable’ to be ‘seen’ together with other men, especially ‘strangers’ (such as a 
researcher) in public places. Many women may also have shied away from situations where 
other customers could overhear their conversations (i.e., interviews). The seemingly lack of 
confidence may partly be explained by t he social control mechanisms inherent in Somali 
culture pertaining to gender relations (for more, see C hapter Nine). This research was thus 
obliged to negotiate access in a w ay that was ‘acceptable’ to the values of (‘majority of’) 
Somalis when access to interview Somali women was sought. Nonetheless, it was an issue that 
was not overcome as adequately as had been initially desired.   
   
Another issue of cultural sensitivity pertaining to Somali women regarded their objection to 
tape-recorded. Many Somali women (six out of nine) refused their interviews to be tape-
recorded. It was plausible that they would not let a stranger (a researcher) store their 
conversations. A onetime encounter was certainly not enough to accord a stranger that 
privilege. This is also what future researchers have to take onboard if they wish to undertake 
qualitative research involving Somali women.    
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Moreover, the fact that only nine out of twenty eight Somali respondents were women 
illustrates the difficulties of gaining access to Somali women (by a male researcher) relative to 
their male counterparts, who were not as culturally constrained.   
  
Overall, the originality of this research lies with the raising of ‘integrative’ dilemmas facing 
Somalis in Sweden, particularly, as t hey relate to socio-economic (employment and 
education), cultural (including gender issues) and religious spheres of society. This may help 
policy makers to gain understanding and focus on t hese issues in their endeavour to help 
Somalis integrate into society. It is, however, for future researchers to focus on s pecific 
spheres (or particular ‘integrative dilemma’) in order to increase knowledge and help 
overcome the prevalent dearth of knowledge about the integration of Somalis in Sweden.  
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Appendix 1 
 
A Note on ‘Race’ and ‘Racism’ in Sweden  
It is important to note why there has not been an explicit emphasis on ‘race’, ‘racism’ and 
‘anti-racist’ perspectives in this research.  This does not imply that one cannot find examples 
of racist attitudes or behaviour in Swedish society.  Indeed, ‘institutional’ forms of prejudice 
and discrimination are discussed in Chapter Seven.  The absence of an explicit ‘racist’ 
discourse does not imply an uncritical acceptance of the assumption that Sweden is a nation 
‘without racism’.  Rather, it reflects the difficulty of using a framework of this kind in a 
society in which race is seen as an inappropriate term of reference.  Within Sweden and within 
Swedish literature inequalities in power tend to be viewed through the prism of ethnicity, class 
and gender rather than ‘race’, which is seen as a problematic or even inappropriate concept 
(see Sawyer, 2008; Mausoud, 2009; De los Reyes, 2001).  
 
The term racism implies a ‘hierarchy of superiority’, based primarily on ‘physical or innate 
hereditary characteristics and extended to cultural or religious characteristics’ (see Mausud, 
2009:1).   I t is underpinned by the notion that non-European ‘races’ are inferior (Anthias, et 
al., 1992:12). It is an ideology that seeks to secure that it is systematic, and involves ‘the 
ability to impose’ one’s ‘beliefs or worldview’ as ‘hegemonic’ whilst at the same time 
‘denying others their basic rights and equality’ (Yuval-Davis (1992:16, as cited in Masoud, 
2009:1).   
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Racist ideology has bedeviled European history both in the past and in the present.  It has been 
the basis for European colonial exploitation and slavery from the eighteenth century; it was the 
central ideology that triggered and sustained Nazism in Europe; and, in more recent years, has 
been used as a r ationale for restricting non-European immigration into Europe and for 
exclusionary policies being adopted towards non-European ethnic groups already residing in 
Europe (Masoud, 2009:14). 
 
In modern day Sweden it should be noted that the term ‘race’ is virtually a taboo.  This reflects 
a common assumption that the term lacks validity, and that ‘racist’ attitudes and practices are 
rarely to be found.   Few ever mention it or admit that it is prevalent in society though it does, 
interestingly, surface in the popular crime fiction of authors such as Mankel and Larsson.  The 
term race is absent in day-to-day conversations and also in academic discourse where one 
might have expected more  in-depth analysis of the ‘term’; discussions of the ‘phenomenon’ 
itself, its prevalence and the measures to combat it in society (cf. Sawyer, 2008; Kamali, 2005; 
Molina, 1977; De los Reyes, 2001).    
 
Indeed, Sweden comes across as a nation which has attempted to delete the concept of race 
(see Prep (2002), cited in Sawyer, 2008:90) from its vocabulary. Indeed, it is a ‘self-image’ 
that Sweden has tried ‘hard to build’ since World War Two.   Sweden has prided itself on the 
notion that it is a nation built upon i nternationalism, humanism, solidarity and colour-
blindness (Sawyer, 2008:90).  T his argument is strengthened by t he fact that since 1945 
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Sweden has   a ‘generous and liberal history of receiving and welcoming refugees’ (Diakité, 
2006:3). Moreover, Sweden has always identified itself and actively supported, both morally 
and materially, international struggles for freedom and justice. For example, Sweden was in 
the vanguard of the opposition towards the war in Vietnam, and in challenging apartheid in 
South Africa.  F urthermore, the contemporary ‘self-image’ of Sweden can be linked to its 
unique welfare model and its  concept of the peoples’ home (folkhemmet) – a social 
engineered society based on e quality, participation and belongingness that is said to be the 
hallmark of the good family. Accordingly, race and racism had no place in modern Sweden.   
 
By cultivating this ‘self-image’ of being ‘a place without race’  Sweden has tended to view  
‘race’ and ‘racism’ as something applicable to countries other than their own, e.g., the UK, 
USA, Australia, France, Germany, Eastern European countries, etc., (cf. Sawyer, 2008). As a 
consequence, those forms of ‘racist’ behavior that are to be found within Sweden have tended 
to be attributed to the actions of individuals or small groups (e.g., skinheads and extremists) on 
the fringes of society –, or to borrow from Lentin (2004:427), as ‘something’ that is typically 
described as ‘an individual problem’, that has been allowed to manifest itself because of 
inappropriate socialization or psychological disturbance.   
 
This positive self image of a non-racist society can mean that racist activities are unrecognized 
or under-reported.  Certainly, there are a number of examples of what could be described as 
overtly ‘racist activities’ in Swedish society.  These include the rise of explicitly anti-
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immigration rhetoric and violence (Sawyer, 2008); the tendency to still describe  second 
generation immigrants as “immigrants” rather than Swedish citizens and, the ‘fact that many 
institutions’ (e.g., the civil service, universities, etc) ‘remain extremely ethnically 
homogeneous’ (Diakité, 2006:3-6). The emergence of populist, racist parties (most recently, 
the Swedish Democratic Party ,or Sverigedemokraterna, which has managed to scoop a 
sizeable electoral vote enabling it to break through the 4% threshold necessary to win 
parliamentary representation for the first time, in 2010) also indicates that ‘racism’ may be on 
the rise in Sweden.   Moreover, there are clear examples of ‘racist’ policies even in Sweden’s 
recent history.   T he infamous Racial Hygiene Institute (established in 1922) oversaw the 
sterilisation of 60,000 Swede between 1935 - 1974 because they were deemed ‘undesirable’, 
‘insufficient’ and ‘deviant’ (Geddes, 2003:120; see Amstrong, 1997; Lennerhed, 1997). 
 
There is little in the form of explicitly anti-racist legislation in Sweden. As Diakité (2006:6) 
argues, there are few ‘anti-racist’ clauses in major Swedish policy areas, e.g., in education, 
labour market, housing, etc.  There are no independent monitoring systems of recruitment 
practices in for example the civil service or other public agencies which might highlight 
discriminatory practice (see Diakité, 2006:6). This can be contrasted to the UK for example, , 
where, as Lentin (2004:427) confirms, anti-racism is a dominant discourse: where the subject 
of ‘racism’ is extensively studied in academic circles; where equal opportunity rights are 
emphasized and are an integral part in UK public institutions, in their dealings with members 
of ethnic minorities groups; and where ‘race’ and ‘racism’ are frequently deliberated in British 
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media and political circles. Masoud (2009:56) attributes the latter to UK’s ‘long’ and 
‘proactive anti-racist tradition’. 
 
The absence of anti-racist legislation in Sweden is linked to the following. First, given that 
‘egalitarianism’ is such a key principle within Swedish society it is thought that ‘no racial 
problems’ can exist and that there is no need for anti-racist legislation. Second, there is a fear 
that any anti-racist legislation that might be enacted runs the risk of favouring one group over 
another, thereby undermining the egalitarian and universal underpinning of Swedish society.  
The latter can be illustrated by the sensitivity surrounding suggestions that  affirmative action 
might be needed to increase the participation of ethnically disadvantaged groups in Sweden, 
which would contravene a basic Swedish law (SFS2003:307), that prohibits ethnic and other 
forms of discrimination in employment (Diakité, 2006:5).  
 
Finally, the lack of an explicitly race oriented framework in this thesis is not intended to 
suggest that there is no racism in Swedish society.  Rather, it is a reflection of the fact that it 
does not surface in an explicit way.  C ertainly, neither my Somalian respondents nor the 
Swedish officials referred to racism (with a few exceptions) explicitly in their interviews or 
believed it was a k ey factor in everyday interactions.  However, it should be noted that 
attention was drawn where appropriate to forms of ‘discriminatory’ practice that could be 
construed as having racial’ undertones (see Chapter Seven). 
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Appendix 2 
 
Rinkeby and Tensta as shown in the Old Administrative Map of Stockholm 
 
 
Source: http://www2.humangeo.su.se/kartografi/kg1/ovn4_text.htm, Date 
accessed 10/10/08 
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Appendix 3 
 
Consent Form 
 
           CONSENT FORM                                Date:      
YES NO 
1. Have you read the information about this research outlying research  
    aims, research questions, methods to be used as well as its overall  
    plan?  
  
2. Have you received enough information about the study to decide  
    whether you want to take part? 
  
3. Do you understand that you are free to refuse to answer any question?   
4. Do you understand that you may withdraw from the study at any given  
    time without giving your reasons? 
  
 
5. Do you know that the researcher will treat all information as 
confidential? 
  
 
6. Do you agree to take part in the study? 
  
 
Signiture:                                                                     Name:                                                                          
                   
I confirm that quotations from the interview can be used in the final research report and other 
publications. I understand that these will be used anonymously        
Signature:                                                                     Name:                                                
Courtesy: Arksey & Knight (1999:131) 
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Appendix 4 
Ethical Considerations  
 
The researcher took ethical considerations into account when conducting this research. The 
researcher was aware that he was dealing with people. He was thus sensitive of their rights, 
concerns and feelings, at all time. As a m atter of rule, the researcher always started by 
providing a full explanation of the research to help individuals make an informed decision. In 
addition, as a way to allay some of the ‘fears’ (suspicion, etc) respondents may have towards 
the research, the researcher always reassured respondents that their identities would be 
protected. Accordingly, all the names of the respondents in this research had to be fictitious. 
Thus, all efforts were made by ensuring that respondents could not be identifiable ‘by others’ 
from the stories they shared with the researcher.  
 
The researcher drew inspiration from Arksey & Knights’ (1999:129-130) ‘ethical checklist’ by 
ensuring that the respondents were aware of the following: 
1. The purpose and the nature of study, including the research methods and timing. 
2. The anticipated benefits, risk or costs (for those taking part in the study, and also the 
wider society). 
3. Contact details of the researcher, and the research base. 
4.  The sort of questions being asked, and how long the interview should take. 
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5. The right of not answering specific questions, or of changing their mind by 
withdrawing from the research altogether. 
6. The degree of anonymity and confidentiality; what information will be disclosed, for 
what purposes and to whom; and, the use of quotations. 
7. Arrangement to safeguard confidentiality. 
 
The researcher also drew heavily from the ‘codes of ethics and ethical guidelines’ provided by 
two professional associations to their members, namely, the Social Research Association 
(SRA) and the British Sociological Association (BSA). For more, refer to their respective 
websites:  (http://www.the-sra.org.uk) and (http://www.brisoc.org.uk).  
 
Specific Steps  
 
The ethical issues considered by this researcher in the course of doing this research included:  
• Voluntary and informed consent 
• Confidentiality and anonymity 
• Detrimental harm 
• Power relationship 
• The relevant Swedish legislation. 
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We explore these in more details. 
 
Voluntary and Informed Consent: 
 
It was important that all respondents understood the process that the researcher requested them 
to engage. The researcher explained the research both in verbal and written form. This 
explanation covered the nature and the overall plan of the research, the purpose of research, 
the research methods, as w ell as the consequences and risks the research might entail. The 
researcher made it clear to respondents that their participation was voluntary and that they had 
the right to withdraw from their participation at any time.  
 
The respondents were requested to sign a voluntary consent form to ensure that they were 
happy with the information they received about the research; that they were aware of their 
rights, and were able to confirm that they wished to be involved in the process they were asked 
to engage in (cf. Arksey & Knight, 1999:131).  
 
The researcher conducted all but four of the interviews with individual Somali respondents in 
Somali (of those four, three were conducted in English and one in Swedish). The researcher 
also conducted the focus group meeting in Somali. The reason was because most respondents 
felt comfortable in conversing in Somali rather than in English or Swedish. The latter were 
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considered as inhibitive. It was the researcher hope, therefore, that the use of Somali language 
eliminated the possibility for misunderstanding and misinterpretation that would otherwise 
have arisen if interviews with Somali respondents were conducted in English or Swedish.    
 
Confidentiality and Anonymity: 
   
As a qualified social worker with several years experience of work experience, the researcher 
was well aware of the importance of upholding confidentiality (as demanded, often by the 
law). Accordingly, the researcher ensured the anonymity and privacy of respondents were 
respected; and, that personal information concerning respondents was kept confidential. As 
noted previously, one method of ensuring anonymity was the use of fictitious names for all 
respondents. 
 
Detrimental Harm:  
 
The researcher aimed to protect respondents from undue harm as a result of their participation 
in this research. In line with research ethical principles, the respondents of this research were 
not subjected to any deliberate harm. No undue psychological pressure was exerted at any 
time. On the contrary respondents were made to feel ‘comfortable’ prior to, in the course of, 
and, after the interviews. Their informed consent was always sought in advance; there were no 
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intrusive questions; and, respondents were not deceived overtly or covertly to ensure they 
participates in the research.   
 
Power Relationship: 
 
The researcher was aware of disparities in power and status between him and some 
respondents, especially, Somali women. The researcher aimed from the outset to cultivate 
mutual trust and integrity with all respondents. All respondents were, for example, encouraged 
to speak out of any uneasiness with the research, the types of questions asked, the way the 
questions were put to them, the rendezvous, etc. The researcher conveyed an impression that 
he was ‘equal’ (in status) to the respondents both in his tone of language and deeds. 
 
As a ‘fellow Somali’, the researcher could only speculate that Somali respondents regarded 
him as an ‘insider’ and therefore less intimidating. Nonetheless, the researcher was also fully 
aware of the importance of maintaining his ‘distance’ in order to portray a sense of objectivity. 
The researcher thus attempted to strike the right balance, knowing when to ‘appear’ ‘friendly’ 
and when to withdraw. 
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The Relevant Swedish Legislation:  
 
In Sweden ethical vetting is required if the research involves human beings. The aim of the 
‘Act concerning the Ethical Review of Research Involving Humans (2003:460)’ is to protect 
individuals and human dignity when conducting research. In particular, sections 3-4 of the Act 
(2003:460), stipulates that researchers working in following areas must seek ethical vetting in 
Sweden: 
1. Sensitive personal data as defined by section 13 of the Personal data act (1998:204). 
2. Personal data concerning offences against the law including crimes, judgements in 
criminal cases, coercive penal procedural measures or administrative deprivation of 
liberty as defined in section 21 of the Personal Data Act.    
3. Physical intervention affecting a person who is participating in the research. 
4. Research that is conducted in accordance with a method intended to physically or 
mentally influence a person who is participating in the research. 
5. Studies that concern biological material that has been taken from a living person and 
that can be traced back to that person. 
6. Research that involves physical intervention upon a deceased person.  
7. Research that pertains to biological material that has been taken for medical purposes 
from a deceased person and can be traced back to that person.    
Source: http://www.epn.se/start/regulations/the-act-(2003460).aspx, Date accessed 12/06/06  
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This Research 
 
This researcher was not required to adhere to the above in order to conduct his research. 
Indeed, the researcher contacted a member of the Ethics Committee in Stockholm, Sweden – 
someone knowledgeable about the ethical process in Sweden. The researcher was informed by 
this person that in his opinion an ethical review was not necessary in the case of this research, 
as long as, an ‘informed consent’ was sought from, and granted, by the subjects (respondents) 
of research.  
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Appendix 5 
Aide Mémoire 
• Migration and resettlement  
• Integration 
• Formal contact/cordiality with Swedish officials 
• Language and communicative competence 
• Education 
• Work 
• Area/place of domicile 
• Social network 
• Interaction with native Swedes/ Social connectivity with members of the Swedish 
community 
• Residential segregation 
• Service provision in the neighbourhood, e.g., education, health, and, housing 
• Perception of ethnic discrimination, xenophobia and racism (including institutional 
racism) 
• Cultural arena 
• Negative fame (prompted for issues such as stigmatisation /stereotyping/ unfavourable 
characterizations) 
• Portrayal in media and political discourse 
• Gender (bone of contention; empowerment; changing roles, etc) 
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• Youth (embody the future) 
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Appendix 6 
The New Administrative Map of Stockholm (see Skärholmen; Kungsholmen, 
Norrmalm and Södermalm). 
 
 
 
Source: SCB/USK, 2008. 
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Appendix 7 
 
A Map showing the Location of Märsta 
 
 
 
 
Source: http://www.weather-forecast.com/locationmaps/marsta3.8.jpg, Date 
accessed (17/11/10). 
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Appendix 8 
 
Some Communes (including Solna) in Greater Stockholm   
 
 
 
Source: http://www.google.co.uk/search?hl=en&q=map+of+stockholm&um,  
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Appendix 9 
Map of Sweden 
 
Source: http://www.travelblog.org/Europe/Sweden/map-of-sweden.html, Date accessed 
(10/10/08). 
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Appendix 10 
Swedish‘Official’ Respondents 
NAME SEX ORGANISATION ROLES/RESPONSIBILITIES 
Björn M Rinkeby Social 
District 
Employment advisor (Labour 
Market Section, Adult 
Services).  
Elisabet F Migration Office An Immigration Officer. Had 
previous worked as a social 
worker in Rinkeby.  
Eriksson M Märsta Commune/ 
Social District 
Social Worker, Social Assist-
ance [Economic] Section.  
Eva F Rinkeby Social 
District 
Youth Employment Advisor. 
Liaisons closely with the local 
Employment Exchange 
Office. 
Göran M Rinkeby Social 
District 
Refugee Coordinator. 
Responsible for the 
’introduction’ of newcomers. 
Helena F Migration Office Immigration Officer. Had 
previously worked as a social 
worker in Rinkeby. 
Maria F Rinkeby Social 
District 
Coordinates literacy courses 
for refugees. 
Mona F Rinkeby Social 
District 
Social Worker, Social Assist-
ance [Economic] Section. 
Oskarsson M Swedish 
Integration Office 
Ethnic Associations’ Liaison 
Officer 
Sara F Skärholmen Social 
District 
Social Worker, Assessment 
and Referral Section, Adult 
Services.  
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Appendix 11 
 
Crime Statistics: Comparison between City of Stockholm and Rinkeby-Kista 
(2007). No/1000. 
City of Stockholm  Rinkeby – Kista Area 
Type of Crime  Number/incidence Number./1000 Number/incidence Number./1000 
Crime against 
life & health 
10 942   13,8      
 
 657           
 
 14,5 
Outdoors   6 016       7,6     311 6,8  
Indoors 4 926    6,2     346            7,6  
Crime against 
liberty and 
peace 
 
11 604   
 
14,6 
 
1 026 
 
22,6 
Threat 5 822      7,3 549  12,1  
Molestation   4 354     
 
 5,5 372 8,2 
‘Disturbing the 
Peace’ 
1 428   
 
1,8 105 2,3  
 
Sexual offenses 947    1,2 59 1,3 
Exhibitionist 131    0,2 8 0,2 
Sexual 
molestation 
556  0,7 29 0,6  
 
Rape 260   0,3 22 0,5  
Property crime 17 963   33,5 1 367 30,1  
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Theft of 
vehicles 
9 549   12,1   471  10,4  
Burglary 3 977      5  302  6,6  
‘Stealing from 
a person’ 
8 366    10,6  231  5,1 
’Stealing from 
a shop’ 
178     
 
0,2  
 
 14  
 
0,3  
 
‘Robbing from 
a person’ 
733     
 
0,9    
 
66  
 
1,5  
 
Other property 
crime 
3 704    4,7 283 6,2 
Damages  29 912    37,9  1 926  42,4 
Graffiti 15 642   19,8  761  16,7  
‘Other’ 
Damages 
14 270   18,1  1 165  25,6  
 
Drugs 11 284    14,2  627 13,8  
Total 82 652   115,3  5 662   124,5 
 
Source: www.stockholm.se/PageFiles/119380/Rinkeby-Kista.pdf, Date accessed 11/10/2009.                      
Translated from Swedish by the Author. 
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Appendix 12 
Somali Clan Chart 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Developed as part of this Study. 
Digil Rahanwein Dir Isaq Hawiye Darod 
Tuni Siyyeedd Sagaal 
Issa Samaroon
 
Bimaal 
Dulbahante 
Majerteen 
Warsangli 
Ogaden 
Marehan 
Gurreh Degodia Ajoran Murule 
 
Habir Gedir Sheikal Abgal 
Habar Awal Habar Jaelo Habar Yoonis 
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Appendix 13 
 
‘Specific Global Incidents’: Cited Examples 
 
The following examples were cited by Swedish ‘official’ respondents as ‘global incidents’ that 
‘inflamed’ relations between Muslims and the West. They include the Rushdie Affairs, the 
slaying of Theo Van Gogh in the Netherlands, the Danish Cartoons depicting Prophet 
Mohamed, as well as Sweden’s own Lars Vilks, who also depicted the Prophet.    
 
The Rushdie Affairs followed the publication of his book the Satanic Verses in 1988 in which 
the prophet of Islam, Mohamed and his members of family were portrayed in ‘a postmodern 
satirical style’ (Slaughter, 1993: 153). The Satanic Verses was construed by Muslims to mean 
the Quran, which is blasphemous in Islam. The controversies (including riots in many parts of 
the world) surrounding the publication of the Satanic Verses culminated in a Fatwa or 
‘religious sentence’ by the late Ayatullah Khomeini of Iran calling on all Muslims to kill the 
author, Salman Rushdie, a Britt of Indian origin (Chakravorty, 1995:2216) 
 
In the Netherlands, Theo Van Gogh a filmmaker was murdered by a man of Moroccan origins 
for making his controversial film, Submission, which was highly critical about the position and 
treatment of women in Islamic societies. Theo Van Gogh collaborated with Ayaan Hersi Ali, a 
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Somali-born former Dutch parliamentarian who is herself highly critical of Islam. What 
inflamed Muslim sensibility about the film was that it used verses of the Quran against the 
background of a ‘half-naked woman’ (see Brockes, the Guardian, 08/05/2010).  
 
A third example that surfaced at the time of the interviews (with research respondents) but 
whose controversy took months to ferment before it developed into a major global incident 
was that of the so called Mohamed’s caricatures in which the Danish newspaper Jylland-
Posten (JP) published twelve cartoons by Cartoonist Kurt Westergaard who depicted Prophet 
Mohamed, with, among others, a bomb in his turbine to insinuate the terrorist association with 
Muslims (see, Ziebertz, & Riegel, 2008). The newspaper justified its publication as a means to 
contribute to the debate pertaining to the criticism of Islam and to demonstrate the self-
imposed, self-sponsorship in the press in matters regarding Islam. These publications caused a 
storm in many Muslim countries and in some case led to the loss of lives and properties, as a 
consequence.   
 
Sweden’s own controversy came when Lars Vilks, a Swedish cartoonist depicted the Prophet 
Mohamed as roundabout dog. Lars’ cartoon was first published by Örebro based newspaper 
Nerikes Allehanda (NA) and latter by other newspaper in solidarity with Lars and the editor of 
NA, when the latter received death threats. Nonetheless, although the Lars’ drawing did 
created some demonstrations, their scope and effects were muted in comparison to those 
triggered by the Danish Cartoonist, Kurt Westergaard.   
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Appendix 14 
The Somali Research Respondents 
 
 Name  Age Sex Duration 
in 
Sweden * 
Education     Current 
Work Status:  
E¤. (P/T;F/T) 
Temp. 
U¤¤ 
No. of 
Years of 
economic 
‘Inactivity’ 
** 
 
Somalia Sweden 
Abdiwahid 33 M 15 Sec. Ed. Univ. 
student 
S 2 
Abdirashid 51 M 30 Sec. Ed. Bsc.  
(Comp. 
sci).  
E (F/T) 2 
Hanan 42 M 15  Bsc. 
(Nat.Sci.) 
Msc..(Pol. 
& Deci.).  
E (F/T) 5 
Muktar 44 M 14½ None None E (Temp) 8 
Mariam 30 F 9½ Pri. Ed.  Nurs. aux.  
ass’t. 
E (F/T) 5 
Awer 42 M 18 Sec. Ed. BEng. E (F/T) 7 
Diriye 40 M 13 Pri. Ed. None E (F/T) 8 
Hirab 55 M 16½ LLB NDC P/E (F/T)  13 
Anab 33 F 15½ Pri. Ed. None E (Temp) 9 
Hassan 37 M 16 Sec. Ed. BSET E (F/T) 1½ 
Jelle 53 M 16 Pri. Ed. None E (F/T) 2 
Ahmed 42 M 13 Sec. Ed. NDC E (Temp) 7 
Isir 32 F 10 Pri. Ed. Nurs. aux. 
ass’t. 
E (Temp) 5 
Abshir 40 M 13½ Sec. Ed. Ms.(Eco.) U 10 
478 
 
Adow 22 M 4 None None U 4 
Bashir 35 M 15 Sec. Ed. None U 9 
Amin 36 M 13 Post. 
Sec. Ed. 
Bsc. (Eco). E (F/T) 5 
Farhiya 43 F 5 None None U 5 
Barni 36 F 10 None None U 10 
Safia 23 F 3 Pri. Ed. None U 3 
Iman 25 F 7 Pri. Ed. None U 6 
Rukiya 29 F 13 Pri. Ed. None U 10 
Abdirizak 33 M 15 Pri. Ed. Bsc. (Eco.) U 2 
Saadia 19 F 12 N/A Sec. Edu. S 1 
Fanan 45 M 13 None None U 12 
Irshad 41 M 10 Sec. Ed NDC P/E (F/T) 4 
Khalif 37 M 14 Pri. Ed. None U 12 
Fawz 38 M 15 Sec. Ed. Degree. 
Med&Com. 
E (F/T) 2 
 
Key 
*   Duration in Sweden at the Time of Interviews  
**  No. of Years of Economic ‘Inactivity’ (i.e., not in studies, training or     
employment) 
E¤  Employed  
F/T   (Full-time employment) 
P/E  Project Employed 
Temp.  Temporary Work 
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S  Student 
U¤¤  Unemployed 
Bsc.  Bachelor of Science 
Msc.  Masters of Science 
Comp. sci. Computer Science 
Sec. Ed. Secondary Education Level 
Nat. Sci. Natural Science 
NDC  None Degree Courses 
Pol. & Deci. Policy & Decision 
Pri. Ed. Primary Education Level 
BSET   Bachelor of Science in Engineering Technology 
LLB  Bachelor of Law 
Med&Com.  Media & Communication 
Eco.  Economics 
Post.Sec.Ed. Uncompleted University Education   
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Appendix 15 
The Focus Group Participants 
 
Name* ‘Responsibility’ 
Abdi Project Leader 
Ahmed Interpreter 
Ali ‘Integration’ 
Consultant  
Mohamed Teacher 
Osman ‘Community Elder’ 
Roble ‘Businessman’ 
Siad ‘Community Elder’ 
Yussuf 
 
Home Language 
Instructor 
 
 *All male.  
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Appendix 16 
 
Interview Schedule I (with Somali respondents) 
 
 
Introduction  
 
Before interviews started a full explanation of what the research was all about was given. The 
purpose of the research was also explained. Respondents were informed that the interviews 
would last for about 1 hour, but that it could also extend the allotted time if the researcher and 
the interviewee deemed that necessary. However, that could only occur if it was mutually 
agreed.  
 
The researcher emphasised that this was an independent research project, and hence, the 
information respondents shared with the researcher would be used as part of his study.  
 
Respondents were required to sign a ‘consent form’, after their voluntary and informed 
consent was secured. The respondents were under no obl igation to answer all the interview 
questions, and, were informed of their rights to withdraw from the interviews if they wished.  
 
 
Interview Topics 
 
 
Demographics:  
 
1. Sex: 
 
2. Name: (The names of respondents was to change in order to protect their real 
identities)  
 
3. Age: 
 
 
Migration and resettlement: 
 
  
1. What prompted you to migrate to Sweden? 
 
2. Could you tell me about your experience when you first arrived in Sweden? 
 
3. How long have been in Sweden, now? 
 
4. What is your current ‘immigration’ status [permanent residency/citizen]? 
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Integration: 
 
  
1. What does the term ‘integration’ mean to you? 
 
2. What is your perception about your own integration in Sweden? 
 
3. What has worked/not worked for you? 
 
4. What about your perception of the integration of Somalis in Sweden? 
 
5. What has worked in terms of the integration of Somalis? What has not worked? 
 
 
Language: 
 
 
1. What can you tell me about your competence in your Swedish language? 
 
2. What has Swedish language meant particularly for you? 
 
3. In your opinion, what does Swedish language mean for refugees/immigrants in 
Sweden? 
 
4. Can you share with me, your assessment about the competence of Somalis regarding 
their general competence in Swedish language? 
 
Education:  
 
 
1. Tell me in general terms, the importance of education for you. 
 
2. What was your educational attainment prior to your arrival in Swedish? 
 
3. Did you feel the need to supplement your previous education, or, ‘re-educate’ yourself 
in Sweden? 
 
4. What educational level have you attained in Sweden? 
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[Prompt: whether education from homeland is valued and whether new education/ 
skills attained in Sweden have made a significant difference to the individual] 
 
5. What can you say about Somalis and their educational levels in Sweden? 
  
Employment (Labour Market): 
 
 
1. What is your current employment status? [Employed/unemployed]   
 
2. If employed, what is your status? [Permanent/temporary/full-time/part-time] 
 
3. What skill/job experience have you had prior to your arrival Sweden? 
 
4.  What skill/job experience have you attained in Sweden? 
 
5. Following up on what said earlier about you work, are you satisfied with your current 
employment status? 
 
6. Could you briefly give me a general assessment about your employment history in 
Sweden? 
 
7. Tell me whether you experienced periods of unemployment/when you were out of paid 
employment. 
 
8. If so, why do you think you were unemployed? 
 
9. How easy/difficult was it for you to get employment/re-employment in Sweden? 
 
10. What are you experience of seeking employment in Sweden? 
 
[Prompt: for qualifications, training, recognition of skills/work experience/whether an 
applicant was under-employed, etc].  
 
Area/place of Residence: 
 
 
1. Prior to the granting of your permanent status… did you have the experience of living 
in a refugee reception centre? 
 
2. If yes, what can you say about your experience in that centre? 
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3. How long did you spend in the centre before you were granted permission to stay in 
Sweden? 
 
4. Did you ha ve the experience of living in communes outside Stockholm when you 
received your residence permit? 
 
5. Tell me about your experiences in that/those commune(s). How were they different 
from your experiences in Stockholm or your current suburb? 
 
6. How long did you live that/those commune(s) before you moved to Stockholm? 
 
7. What prompted you to move to Stockholm? 
 
 
Current Residence/Suburb: 
 
1. Where, or in which suburb, do you currently live? 
 
2. What was/were your reason(s) for moving into this particular suburb? 
 
3. What can you say are the ‘pros’ and ‘cons’ of living in your suburb? 
 
4. Do you consider ‘your’ suburb as a segregated suburb? 
 
5. If so, would you like to move to a less segregated suburb? 
 
6. If, yes what do you think is preventing you from doing so? 
 
7. If you prefer this suburb, tell me the reasons why?  
 
8.  What can you tell me about service such as schools, health, environment, etc, in ‘your’ 
current suburb? 
[Prompt for the ‘problems’ encountered in living in segregated suburbs] 
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Social Networks: 
 
Social Networks among Somalis:  
 
1. Could you tell about whether you belong to any Somali organization. 
 
2. Do you have Somali friends?  
 
3. Tell me a little about the intensity of contact with your friends. 
 
4. Do you have relatives in ‘your’ suburb? 
 
5. Tell me about your contact with your neighbours.  
 
[Prompt about: how friendly/ supportive/ neighbours/relatives were]   
 
6. What do have you t o say about the ‘concentration’ of Somalis/immigrants in ‘your’ 
suburb? [Prompt why problems encountered in these suburbs?] 
 
 
Interaction/Connectivity with ‘native’ Swedes: 
 
1. Do you live in a shared neighbourhood [where the proportions of Swedes are higher or 
slightly higher than those of immigrants]? 
 
2. Tell me about your experience in a ‘shared’ neighbourhood?  
 
3. If no, do you have ‘native’ Swedish neighbours in ‘your’ current suburb? 
 
4. Do you have ‘native Swedish network’ (friends, work colleagues, etc) that you interact 
with on regular basis? 
 
5.   If no, what do you think are the reasons? 
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Perception of Ethnic discrimination, Xenophobia and Racism in Sweden: 
 
 
1. Have you experienced discrimination, racism or any form of unfavourable treatment in 
Sweden? 
 
2. If yes, let’s talk a little more about your own experiences in the following:    
 
(a) Public places (workplaces, public institutions, etc) 
(b) Private places (street, males, neighbourhood, etc) 
 
3. In your opinion, why do you think you encountered discrimination/racism/xenophobia? 
[Prompt. Why and how the respondents felt about the above mentioned phenomena].  
 
Cultural Arena: 
 
1. What can you s ay about the perceived cultural differences between Somalis and 
Swedes? 
 
2. Are there areas where you can say Somali culture is ‘at odds’ with Swedish culture or 
way of life? 
 
3. Can you elaborate on the examples you have just mentioned? 
 
4.  How have you coped with these ‘cultural differences’? 
 
5. How important is individual adaptability to Swedish way of live important to you? 
 
6. Have you felt compelled to conform to Swedish way of life in order to ‘integrate’? 
 
7. Does conformity or non-conformity to Swedish way of life affect one’s ability to 
obtain education or employment in Sweden? 
 
8. Can you f reely practice your culture or way of life without making anyone 
uncomfortable? 
 
9. Religion (Islam): How is your religion perceived in Sweden? 
 
10. How does the Swedish media portray Islam, in general terms? 
 
End of Interview. 
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Appendix 17 
 
Interview Schedule II (with ‘Swedish Official’ respondents) 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Before the interviews started, the researcher introduced himself and his research (purpose, 
aims, methods, etc). A ‘consent form’ was then signed after an informed and voluntary 
consent was secured from the respondent. The researcher wanted the following ‘part 
instructive’/ ‘part informative’ ‘items’ to come across before an interview started.  
 
• Many questions/statements in the areas/topics to be covered were based on t he 
subjective interpretation of the Somali respondents. 
 
• Many of the accounts that we are about to be explored border on what may be viewed 
as ‘gross generalisation’. 
 
• You need not be ‘politically correct’ – [having secured the ‘official’s’ consent, and 
having assured that utmost confidentiality would be respected]. 
 
• Many of these questions will be in the form of statements, and, you would be requested 
to comment. 
 
• Many of the questions could simply be answered by ‘no’ and ‘yes’, but you would be 
requested to elaborate upon.  
 
• Some questions may be outside your specific area of duty or responsibility. In that 
case, you are under no obligation to answer them. However, you are free to give a try 
where possible. 
 
• Finally, I would like you to know that I am no ‘expert’, and that it would be ‘us’ 
together – I the researcher and you, the ‘respondent’ – who would attempt to construct 
what could be regarded as the ‘accurate’ situation/reality of Somalis in 
Stockholm/Sweden. 
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Interview Topics 
 
Language and Education:  
 
1. Do Somalis have a relatively good command of the Swedish language? 
 
2. Do many Somalis lack education or have ‘unsuitable’ education in Sweden?  
 
3. Do many Somalis lack ‘appropriate’ skill to function in Sweden?  
 
4. Do you think there is widespread ‘illiteracy’ amongst Somalis in Stockholm/Sweden?  
 
5. What can you say about Swedish Instruction for Immigrants (SFI)? 
 
Qualifications:  
 
1. Previous qualification (e.g., from Somalia) are not ‘valued’ in Sweden.  
 
2. Somalis/immigrants are less likely to obtain jobs commensurate with their 
qualifications.  
 
3. Even those [Somalis/immigrants] with Swedish qualifications are met with scepticism. 
Do you agree? If so, why?  
 
Active Labour Market Programmes (ALMP): 
 
1. How would you characterise the attitude of Somalis towards activation programmes? 
 
2. There is a perception among some Somali respondents that that: 
 
(a) activation programmes have become the substitute to ‘real’ work (i.e., in the 
absence of work), and, that, 
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(b) after a while people become tired (or less enthusiastic) of them. Do you agree?  
 
Labour Market/Work: 
 
1. Long-term unemployment is prevalent in the Somali community of Sweden. Do you 
agree?   
 
2. Do you believe in the premises that there is ‘no integration without work’ [i.e., gainful 
employment]?  
 
3. How has mass unemployment amongst Somalis affected their reputation/image in 
Sweden? 
 
4. Would you s upport affirmative action such as a quota system in which Somalis are 
guaranteed positions in employment and places in education in Sweden? Why? 
 
5. Has the labour market situation for Somalis improved in the last five or so years? 
 
 
Integration:  
 
1. Do you be lieve Somalis have difficulties in integrating themselves into Swedish 
society? Why? [Who is to blame?]. 
  
2. Do ‘native’ Swedes consider Somalis as ‘part’ of the wider Swedish society? 
  
3. Do Somalis feel that they are ‘part’ of the wider Swedish society? 
 
4. Do you think Somalis and their ‘problems’ in Sweden, ‘stick out’? 
  
5. Somalis tend to keep to themselves. Is this counterproductive to their socio-economic 
integration in Sweden? What would you advice them to do in this respect? 
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6. Many Somalis are not willing to adapt. Do you agree? If so why? 
  
7. Do you think Somalis will adapt over time? 
  
8. Would you prefer for Somalis to ‘assimilate’ in Swedish society so as to eliminate 
cultural differences with ‘native’ Swedes? 
  
Motivation: 
 
1. Are Somalis motivated to integrate themselves into mainstream Swedish society? 
Why/how? 
  
2. What can you say about Somalis’ own determination to change their present 
predicament in Sweden?  
  
Stability: 
 
1. Majority of Somalis do not ‘feel at home’ in Sweden. Do you agree? 
  
2. Somalis are likely to relocate to other countries (notably UK) that they perceive is 
relatively more open and tolerant to Somali way of life. Are you a ware of such a 
relocation/trend? What is your opinion? 
 
Housing: 
 
1. Do you t hink many Somalis have moved to Stockholm on t heir own volition and 
against the advice of officials?   
  
2. Does the concentration of Somalis in a few suburbs in Stockholm present a problem to 
their integration?  
 
3. Do you t hink Somalis are compelled (by reasons such as income, etc) to stay in 
suburbs dominated by immigrants, or may this be due their own preferences/choices? 
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4. Housing corporations/agents are more likely to allocate apartments to Somalis in 
suburbs with a predominant immigrant population than members of the host 
community.  
 
‘Native’ Connectivity/interaction:   
 
1. The interaction between Somalis and ‘native’ Swedes is limited.  
 
a) Do you think this is because Somalis want to maintain their ‘distance’? 
 
b) Or, is this because ‘native’ Swedes are unwilling to ‘let’ Somalis ‘in’? 
 
 
‘Official’/‘Formal’ Contacts:  
 
1. Do you think Somalis present ‘special problems/difficulties’ for Swedish authorities? 
 
2. Do you think the information... counsel you give to members of the Somali community 
you come into contact are well received or ‘digested’ accordingly? 
 
3. Earlier encounters between Somalis and Swedish authorities were characterised by 
misunderstanding and lack of trust.   
 
4. Do you think Somalis have more (formal) contact with officials and less (informal) 
contact with members of the host society? If yes, why do you think that is the case? 
  
5. There is an excessive scrutiny and control from authorities regarding Somalis.   
  
6. Officials are perceived as ‘partial’ rather than ‘impartial’ when they [officials] 
intervene in familial/marital disputes among Somalis.   
  
7. Many Somali male respondents were of the view that officials often ‘side’ with women 
in the event of marital disputes. 
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Multiculturalism: 
 
1. Is Sweden a multicultural society? 
 
2. How well has Sweden managed multiculturalism/diversity of cultures? 
  
3. Do you think many ‘native’ Swedes perceive other cultures ‘threatening’? 
 
4. Do you think ‘differences’ in cultures are acknowledged in Sweden? 
 
5. Do you think Somalis have difficulties in expressing the cultural and religious rights in 
Sweden? 
 
6. The Swedish society is still a homogeneous society despite its outward attempt to 
project itself as a heterogeneous multiethnic, multicultural society.     
  
 
The Swedish Integration Policy:  
 
1. What can you say about Swedish Integration Policy 
   
2. Is there mutual understanding/mutual respect between Somalis and the native Swedish 
population? 
  
3. One often talks of a two-way traffic, regarding the objectives of Swedish integration 
policy. Does this apply to Somalis in Sweden? 
  
4. The latent objective of Swedish integration policy is to assimilate immigrants and not 
to integrate them. Comment. 
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The Swedish System: 
  
1. What is meant by ‘Swedish system’?  
 
2. Have Somalis come to a system ‘alien’ to them? 
 
3. Do many Somalis lack knowledge about the ‘Swedish system’ and how it functions?  
 
4. Do you think Somalis find the ‘Swedish system’ ‘oppressive’?  
 
5. The Swedish welfare system makes immigrants (including Somalis) passive.  
 
 
Passivity/Dependency: 
  
1. Do Somalis come across as a community that is ‘passive’ in Sweden? 
 
2. Somalis are more likely to live on social assistance and other benefits (e.g., 
unemployment benefits) than ‘native’ Swedes or other more established immigrant 
groups.  
 
3. There is a connection between living off social assistance and long-term 
unemployment among Somalis in Sweden.  
 
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Racism:  
 
1.  Swedes are generally ‘fearful’ of the unknown [i.e., newcomers].  
 
2. There is ethnic discrimination in Sweden.  
 
3. Are Somalis ethnically discriminated? 
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4. Swedish employers/ prospective employers subject Somalis to what may amount to 
ethnic discrimination.  
 
5. Institutional racism exists in Sweden.  
 
6. Xenophobia is prevalent in Sweden. 
 
7. Somalis bear the brunt of racism and xenophobia in Sweden. 
 
8. Somalis use ‘discrimination and racism’ as a mere ‘pretext’.   
 
Culture:  
 
1. Somalis ‘deviate’ markedly from what is considered as Swedish cultural norms and 
standard.  
 
2. The Somali culture represents an old traditional pattern which is incompatible with 
Swedish way of life.  
 
3. Many Somalis are bent on r etaining their original culture (and resist [positive] 
influences from the native Swedish cultures).  
 
4. Somali culture comes across as being ‘rigid’.   
 
Societal Codes: 
 
1. Somalis have no clear understanding about Swedish culture and Swedish cultural 
codes.  
 
2. How important is the internalisation of ‘Swedish cultural codes’ by Somalis in order to 
integrate into mainstream society? 
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Religion:  
 
1. Many in the ‘native’ population and in the establishment have a dearth of 
knowledge/understanding above Islam.  
 
2. ‘Native’ Swedes are suspicion towards Islam.  
 
3. The media has been instrumental in portraying Islam as a ‘dangerous’ religion.  
 
4. Religion plays a big role in Somali way of life.   
 
5. There is a ‘clash’ between secular Sweden and [‘religious’] Somalis? 
 
6. The veil attracts frowns and is viewed with derision by many people in Sweden.  
 
 
Culture and Religion Revisited:  
 
1. In your opinion is there a clear-cut demarcation between the religion Somalis practice 
(Islam) and their culture?  
  
2. Do you believe Somali culture is a ‘problematic’ to their socio-economic integration in 
Sweden?  
 
3. Do you believe Islam (the religion most Somalis subscribe to) is ‘problematic’ to their 
socio-economic integration in Sweden?  
 
Gender Roles/Patterns: 
  
1. ‘Patriarchy’ among Somalis is contentious to ‘native’ Swedes.  
 
2. Gender equality in Sweden presents both challenges and opportunities for Somalis in 
Sweden.  
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3. The welfare state has displaced the role (position, status, etc) of Somali men and 
empowered Somali women.  
 
Youths: 
1. Somali youths have ‘lesser cultural baggage’ than their parents. 
 
2. What is your opinion about the following perceptions regarding Somali youths:  
• the prevalence of adolescent delinquencies/criminality   
• the rate and magnitude of joblessness  
• the rate of truancy and school drop-out   
• their lack of role models  
• they oscillate between Somali and Swedish cultures, hence, ‘confused’ by the two 
diabolically opposed forces/demands  
 
Swedish Media: 
 
1. The Swedish media is biased towards Somalis.  
  
2. The media focus on ne gative aspects, e.g., drugs, crimes, etc, when it comes to its 
dealings with/ reporting on issues regarding immigrants (including Somalis) in 
Sweden. Comment 
  
MISCELLANEOUS 
 
Smaller or Medium-Sized Towns/Cities: 
 
1. It is better for Somalis to start their first few years of residency in Sweden from smaller 
or medium-sized towns/cities as opposed to larger metropolitans like Stockholm, 
Malmö and Götoborg, from an integration perspective, 
 
Somali Ethnic Organisations: 
 
1. What is your assessment of Somali ethnic organisations? 
497 
 
 
2. Do you t hink Somali ethnic organisations play an important role in facilitating the 
integration of their members? 
 
Somali Families: 
 
1. Many Somali families are extraordinarily large in Swedish standards. The host 
community regard these families as being abnormal in Sweden. What kind of problems 
would you normally associated with these families? 
  
Khat [a stimulant drug chewed by Somalis]: 
 
1. Do you t hink that the usage or misuse/abuse of Khat has a negative impact on t he 
image of Somalis (especially Somali men) in Sweden? If yes, in what ways? 
 
Knowledge about Somalis: 
 
1. There is lack of knowledge about Somalis by officials, employers and in the general 
population. Do you agree?  
 
2. What should society do about this lack of knowledge? 
  
 
End of Interview 
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Appendix 18 
 
Interview Schedule III (employed in the Focus Group Interview) 
 
Focus Group Interview: 
Venue: Rinkeby (Stockholm) 
Date: 06/10/07 
 
Introduction 
 
The session was opened by t he researcher with a brief introduction about the aims and 
purposes of the research. Participation was voluntary. Confidentiality was assured. The 
researcher extended his gratitude to the participation.    
 
Discussion Topics 
 
General: 
1. Somalis and their ‘problems’ ‘stick out’ from the rest of immigrants in Sweden. 
Multiculturalism: 
1. Is Swedish Multiculturalism a ‘vision’ or ‘reality’? 
Prompt: Swedish multiculturalism is based on diversity (ethnic, cultural and religious 
diversity)? Whether the following existed:  
• mutual respect  
• tolerance 
• everyone takes an active and responsible part in society (irrespective of background)   
- Are we there yet? How far are we from that goal? 
- Will we ever reach there? 
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Integration Policy: 
 
1. What can you s ay about the efficacy of Swedish Integration Policy in relation to 
Somalis? 
 
Education and Work: 
 
1. What can you say on the lack of/inadequacy by Somalis in the following:  
• Swedish language competence (command or proficiency).   
• Education.   
• Appropriate work skills/experiences. 
 
2. There is (widespread) prevalence of illiteracy.  
3. There is a widespread long-term unemployment among Somalis in Sweden. Why? 
4. Long-term unemployment among Somalis impacts adversely on their reputation/image 
in Sweden. 
5. Is there an improvement in the labour market situation for Somalis in recent years.  
 
Housing:  
 
1. The concentration of Somalis in a f ew segregated suburbs is ‘problematic’ to their 
integration. 
2. Would you recommend a ‘spread’ (i.e., for Somalis to move to other ‘less’ segregated 
suburbs)? 
3. If so, how could that be achieved? 
 
‘Native’ Connectivity/Interaction:  
 
1. There is ‘little’ interaction between Somalis and ‘native’ Swedes. 
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2. Somalis need informal contacts with ‘native’ Swedes. 
 
3. In what way can we establish/encourage such contacts between Somalis and ‘native’ 
Swedes? 
 
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Racism: 
 
1. What are your opinions about the prevalence of these phenomena in society? 
2. Are Somalis particularly afflicted by these phenomena? 
3. How does discrimination impacts on the integration of Somalis in Sweden?  
4. What can you say about the efficacy of Swedish anti-discrimination laws/policies? 
 
Culture & Religion: 
 
1. Somali culture deviates excessively from Swedish culture. 
2.  Is Somali culture an obstacle to their integration in Sweden? 
3. Clanism is ‘problematic’ to the integration of Somalis in Sweden. 
4. Many in the host society have prejudices against Islam and Muslims. 
5. Religion plays a big role in Somali way of life. 
6. Does this clash with Sweden ‘secularism’. 
 
Gender Role/Patterns:  
  
1. Somalis lag behind when it comes to gender equality   
 
2. Somali women as less integrated than their male (Somali) counterpart 
  
End of Session.  
